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ABSTRACT
Technology is now a separate, central factor in the development of any State.
However, today, inter State relations are characterised by wide technological
disparity between developed and developing countries. All States agree that
transmission of technological capacities to developing countries is key not only to
reduction of technological inequalities, but also to maintenance of future
international peace.
Traditional international legal responses to the problem are inadequate or static.
The traditional multilateral intellectual property legal regime is mercantilist,
designed to deal with a technologically minimally interdependent international
society. It promotes extra-territorial exclusive protection of private intellectual
property rights by comprehensively defining those rights while setting up private
international law standards as the as the primary basis for host country regulation
of technological rights. Protection of private intellectual property is then
reinforced through bilateral treaties. Reform of the regime to facilitate
international transmission of technological capacity, is largely regarded as ultra-
vires its objectives.
Increased extra-territorial effects of technology, the emergence of technologically
least developed countries indicating gross interstate technological disparities, the
complexity of non State and non national's technological activity in host States,
among others, have speeded the evolution of new dynamic multilateral legal
principles, standards, rules, procedures and instruments that more effectively
define the problem of international technology development and transfer as a State
based effective acquisition of technological capacity by a country under balanced
legal commitments. We show that in recent decades, in relation to international
development and transfer of technology, States have adopted framework treaty
type arrangements which aim at dynamic conversion of multilateral decisions,
policy, agreements, etc. into legal or quasi-legal norms. When implemented, the
new norms extend legal measures and remedies towards those States whose
international technological practices most accord with international
interdependence and reduction of technological disparities among States.
PGS/ABST/88 Use this side only
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WORKING DEFINITIONS
Assignment: Agreement under which the assignee obtains substantially the
same rights, privileges and powers, including duration, as those
granted to a patentee or other rights holder.
Background:
Patent
Foreign or Domestic Patent(s) held by a third party which the
grantee of a patent for a new invention or improvement or his
licensee cannot avoid infringing upon the practice or exploitation
of such subject or improvement.
Balance of Commitments Dynamic Principle similar to 'overall' reciprocity i.e. the .
reciprocal effect and equal value of obligations or concessions,
for example as applied under GATT. However, balance of
commitments is dynamic in nature, applied by States taking into
account negotiating disparities between parties, the material
condition of each party to a negotiation or transaction and the
specific need for differential treatment.
Copyright The exclusive monopoly right to reproduction in any









Dynamic process of change and progress towards an
ultimate aim (a telos).
Right of a holder of an intellectual property right, to make, use,
sell or otherwise dispose of according to law, any machine,
design or manufacture any of composition of matter physically
embodying the invention, or to use or have used the process or
mcdiod comprising die invention.
Treaties and Institutional Frameworks which member States
agree to set up as institutions or mechanisms empowered to make
'operating' decisions continuously, decisions which add to or
change previously agreed rules, in accordance with the dynamic
and changing circumstances of subjects which are dynamic, wide
and yet specific in many aspects, for example free trade zones.
Arrangement under which the licensee agrees to convey back to
die licensor any improvements made on the original patent or
other right.
Imports into the immediate contract terms and (clause)
conditions contained in tinolher agreement (document).
Law binding irrespective of the will of individual states.
Law capable of being modified by consensual engagements.
International
Legal Order
Rules whieh international actors (states) accept as valid and
obligatory in the pursuance of international activity/agreements
Licence A Legal Agreement under which the Licensee, for a
consideration, acquires the legal right and power to use, with
specified restrictions and obligations, an intellectual property
right belonging to the licensor.
Norm (s) Rules which command, empower, permit or derogate and
recognised by the concordance of states as such.
Normalcy Analogy to human development employed by Tarrullo to define
the normal state of development towards which all states aspire
to achieve, with underdevelopment or post - industrial decline
being extremes.
Patents Exclusive Legal protection of technically novel and inventive
ideas applicable to industrially useful products/processes.
Petty patents) Legal protection for inventive ideas applicable to industrially
useful products/processes - but of greatly lesser value and
duration than patents.




Monopoly protection of aesthetically novel Design (s) applicable
to commercial products
Rules Standing orders, which are valid erga omnes (applicable to all)
as distinct from commands which are always situation specific
Transparency Adequate availability to all parties, of all relevant National
Laws, Regulations, Administrative Guidelines and International
Agreements, applicable to an international transaction (e.g. for
the development and transfer of technology)
Trade Marks
Tying
Monopoly protection for the identity of a product
Condition in grant or Conveyance, requiring a grantee to
undertake obligations not necessary or adequately related to
purpose ofmain agreement
Utility Models Monopoly protection of technically useful ideas which however
do not meet the full criteria applicable to patents (i.e. non





Process under which nationals of a state, acquire
from non nationals, for a consideration, independent
technological capacity and ability to usefully apply capacity and
innovate in the relevant technology.
Custom Clear and "continuos" habit of doing certain actions.
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INTRODUCTION
"In international Law, as in Domestic Law, rights and
duties go hand in hand. It is therefore legally not
permissible to claim rights. .. without being willing to
assume correlative duties"
A Constitution for the Oceans, Remarks by Tommy T.
B. Koh (President, Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea) Introduction Page XXXVI.
Three Snap shots ofdeveloping countries technological evolution:
The first reflected the end of the 1950's, when
developing countries were just becoming independent.
They were putting together the elements of development
plans, and were being persuaded to draft foreign
investment laws as possibly the only vehicle for their
future economic [social and technical] development
There were pockets of industrialisation to be found, but
the question of technology was never mentioned.
The second snapshot represented the end of the 1960's.
It showed the advent of import substitution of consumer
goods, academic skill formation, followed by movement
towards capital goods production [and processing].
The third stage, end of the 1970's, institutional
mechanisms [national, regional or global] were applied
to develop specific policies, laws, regulations, rules and
decrees dealing with technology transfer and new
structures [such as] national registries licensing
committees, departments, divisions, ministries, to co¬
ordinate technology imports with national plans and
achieve import substitution of technology itself'
Adapted from United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, Official Records, 28th. Session,
First Special Session, Address by Director of
Technology Division, at Page 3.
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1.1 Statement of the Problem
Until recently (post 1970's), international development and transfer of
technology was viewed as a problem exclusively affecting developing
countries, that is, it was not viewed by developed countries as a problem of
international interdependence but one of national choices, legal and non legal.
The major result of this view was that initial legal responses and solutions to
the problem of international technology development and transfer were
intrinsically territorial, that is, not taken in a multilateral context or with
regard to related international scientific, economic, cultural and other
factors.1
The nature of the iniual legal responses was characterised by
predominance of national territory based claims to rights accompanied, by
little undertaking of international obligations. Developing countries, the
majority newly independent, faced an ever increasing need to acquire
technological and scientific skills, mainly available in developed countries.
Under the traditional2 international legal framework, international technology
transfer was taken as part of direct foreign investment flows between
developed and developing countries and was 'conveniently' classified as a
subset of foreign investments and international commerce, largely involving
private parties from the developed countries, and developing countries public
and private enterprises.
The traditional international legal framework for the regulation of
foreign investments, as discussed in Chapter 5 below, emphasised sovereignty
and extra territorial protection of rights of nationals investing abroad.
3
Traditional principles such as material reciprocity, national treatment, non
discrimination and standards such as those applying to compensation and levels of
protection were applied to regulation of relationships arising during technology
development and transfer transactions. However, because technology was taken
as a direct investment asset similar to capital, equipment or machinery, the
interpretation was that a delivery or sale of technology, which transferred title,
possession or ownership, constituted a technology transfer.3
Further, the traditional foreign investment framework, largely evolved
during the unorganised international society era, (unorganised since it was
characterised by self - help, the right to wage war, equal aggrandizement,
dependency, ad hoc arrangements, etc.)4 saw the law applicable to technological
"investments' as largely that of the home state or bilateral treaties5 that provided
for extraterritorial extension of guarantees and special advantages offered by the
home State to nationals investing their technological property in developing
countries. The industrial property legal regime of the home State was often
extended under the bilateral treaties to apply in developing countries, even after
such developing countries acquired "independence1.6
The traditional foreign investment regime, to the extent it was
applicable to the complex international technology development and transfer
transaction relationships, was characterised by imbalance between rights and
duties of technology "investors' and host States and their nationals. The
imbalance was most pronounced during the international concession regime,7
though as set out in Chapter 5 of this work, concession like arrangements still
characterise international development and transfer arrangements involving the
least developed country nationals and enterprises.
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Because of the imbalance in rights and obligations, the traditional foreign
investment regime did not legally discourage foreign nationals "investing'
technology in developing countries from exclusive application of extraction and
exploitation techniques in the host States8 which excluded the building of a
technological capacity in those States. This fact has been the subject of perpetual
international legal debate, especially in relation to activities of transnational
corporations in host developing countries.9 During the debate, developed
countries lay emphasis on private party -host State "property' relations, that is,
the need to safeguard private parties from arbitrary or discriminatory host state
action. The "technological' relationship, in terms of duties and rights of the home
State vis-a-vis the host State, is regarded as ultra vires the foreign investment
regime. Further, issues such as control of abuse of rights, preferential treatment
for developing country nationals seeking to acquire technology from developed
countries, guarantees of effective transfer of technology, etc. are taken as
adequately addressed under traditional principles such as freedom of contract,
caveat emptor and free trade. When followed, such principles make it
unnecessary for developed countries to "interfere' in private party transactions
unless they take up the claim of a national.10
Despite the predominance of national legal responses, multilateral
instruments, in the form of intellectual property conventions have existed since the
19th. Century, that is, in the form of the Paris (1883) and Berne (1886)
Conventions.11 These conventions, a result of the mercantile era, did not correct
the imbalance in commitments between technological owners and host States. In
Chapter 2 below, we show that despite periodic revisions and reforms, the
conventions have never adequately and equitably addressed the primary
(technological) development interests of developing countries or those of a
5
technologically interdependent international community. This may be due to the
fact that the conventions did not envisage the emergence of a large group of
technologically dependent countries, the need to prevent the growth of gross
technological disparities between States, the problems of extra-territorial effects of
industrial property rights applied in one State on other States in terms of
environment, health, culture, etc. Instead, the conventions offer comprehensive
definition of standards and terms of protection for intellectual property rights in
order to promote international commerce or trade in these rights, that is, their
under lying presumption is that all States own roughly equal industrial property
rights.12
We argue that the traditional multilateral intellectual property
regimes have not assisted developing countries, despite their granting and
revoking powers and rights to, inter alia, correct abuses by intellectual or
industrial property rights holders, for example, use of indivisible technological
rights or "packaging", use of general restrictive practices, importation of
hazardous or obsolete technologies, etc. The majority of developing countries
have not, inter alia, been able to use the conventions to promote local innovation,
research in development of technology, by among others, enforcing local
exploitation, for example, through the issue of compulsory licences or exclusion
from protection of certain "products and processes', offer of special patent rights
to nationals, etc.
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1.2 Multilateral Legal Responses and The Transmission of
Technological Capacity to Developing Countries - The Balance of
Commitments Principle
The emergence and continued growth of (the) organised interdependent
international community (post United Nations Era), has led to the evolution,
within permanent international forums, of multilateral legal measures and practices
to regulate the flow of government sponsored technological skill flows between
developed and developing countries. These measures, procedures, standards etc.
are widely disseminated to all States, impacting not only on those State's national
legislative and administrative measures to deal with international transfer and
development of technology (Chapter 5), but also their treaty arrangements at
regional and sub - regional levels (Chapter 4).
Multilateral legal responses became necessary because of, among
others, the increasing centrality of international technology development and
transfer in inter - State relations and national growth and development, increased
extra-territorial effects13 of technology exploited in one State in other States, the
need to determine the international legal role, rights and obligations of private non
State parties involved in international development and transfer of technology
transactions and most importantly, the need to extend international law to promote
the transmission of technological capacity to developing countries as a pre¬
condition for the maintenance of future international peace.14 The multilateral
legal 'intervention' mechanisms, measures, instruments, procedures, etc. involve
good offices, mediation, conciliation, consultation, negotiation, arbitration and
progressive evolution and development of international law.15
7
1.2.1 Multilateral Level
Using the example of the UNDP multilateral framework, we illustrate,
inter alia, that multilateral commitments made within the United Nations and
other multilateral frameworks16 by all countries, including developed countries, to
transfer systematic technological and scientific skills to developing countries, have
been evolved into specific legal principles, procedures, etc. are evolved as
framework treaty law17 are of formal legal nature, implemented as measures and
instruments for the regulation of the entire process of public or government
sponsored international technological skill development and transfer to developing
countries. The principles, measures and instruments extend to cover, pre -
negotiation, negotiation and implementation of all international technological
cooperation agreements, thus guaranteeing balance of commitments.18 The
multilateral framework has also evolved measures and mechanisms that guarantee
transparency and accountability, adequate review, monitoring and evaluation, thus
promoting equal participation by all parties in the technology development and
transfer process. This ensures the party receiving international technological skills
develops a full and complete technological capacity19 in the relevant technology,
all in goodfaith and on preferential terms, in accordance with need - Chapter 3.
Because of the evolution, among others, of the principles of balance of
commitments and preferential treatment in addition to established principles such
as goo-faith (non abuse of right),no unjust enrichment, etc. within multilateral
agencies, States had gradually moved towards making multilateral instruments
such as WIPO administered conventions, that is, Paris, Berne,20 the UCC,21 etc.
are responsive to the international commitment to transfer technological capacity
to developing countries without disrupting the continued production of new
8
innovations. Revision of the Conventions was undertaken to make them conform
to these objectives.
However, under the on-going Uruguay Round in GATT,22 developed
countries have sought to halt or reverse further reform of the WIPO administered
conventions by instituting vnew' parallel reforms, commonly referred to as TRIPS
or trade related aspects of intellectual property.23 In discussing those aspects of
the reforms which would have an impact on developing countries ability to acquire
further technological capacity especially through technological imports or
enforcement of exploitation of locally protected rights (Chapter 6) we show that
developed countries are re-interpreting multilateral intellectual property rules in
way which, if implemented, would unbalance commitments between developed
and developing countries in their technological relations. We argue that the
GATT - TRIPS reforms in their current form are detrimental to developing
countries technology development and transfer goals because they seek to grade
trade related aspects of intellectual property rights, a development related
(commercial) goal, as overriding technology development and transfer policy of
developing countries which is a primary development goal.
We contend that this result will be achieved because the GATT -TRIPS
reforms aim, inter alia at increasing standards of protection for exclusive property
rights, extension of Paris Convention's definition of working, restriction of the
right of States to determine the nature and scope of the rights be granted, by de-
facto, linking of the exercise of such sovereign rights to international trade,
finance and other arrangements. We argue that unless these reforms are adopted in
accordance with the balance of commitments1* principle which is well established
under the GATT negotiating procedures as overall reciprocity or balance of
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concessions, technological and therefore material disparities will increase as the
ability of developing countries to acquire technological capacity is further
restricted.
1.2.2 Regional and Sub - Regional Measures
The evolution of multilaterally generated legal principles, rules
procedures, etc. dealing with the transmission of scientific and technological
capacities to developing countries, is enhanced by their incorporation into regional
and sub-regional technological cooperation agreements and arrangements25 as well
as gradual but widespread incorporation into national regimes for the regulation of
international technology transfer, leading to gradual harmonisation of the national
regimes with international law requirements.
Regional
Using the example of the Lome Conventions,26 we show the extent to
which multilaterally evolved principles, rules, mechanisms and measures have
influenced regional arrangements for the development of and transfer of
technology to developing countries. We question whether the multilaterally
evolved legal principles are adequately applied under the Lome technical
cooperation arrangements or are only adopted in principle. Given the extreme
technological disparity between the two partner groups, that is, European
Community States and Afro - Caribbean and Pacific States, we assess the extent to
which legal principles and rules have been applied to correct the negotiating and
bargaining disparities between the State parties and those between their nationals
who are involved in ACP - EEC technology development and transfer activity.
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We assess how comprehensive implementation of the legal measures
dealing with development and transfer of technological skills in ACP States is
under the convention's specific "permanent' mechanisms and institutions in which
the ACP states participate.
Sub - Regional
Using the Andean Pact arrangements, we examine the extent to which legal
principles, rules and procedures, etc. have legally influenced the technology
development and transfer arrangements within the sub-region. We specifically
show the extent to which "direct regulation' or use of mandatory legislation, sub-
regional or national, has been modified to comply with the balance of
commitments principle and the need to guarantee transparency of national and sub-
regional technology development and transfer laws and regulations. We examine
the Andean Pact arrangements to see how far they promote technological " mutual
self help' amongst all member States, for example, through a joint technological
policy, specific safeguards and preferential measures for the least developed
countries, etc. and whether the measures and instruments mitigate abuse of power
by foreign technology suppliers, preserve technological balance among the
member States, enhance international technology development and transfer
transactional transparency, etc.
1.2.3 State Practice - National Instruments
The modification of national legal regimes for the regulation of
international technology development and transfer, through incorporation of legal
principles, standards, minimum rules, etc. developed through State and permanent
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multilateral forum practice, is discussed in Chapter V. Under this Chapter, the
traditional treatment of international technology development and transfer as
forming part of the direct foreign investment regime is shown to be the result of
arbitrary division of public and privately sponsored technology flows which
excludes the application of multilaterally generated legal principles, rules,
procedures, etc. to the regulation of technology development and transfer
transactions involving private parties, thereby preserving imbalance in legal
relationships and the non recognition of technology as a separate factor of
production with complex effects in host States.
We show that technology importing countries have undertaken
widespread incorporation of multilaterally generated rules, principles, procedures,
etc. to harmonise their national legal regimes for the regulation of international
technology development and transfer with international law. The extent of
incorporation is discussed by tracing the existence of principles such as balance of
commitments in new national legislation dealing specifically with international
technology development and transfer, and the incorporation into such legislation
of multilaterally generated rules standards such as transparency (e.g. through
divisibility of rights and obligations or vunpackaging'), accountability, preferential
treatment, etc. which discernibly modify the traditional principles of freedom of
contract, caveat emptor, reciprocity, national treatment, non discrimination, or
standards of compensation (the so called Hull formula i.e. of prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation especially in cases of compulsory acquisition of a non
national's property by the host State).27 We also examine the interrelationship
between extent of incorporation of multilaterally generated principles, rules and
procedures, etc. on the terms and channels used to transfer technology, that is, the
growth of joint ventures, licensing, management contracts, co - production
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arrangements, etc. vis-a-vis concession, turnkey and other indivisible type
arrangements.
We show that international law is being gradually extended,
especially through framework treaty type arrangements, to cover the entire
technology development and transfer process, causing increased legal recognition
of the need to offer technology to developing countries on equitable terms and
conditions that take into account negotiating and bargaining gaps, creating more
than candidate rules for future legal recognition, that is, the rules, standards and
instruments, principles, etc. as they have evolved already form quasi-legal norms,
widely recognised as binding in practice.
For this latter reason, a discussion of the Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology, whose contents have already been substantially agreed, is included
(Chapter 7). The Code represents a current and future logical step to concretise
the international legal regime for the regulation of international development and
transfer of technology. We assess the extent to which a Code would promote
balance of commitments, for example, by maximising recognition of rights and
obligations by home and host States, thus mitigating or eliminating conflict of
interest between private property holders and developing country host States. We
also argue that the Code would best be able to resolve the complex issues raised
by international development and transfer of technology when it is adopted as a
framework treaty law. Thus adopted, it will not only facilitate the permanent
institutionalisation of relationships between international technology suppliers and
users, but will also enable, through a multilateral decision making machinery,
dynamic and continuous adjustment of agreed rules and procedures in accordance
with the needs of dynamic international technological relationships, removing the
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need to negotiate a new treaty all the time. Finally, we also argue, among others,
that such a Code would make full use of all available international legal means to
resolve apparently "intractable' issues such as the exact legal nature of
participation by non "traditional' subjects of international law in the international




1.1 Theoretical foundations and presumptions of the
current international legal order and the international
Transfer and Development of Technology
Because of its complexity and special characteristics, analysis of the
subject of international technology development and transfer28 under
international law could be made at various levels. At one level, we could
examine international law as applicable to the subject at hand, if at all, as a
"value free neutral" framework Under this approach it would be sufficient to
enumerate, within the limits of Article 38 of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), the relevant treaty or convention provisions, customary law, if any,
case law or precedent.29 Little effect need then be given to "inconvenient"
collective pronouncements and decisions of the United Nations General
Assembly30 and other multilateral bodies, which can perhaps also be
dismissed as political or moralistic. State practice, whether bilateral, regional
or multilateral, would have to satisfy strict judicial or (the) international legal
"practitioners"'31 criteria to be of any legal value. In short, law would be
neutral.32
Under the above noted methodology, issues such as those note
immediately below need not be dealt with, that is: inequality of negotiating
and bargaining power (including transactional incapacity33 and what parties
would have done if they had parity of negotiating/bargaining power) and
enforcement of unequally transacted (international development and transfer
of technology) agreements, that is, whether there is a fair price, need for
equality in exchange (necessitating preferential treatment) and observance of
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distributive or commutative justice needs, and the legal effect of multilateral
resolutions and decisions, etc.
Certain legal and theoretical presumptions with a determinant impact on
public international law, especially the international economic and development
law aspects are incorporated into this approach. The most important of these
theories and presumptions are:
(a) That there is a perfect v competitive market' framework in which all
parties have power parity. For our purposes, this presumption
translates, inter alia, into the legal assumption that all states
possess equal technological rights and capabilities. Proponents of
this theory argue that without an international market34 in
technology, there can be no international technology development
and transfer.
We argue that the existence of an international market in technology,
though necessary, is not a sufficient condition for the institution and application of
specific legal norms and instruments for the regulation of international technology
flows. This is due to the fact, among others, that the market concept is of
secondary importance during multilateral or government sponsored technological
co-operation activity (for example, in international competitive bidding for
multilaterally sponsored contracts).
(b) That there is a generally recognised objective "theory of
contract"35 which generates and embodies, inter alia, the theory of
sovereign consent and ensures fairness in negotiation and
performance of agreements;
(c) All valuable things must naturally be subject to exclusive enjoyment as
the normal state of proprietary right, justice then being defined as
17
defence of property and its attendant status. Consequently, for
example, in considering international agreements for sale or
licensing of technological property, exclusive rights must be
regarded as a precondition for promotion of technological activity
in the host State, regardless of whether the owner exploits his
invention in the host State or not;
(d) Certain legal principles are v binding or even immutable' because they
have been defined in the past so to be;
(e) Private international promises and agreements must not be upset and
therefore law must conform to and promote voluntary -ness and
freedom of private choice, etc.
A second approach could be so called ^radicalism',36 under which we
could seek to dogmatically oppose all the above traditionalist or classical
presumptions and principles. The radical position is dogmatic because the
economic, sectoral or other basis for its arguments, while posited as solutions, are
in fact open to opposing non economic, non sectoral, etc. arguments. The main
contention under this approach would include the arguments that:
(a)Contracts or agreements between parties with unequal bargaining
power, however they may appear to parties, must not be a matter
of freedom of command but of choice, that is, when one party is
so strong in bargaining power and the other so weak, as a matter
of common fairness, the strong should not be allowed to push the
weak to the wall;37
(b)The State (and subsequently international law) is not a value free
neutral framework whose task is to enforce law in cases of dispute
but a body with power to create norms and enforce them;38
(c) There is no sharp discontinuity between private rights and obligations,
State practice and non intervention, etc.
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These two foregoing schools of thought have engendered a complicated
circular debate on "hard and soft" international law which:
"proceeds independently of any alleged new norms,
blending reliance upon a vision of pre-existing national
sovereignties which must be internationally registered or
recognised, with reliance upon a region of pre-existing
international sovereignties which must be municipally
registered or constituted".^'
Understanding the main arguments presented under the above outlined
circular debate is crucial if we are to grasp:
(a) The process by which international legal norms and standards have
been denied extension, to cover the entire international transfer
and development of technology process;
(b) Why states may declare existent or non existent, international legal
norms and standards relating to a new (especially complex) subject
of international law, such as international development and transfer
of technology;
(c) Why specific international "problems" between State and non State
parties, which seem intractable exist for example, those regarding
"restrictive" practices;
(d) Why no clear course of action has been postulated, despite the
intensity of the debate, and why there is need to follow a third
course if the problems are to be resolved.
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1.2 Sources of international law conflict, progressive
evolution of international legal norms and the legal
regulation of international technology transfer
Under traditional international law, sources of international law are
absolute, as formally set out under Article 38 of the statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Under the article, the Court, whose
function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall apply:
(i) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognised by the contesting states;
(ii) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(iii) The general principles of law (recognised by civilised nations);
(iv) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, Judicial decisions and
teachings of the most highly highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, (as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law);
The absolute or 'near universal' nature of the article is, according to
Swarzenberger, supposed to safeguard international law against the
subjectivism of deductive speculation and eclectic caprice.40
The classification described above has produced a variety of results.
Firstly, it has encouraged the growth of a sources' doctrine and rhetoric
under which proponents of the hard or soft law approaches attempt to
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elaborate theoretical boundaries and abstract categories that are then
supposed to control the content of the norms, rather than merely register
them.41 Secondly, sources' doctrine and rhetoric, is carried on within an
endless structure that opposes sovereign autonomy and absolute private
entitlements to sovereign co-operation and qualified rights and obligations, a
structure that enables endless "positional switching" by both proponents of
the hard and soft law options, that is, as Kennedy notes:
"when pressed, the hard (international law) defender of a
norm can be forced to concede that the norm can only
have binding effect if it is soft. Likewise, the defender of
a soft norm can be forced to defend his own norm in hard
terms...argument within this structure could go on
indefinitely without resolution" 42
Such positional switching is undertaken with little regard to the
overriding effects of interdependence, the actual roles of State's fulfilling
international obligations and promises, the need for promotion and
preservation of international justice and relations.43
Thirdly, as Kennedy further correctly notes, sources' doctrine and
rhetoric have created an extremely abstract discussion of the general
relationship between international and municipal law, that is: whether
undertaken as a general inquiry into the relative authority and separation of
the two sources;44 or as a specific inquiry about the process by which an
international norm can be imported into municipal law, for example, by
transformation, adoption or execution. Under the abstractions stress is laid
inter alia, on the organisational features of law enforcement, the systemic
character of norms and an implicit acknowledgement of the 'power of
power'. The actual context of norm application, and the achievement of
21
principled "interdependent" adherence to law by states, is down played or
rejected.45
Among the many requirements of the abstract sources doctrine,
regarding the separation of international law from national law, is that, to
qualify as international law, such alleged rules must follow a process of
evolution, first acquiring universal acceptance as opinio juris (for example,
the lex mercatoria in international trade law)46 in addition to incorporation
into other states municipal laws.47 This mode of evolving international legal
norms was perfected during the unorganised or partly organised stage of
international law.
During this stage, 'internationally' desirable objectives were identical
with those of the equal and sovereign states and implementation of such
objectives was through effective exercise of power. Consequently, many of
the norms that evolved during this stage found expression as part of national
interest goals of sovereign states, selectively extended through bilateral
treaties or various diplomatic devices such as gentlemen's agreements, or
imposed as commands, regardless of the international community interest(s).
Such a mode of formulating new norms caused other sovereign states
to protect their self interest by, among others, requiring lengthy periods of
evolution and consistent application before a norm was created. This process
was especially necessitated by the then comparatively "primitive" nature of
international communication, including the nature of the international treaty
negotiation process based on limited ad hoc mandates.48
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The historical process noted above has had a serious restrictive effect
on the subsequent development or adjustment of modes of evolving
international law norms and thus rules and standards. Firstly, with reference
to customary international law it was formerly maintained that only an
immemorial practice could give rise to a customary rule.19 Today, after the
decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases50 opinio juris is no
longer seen as a consciousness that matures slowly over time but instead as a
conviction that "instantaneously" attaches to a rule believed to be socially
necessary or desirable, with the "indispensable" requirement that within the
period in question, short though it might be. State practice, including that of
the states whose interests are specifically affected, should have been both
extensive and virtually uniform.51
It can therefore be correctly maintained that the absolutist requirements
with regard to 'time'52 and standard of decision making necessary to form
opinio juris (that is, whether consent53 or consensus is required), has been
replaced by a community standard which does not primarily depend on the
relative importance of the states participating in a practice, (and therefore
presence or absence of 'underlying authority') or the legitimacy of the form
followed, but on the effect of the content of a proposed norm on the
(international) community interest and international co-operation,54 especially
in cases where a large amount of 'new' complex international State practice
and private activity is involved.55
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Secondly, with regard to treaties, the real intention of the parties, (and
therefore a just construction of the text), must be undertaken in conformity
with the underlying assumption of consensual inter - State relations, that is,
treaties encompass or reflect a consensus between State parties entering into
the treaty relations. It is for this reason that historically, most international
"treaty" legal developments have taken place as a result of judicial and
scholastic interpretation of often conflicting State practice being incorporated
into legislation or made into treaties, which then cause a "settling effect" in
that area of international law.
1.3 The Third option: International law as a reflection of
Organised International Society
From the foregoing, clearly, traditionalist or radical schools would
provide inadequate or inappropriate legal solutions to the gross international
problem of how to avail science and technology to all states and peoples,
while preserving the means of continued generation of such science and
technology.
All "open" legal systems develop procedures of internal validation by
which norms are or can be created, altered or abolished.56 The international
legal system is no exception and member states have evolved distinct new
ways of creating, altering and invalidating or voiding of alleged norms57
without merely constraining 'perceived' State or private entitlements.58 Such
change is justified and necessitated, among others, by the high degree of new
inter - State interaction, the complexity of such interaction, disparities among
24
the sovereign actors and resultant inequality of bargaining and conflict of interest
as well as the predominance of non sovereign actors in certain fields of
international activity.
These new conditions exist under a "newly' organised international
society (that is United Nations era). We therefore argue that a correct approach is
to view current international law as reflecting and springing from international
society's organised practice.59 The operation and proceedings of international law
under such a regime are distinctly different from those under international law
based on State power or adhoc arrangements. Organised international society is
characterised by comprehensive and permanent multilateral institutionalisation60 of
mechanisms, measures and procedures and measures through which international
law then "manifests'. The approach to new and complex issues under organised
international society therefore tends to employ the whole gamut of legal
intervention mechanisms, that is, from good offices, mediation, conciliation,
consultation, arbitration, litigation to gradual development of international co¬
operation, etc. with the intention of effecting the extension of international legal
backing towards that State or States whose claims most accord with
interdependence, respect for sovereignty and preservation of international peace.61
Primarily, we intend to show that, under the organised international
community, the progressive evolution and extension of international legal
principles and minimum standards for the regulation of international technology
transfer is primarily based on the organised practice of States under permanent
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inter - State organisations. This approach promotes the interpretation of new
norms, general principles, standards or rules in favour of interdependence, the
collective interest and international equity (especially the prevention of unjust
enrichment, arbitrariness and abuse of rights).62 Consequently, it is
simultaneously less restrictive in nature and takes a more dynamic view of
international society than that envisaged in the classification laid down by
Article 38, while at the same time avoiding "the subjectivism of deductive
speculation and eclectic caprice". Also, under this approach, the increased
dependency of an organised international community on legitimate consensus
and reciprocity (including reciprocal entitlement violation)63 to achieve
universally recognised goals such as the transmission of scientific and
technological capacity to developing countries as a tool for eliminating
material inequalities between states, is stressed.
1.4 From International Commerce in Technology towards
Co-operation to Promote Acquisition of Technological
Capacity in Developing Countries
Most states agree that greater application of international legal norms
and equitable principles is a precondition for effective transfer of the products
of the human intellect from highly industrialised countries to developing
countries and the achievement of greater material equality (especially in
technological sense) between states, peoples and individuals.64 However, the
recognition of the need to extend international legal and equitable principles
to the entire international development and transfer of technology process has
received little implementation in practice mainly due to:
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(a) The continuing conflict over sources of international law, as outlined
above, causing, among, others, rejection by some States of the
need to extend international law to the entire international
development and transfer of technology process;
(b) Continued conflict over what constitutes an international development
and transfer of technology, that is:
(i) The current definition of international technology transfer as a
commercially motivated international private party activity
(or transaction) which largely excludes the well established legally
regulated multilateral government sponsored flows of
technological skills (which in practice constitute the most effective
means for acquisition of technological capacity by developing
countries importing technology);
(ii) The truncation of or dichotomy in (i) above causing a failure
to define the exact nature of the technology acquisition process of
as a dual process involving supply of technology, for example,
through giving access to intellectual property rights whether
through sale, licensing, management contracts, etc. and the
effective "uptake' of such supplied skills by nationals of the
recipient State, which then concludes the transfer.
It may be noted that it is for this reason that the Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology excludes the sale of goods form its definition of
international technology transfer. Where nationals of the recipient country are
unable to assimilate the supplied technology, that is, acquire technological
capacity in the relevant technology, there is no development
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or transfer of technology, even though the technology is physically operated in the
host State;
(c) Who are the legitimate parties to whom international legal norms,
principles, etc. for the regulation of international development and
transfer of technology may be applicable and whether non State
parties may be subject to such a regime, that is:
(i) The assumption that a recipient State can only intervene in
international technology development and transfer arrangements if
the recognised interplay of contractual forces fails, that is, where
there are such factors as fraud, duress or mistake,65 or if the
agreement has anti competitive effects. This assumption is
contrary to the legitimate rights of a State to guarantee, subject
only to international law,66 its technological and scientific
development, for example, through enforcement of local
exploitation of protected technological rights, promotion of access
to imported technology (through inter alia, elimination or control
of use of restrictive practices in technology transfer contracts,
prevention of disparity in values exchanged or import of
hazardous or obsolete technologies, etc.)
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1.5 Summary of Issues
1.5.1 Preliminary Legal Issues Caused by Wide Technological
Disparity or Inequality Between States:
Modern technology has raised a host of issues in relation to its impact on
inter - State relations and therefore international law. Many of the issues have a
direct impact on existing international legal frameworks, institutions, measures
and instruments. Among the outstanding technology related issues with an
international legal dimension are:
1.5.2 General
The wide technological disparity between States, per se, raises, on the one
hand, questions about the rights and duties of "technology owning' States in
relation to, inter alia :
(a) Technology ownership, that is, interest in promotion of public or
government owned rights vis-a-vis private rights promotion and
extent to which States can legally " intervene' extra territorially to
protect, inter alia, their national's technological property interests;
(b) The legal rights and duties of these States, if any, in mitigating
bargaining and negotiating power disparities67 between their
nationals and non nationals wishing to acquire technology;
(c)The role of technology in the evolution of a New International
Economic Order, is equally controversial, that is:
(i)The cost of access to technology and the meaning of access,
especially under special and preferential treatment;
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(ii) The existence of an international legal duty or obligation to promote
development, that is, acquisition of technological capacity by
developing countries on preferential terms;
(iii) The right of recipient states to participate effectively and equally, in
international technological co-operation activity;
(d) Whether technology forms part of the common heritage ofmankind;
1.6 The Traditional Framework - The Multilateral
Intellectual Property System and the Acquisition of
Technological Capacity by Developing Countries (Chapters
2 and 6)
Developing countries have consistently criticised the basic precepts and
actual operation of the existing multilateral intellectual property treaties and
conventions (largely administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organisation {WIPO}).68 Despite some reforms, (for example, of the Berne
and Universal Copyright Conventions69 and the on-going - now endangered70
attempts to revise the Paris Convention),71 the conventions do not
effectively or seriously address the problems of a large group of
technologically dependent states. Instead, they concentrate on
comprehensively defining intellectual property rights and standards for their
protection.
In the context of the theoretical framework of the multilateral
intellectual property Conventions (the Paris, the Beme and the Universal
Copyright Conventions - see Chapter 2) and the multilateral negotiation
framework of the Uruguay round (Trade Related aspects of Intellectual
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Property - see Chapter 6), we discuss the intellectual property issues that
have historically obstructed developing countries' efforts to acquire
technological capacity in all sectors, and the new measures proposed by
developed countries which are likely to frustrate developing countries' efforts
to acquire technological capacity, especially through import substitution of
technology. The specific issues include:
(a) Whether the multilateral intellectual property treaties and Conventions,
that is, the Paris Convention, Berne and Universal Copyright
Convention, adequately address the need for correction of the
technological imbalance between developed and developing
countries, that is, whether the Conventions provide sufficient
balance between the production and dissemination of new works
and inventions (for example, through economic rights incentives to
owners of intellectual property rights IPR's) and promotion of
access to and use of these works and inventions, especially by
LDC nationals;
(b) Whether the basic theoretical assumptions of the treaties and
Conventions adequately balance private entitlements (for example,
guarantees of 'economic' incomes and adequate protection for
their intellectual property rights) with the public interests of
developing countries (especially technology development and
control of imports ofdangerous or hazardous technologies);
(i) Whether current international levels of protection for economic and
moral intellectual property rights are inadequate, adequate or
excessive,
(c) Whether the Conventions are based on a fundamental legal
presumption that juridical equality of states translates, inter alia,
into technological and competitive equality between states and
consequently, their nationals;
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(i) Whether the current multilateral framework facilitates the selection,
negotiation, acquisition of technology by developing countries and
their independent development of technological capacity;
(ii) Whether the sovereign rights of developing countries to gain and
preserve a balance between their interests (for example, technology
development and transfer) and those of intellectual property owners
can be exercised effectively under the multilateral Convention
principles, for example, to guarantee local disclosure of protected
technology in host developing countries and its dissemination after
lapse of protection, provide for special regimes or rights for national in
relation to particular technologies, product or process categories is
being eroded in favour of the economic rights of intellectual property
owners,
(d) Whether there is adequate enforcement of the rights and obligations of
intellectual property owners, as contained in the conventions;
1.7 International "Trade Related Reform" of the
Traditional Framework - Trade Related intellectual
property Issues affecting acquisition of technological
capacity by developing countries (Chapter 6)
(a) Whether states may exclude from patentability "products and
processes, for example, on grounds of promotion of local
technological capacity as a matter of development and public
interest.
(b) Whether "importation as working" promotes or obstructs acquisition
of technological capacity in developing countries.
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(c) Whether internationally harmonised periods of duration of protection,
for example, as a minimum standard of 20 years would promote,
more effectively than territorial standards, development of
technology in developing countries (for example, through
increased commitments to develop, research and exploit protected
intellectual property rights in developing countries.)
(d) Whether use of trademarks should remain conditioned under the law of
the granting State, for example, use of a trademark with other
trademarks to promote local technology supporting brands;
(e) Whether developing countries should condition grant and use of
trademarks, for example, to prevent their use as protective devices
for "technological packages' which aim inter alia, at restricting
technological flows into the recipient State;
(f) Whether new forms of technological knowledge and skills, for example
computer programmes, are to be internationally protected and if
so, if the forms of protection (for example, as ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts) restrict the
dissemination of usable or state of the art technological
information and skills in developing countries;
(g) Whether there is need to protect trade secrets, industrial formulae,
product test data (normally protected under laws of confidentiality
in some national jurisdictions), etc. held by nationals in
developing countries as part of "technology rights'.
1.8 The Real Reform Needs
Whether conventions can be reformed to provide a balanced and dynamic
framework that would not only adequately protect intellectual property rights but
would also offer more open and less costly access to technology in developed
countries for developing countries and deal with specific problems caused by
technology rights owners such as abuse of
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exclusive rights, that is, refusal to disclose the technology behind protected rights
on expiry of protection, exclusive use of importation as exploitation, use of
general restrictive practices, monopolistic opposition to compulsory licences, etc.
1.9 Organised International Society - Public or Government Sponsored
Multilateral Technological Flows
In Chapters 3 and 4 and partly Chapter 5, the role of multilateral
international organisations in the elimination of material disparities between
States, through, inter alia, effective facilitation of access to technological and
scientific skills for the technologically deficient states, is discussed. The legal role
of multilateral institutions in the transfer of public or government sponsored
technology and know-how, though involving various legal issues, has relatively
remained un-examined. Much scholarship, on the other hand, has been expended
on analysis of international technology transfer activity involving private parties
0commercially motivate technology flows) especially in its economic aspects.
In this work, using the example of the multilateral technological co¬
operation framework of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),72
a phenomenon of organised international society, we examine the international
legal aspects of the new international relationships between host or recipient
governments, multilateral international organisations, public and private parties
and enterprises involved in international technology development and transfer to
LDC's. The issues discussed include:
34
(a) Whether multilateral technological co-operation activity and practice
develops and extends international law to the entire process of
acquisition of technological capacity by developing countries (that
is, technology import, development and transfer or specifically
from pre-negotiation, through negotiation and performance to
follow up and dispute settlement stages of the process),
(b) Whether multilateral technological co-operation activity is regulated
within a permanent and transparent legal framework,
(c) Whether multilateral technological co-operation activity offers:
(i) Adequate and effective balance of commitments between States
importing technology and suppliers and recipients of technology,
(ii) Effective legal promotion of preferential and equitable
relationships between suppliers and recipients of technology,
(iii) Adequate legal safeguards for the recipient country's interests,
for example, to prevent abuse of power by technology suppliers,
guarantee consensual and negotiated arrangements, etc.
(d) To illustrate whether, at State level, the international legal principles,
rules, instruments, measures, instruments, measures, institutions,
etc. if any, which have been developed within the organised
multilateral framework have been applied or extended outside the
purely multilateral framework, that is, in multi-bilateral,73
regional or sub regional frameworks, two examples are used:
(i) The legal arrangements for the transfer and development of
technology under the Lome Convention (a North - South multi -
bilateral agreement)
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(ii) The Andean Pact Agreement (a South - South sub regional agreement -
Chapter 4).
The principal issues discussed under Chapter 4 include :
(e) Whether these arrangements, reflect any of the principles, measures,
instruments, institutions, etc. found under the multilateral
technological co-operation;
(f) Whether the multi - bilateral technological co-operation principles,
instruments, measures and practice if legally synonymous with
those of the multilateral framework, are implemented as
effectively, that is, to promote effective acquisition of
technological capacity by developing member states;
(g) With reference to the Lome Convention, whether the principle of
preferential (special) treatment is effectively applied to give access
to technology for developing country member States to the
Convention and their nationals,
(h) Whether the principle of transparency74 is observed by all parties, that
is,
(i) Whether recipient member States juridical and administrative
arrangements to regulate technology imports conform to
international law;
(ii) Whether developed member States give adequate guarantees of
technological non coercion of developing member States and
decision making is consensual,
(iii) Whether the arrangements provide for and implement
adequate safeguards for developing countries seeking to acquire
technology from non State parties who are nationals of the
developed member
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countries, for example, by eliminating blanket national treatment provisions or
requirements that private party activity be regulated only in accordance with anti¬
trust and competition law principles, as applied in developed member states.
1.10 A Newer Approach ? The Role of State and International
Organisation Practice in the Extension of International Legal
(norms, principles, rules, standards, measures, instruments,
etc.) to The Entire Process of Acquisition of Technological
Capacity by States
The evolution of new international legal norms and policies for the
regulation of, inter alia, international technology transfer activity through State
and multilateral organisation practice remains largely un researched. This is due
not only to the sharp traditional demarcation between national and international
law (not recognising any continuum between the two), and consequent conflict
over hard and soft law, but also to a continuing failure to recognise the essential
difference in international law formation process during era of organised
international community vis-a-vis that of unorganised international society.
Consequently, the link between development of certain legal principles,
rules, mechanisms, etc. through widespread State practice and the incorporation of
these new principles and rules into multilateral Conventions, Decisions,
Resolutions, etc. dealing with acquisition of technological capacity by developing
countries (or transfer and development of technology, in a narrower sense) which
in turn, when widely disseminated, has influenced
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subsequent State practice, especially in technology recipient States has not
received legal scholars due attention. In this work, we discuss, inter alia:
(a) The international rights and obligations arising during a recipient
State's regulation of international transfer and development of
technology activity, that is, technological activity involving non
nationals carried out on it its territory. The extent of a host
country's jurisdiction over international technology development
and transfer agreements, including protection of rights, non
discrimination, compensation, exclusive application of law of host
the State to settlement of disputes, etc. is examined.
(b) The rise of the principle of balance of commitments, international laws
answer to the elimination of technological disparities between
States within a framework of interdependence?
(c) Whether a recipient State has a duty to provide a v transparent' legal
regime and the international legal meaning of the principle of
transparency as applied to international development and transfer
of technology.
(d) The meaning of vright to development', a right of access to technology
internationally available, subject only to adequate remuneration for
owners, (mainly Chapter 5 and 3);
(e) Whether a general or specific standard of preferential treatment for
LDC's seeking to import technology as it has evolved in practice,
that is, special, and fair and favorable, etc. standard exists.
1.11 An International Framework for The Regulation of International
Technological Activity - The Code of Conduct on Transfer of
Technology and its Institutional Arrangements
(a) The need for an international treaty, convention, machinery or
institution, etc. for the extension of international legal norms,
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standards, rules, etc. to the entire technology transfer process, that is, the need to
for an international Code on Transfer of Technology.
1.12 Legal Definition of Technology, its "working1 and meaning of
Acquisition of Technological Capacity
The traditional definition of technology has been influenced by territorial
national commercial interests.75 The influence of private commercial motivation
and interests is detectable even in the United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations definition of technology as "the stock of knowledge which permits
the introduction of new or improved machinery and equipment, products,
processes and services, (adding) including, in a wider sense, additional elements
such as management and marketing skills.76 This definition of technology, when
applied to international technology development and transfer, reinforces certain
assumptions, for example, that the mere supply or delivery of technological goods
(such as a manufacturing plant) or technological processes, will constitute a
technology transfer so long as the parties define it as such.
Legally, a more exact definition of technology is given in the WIPO
Licensing Guide77 as systematic knowledge of the manufacture of a product, or
rendering of a service (in industry, agriculture, commerce, etc.), whether that
knowledge be in an invention, a utility model, an industrial design, a plant
variety, or technical information in the form of documentation, or skills or
experience of experts, for the design, installation, operation or maintenance of an
industrial plant or its equipment
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or for the management of an industrial or commercial enterprise or its
activities.78 This working definition gives the essential characteristics of
technology as being:
(i) Systematic knowledge;
(ii) Usefully ("not only commercially,) applicable in production,
distribution or consumption;
(Hi) Comprised intellectual property rights or human skills usable
in production, distribution or maintenance.
1.12.1 Working Definition of International Transmission of
Technological Capacity or International Technology
Development and Transfer
Since these elements are to he regarded as integral, international
development and transfer of technology may be regarded as a process which
involves the supply of systematic knowledge or skills by a State or non State
party, for a remuneration, to another State or its nationals, leading to the
acquisition, in the recipient State, of a technological capacity in the relevant
technology.
Consequently, it may usefully be reiterated that international supply of
technological products, goods or processes which embody systematic
knowledge does not, constitute international development and transfer of
technology but a sale of technology, technological goods or processes. This
situation would equally apply even if the recipient, at the time of receiving the
good in question possesses adequate know-how to reproduce that good,
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since there would then be no actual "transfer" of knowledge, that is, there
must be a "learning element"19 and acquisition of the ability to translate
acquired learning into products, processes, required technological services.
These factors apply whether the technology or technological goods or
processes supplied are civilian or military, though the latter type of
technology flows are not dealt with in this work.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that one of the major causes of
misinterpreting the effect of extension of international law to cover the
technology development and "transfer" process has been the inclusion of
international supplies or sales of technology or technological processes in the
definition of international technology development and transfer. The sale or
supply of technology or technological transactions, per se, are therefore not
necessarily included in international development and transfer of technology,
though they may fit into the traditional definition of direct foreign
investments-80 We argue that international development and transfer of
technology is not constituted by technology supply transactions but by a
consensually based process in which the supplying party agrees to promote a
specific technological developmental goal in the recipient State, that is,
international development and transfer of technology agreements must in their
aims and objectives be compatible with developmental goals of recipient
states and consistent with international legal commitments.
Lastly, the Code of Conduct on Transfer Technology's definition81 of
technology transfer as the transfer of systematic knowledge for the
manufacture of a product, application of a process or rendering of a service,
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excluding the sale or lease of goods,82 while expressly excluding sale of goods from
technology transactions, does not encompass the need for assimilation of supplied technology
by the recipient. Consequently, the Code imposes no explicit duty on the transferor to
guarantee that the technology "transferred" is adequately and completely assimilated by
recipient, that is the essential condition of acquisition by the recipient, through a learning
process, of a systematic capability that completes and constitutes the essence of a transfer, is
left to the discretion of transferors. Because of this omission, the need to legally balance
foreign technological rights (especially those commercially motivated) with local technology
"learning effects" and the general public interest, for example, in relation to health,
environment, culture, would therefore, even if the Code were implemented, appear "intrusive"









The Paris Convention System
"This system, which is based on a hypothetical
reciprocity and exchange of benefit between member
States, when applied, as it is now, to countries with
vastly different levels of development, works in favour of
the stronger partners and increases inequality...Under
developed countries who are parties to the Paris Union
find themselves in a position where they have to protect
processes originating from highly industrialised
countries, without themselves having in fact any
processes to protect in those same highly industrialised
countries. This is one of characteristic example, among
many, of abstract equality breeding factual inequality.
The Role of Law in the Process of Development by G.
M.ABI-SAAB (1967) at P. 493 - 519. 83
2.1 Historical
The Paris Convention, is a product of the unorganised international
system, based on free market principles and prescribed standards known as
the Union standards84 that largely relate to constraining the State in the
measures it takes against foreign patentees, especially in enforcing its
economic rights. The problems that the Convention initially envisaged have
radically altered since its inception. Though in principle the primary goal or
objective of the Convention (that is, the progressive and evolutionary
achievement of a high and comprehensive level of protection for inventors) is
laudable, the nature of the new problems requires a radical reformulation of
the timing, form and content of the 'progressive' achievement of this primary
goal.
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The lack of a radical shift has made the Paris Convention demonstrably
unable to meet the needs of a large majority of its members, that is,
developing countries, especially in relation to provision of greater access to
protected intellectual property rights at reasonable cost. According to
developed countries, for the Convention to remain an effective and
progressive instrument, that is, "evolving steadily towards higher and more
comprehensive levels of protection for intellectual property rights", it must
concentrate on improving the scope and levels of such protection. Not
surprisingly, the Convention therefore manifests a dearth of provisions that
are of strict relevancy to the needs of developing countries in relation to
international technology development and transfer.
During the early years of the Paris Convention international trade and
exchange were dominated by trade in goods or capital (with international
investment largely in extractive industries and raw material processing). The
countries that benefited most from that trade and investment expanded
originally bilateral treaties amongst themselves for the protection of industrial
property into a multilateral treaty, that is, the Paris Convention (18 83).85 The
basic principles of the convention were predicated on the juridical and
material equality of the member States, that is, relatively even ownership of
industrial property rights. The subject matter of protection was defined in
accordance with the prevailing nature of international exchange and trade, for
example, Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Convention.86
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Because of the Convention's bias towards promotion of commerce and
"reciprocal international exchange" of industrial property rights (held
predominantly by private parties) the promotion of technological
development in member States or offer of special and differential treatment to
technologically underdeveloped members, was alien to the regime, a position
still largely maintained today, despite attempts to revise the Convention.
Developed countries argue that sufficient special treatment for techno -
economically less developed States was inherent in the fact that members are
bound by the version of the treaty they adhere to and the Convention
predicates the application of the National Treatment standard on the
treatment offered to nationals, that is, protection is granted only against
unjustifiable discrimination and discrimination will not be said to have
occurred if a non - national is offered the same low standard of protection as
nationals, the so called assimilation to nationals. However, in practice, as
detailed below, whichever version of the Convention is binding on a
developing country, the developing country cannot effectively implement or
maintain measures that are perceived by developed countries as
discriminatory.
Developed countries therefore view the current international system for
the protection of industrial property as, on one hand, liberal, that is, with
reference to the discretion given to member States to, inter alia, restrict the
scope of rights protected under the Convention as defined in Article 1 (3) and
on the other inadequate, that is, with reference to new rights in industrial
property or new objects which require protection. They therefore stress the
need for strengthening of protection in all countries, especially in developing
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countries which offer only minimum standards of protection, exclude sectors or
products from protection. The major ground for extension of protection, it may be
usefully reiterated, is that the Paris Convention, like the other major multilateral
intellectual property treaties, is a progressive instrument which should evolve
steadily towards a higher and comprehensive level of protection for owners of
intellectual property rights. Accordingly, they oppose, among others, the principle
of territoriality as a basis for sovereign determination of patentability, subject and
product exclusions, grant of compulsory licences.87
Some of the functional principles of international "free trade" which were
either presumed or embedded into the convention include those of non
discrimination and the ensuing standard of national treatment, the most favoured
nation treatment (MFN), and the presumption of juridical and material equality of
States which yielded the territoriality and abstract reciprocity principles,
respectively. To mitigate the effects of sovereign interests on those of commerce,
the priority and independence of patents principles were included. These and other
less recognised principles have greatly influenced the reaction of technology
owning States and their nationals to calls by developing countries for greater access
to technology, whether in the public domain or not, developing country's
enforcement of their sovereign rights, for example, by demanding for greater
working of patents in their territory, greater transparency and more flexibility in
transfer of technology contracts.
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2.2 Theories and Presumptions which underlie the Paris
Convention's Principles and Standards for Protection
Intellectual Property
Basic Theories ofProtection
In order to understand why the Paris Convention System is inherently
biased in favour of intellectual property rights owners, it is essential to
examine the theories and presumption that underlie the system. Without such
analysis and understanding, competing theories and interests, such as those
underlying development and transfer of technology claims can only be posited
as alternatives and not improvements or ways to achieve ultimate aims and
goals. However, the main gain from such examination is to show the
ascendancy of economic rights vis-a-vis moral and other rights of inventors
or authors. The theories per se have been examined in detail by many authors
and we only deal with each theory briefly.
2.2.1 The Natural Rights Theory
The essential tenet in the natural rights theory of protection of
intellectual property, principally developed by French and continental Europe
jurists, is the presumption that there is an absolute innate right in all
practicable ideas, that is, that every novel idea whose realisation or
development can be useful to society primarily belongs to him who conceived
it.88 Two consequences may be said to flow from this position.
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Firstly, at the individual level, it was historically argued that inventors
should be able register their inventions or designs without previous
examination.89 Theoretically, a denial of property rights in the invention is
taken to be a violation of a fundamental human right. International
recognition of this consequence of the theory is reflected in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which provides that:
"Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author"90
Despite this theoretical recognition, the natural rights theory has
gradually given way to the socio - economically based framework theses.
While many national laws incorporate the natural rights idea, the innate right
to property in ideas, per se, is excluded, with most countries requiring proof
of absolute novelty and utility, verified through the search and examination
process, before granting intellectual property protection rights. The major
recent antagonist of the theory in international intellectual property
Conventions is the United States which regards natural rights (and thus moral
rights) as inimical to the jurisprudential view point as it has evolved in the
United States, that is, that intellectual property rights are freely alienable
economic rights.91
Secondly, at the international level, with special regard to international
transfer of systematic knowledge, the universality of ideas is reflected in the
theory that ultimately, technology is the common heritage of mankind and
promotion of its transfer helps to accelerate development in all countries and
thus contributes to the advancement of the general welfare of mankind.
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Consequently, most States have recognised the universal human right to share
in scientific and technological advancement and a general duty of support and
co-operative effort to promote the transfer of knowledge. This latter support
is referred to as promotion of the right to development, that is, that no State
has the right to appropriate specific ideas to itself indefinitely or arbitrarily
restrict the free movement of such ideas among States. Therefore, all States
have the duty to ensure the freest and fullest possible access to all available
technologies and know-how in accordance with their sovereign right to
regulate their socio - economic systems as they deem suitable. The
predominance of economic rights therefore means that those States which
wish to restrict international technology transfer are in the ascendancy.
2.2.2 Bargain framework or guarantee of income to
inventors?
The limited monopoly granted to authors by intellectual property grants
is supposed to embody a quid pro quo or balanced arrangement intended to
serve the public interest, rather than guaranteeing the rights of intellectual
property owners.92 Internationally, this balance is however becoming
increasingly upset by the new emphasis on higher levels of protection in all
countries, regardless of whether such new levels would be excessive or not.
The balance or quid pro quo framework is usually referred as the "Bargain
Framework thesis". The thesis has three components. Firstly, that the talent
of invention, as an expression of intellectual originality must be given the
maximum encouragement by providing the inventor with all necessary stimuli
to inventive activity, that is, the incentive component. Secondly, the State, in
the public interest, offers the inventor a grant bestowing exclusive protection
50
for a limited period of time, to enable such inventor to display and develop his
invention and work it advantageously, that is, the reward component theory.
Thirdly, that for his part of the bargain with the public, the inventor, after the
term for which the patent is granted must disclose his secret and specify his
invention in such a way that others may be taught to do the thing for which
the protection is granted. This requirement is based on the need for sufficient
disclosure in return for the otherwise excessive protection conferred by patent
protection, that is, the fact that patents protect inventive ideas which are
applicable to industrially useful products or processes even against
independent evolution.
While these three ingredients, that is, incentive, reward and disclosure
cannot be exhaustively dealt with here, we shall outline their essential
relationship to the international transfer of technology process.
2.4 Industrial Property Protection levels, redefining
incentive?
Theoretically, as incentive, the State offers inventors a legal monopoly
for a limited period of time. The most important form of limited monopoly or
protection has been the patent grant. A patent grant does not give a positive
right to its proprietor to use the invention but rather only confers the right to
exclude others from using the invention for a limited period of time.
Consequently, if the granting State, as legislator, is of the opinion that certain
technical knowledge should be used under limited conditions only, it is up to
it to enact appropriate legislation.93 This right is preserved under, inter alia.
the principle of territoriality, which is being gradually eroded,94 as explained
below.
Further, developed countries have increasingly stressed the importance and
role of granting exclusive rights (for the longest possible duration) as the most
appropriate incentive for the promotion of innovation. The school of thought
which traditionally questioned,95 whether the patent grant is the most appropriate
form of maximising individual and social returns from the innovation process has
declined with the rise of emphasis on economic rights in intellectual property vis-a¬
vis moral and sovereign rights. It may be relevant to out that though many
developing countries, especially the lest developed, offer lengthy periods of
protection for industrial property,96 the level of innovative activity in these
countries remains low. Thus for instance, in the countries member to the African
Industrial Property Organisation (AIPO) which includes many Sub Saharan least
developed countries such as Burkina Faso, Benin, Central African Republic,
Chard, Mali, Niger, Togo, Guinea, the duration of patents is 20 years from the day
of registration.
2.5 Disclosure
Transfer of technology is basically transfer of information or systematic
knowledge.97 The international industrial property system is primarily intended to
stimulate international innovative activity by facilitating the orderly dissemination
of information about innovations, especially through the patent system. Disclosure
(description and explanation of the invention)
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therefore forms a sharp point of potential conflict between the State and the owner
of intellectual property rights. Today, it also constitutes one of the areas of
greatest conflict of interest between developing countries which rely on imported
technology and major technology exporting States.
By granting monopolies, the State is supposed to secure for the
public both the knowledge of the protected invention and its commercial
development. The importance of these two aspects, that is, information and
commercialisation depends on the level of general technological development of the
relevant State. Historically, initial early patents generally contained little
information about the inventions. Thus for instance in England, it was not unit the
early 18th century when the first patent application containing a detailed
specification was filed.98 Early systems did not impose stringent disclosure
requirements on inventors because inventors argued that disclosure offers
competitors opportunity to freely use the new invention without investing in the
necessary research and development and since infringement was difficult and costly
to prove, it was necessary for them to disclose as little as possible in their
specifications.
Today, most nations' patent statutes require that the description of an
invention be sufficiently clear to enable those skilled in the art to make or use the
invention and set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor, of carrying out
his invention. The Japanese law, for instance requires that disclosure must be
sufficient to enable any person having an ordinary knowledge in the technical field
to which such invention belongs to easily work the invention.99
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The primary divergence between developing and developed States on
the issue of disclosure springs basically from the current function of the
international property system in developed countries vis-a-vis that in
developing countries, especially the least industrialised. Most developing
countries, especially the least developed, are engaged in adapting and
diffusing products and processes developed in industrialised countries and
consequently, their research, largely in the Aggro - food industries sector, is
based on the extension of established designs and processes.100 Consequently,
the primary function of their disclosure requirements, with the exception of a
few sectors in the highly industrialised developing countries, is to encourage
local working enable improvements to and diffusion ofproducts or extension
of established designs and processes. This disclosure function in developing
countries diverges from that in the developed countries, which is:
(i) To provide direction, (in an atmosphere of rapidly changing
technology) to those interested in the exploitation of an invention, to
the relevant source of the technology;
(ii) Provide information to competing firms or corporations on the state
of the art in the industry; thus allowing them to acquire a picture of the
strategy of research and areas of exploitation to be sought;101
(iii) Ameliorate the effects of the anti-competitive practice of pre -
patenting or the filing of claims before the invention is actually
developed;102
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The Paris Convention, with a pro - patentee position, does not sufficiently
take into account this divergence in objectives. Developing countries, especially
the least developed which possess weak 'dependent' intellectual property systems,
are therefore often unable to ensure sufficient disclosure either through
examination or invalidation of grants in order to discover for instance whether
matters necessary for the working of an invention were omitted in the
speciflcation(s) or extraneous matters which were not necessary to work the
invention that made working difficult were included,103
2.6 Key Principles, rights and obligations under the Paris Convention
of relevance to international transmission of technological Capacity
2.6.1 Reciprocity
Material reciprocity is excluded under the conventions104 and though it has
been argued otherwise,105 countries of the Union are not expected to apply national
treatment to non nationals on the grounds or understanding that their own nationals
would in return enjoy the same or similar advantages elsewhere (material or
abstract reciprocity), that is, the underlying basis of national treatment is the
balance of entitlements (legally defined) and not the imposition or exertion of
leverages.
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2.6.2 Non - discrimination and National Treatment
The abstract principle of non discrimination which has doubtful roots in
customary international law,106 played a fundamental role in the largely
unorganised international trade based on free trade principles. The principle
forbids arbitrary differential treatment because of foreign nationality. The
principle of non - discrimination was indirectly incorporated into the Paris
Convention as the standard of national treatment.
2.6.3 National Treatment
Under the Paris Convention member States are required to grant
national treatment and refrain from demanding reciprocity above the limits
and extent set out in the treaty.107 This principle, as provided for Under
Article 2 paragraph 1, is said to be the fundamental principle108 of the Paris
Convention, that is, since it sets the criteria for obtaining protection as well
as the scope of rights conferred. The principle requires that nationals of
Union countries and those assimilated to them enjoy in all other countries of
the Union the same protection as that accorded to nationals of the State
'granting' rights, that is, member States are required, in granting intellectual
property rights to nationals of other member States, to grant all the
advantages that their respective laws now grant or will grant in future to their
own nationals,109 without prejudice to the minimum rights provided for by the
convention. The principle entitles them to receive the same protection as
nationals and the same legal remedies against any infringement of their rights,
provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are
complied with - Article 2 paragraph 1. Similar treatment is accorded to
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persons who are domiciled or who have real or effective establishments in the
territory of one of the countries of the Union - Article 3. The same principle
applies to a large extent, as seen below, under the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic works (article 5) and Universal Copyright
Conventions, which offer limited reciprocity.110 The uniform application of
the abstract principle of reciprocity, as reflected in the national treatment
standard, breeds increased material inequality with the ever widening gap in
international ownership of intellectual property among member States.
2.6.4 Territoriality
"The development of new technologies is normally
afflicted with new risks...This means that for each
individual invention...possible detrimental effects and
risks have to be weighed [by each State] against the
merits and advantages aimed at"
Communication by European Patent Office's
examining Division to Applicant for Harvard Mouse
Patent, [emphasis supplied) 111
To developing countries, the principle of territoriality is a very essential
and 'saving' principle. This is due to the fact it enshrines the fundamental
right of each State to create, determine the scope, effects and expiration
(content) of industrial property rights, in recognition of the State's role as the
sole arbiter of its own primary developmental interests. This fact is given
recognition by the permission of States to determine the subjects and areas of
protection, that is, "make exclusions" to exclusive rights. Territoriality is
affirmed in provisions contained in the WIPO Model Law for developing
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countries on inventions112 (herein after Model Law), that is, that inventions
concerning certain kinds of products, or processes for the manufacture of
such products may temporarily be excluded from patent protection by decree,
recognises this sovereign right. In practice, territoriality guarantees the
granting State its sovereign right to control technology import activity and
conform such activity to legitimate primary development goals, that is, the
establishment of conditions that balance legal entitlements (return to the
innovator or inventor) and technoeconomic or social benefits within the host
State.
The functions of territoriality are however overlooked or rejected by
"economic rights" holders in intellectual property principally from developed
countries. Such owners regard the principle solely as a mechanism for
enhancing the 'economically inhibitive effect of national sovereignty'.113 The
contrary argument, which we regard as crucial to international trade -
technology development and transfer debate, that is, that territoriality does
not only imply that States are allowed to regulate their domestic markets and
technological114 conditions (for example by banning imports, granting parallel
import rights or even revoking specific rights), but also requires them to
refrain from 'conditioning" other States intellectual property regimes and
markets, is increasingly ignored by free trade enthusiasts.
Territoriality is fully conformed to by the principle of national treatment
as embodied in the Paris, Bcme and other major intellectual property
conventions (and even to a large extent as strictly interpreted under Article
XVIII of GATT). The resultant effect is to safeguard sovereign nations from
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foreign intervention in the regulation of national industrial property systems,
except under specific already established conditions.115
2.6.5 Rights of Priority
The right of priority is a special right of the convention that is meant to
protect inventors extra - territorially. The right protects an inventor or his
successor in tide who has duly filed an application in his home country for a
patent or other right covered under the convention, in other countries of the
Union, so long as such inventor makes an application in those other
countries within a certain period after the initial application Article 4 (a) (1).
During the period between his application in the home State and a valid
application in other States, his rights suffer no prejudice. The effect of a
claim of priority is that a subsequent filing in any other country or countries
of the union before the expiration of the priority period is not invalidated by
any acts accomplished in the interval. Publication or exploitation of the
invention or the filing of the same subject matter within the priority period
cannot prejudice the effects of the filing for which priority is claimed.
Consequently, the right is said to be an inchoate right in foreign member
countries that is perfected by the actual filing of an application in individual
States. Once filed, the latter application is regarded as filed on the same day
as the first and withdrawal, abandonment or rejection of such first application
does not destroy its validity to serve as a priority basis. Further, the
convention recognises claims based upon multiple or partial priorities, that is,
a claim may not only state the priority of an earlier application, but may also
59
combine the priority of several earlier applications if they deal with different
features of the subject matter of the latter application, even if such multiple
priorities come from different member countries. In the latter claim, elements for
which no priority is claimed may be combined with those for which priority is
claimed, so long as, as in other cases, requirements for unity of invention are met.
The right therefore presupposes, among others:
(i) An international system consisting of materially
and technologically roughly equal States;
(ii) That rights owners need universal protection of
rights, exercisable in any these equal States which
emphasise the 'foreign' over the 'international' in their
territorial grant;
(iii)International monopoly or suppression of independent
inventive activity in other countries is obstructed by slow
international communication, difficulty in assessing
technoeconomic progress in other countries.
The priority right provides an example of a traditional principle that
continues to be detrimentally applied under changed circumstances with a resultant
effect of concentrating intellectual property ownership, and therefore technology,
in a few States. The Model Law provisions relating to the right of priority, that is,
"grace periods" and "prior art effect of applications" do not mitigate but enhance
the impact of the territoriality principle. Under the grace period provision, under
certain conditions, the
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novelty of an invention is unaffected by certain disclosures. Under the prior
art effect of applications provision, the entire contents of an earlier
application that has not yet been published affect the novelty of an invention
as if the application had already been published.
Developing countries, especially the least industrialised, depend largely
on intermediate technology imports. In these technologies, even new
inventions are frequently improvements on existing technology. As was
noted in the Vienna conference Report, among others, technological
development being cumulative, for most technological imports into
developing countries, previous technology is largely developed and held in
industrialised countries.116 Nationals of developed countries therefore
naturally hold dominant background rights (for example, second patents,
whereby the first patent cannot be exploited without the second) in most
technologies. Developing country inventors who wish to exploit their new
invention or improvement, cannot avoid incorporating ideas held as
background rights by developed country nationals. Thus to avoid
committing an infringement inventors in developing countries have to institute
international searches. Such searches provide background rights holders with
opportunities to monitor technological progress in other countries. Holders
of dominant background rights (often multinational corporations) actually
carry out research in various countries in technologies in which they hold
dominant rights.
Because most developing countries, especially the least developed, lack
independent examination systems under which the novelty and inventive step
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of an invention can quickly be ascertained, it is often necessary for an inventor in the
developing country to have his invention or improvement examined extra-territorially. The
above combination of factors means that, using the principle of priority, a developed country
national or enterprise holding dominant background rights can, among others, combine use of
multiple priorities and pre-patenting practices, to inhibit research and independent
technological development117 in developing countries, cause a licensee in an LDC to accept
unwanted "rights" as part of an indivisible package of licensed background rights, thus
perpetuating the role of developing countries as markets.118
2.6.6 Independence of Patents principle
In the absence of an international patent, an inventor or his successor at law must make
an application to the competent national office pursuant to the relevant provisions of that
country's laws. Since countries have differing standards of protection, levels of technological
development and technological needs, it was thought prudent, in order to protect rights
owners, to make a decision to invalidate a patent in a member State ineffective with regard to
the legal position of the same patented invention in other member States. Consequently, under
Article 4bis of the Convention, it is provided that patents for invention granted in member
States must be treated as independent of patents for invention obtained for the same invention
in other countries.
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Developing countries have opposed the independence of patents rule on
the grounds that it opens the door to perpetuation of protection of patent
rights in developing countries that have otherwise been invalidated or have
fallen into the public domain, in the original granting State. Since many
developing countries use non examining systems under which intellectual
property rights, (often originating and examined in developed countries) are
registered if they are deemed in compliance with formal legal requirements,
the arguably the validity or protection of the patent in the developing country
should automatically lapse at the same time in the developing country as in
the granting State; especially in cases of revocation in the first granting State.
Historically, many of the now developed countries used national patent
laws, and specifically the parallel patents principle, to prevent the application
of obsolete technology by foreign inventors. Under the parallel patents
principle, national laws conditioned the abandonment, revocation, forfeiture
and duration of national patent grants upon the status of parallel patents
covering the same invention in other countries. Thus for example, the United
States Revised statute of 1874 provided that:
"every patent for an invention which has been previously
patented in a foreign country shall be so limited as to
expire at the same time with the foreign patent, or if
there be more than one, at the same time with the one
having the shortest term, and in no case shall it be in
force more than seventeen years".119
Developed countries, especially the United States, disagree with any
attempts to depart from the independence of patents principle. Arguably,
inter alia, the independence of patents protects developing countries from
cheap imports since lapse of patent protection in developed countries often
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means that many enterprises, largely from developed countries, can exploit
such originally protected technology, often exporting or even dumping
cheaper products in developing countries often discouraging local working of
the relevant competing patents. Ironically, the major ground relied on to
justify the independence of patents, that is, differences in levels of economic
and technological development, is judged very inadequate to justify
differences in scope or levels of protection.
2.6.7 Right of Importation
The Convention provides, for its members who are bound by the pre-
1934 Acts, that where the law of a member State confers rights with respect
to a product manufactured by a patented process, that State is obliged to
grant to the owner of the patent the same rights if such a product is imported
into it as those it grants in the case where such a product is manufactured on
its territory.
Developing countries have consistently opposed the rights granted
under the right of importation since it ignores the fundamental link between
protection of intellectual property rights and the effect of imports on the
exercise of such rights, that is, the right of importation bestows on its owner
the right to exploit his invention extra-territorially and merely import products
to satisfy local working requirements.
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2.7 Application of Principles;
2.7.1 Patents
Working ofPatents, Importation and the Transfer of Technology:
The most important provisions of the Paris Convention that may relate
to the development and transfer of technology are those regarding the
exploitation of protected rights and the importation of extra-territorially
produced goods in place of local working, that is, generally known as
economic rights. Patentees who have registered their patents in several
countries may decide to manufacture or have manufactured the patent subject
matter in only one of the countries, particularly their home State, and to
prohibit exploitation of the patented invention or process in other countries
where they have acquired protection, subject to the legal provisions in those
countries. They may thereby control, often detrimentally, the economic
development in other States with reference to the subject matter.
Thus the majority of States agree that simultaneous and parallel
working of one and the same invention or technology in many countries is not
feasible, especially in fields where working requires heavy investment and
large scale production.120 However, it is equally well established that local
exploitation of patented inventions is instrumental in the process of
acquisition of technological capability, a fact backed by developed countries
historical resort to working requirements121 to ensure local exploitation of
inventions and works.
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Given disparity in technological ownership among and between States, a decreasing
pool of technologies in the public domain and a corresponding rise in private intellectual
property rights, there is great potential for conflict between private technological rights as
represented in the inventors right to his invention, and those of protecting States, that is, the
State's right to protect the public interest, nutrition, health, national security. By obliging its
members to grant to foreign nationals of other member States, the right they grant to their
nationals (under the national treatment principle) the Convention provides a level of
protection that is intrinsically pro-patentee, even in its 1967 Stockholm version. The Model
Law provides that the owner of a patent has the exclusive right to the exploitation of the
patented invention. Exploitation means, for a product patent, "the making, importing,
offering for sale, selling and using of the product, or the stocking of the product for the
purposes of offering for sale, selling or using; for a process patent, exploitation means the use
of the process, or the doing, in respect of a product directly obtained by means of a process,
of any of the acts referred to above in connection with a product patent". This provision thus
extends process patent protection to products, contrary to developing countries demand.122
The Convention allows each of its members to take legislative measures providing
for the grant of compulsory licences to prevent abuses that might result from the exercise of
exclusive rights, for example, insufficient working or complete failure to work - Article
5(A)(2). This freedom to take legislative measures such as granting compulsory licences is
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immediately curtailed. The Lisbon (1958) and Stockholm (1967) texts that bind the
majority of developing countries provide that:
(a) A compulsory licence may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or
insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the
date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant
of the patent, whichever period expires last - Article 5(A) (4);
(b) The compulsory licence must be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by
legitimate reasons - in practice a subjective condition.
Consequently, where the patentee or his assignee has not taken or is not expected to
take, in reasonable time, effective steps to achieve commercial utilisation of the invention or
fails to meet within reasonable time health or safety needs, the granting State must tolerate
such abuse for three to four years or refuse to grant a compulsory licence to a competent
party willing to exploit the invention locally if the patentee then justifies his failure to work
with "legitimate reasons". Further, compulsory licensing is opposed in all cases, regardless
the technoeconomic and social uses of the invention in the granting State.
(c) Such a compulsory licence must be non-exclusive and is not transferable, even in
the form of the grant of a sub-licence, except with that part of the enterprise or
goodwill which exploits the license.
These well known pro-patentee provisions, as noted above, assume that the patentee
is the best qualified person (in terms of resources, skill or
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interest) to exploit his invention and that such right should not be denied without
immediate recourse to traditional 'due process' procedures or prompt compensation. The
provisions effectively block developing countries effective ability to cause mandatory local
exploitation of the granted right. These provisions are among those which have been under
WIPO revision negotiations for years. On the other hand, parallel reforms initiated by
developed countries under the General Agreement On Tariffs and trade (GATT)123 will, if
implemented metamorphose intellectual property rights into trade measures and impose more
stringent conditions against the use of non voluntary licences, will circumscribe the State's
compulsory licensing rights even further than at present.
Consequently, it may be said that developing countries wishing to prevent
abuse of exclusive rights by withdrawing or qualifying protection face an implicit burden to
prove, inter alia, that greater benefit to the public will or would result from the
discontinuance of exclusive rights, the patentee does not have the incentive to exploit his
invention locally, such patentee is not the best qualified person to exploit the invention to
meet the granting State's interests, that such exploitation under others would respect or
protect confidential proprietary data, technical know-how and other intellectual property
belonging to the owner of the invention or his assignees.
Such presumption of limitation on the powers of States has been frequently opposed
by developing countries and defended by developed countries. The limitation means that
developing countries cannot legitimately follow the historical precedent set by developed
States,124 that is, to
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encourage local working of imported and foreign owned technology through
the use or threat of use of compulsory or mandatory measures. The
conversion of the mandatory measures into ineffective tools, as is now being
undertaken in GATT, will mean that patent owners in developed countries
would be more likely to manufacture using patented technology in the home
States and merely export products.125 Ironically, despite current opposition
to mandatory measures, developed countries current laws contain many
examples of resort to subject matter, process and sector exclusions from
patentability .126
2.8.1 Local working or exploitation, demise of corrective
powers?
From inception, the Paris Convention faced the question of whether the
patentee, among others, must work his invention in countries where he has
obtained a patent and in case of failure to work, whether the patent must be
forfeited or not. The Convention, in line with its leading members legal
philosophy, has always answered the question from a fundamentally pro -
patentee position.127
Developed member States in the Paris Convention stress the need for
observance and possible extension of the present minimum time limits before
compulsory licences may be issued, that is, three years, and the preference for
the voluntary exploitation by the patentee, his assignees or other party under
the contract. Consequently, there has been no positive agreement during the
revision conferences about the time limits before the compulsory licences can
be issued and the non exclusiveness of compulsory licences. Developing
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countries demand for adequate provisions and safeguards which would enable them to
effectively implement, among others, special regimes including grant of special patent rights
to nationals for particular technological product or process categories, speedy grant and use
of compulsory exclusive licences where a patent is not worked or forfeiture of patent rights
after five years of non working without prior issue of a compulsory licence,128 exclusive of
products or processes from protection or short duration of protection, but these demands have
been frustrated by developed countries on various grounds.129
Further, countries taking such measures are increasingly subject to unilateral
retaliation by technology exporting States. Further, the developed member States have
introduced a "trade and investment linked" issue, that is, whether a higher level of
development by a developing country should be accompanied by the assumption of a greater
level of protection of intellectual property as a reflection of that higher level of
development.130 This issue, among others, has clouded the initial objectives which were
declared in the ongoing attempts to revise the Paris Convention, thus slowing down the
revision process.131 The objectives of the revision of the Convention, set out in Chapter 2
above, include among others, orientation of the Convention to ensure that it can promote the
actual working of the invention in each country itself, facilitate the local development of
technology by and in developing countries, improve the conditions for the transfer of
technology from industrialised to developing countries on fairer and reasonable terms.132
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Mandatory measures, including compulsory licences are increasingly becoming a
solution of token value133 to developing countries. The reasons for this include:
(a) An increase in linkage of international intellectual property issues with other issues
such international trade, investment, by developed countries, reflecting a very
weak bargaining position on the part of developing countries;
(b) The well known problem of procedural and technical requirements such as the
time periods, for example, three years before a compulsory licence may issue;
(c) The non-exclusiveness of compulsory licences which allows patent or trademark
owners to stifle local production in the issuing State through imports or the
establishment of so called 'screw driver' production plants where virtually all
production inputs are imported and assembled in the issuing State;
(d) Exploitation of a patented right under license, assignment or even after purchase
or rights, often requires more than the grant of even an exclusive right to
exploit a bare patented invention or the acquisition of such bare patent right.
This is due, as seen above, to the fact that even new technologies are often
improvements on existing technology in which the patent owner holds
background patents, thus necessitating the negotiation of technical assistance
and other related technical licences agreements before the relevant patent can
be exploited under the compulsory licence.
2.8.2 Revocation or Forfeiture
The Paris Convention leaves the determination of the duration of granted patent
rights to the legislation of member States, though such duration must conform to the
minimum standard of national treatment.
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Patents applied for during the period of priority are independent as regards
their normal duration and patents obtained with the benefit of priority must
have a duration equal to that which they would have, had they been applied
for or granted without the benefit of reciprocity. The Model Law on
inventions provides for a duration of fifteen years from the filing date of the
patent application, with a possible five year extension if the patented is
sufficiently worked in the country or if there are circumstances which justify
the failure to work the invention.
However, the Convention also provides for the revocation or forfeiture
of the patent when grant of the compulsory licence(s) would not be sufficient
to prevent perceived abuses. No proceedings for revocation can be instituted
before the lapse of two years after the grant of the first compulsory licence,
that is, before the expiration of five years from the date of grant of the
patent. This provision which is in accordance with the bargain or quid pro
quo theory of protection, that is, the primary aim of the grant being to
enable the owner to work the invention in a way beneficial to the public,
failing which all other privileges lapse,134 is rarely effectively resorted to by
developing countries. The reasons for the absence of use are not hard to find,
if the opposition to and conditions for resort to the less stringent measures of
compulsory licensing are borne in mind. Consequently, though the threat of
or actual use of revocation measures would be useful in preventing the use of
purely 'strategic patents' (that is, patents held locally to ensure a market
whose holder has no intention of exploiting), the measures are increasingly
getting out of reach for developing countries.
72
2.8.3 Importation
Importation of products manufactured by a patented process, is on the
agenda of the ongoing revision of the Paris Convention. The current Article
5 provides that importation by the patentee of articles manufactured in a
country of the Union shall not entail forfeiture or cancellation of the patent in
the importing country. Developing countries have persistently objected to
this provision.
Among the grounds advanced against importation as working, that is,
the importation of products of the patented invention or process to satisfy the
local market, is that such importation increases the dependency of developing
countries on foreign technology by maintaining developing countries as
markets or more specifically, that such importation normally continues even
where local production is feasible. Further, where compulsory licences have
been granted, importation can hinder the local working of the invention
process, especially in the least developed countries where enforcement
mechanisms are usually extremely inadequate or weak.
Developing countries have proposed,135 under the revision process, to
link importation to local working. Under the proposal, where a patentee does
not actually work his invention or process but continues to import, protection
would be forfeited, revoked or subjected to compulsory licensing, exclusive
or non exclusive. Developed countries repeatedly maintain that where local
demand constitutes only a small proportion of total global demand and the
invention cannot be worked in small economic units, importation is justified,
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unless imports threaten national security or pose material injury to local
established or feasible industry or are contrary to internationally agreed or
acceptable standards or norms, for example, where they constitute dumping.
The compromise solution, that is, to revise the Article so it provides that
importation does not constitute working unless the national law of the
member State recognises such importation as sufficient to constitute working,
has failed to achieve developed country approval.
2.9 Industrial Designs
Industrial designs rights protect the appearance of a product, that is, its
aesthetic nature, not its technical details or way of operation. Like patents,
they are enforceable against anyone who infringes, regardless of the whether
the infringing party independently arrived the infringing design. Industrial
designs form a very important aspect in the commercialisation of goods and
for purposes of technology transfer, their role is chiefly of "negative"
importance to developing countries, that is, that like trade marks (see below)
they can be used to restrict access to technological processes, know-how or
products, especially in relation to the textile industry136 and industrial crafts.
2.10 Trade and Service Marks
Most of the above applies equally to trademarks. The Paris Convention
(1883) obliges its member States to protect trademarks, that is, signs which
distinguish the products offered by an enterprise form those of competitors,
as well as service namely, signs which distinguish services offered by an
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enterprise from those offered by others.137 Member States to the Union are free to determine
which kind of signs (visible, audible, dimensional nature, etc. may serve as trade marks.138
Briefly stated, the grant of trademark protection normally confers on its owner the
right to preclude third parties from using the trade mark or any sign resembling it in such a
way as to be likely mislead the public in respect of the same or similar goods or services for
which the trade mark is registered or from using the trademark or similar sign without just
cause in a way which is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the owner of the trade mark.
Where a trade mark is well known to consumers in a country, its owner may preclude third
parties from using or registering that trademark or a confusingly similar sign,139 for identical
or similar goods, even if the well known mark is not registered or used in the country by its
owner. Third parties may also be prevented from using well known marks or confusingly
similar signs except in connection with specific registered goods or services.140
Under the Convention, a trademark registered in a Union member State establishes a
right in all member other member States to the effect that registration of a trademark in those
other member States can be refused only if:
(1) If the new trademark infringes existing marks;
(2) If it lacks distinctive character;
(3) If it violates morality or public order;
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(4) Is deceptive; The nature of the goods to which a trademark is to be applied may
not form an obstacle to the registration of a mark.
The national treatment principle applies to trade and service marks, that is, the same
criteria applied to nationals also applies to nationals and residents of the other member
States. Similarly, the right of priority applies to non national's applications for registration of
their marks. Countries wishing to use the trademark without the consent of the owner, that
is, mandatorarily, may only cancel registration of the mark after a reasonable time on grounds
of failure to use, and only if the person concerned does not justify failure to use. The
Convention does not provide any standards or norms on compulsory licensing of trademarks.
The importance of trade and service marks in international technology transfer
springs from the fact that they are very useful to an owner of intellectual property rights who
wishes to form of a package of "indivisible rights" which may include patents, industrial
designs, copyrights, etc., protected under one of the constituent parts. Copyrights and trade
or service marks are preferred to "tie" the bundle because they are easier to acquire and last
much longer than other rights.Ul The bundle or package of rights, which may include items
in the public domain, is then used by the owner to prevent or eliminate parallel imports,
allocate exclusive (monopoly) territorial rights to licensees or assignees of the bundled rights,
who are often subsidiaries of the package rights holder, that is, market segregation.
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Trade or service marks are thus frequently appended to agreements for the licensing,
assignment or even sale of patents and/or know-how, that is because trademarks are
associated with the quality of particular goods and the quality of such goods depends on the
standards of production which in turn rely on access to, among others, relevant know-how.
Under multifaceted agreements, the trademark recipient is often required to mark all its
products in accordance with the entire scope of the agreement including quality control,
volume of production limits, advertising requirements, etc. This situation results in total
control over access to the packaged rights by the owner, elimination of independent evolution
of similar technological products or designs already in the public domain (for example,
reverse engineering of those parts of ht package already in the public domain) by competitors
in LDC's, etc.
Further, trademarks are particularly useful to technology owners wishing to restrict
competition or access to their intellectual property rights in that national authorities in
developing countries find it difficult, if not impossible to evaluate the actual contribution of a
trade or service mark to the overall technology imported. To evaluate the actual contribution
of the trademark, some of the more experienced national LDC registering authorities use
estimates of the probably profits or price of the goods which incoiporate the technology,
etc.,142 but these can be contested by the owner of the trademark. Consequently, a trademark
owner can avoid local transparency measures while demanding for better protection of his
rights.
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In the least developed countries where the recipient possesses, almost as a rule,
insufficient bargaining power and/or access to information, the trademark becomes a useful
tool for imposing various restrictions on licensees or assignees, without the granting State
being legally able to intervene. Thus, control over the actual production activities of a
licensee may be ensured by, inter alia, restraining any sale of goods not packaged,
configured, designed, etc., in accordance with the usual way associated with the trade or
service mark. The trademark owner may impose unwanted intellectual property rights (often
justified as necessary to enable supervision and/or control by the owner of the mark over the
quality of all products advertised under the mark), require a licensee not to contest the
validity of the trade or service mark(s) and other rights granted under the package contract,143
or actually prohibit continued manufacture (sometimes indefinitely) or sale of the product
under the trademark, unless an offending practice or omission is remedied. According to
Seyoum's.144 research, evidence of restrictive practices by owners of trademarks over their
licensees in Sub-Saharan Africa is common. Thus for example, prohibition clauses are often
included in agreements (even those involving public enterprises where stoppage of
production would extend far beyond profit consideration's) with the stated 'explicit' aim of
enabling the trademark owner or his representative to inspect the recipient's premises,
manufacturing facilities, records, etc., to take samples of raw materials, components of
finished products or production records; allegedly to ensure compliance with product quality
and standards. Because of lack of transparency in contracts involving trademarks and the
difficulty of assessing the exact technological contribution of the trademark or
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service mark, the trademark owner frequently has ample freedom to control
the recipient's independent development of his own local mark by, inter alia,
prohibiting contemporaneous development of licensee owned marks through
juxtaposition of marks, that is, joint use of both the original trademark and
the recipient's own mark on a product.145 Juxtaposition of trademarks, an
otherwise useful tool in the development of independent marks, is
consistently opposed by developed countries, especially the United States.
To prevent possible abuse by the trademark owner, some advanced
developing countries, such as Brazil have passed legislation under which
trademarks cannot be the basis for consideration or royalty after they have
reached a certain point in their life. Such provisions are however under threat
from the now GATT proposed reforms.146 Article 18 of the GATT trade
related aspects of intellectual property rights Draft provides that after the
initial registration of not less than seven years, a trade mark shall be
renewable indefinitely.
2.11 Dispute settlement under the Convention
Under the Paris Convention, the International Court of Justice is
competent to decide on any dispute between two or more States concerning
the interpretation or application of the Convention, unless such dispute is
settled by negotiations or otherwise. So far, no case has been submitted to
the ICJ.147
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The Multilateral Copyright Frame Work and Transfer of Technology
2.12 International Copyright - new dimensions in international technology
transfer
This importance of Copyright in North - South technology transfer is undoubtedly
rising. This importance arises, inter alia, from the following facts:
(a) Copyrights are obtained under less stringent criteria than patents. Though
Copyright protects only the expression of an idea from unauthorised use and
does not extend to the protection of such expression from independent creation
or confer rights over underlying ideas or functionality, it is of long duration
compared to patents and unlike patents which can always in theory be shown
to be invalid, copyright in practice cannot be invalidated;
(b) It is not always possible to obtain patents even though development of an idea has
been costly or is novel in a commercial or market sense.148 This applies to
computer programmes which are not patentable and many other "information
technologies". Copyright however is easily acquired for original computer
software processes, technical data, engineering drawings, etc., all of which are
gaining great market and international trade significance to their owners,
mostly in developed countries, and are of increasing importance in production
and the translation of innovations into products, in all countries .149
(c) Copyright accords with the drive by developed countries to accord protection to
intellectual property in accordance with the economic value or "commercial
value" of an innovation or idea, rather than in accordance with strict legal
theory or philosophy, for example, protection of moral rights;
(d) Under the Berne Convention, once copyright is granted for a work in a member
State, it applies in all other signatory States according to their own laws.
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Such a provision confers great advantage for instance in cases where the owner wishes
to restrain parallel imports in various territories. In such cases, the copyright
owner - who also holds the original product patent and trademark(s), industrial
designs, trade secrets, etc.; or has equivalent rights - would demand for sale of
the product in original packaging since copyright extends to designs and
words, contained on packaging as well as trademarks and manuals distributed
with the product. The owner of the copyright can therefore link all rights, into
a bundle of indivisible rights, even assignable as a territorial trade right.
Technological goods produced by a developing country national or enterprise,
for example, after reverse engineering, cannot then be marketed or distributed
without violating the copyright protected bundle.150
For developing countries, issues of international copyright protection and technology
transfer are increasingly virtually inseparable.151 Both the Berne152 and Universal
Copyright153 (herein after UCC) Conventions have subsumed the knowledge or information
needs of developing countries under the need to preserve the rights of authors and the level of
protection accorded to them. Before the 1971 revisions of both Conventions154 they
contained no effective special or differential provisions to deal with the recognised problems
of developing countries in getting access to information for purposes of scholarship, teaching
and research.155 Though
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the scope and content of the economic and moral rights of the author (for our
purposes mainly reproduction, translation, adaptation and broadcasting) was
left to each member State subject only to national treatment and other
minimum standards, the progressive extension of the exclusive rights of the
author remained paramount. Thus as Ricketson notes:
"Up to the time of the Brazaville meeting,156 however,
the preparatory work for the Beme Revision had taken no
account of the problems of developing countries, and had
been essentially concerned with the question of raising
the level of protection offered by the Convention. Indeed,
at this time, the major issue for the forthcoming revision
was thought to be the achievement of a uniform regime
governing cinematographic works"152.
The Stockholm Protocol (1967)158 which had been meant to enable
developing countries to adopt certain reservations (vis-a-vis adoption of
wider restrictions on the rights of authors159 which was categorically rejected
by developed countries) had been rendered ineffectual by developed countries
refusal to ratify it,160 on the grounds, inter alia, that:
(i) In theory, according to developed countries, a developing country
could use the Protocol provisions to lower protection below the
acceptable minimum standards or even deny an author's rights
entirely.161 This arose, it was argued, because the Protocol sought to
lower standards of protection, contrary to Beme Convention
provisions. To developed countries, the preservation of Beme
standards was paramount, as the inclusion of a safeguard clause,162 in
the UCC (1952)163 Article XVII, indicated. Under the safeguard
clause, a party acceding to the UCC, accepts, on accession, to grant no
protection to those States which have withdrawn from the Beme
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Convention, and for States party to the both Conventions, the Berne
Convention Provisions prevail.
In rejecting the Protocol, developed countries further argued that Berne
Union member States can only enter into special agreements among
themselves only in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive
rights than those granted by the Beme Convention or contain no provisions
contrary to the Convention. The Protocol, it was claimed by developed
countries, violated these requirements. Further, it was said that the Protocol
violated the copyright owner's right to decide, like the owner of any other
property, when and in what form and place his work was to be used
(economic rights) and to object to its misuse (moral rights).164 Most
importantly, the Protocol was to form an inseparable part of the Berne Union,
contrary to the wishes of developed countries.165
The "negated" Protocol, would have enabled developing countries, inter
alia:
(i) To reduce duration of protection from Fifty to twenty Five years;
(ii) To terminate translation rights which remained unused after a given
period of time, that is, ten years from the date of publication of the
original translation.166 This right of termination was however of little
practical value to developing countries since the said translation could
take place in any member country of the Union and the developing
country would then have to sustain the economic burden if importing
copies of such a work.167
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(iii) To translate and reproduce protected works under compulsory
licences in return for equitable payment;168
(iv) To restrict protection in order to enable the use of protected works
for teaching, research and study in all fields of education.169
According to developed countries, these concessions were unjustifiable.
Particularly, it was argued that if the Protocol was implemented, authors
would have no guarantee of payment in cases of use for teaching, scholarship
and research. Developing countries, ambiguously defined, would be free
under the Protocol to export copies of reproduced or translated works to
other developing countries and would have no incentive to improve the level
of protection beyond that offered by the Protocol.170
2.13 Post - 1971 Paris Revisions of the Berne and UCC
Conventions
Provisions governing preferential and special access to protected
rights by developing countries:
The impasse that was reached after the non implementation of the
Stockholm proposal was supposed to be eliminated by the 1971 Paris
revisions of both the Berne and UCC conventions.171 However, the
reservations that developing countries were allowed to make under the Paris
revisions are greatly more restricted than those which had been envisaged
under the Stockholm Protocol. The "favourable compulsory licensing"
provisions are laid down under articles Vbis, Vter and V quater of the UCC
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(1971) and the parallel provisions of the Appendix to the Berne Convention
(1971), respectively.172 These "favourable'-'provisions are then hedged
around by an extremely complex and detailed set of exceptions and
restrictions. The result renders the Beme Appendix longer than the Act
itself. As Ricketson notes, "the detail of the compulsory licences allowed
under the Appendix contrasts strangely with the general compulsory licences
provided under Articles 11 bis and 13 (l).173 The Paris revisions allow for
the use of non - exclusive licences, which are non - transferable and are
granted in return for due remuneration, for the exclusive purpose of teaching,
scholarship and research or systematic instructional acts. Remuneration is to
be in conformity with the scale of royalties paid in freely negotiated licences
between two persons in the countries concerned. Copies of titles are not,
normally, to be exportable.174
To ensure maximum compliance with Berne standards after the
revisions, developed countries ensured that no new member State to the UCC
could, after the coming into force of the new convention, accede solely to the
1952 Convention, that is, a State acceding to the 1971 UCC Convention
automatically became party to the 1952 UCC Convention. However, where
two States belonged one each to the 1952 and 1971 versions of the
Convention, relations between them would be regulated under the 1952
version of the Convention. These provisions were justified as ensuring non
discrimination between developing States that were at the time of the
revisions (1971) members of one of the Conventions, and those acceding to
the new Conventions (the revisions contained, in the case of the UCC, higher
minimum standards than the 1952 version). To avoid non - ratification and
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ensure harmony in implementation of the new revisions, an unusual
cumulative condition was included in the ratification procedure of the Berne
Appendix which required that specific member States, that is, France, Spain,
the United Kingdom and the United States should become bound by the
revised text of the UCC Articles 1 to 21 of the Beme Convention175 and
Appendix did not enter into force until three months after five member States
had ratified the Paris Act without making a declaration under Article 28(1)
(b).
The revisions were supposed to achieve a balance between the legal
entitlements of authors the equitable needs arising out of the development
process in LDC's. Briefly stated, the post 1971 multilateral Copyright
protection system would in the main ensure:
(a) That developing countries could apply the same level of protection to
foreign works, whether covered by the Berne or UCC;
(b) That developing countries could not be prevented from leaving the
Berne Convention (suspension of safeguard clause, Article XVII
UCC, in case of LDC's;
(c) The minimum level of protection provided by the UCC was raised, to
counter balance the suspension of the safeguard clause in the case
of LDC's;176
(d) The least developed States educational and cultural needs would
receive special attention;
(e) Except for duration of protection, material reciprocity was not to
apply to the compulsory licensing system, that is, the developed
countries were to continue applying the national treatment
standard by giving equal protection to works from LDC as they
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gave to those of their own nationals. The Principle was included in the Appendix to
the Berne Convention as Article 1, paragraph (6), but is only implicit under
the UCC.177
Below, we assess to what extent, if any, most of these objectives have been fulfilled.
As already stated, in technoeconomic terms, copyright is of increasing importance to
developing countries seeking to use imported systematic knowledge (technology) to establish
local technological innovation systems, translate such innovations into products and
processes, boost local production, etc.178 Real access to such systematic knowledge,
including state of the art knowledge, through copyright(s) granted on favourable and special
terms, will in future play an increasingly greater role relative to patented knowledge.
However, the threat of increased use of leverage,119 protection of "commercial" copyrights,
as incentive to copyright owners, maintenance of markets and market lead times, etc.;
threatens to eliminate the limited LDC gains180 since the 1971 revisions at Paris. We
concentrate on the provisions under the revised UCC (1971) - articles Vbis to V quater,
because they are substantively in line with those of the Berne Convention Appendix and
analysis of both Conventions would entail unnecessary duplication181 Berne Convention
Appendix parallel provisions are cited whenever relevant. All references to the UCC, herein
below, apply to the 1971 revised version, and Berne Convention references, apply to the
Paris version (1971), unless otherwise stated.
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2.13.1 Eligibility under the Revised Convention
There are two (apparent) standards set down in the Conventions for
countries that want to take advantage of the provisions allowing restriction of
the exclusive rights of authors.
The two standards are:
(a) That any contracting State to either the UCC or the Berne Union*82
Convention is considered a developing country in conformity with
the established practice of the United Nations General Assembly -
Article V bis 1 UCC. The standard has been criticised as vague,
not setting out specific criteria for determining exactly which
countries may be regarded as developing and therefore eligible.
The Main Committee II at the Stockholm revision conference,183
that is, that "established practice" implied that the country in
question received assistance from the United Nations
Development Programme through the United Nations or one of its
specialised agencies, is of little value when account is taken of the
fact that many developing countries, especially the advanced ones,
may contribute to, as much as they receive, from such sources.184
This test therefore has to be simultaneously or concurrently
applied with the next one below, that is, whether the country in
question considers itself a developing country for the purposes of
using the Convention's provisions.
(b) This second test, much more difficult to assess than the first, requires
that a country decide whether, in view of its "economic" situation,
social and cultural needs, it does not consider itself immediately in
a position to make provision for the protection of all rights as
provided for in the Convention. The obvious danger here is that
"self - evaluation" may be difficult due to rapid changes in
technoeconomic and other circumstances, making some States to
take undue advantage of the provisions.
88
However, apparently, simultaneous application of both tests balances
sovereignty, State responsibility and national and territorial interests against
the collective interest and international consensus. Thus a State may not
arbitrarily declare itself eligible without corresponding recognition from the
majority of States as being in such need. This process therefore ensures
negotiated "graduation" of developing countries from the scheme, rather than
arbitrary or "leveraged ejection" while also eliminating unjustifiable claims.
In practice, "notification" of the need for use of the reservations at the time of
ratification is normally sufficient.185 Under the Berne Convention, the
developing country may choose between the procedure under Article 1(1)
and that of the ten year period provided for in the Paris Additional Act (1896)
which allows the extinguishing of exclusive rights of an author if after ten
years no translation of the original has occurred into the language of a
country availing itself of the facility.18^
2.13.2 Termination of right
Once an LDC ceases to be regarded as such, it becomes ineligible to
renew the ten year notification or to avail itself of the exceptions as from
either the end of the "current ten year period" or three years after it has
ceased to be regarded as a developing country, whichever period expires
later.187 The criteria for graduating a country from the scheme are not clear.
Under the new GATT - IPR reforms, developed countries have attempted to
establish criteria based on the export performance (often sectored) of a
developing country. This approach, which threatens to reinterpret the criteria
for graduation, especially in the case of the newly industrialising countries188
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does not consider whether the country in question has achieved overall
technological capacity and if so whether such capacity is in balance with
cultural, social and economic needs.
Specific Rights:
2.13.3 Translation Rights
Developed countries have been more willing, especially in very recent
times (Uruguay Round),189 to allow the limitation of the authors exclusive
right to translate vis-i-vis the limitation of the right to reproduce or
distribute. The very recent lack of emphasis on moral rights, traditionally
defended by continental European States, especially France, indicates, as
already stated, the ascendancy of the United States view of copyright as a
freely alienable economic190 right and not a natural right.
The exclusive right to translate - Article V (2) UCC (1952),191 is the
exclusive right to the integrity of his work or to the correct translation of his
work. It is therefore essentially a moral right. The Tunis Model Law, section
5(2), provides that the author has the right "to object to, and seek relief in
connection with any distortion, mutilation or other modification or
derogatory action related to his work where such action would be prejudicial
to his honour or reputation. Due to the difficulty of assessing the nature, this
right, it would, if rigorously applied, give a blanket right to authors to restrict
almost any activity related to their work. Increased emphasis was laid by
some developed countries on this right, especially before the Uruguay Round,
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allegedly in order to cub mass "fragmentation of copyright" or illegal translation and
transmission of protected works, especially through use of new (communication and
information) technologies.192
2.13.4 Translation Licences, eligibility and scope
Translation rights are granted to developing countries which comply with the
requirements set out under Article Vbis 1 of the UCC 1971193 The licence rights are much
more restricted than those originally envisaged under the unratified Stockholm Protocol. The
licences are granted only for purposes of teaching, scholarship or research.194 Among the
most notable restrictions on non voluntary licensing that would affect efforts to promote
technology transfer, either through improved dissemination of works or grater application of
new ideas to improve local technological capacity are the provisions that:
(a) The licences are non-exclusive and non-transferable, that is, purely personal to the
licensee;195
(b) Translation licences apply only to published works, that is, copies must be
available in readable form. Consequently, among others, non compulsory
licenses exclude almost all new forms of information, for example, computer
data bases and software, sound recordings, television, video-grams, cable,
etc.;196 Note - Translation for research purposes is only to teaching or
dissemination of results to specialised technical or scientific research to
experts in a particular field, but excludes industrial research institutes and
private undertakings;
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(c) Where the author has withdrawn from circulation all copies of the work, a
compulsory licence cannot issue;197
Further, such limitations obstruct development of informatics industry198 in LDC's,
their ability to utilise information especially in the development of national technical or
scientific research curriculum's199 or disseminate knowledge to nationals involved in specific
productive and developmental activity, etc.
2.13.5 Time Limits and other restrictions on translation licences
Time limits or waiting periods for translations are under the UCC (1971) set up in a
3 tier system synonymous with that under the Berne Appendix. Translation licences may be
issued, where after three years or such longer period as may be determined by national
legislation, a translation of a work remains unpublished in a language in general use in a
member country of the Union.200 Translation licences may also be acquired for works that
are out of print, or those published in languages that are not in general use in one or more of
the developed countries' member to the Union.201 However in terms of technology transfer,
the most important limitation is that imposed when a developing country wishes to reduce
the period before translation licenses can issue to one year or less. In such cases, there must
be unanimous agreement by all the developed countries in which the language to be
translated is in
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"general use".202 This restriction has various effects, that is, technoeconomic and political.
Technological advancement may be restricted since the short time period does not apply
where the language in question is French, English or Spanish, that is, the major languages in
which most works of immediate technoeconomic value to the majority of LDC's are
published. In addition to the above, protection of the private rights of authors is reinforced
by further time limits. Thus, a licence may not be granted until six months203 after the
applicant has complied with the required procedure, or nine months204 in cases where the
address of the owner of the licence right is unknown. During these six or nine month
periods, no licence may be granted if a translation in the language in respect of which the
licence application was made is published by the owner of the published right or with his
authorisation205 (in any member country of the Union).
2.13.6 Reproduction Licences
The permission to reproduce works on concessionaire terms is vital to LDC's in their
use of information to adapt, develop and disseminate imported technologies. Reproduction
rights are supposed to mitigate differences between LDC users and the owners or holders of
rights, especially in relation to bargaining power (caused inter alia by unequal access to
resources and information regarding transfer of rights), royalty payments etc. The right to
reproduce should guarantee that protection is used for more than facilitation of importation of
foreign works.206 However, developed countries exclusively focus on the potential of
reproduction rights to deny
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authors the opportunity to reproduce and freely alienate their own work, enter into
the execute contracts in relation to such work, etc.
2.13.7 Criteria and conditions for obtaining compulsory licences
These parallel those for translation licences but are even more restricted.
Reproduction rights may be obtained, generally, upon the expiration of five years.207
Compulsory licenses to reproduce are only granted after the latest edition of the work has
expired. Like with translation licences, the right to reproduce can only be acquired if the
owner has failed to put copies of an edition of a work on the market at a reasonable price
(defined as similar to that normally charged for the same or related work in the requesting
State).208 The purpose for which a licence is granted is very restricted, being limited to
"systematic instructional activities",209 which excludes reproduction for purposes of research,
distribution of copies produced under licence to the "public" in the granting country, etc.
2.13.8 Science and technology as "exceptions" to the five year period
The five year period does not apply to works the natural and physical sciences,
including mathematics and technology. Instead a three year period applies,210 while a seven
year period applies to works of fiction. While the three year (shorter) period for technical
and scientific works is supposed to meet the needs of LDC's, this provision i of little practical
value. This is due to, inter alia, the current and foreseeable rapid nature of scientific and
technological change, the imposition of a dichotomy between technical
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knowledge and its social - cultural basis, which renders LDC's prone to "blind"
import of technological and scientific ideas, etc. Developing countries are consequently left
import dependent especially due to consumption of near obsolete information technologies,
are made vulnerable to the application of technologies of "unknown" social - cultural
effects211 or even environmental effects. Export of reproduced copies is strictly forbidden, as
in the case of translations,212 with few exceptions213 which centre on exports to nationals.214
Such provisions are detrimental to joint regional cooperation efforts in, inter alia, science
and technology development.215
2.13.9 Termination ofRight
The right terminates when the owner, or somebody who is duly authorised by him
puts on sale, at reasonable prices, copies of ht work on the national market to meet the
requirements of the general public for systematic instructional activities.
2.14 Undetermined Issues and Preliminary Conclusion
The Paris Convention is inherently aimed at the protection of intellectual property
rights against "granting State control". Because the Convention predates the current
international development crisis and the international development gap, it remains based on
a very weak (private individual and commercially oriented) perception of the nature of
technological innovation and change. Consequently, efforts to revise the Convention have
faltered or even been reversed.216 The Convention therefore contains virtually no provisions
or mechanism to correct
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technological and material inequality between States. At the enterprise or
contractual level, developing country nationals seeking to select, acquire and
adapt foreign patented technology and related know-how directly related to
and immediately applicable to their operations, face terms and conditions
unilaterally determined, set and maintained by developed country nationals
who own the majority of increasingly absolute intellectual property rights.217
Consequently, many issues remain unresolved or un-addressed. These
include:
2.14.1 Patents
Sovereign rights vis-a-vis Intellectual Property Rights:
To what extent should a State exercise or refrain from exercising its
sovereign powers in order to ensure performance of its primary duty and
responsibility, that is, to ensure its technoeconomic, social and cultural
development. Similarly, the issue of whether duration of protection should
have a harmonised international minimum standard, that is, 20 years or be a
matter for domestic legislation, is unresolved.
Scope and Duration ofRights:
The extent to which parties may exclude, from patentability "products
and processes, on grounds of public interest, national security, public health
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or nutrition, (including food, chemical and pharmaceutical products and processes), etc.
Working versus Importation:
Whether if working includes importation, such working is compatible with the
acquisition of technological capacity by developing countries, especially the least developed.
2.1.4.2 Trade Marks, Industrial Designs, Extra
Because trademarks are primarily concerned with finished products, they have
traditionally had little relevancy in connection with international development and transfer of
technology. However, they are increasingly used in combination with other intellectual
property rights, that is, as part of a package, when they can be actively used to influence the
terms and conditions under which an LDC national selects, acquires, adapts or disseminates
any technology. Even more importantly, they can be used to prevent the acquisition of an
independent technological capacity by the recipient. The issues that will therefore have to be
addressed include:
Whether trademark use should be conditioned under law of granting State, for
example, use with other trademarks, use in special form or under multilateral instruments and
whether duration of period of non use, uninterrupted or not, before cancellation of trademark
and what constitutes valid reasons (a subjective standard) for non use of the trademark
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2.14.3 Copyright
The complexity of the compulsory licensing provisions which is meant
to guarantee protection of private rights, has thoroughly defeated the original
purpose of the Paris reforms, that is, to ensure access to information and
systematic knowledge on fair and favourable terms for developing countries.
As in the case of the Paris Convention, few developing countries have been
able to use compulsory licensing provisions at all. By requiring them to
increase protection for copyrighted works, developed countries seek to deny
developing countries the opportunity to create and develop effective
intellectual property institutions. This is due to the fact that a country's
interest in protection depends primarily on the size of its own intellectual
property pool, the contribution of intellectual property to its technoeconomic
and social cultural development and the perceived goodwill of other States.
Unlike the unratified Stockholm Protocol, the UCC revised provisions and
the Berne Appendix are balanced against LDC's to the extent of being of only
token value in facilitating the acquisition of technological and related




The Multilateral System and the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries, the
Example of the United Nations Development
Organisation (UNDP), Issues of International
Transmission of Technological Capacity to
Developing Countries and a New International
Order
The role of the United Nations Development Programme (herein after UNDP) in the
acquisition of technological capacity by developing countries through, inter alia,
international technical cooperation, provides a unique model for the adaptation of
international institutional arrangements and the multilateral legal framework to
ensure that developing countries effectively participate equally in international
technoeconomic cooperation decision making and implementation of the resultant
decisions, within framework provided by the UNDP and its related specialised
agencies, in relation to acquisition of technological skills, among others, by member
States, is a proximate framework treaty, that is a framework that is designed to deal
with complex and dynamic technological skill transfer practices or relationships
between State parties and their enterprises through a framework that allows
continuous adjustment of agreed rules, through new decisions, resolutions,
procedures, etc. This feature of UNDP law making is characteristic of the new
organised international community's progressive lawformation processes that do not
fall into any clear category of Article 38. The new framework arrangements have
promoted the opportunities available to developing countries to:
(i) Choose andformulate their own technoeconomicprioritiesfor development;
(ii) Acquire external technoeconomic support through a contractual and equitably
negotiated settlement i.e. a multilateral legal process (substantive and procedural)
which involves, among others:
(a) A requestfor external assistance by apotential recipient State;
(b) Offer ofassistance by the UNDP;
(C) Consideration of offer by recipient State, including opportunity to reject
offer;218
(d) Conclusion ofnegotiation:
(e) Performance of negotiated agreement under transparent legal terms and
conditions - multilaterally agreed, with automatic safeguards for maintenance of
sovereign rights ofa recipient State to determine its needs and interests;
(f) Performance andfollow up of any request in accordance with agreed legal
terms and conditions;
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(g) Offer of special and preferential treatment to the least developed recipient
countries through specific formal legal mechanisms and instruments such as the
special industrial services programme, special measures fundfor the least developed
countries and "round - table process", while maintaining balance of commitments
amongst all recipients in accordance with the principle of universality219 This
unique feature is ensured by, inter alia, promotion ofmutual self help among parties,
reciprocal participation (colloquially referred to as "those who receive also give"),220
use of the net contributor mechanism 221 etc. Consequently, programme activities
enhance cooperation and reciprocity rather than unilaterally imposing aid or
assistance;
(h) Settlement of disputes under transparent procedures and provisions with the
objective aim ofensuring achievement ofagreed legal objectives;
(i) Promotion ofmutual self help (i.e. self help by the amongst recipient States)
in order, amongst others to ensure that the international collective interests are
incorporated into the cooperation process and adequately addressed by the
developing countries; etc. without departing from multilateralism, collective
interdependence andpreservation ofeach members sovereign rights and duties.
Below, we examine the legal substantive and procedural "coordination table" or
framework treaty type ofarrangements i.e. multilateral legal machinery, instruments,
measures, rules and standards that UNDP member States have established to
promote the transfer of technical knowledge and skills to LDC member States on a
fully negotiated, consensual, equitable and co-operative basis. The other purpose of
this chapter is also to highlight the factors that are inter linked or related to
international development and transfer of technology i.e. as we cited Schneider in the
introduction above, no problem of international law can be viewed realistically
without considering it within its political economic, sociological, scientific and
technological context.. Similarly, no solution to the problem can be achieved which
does not accommodate these realities.
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The Origin of the International Technical Co¬
operation Multilateral Framework
International technical co-operation as a permanent aspect of inter- State
relations was in built into the United Nations Charter. Under Article 56 all members
of the United Nations pledged themselves to take joint and separate action in co¬
operation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth under
Article 55. Article 55 calls for States to co-operate, inter alia, to create conditions
of stability and well-being, on the basis of the principles of equality and self-
determination. Such co-operation, for our purposes, is the promotion of access to
science and technology for all States and peoples.
To meet the newly recognised international development needs, the countries
member to the United Nations created the Expanded Programme for Technical
Assistance (EPTA)222 and the Special Fund (SF). The merger of these two bodies,
with provision for the continuation of their underlying principles to form the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), showed a commitment by all member
States of the United Nations to co-operate, thorough, inter alia, technical co¬
operation and assistance, to reduce material inequalities between and amongst
them. This commitment is to date the only highly effective means for facilitating the
acquisition of technological skills by developing countries.223
3.1 The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
(EPTA)
EPTA was created in 1949 and was the first concentrated large scale effort
by the United Nations system to transfer technical knowledge and skills to
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developing countries through, inter alia, the provision of expert advice and
fellowships.224 The programme derived its substantive basis largely from United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 200 (III) of 1948 on technical
assistance in the field of economic development, Resolution 418 (v) of 1950
which called for the institution of advisory social welfare services and Resolution
723 (Vni) of 1953 which set up the public administration programme and the
Economic and Social Council Resolution 222A of 1949 which set forth the
operating principles for the programme and provided for its organisational nature.
Under EPTA, expert assistance, fellowships and equipment was provided
through a central pooling of government voluntary contributions. The
timing, value and size of the contributions and their non-guarantied nature were
a problem from the inception of the programme. Use of pooled resources was
supervised, controlled and guided through the Technical Assistance Board
(TAB),225 an inter-organisation or agency body without autonomous legal
personality. The board consisted of representatives from the secretariats of the
participating agencies and an executive Chairman appointed by the United Nations
Secretary General in consultation with the participating agencies that received
allocations from EPTA to finance technical assistance projects. Each of the
participating agencies executed its EPTA funded project according to its "formal
relationship" or agreement with the programme, its own constitutional powers and
objectives and wherever relevant, the nature of the project.226
The agreements between EPTA and the agencies gave rise to established
practice and principles that were later incorporated, with appropriate modifications,
into UNDP practice. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) set forth
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clearly, under Resolution 222A (IX) of 1949, the operating principles along which
EPTA was to operate. The resolution recognised the future role of international
technical co-operation in promoting international exchange of technical
knowledge among countries with varied experience, differing social patterns and
cultural traditions and at different stages of development. The promotion and
guarantied continuation of international technical co-operation was however
dependent on:
(i) Assistance to requesting States was under negotiated agreement, that is, it
was not imposed;
(ii) The negotiations were formal and legally binding. Thus technical
assistance agreements concluded under the expanded programme (initially
referred to as "Basic Agreements" and later as "Standard Agreements")
contained specific terms for the implementation of each project; with
administrative arrangements dealt with under supplementary agreements or
mutually agreed programmes of operations contained in notes exchanged
between the recipient Government and the agency or agencies concerned.
3.1,1 The Standard Agreement under EPTA, a unilateral
instrument?
These agreements, forerunners of the current Standard Basic Assistance
Agreement, embodied the general rules governing provision of technical
assistance by all organisations participating in the expanded programme, the
obligations of requesting States and the rights and duties of the parties involved.
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The agreements have incorrectly been regarded as examples of "contrat d'
adhesion"227 i.e. a type of contract with conditions and terms unilaterally determined in
advance by one party, the terms and conditions of which are then offered to the other party
without an opportunity for the accepting party to effectively negotiate or discuss. The
accepting party therefore accepts or rejects them in toto without a future option of re¬
negotiation.228 This categorisation of the standard agreement as a "contrat d' adhesion" is
based on examples of "unequal" bilateral treaties229 or of contracts entered into and regulated
by national contractual and other relevant national laws, for example, contracts of
employment between individuals and public or private corporations purchase or hire of
goods and/or services etc. which are, due to the grossly disproportionate bargaining and
negotiating powers of the parties, are characterised by standard terms adapted to the subject
matter involved and the unilateral or special wishes of the dominant contracting party.
Under such treaties or contracts, the weaker State or contracting party often has no power to
negotiate or re-negotiate the terms of a unilaterally drawn and regulated agreement which is
normally likely to be detrimental to such weaker parties interests. However, extension of
"unequal" treaty or standard contract arguments to multilateral arrangements whose
implementation is not regulated by any State or group of States, is misleading.
3.1.2 Refutation of Standard Contract analogy
The standard contract analogy is largely based on the nature of decision making
under the target figure system. The Technical Assistance Board estimated the amount of
funds it expected to have during the next two years from the relevant time, setting sixteen per
cent apart for regional programmes and the rest into amounts spend-
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able in each State. These figures, known as target figures, were sent to the
Governments which submitted, for each project, the expected duration, main objectives, cost
of expert services, fellowships, the counterpart facilities it expected to provide and the way(s)
it would continue when outside aid was withdrawn. Criticising the system of target figures
as restrictive, a representative of the French Government was of the view that "when
available funds were distributed by the organisation rather than in accord with recipient's
needs and preferences, a rational programme of development priorities could be set only by
rare coincidence".230
However, despite its use of target figures, EPTA was in practice favourably
perceived by developing countries as within the United Nations operating principles such as
equality and universality231 that are indispensable to the preservation of inter alia, jurisdiction
and sovereignty over natural resources, Choice of national development priorities, successful
international development cooperation, etc.
Various legal factors distinguish the international law regulated multilateral
agreement, such as the Basic Agreement (or its successor the SBAA) from "unequal" treaties
or the national law regulated standard contract. Some of the features are that:
(a) The Basic Agreement contains provisions which reflect the specific multilateral
objectives which the member States expect the institution to implement.
(b) The international institution that has specific powers and competency's bestowed
on it by member States has the authority and properly exercises that authority
if it enters into international commitments necessary for the attainment of the
objective(s) even without
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express consent by its member States.232 Consequently,
international agreements in "standard contractual form" form a legitimate
basis for the implementation of agreed "consents" of member States
which in this case are consents which expressly empower and require the
organisation to provide for international technical co-operation to
promote development in the requesting States.
(c) Under the rotational system, a requesting State, as a member of EPTA was
effectively represented on the Technical Assistance Committee (or the
Governing Council in the case of UNDP). Such representation enabled
the potential requesting State to negotiate and influence the "framing" of
members' objectives into standard agreements based on the principles
of equality or parity.233
(d) Assistance offered by the programme was complementary to development
plans and priorities of the requesting State and the recipient State
could change the terms of its country programme or project(s) if it
showed over-riding need, through negotiation with the Programme and
so long as such change would not be discriminatory to other member
States.
(e) While standard terms under a national contract (or bilateral - multilateral
agreements)234 may often reflect the special interests of the dominant
party, the objective of standardising terms under multilateral
arrangements dealing with highly complicated subjects and
relationships between numerous parties is to "stabilise" the definition
and implementation of "agreed" principles, standards, rules and
procedures and therefore compliment beneficiary members efforts to
achieve their objectives rather than merely restrict their sovereign
rights.
(t) The Basic Agreement provided for "peaceful settlement" of disputes in
cases where lacunae existed in the agreed provisions. Settlement was to
be made in accordance with the relevant resolutions and decisions of the
Assemblies, Conferences, Councils and other organs of the United
Nations organisations. Each party had to accord full and sympathetic
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consideration to any proposal for such settlement advanced by the other party.235
3.2 The Special Fund
Before the formation of ht Fund in 1958, developing countries had made
unsuccessful attempts to establish a special United Nations Fund For Economic Development
(SUNFED).236 SUNFED would have provided assistance on "continuous" basis in areas that
encourage integrated technical, economic and social development of developing countries
thus creating conditions conducive to investment as provided for by, inter alia, General
Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII), paragraph 1. The pre-investment projects funded by
SUNFED were to assist the developing countries to perform comprehensive surveys of their
natural resources, programmes of vocational and technical training, establish local research
institutions etc. The SUNFED proposal was rejected by vote in the General Assembly237 due
to opposition from some major developed countries, on the grounds, inter alia, that a
developing country controlled development institution would be unable to meet high
performance standards in resource distribution and that there was no shortage of funds, only
effective capacity ofDeveloping Countries to absorb such investment.
When the Special Fund (SF)238 was formed, the developing countries in their turn
opposed on the grounds that"
(1) It was a conduit for commercial interest seeking to export or create markets in
the developing countries.239 This view was largely based on the informal
linkages the SF had with Bretton
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Woods institutions which operated the well known system of
"efficiency based conditionalities"240 and the initial official
disinclination of the Bretton Woods241 institutions to integrate
United Nations "multilateral development ideology", despite their
specialised agency status, into their policy framework,242 The SF
was thus seen by many developing countries as flawed in its
approach to their collective interests which would further weaken
their negotiating and bargaining position in their negotiations
with contributing developed countries.
(2) That the SF given its "independent" legal nature (GAR 1240
(XIII) paragraph iv (8) and links with private property holders,
would grow into a "unilateral" decision making body, setting
conditionalities for its assistance which could be restrictive of their
sovereign rights to choose priorities.
(3) The proposed allocation of part of the resources of the SF to
advanced or able developing countries, on a refundable basis
would encourage discrimination among recipients contrary to the
universality principle and the multilateral character of the fund and
also negate the need to guarantee preferential treatment for
developing countries.
Despite the initial opposition by developing countries, the SF became quickly
operational. In practice, its decisions were supposed to made by consensus and in
accordance with the principles of non-intervention or non-interference in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of the recipient State, the need for preservation of
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voluntary contributions by "donor" States and "acceptance" of assistance by
recipient States.243 However, contributions by members were made
unconditionally, that is, without limitation as to use by a specific agency or in a
specific recipient country or for a specific project and no recipient country
received special treatment with respect to its contribution. Negotiations about
"use of funds" between contributing and recipient countries were prohibited under
GAR 1240 (XIII) paragraph 50.
The SF's assistance was rendered under three types of agreement244
Firstly, the Basic Agreement which regulated the legal relationship between the
requesting State and the Fund. The Basic Agreement whose provisions applied to
all requests, laid down the conditions under which Fund Assistance would be
provided and the basic conditions for project execution. Secondly, the SF
sometimes allowed "reservations" to be made by the recipient government under
"exchange of letters".245 Reservations could be made in respect of project grants
to third parties with regard to extension of exemptions and facilities granted to the
SF. Such reservations could deal with issues of immunities for third party firms or
private organisations and their personnel. However, SF assistance was, in
practice, offered under more stringent terms than that under EPTA. This was due
to the fact that approval of projects as recommended by the Fund's Managing
Director required a two thirds majority, a process that developed contributing
countries had the power to influence.246 However, the principles of multilateralism
were strictly adhered to, for example, project re-negotiation and departures from
multilateral!y agreed norms and objectives without over-riding reasons for such
departure, were disallowed as contrary to the principles of equal participation and
non discrimination.
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Thirdly, the SF also signed Standard Agreements with Executing Agencies.
Most of the characteristics of these agreements have been retained in similar
agreements between the UNDP and the specialised agencies. Some of the
characteristics of these agreements, such as lack of a dispute settlement
mechanism are due to the fact that the Executing Agency, on signing the Standard
Agreement, became covered by the Basic Assistance Agreement between the SF
and the recipient government
3.3 The UNDP
The continuation of the potentially conflicting special characteristics of the
two programmes, that is, EPTA and SF was inherently problematic to the future
balanced growth of the new programme.247 However, the degree of success in
achieving this balance is ascertainable from the fact that the Programme is the most
successful international development policy formulation agency for fostering
technoeconomic development in developing countries,248 the world's most extensive
single multilateral "market" for technoeconomic skills, services and currencies.249
The UNDP was created in 1965 under the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2029(XX)250 through the merger of EPTA and the SF.
The merger aimed at, inter alia, to stream line operations of the two constituent
parts, simplify organisational arrangements and procedures, facilitate over-all
planning and needed co-ordination programmes of the United Nations and thus
provide a framework which allowed evolutionary growth based on voluntary
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financial contributions by member States as well as the retention of the special characteristics
and features of the two constituent operations.251
In addition to the main principles set out in the introduction above, relating to the
international technical cooperation activities of the Programme, UNDP in practice adheres to
"multilateral" principles set forth in the United Nations Charter and subsequent treaties,
international Resolutions, Decisions etc. These principles include, neutrality, universality,
voluntary and equal participation in international co-operative activity and non-
conditionalitv. Consequently, as we shall see, the programme has managed to ensure that
even "autonomous" specialised agencies such as the World Bank (which is legally bound
only to give "due consideration" to the inclusion on its agenda of items proposed by United
Nations bodies), incorporates252 developmental considerations into its development
cooperation policy and activity.
The UNDP has achieved the latter goal by stressing, in principle and practice, that
recipient government execution of programme supported projects should be the ultimate
modality and that in co-ordinating programme and other multilateral financing institutions
cross conditionality is to be avoided, that is, the programme's identity and principles must not
be compromised and any joint activities with such institutions shall be of a complementary
nature without any conditionalities on the assistance provided by the programme.253 UNDP
however does support the application of prudent management criteria by specialised agencies
in relevant cases.254
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The programme's influence has also helped it to encourage recipient governments to
accept the need for modification of absolute sovereignty or territoriality based claims in
accordance with the principle of interdependence which inter alia, requires promotion of
international balanced technoeconomic cooperation as a pre-condition for preservation of
international peace, independence and sovereignty of States, etc. Thus while national
authorities, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, are in principle
taken to better placed than external agencies, institutions or organizations to determine "the
best developmental interests" of the State in question, these countries contractually accept,
among others, to:
(a) To ensure that in exercising their sovereign right to formulate their development
goals and objectives, they also guarantee to their partners in international
technical cooperation i.e. UNDP, specialised Executing Agencies and other
relevant parties, that proper accountability255 and transparency will be
exercised in relation to their rights and obligations to the partners;
(b) That they address issues of global concern256 such as human rights, under
privileged groups, environmental issues etc. as a necessary condition for
successful and continuous international technical cooperation.
In short the recipient government accepts the basic principle that the very essence
and fundamental of all governments and laws and thus international technical cooperation is
merely to ensure the safety of the people and the advancement of their rights and liberties.257
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3.3.1 The Standard Basic Assistance Agreement as basis for Negotiated and
Contractual International Technological Cooperation
The above mentioned principles are in-built into the Standard Basic Assistance
Agreement (SBAA or the Standard Legal Text for non SBAA countries) which forms the
major legal basis for UNDP cooperation activity with member recipient States. The SBAA
provides a formal multilateral legal framework for negotiation and formulation of agreements
and the continuous monitoring, evaluation and review of the agreed terms and conditions,
which in turn ensures transparency, accountability, negotiated and consensual decision
making, minimisation of disputes and thus better achievement of objectives.258
The Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA)259 fonns the legal basis for
international technical cooperation activities between the UNDP and member States. It
(SBAA) facilitates the programme's implementation of its various mandates, that is, on
industrial training, natural resources development, stimulating scientific, technological and
industrial development, facilitating regional and inter regional cooperation, fostering and co¬
ordinating technical cooperation among developing countries,260 etc. The number of
member States that have signed the agreement rose from seventeen (17) by the end of 1974 to
one hundred and eight (108) by March 1990.261 The SBAA, is therefore correctly defined as
a recital of a relationship between the whole and one of its parts, and instrument, which, by
creating positive conditions andpromoting fruitful cooperation between all members and the
recipient State, guarantees continued international peaceful interdependence,262
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3.3.2 Substantive Provisions of the SBAA: a co-ordinated
formal legal frame work for negotiation (offer - bargain -
acceptance, performance and Follow-up) in Multilateral
Technical Co-operation Agreements between UNDP and
member States
The success of the SBAA, which replaced provisions formerly contained in
four agreements and project documents, is due to a variety of factors. Firstly,
the agreement, as a multilateral international agreement governed by
international law, is fundamental, within the area of international technical co¬
operation, in encouraging member States to accept and adopt certain time tested
legal models dealing with, among others, negotiation, performance of agreed terms
and conditions under transparent, rules, procedures, standards and principles with the
eventual purpose of creating a legal framework that facilitates:
(a) Orderly evolution and equitable change in the negotiation, implementation
and follow up of the complicated international technical co-operation
relationships;
(b) Safeguarding of rights of weaker parties;
(c) Proportionate and reasonable remuneration for suppliers of skills, services
and other resources;
3.4 The Request and Offer Provisions in UNDP
International Technical Co-operation Activity
Member States signatory to the SBAA become subject to "multilateral
standards and principles" based on decisions and resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly and those of the UNDP Governing Council, in addition
to the country programme. Consequently, the SBAA serves as a formal guiding
framework for negotiation with individual Governments. The agreement
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provides for individual States conditions or circumstances, providing opportunities
for rejection or termination of assistance and possible "departures" from the basic
agreement in cases where recipient countries show "over-riding circumstances for
such departure";263 while also providing, within a single instrument, a balanced,
structured and equitable framework for UNDP operation in its relationship
with co-operating States.
Article 1 of the SBAA provides for the application of the agreement to define
the particulars of assistance and the respective responsibilities of the parties and the
Executing Agency with regard to UNDP assistance and Project Documents and
other instruments concluded by the parties. The SBAA provides the parties with
advance knowledge of the legal parameters for UNDP assistance within the
recipient country. The parameters are extremely useful not only in implementation
but also in the rare cases when a member State or the programme may wish to
suspend or terminate 'assistance'.264 Article 2 provides that, in accordance with
the principles of national sovereignty and freedom to choose or reject assistance,
that UNDP assistance under the agreement is made only in response to requests
submitted by the recipient Government and approved by the UNDP. The Article
further provides that assistance shall be availed to the government, or such entity
designated by the government, in accordance with the relevant and applicable
resolutions and decisions of the competent UNDP organs and subject to the
availability of funds to the UNDP. National Sovereignty is, preserved, further,
under Article 3(1) which provides for overall responsibility for UNDP assisted
projects to rest with the recipient Government.
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3.4.1 Negotiation Modalities
The SBAA provides comprehensively for forms of assistance,265 conditions of
project execution,266 privileges and immunities,267 information concerning projects,268
participation and contribution of Government in execution of projects,268 use of
assistance,270 and relation to assistance from non - UNDP sources,271 suspension or
termination of assistance272 settlement of disputes etc.273 in short, it provides a substantive
and procedural coordination table that the recipient State and the Programme use as a
reference point in determining the direction of technical cooperation activity, its content and
rights and obligations involved.
Adherents to the above mentioned argument about the Standard Agreement being a
"contract d' adhesion" or "innominate contract" claim that while the SBAA may be a useful
framework for consultation, evaluation, review and monitoring of undertakings, decision
making between the organisation and the recipient countries have no effective power to
decide the size of UNDP core resources,274 rate of disbursement of those resources or their
allocation to member States. The "unilateralism" argument is buttressed by citing
"unilateralist features" of the SBAA such as the lack of specific stipulation(s) on non¬
interference by the UNDP in the internal affairs of the recipient country, non-definition of
terms, lack of specification in Article XII that the venue for any arbitration proceeding would
be the recipient country and the provisions for suspension or termination of assistance as
under Article XI.
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Such criticism, though of substantia] validity in other related contexts,275
ignores, as already noted, the fundamental nature and complexity of multilateral co¬
operation, that is, its being founded on consent, effective participation by the
recipient State in multilateral decision making, a process which is by definition and
nature, based on consensus. Since its inception, the SBAA has undergone negotiated
"evolutionary" change. Such change has covered the whole chain of co-operation
from preparation of country programmes to post contract or follow up
arrangements. Consequently, the negotiating framework of the SBAA has been
gradually modified to meet the special requests and needs of recipient States. Thus
some provisions originally included under the standard agreement, such as those
relating to rights to intellectual property generated during the performance of
projects, have been dropped or modified.276 Recipient countries have also on the
other hand dropped some initial objections, such as those relating to the extension of
"certain privileges and immunities" to cover, resident representatives and
consultants.277
Following one of the recommendations of the Jackson Report,278 country
programmes for technical and pre - investment assistance emerge from continuous
formal "dialogue" between the Government authorities concerned with the
administering or studying of economic and social development conditions of the
recipient country and the UNDP Resident Representative supported by UNDP
headquarters in communication with other multilateral and bilateral programmes,
especially the World Bank.
The UNDP view on the country programme is contained in the Resident
Representative Advisory Note which is based on the national development plan or
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the governments known socio-economic priorities, especially those development objectives
where technical cooperation279 can play a critical role. The note also contains the relevant
information derived from the national development plan and other relevant documentation,
for example, on sectoral or multilateral studies undertaken by the Government, multilateral or
bilateral programmes, or from UNDP funded programmes under the authority of the
Administrator, it also includes Programme past experience and lessons, initial assessment of
resource availability and relevant information from the outcome of any World Bank
consultative group meetings and UNDP assisted "round tables", if any.
During all negotiations, the basic purpose of UNDP technical assistance is to help
the recipient State to achieve "self-reliance" by helping it to develop its technological
capacity to meet, inter alia, production or output targets in the relevant sectors, especially
through development and enhancement of its human resources280 or skills, etc. To fully
execute its role, the UNDP prepares thoroughly for its "advisory" role through, inter alia, the
Resident Representative holding consultations with the Executing Agencies on the proposed
content of the country programme, and if prior permission is given by the recipient country
as required, holding consultations with multilateral financing institutions, bilateral agencies
and representatives of non Governmental organisations (NGO's).281 Negotiation of the
recipient country's share of UNDP core resources has proved unnecessary in UNDP practice
for various reasons, for example;
(a) The UNDP is a multilateral body with no narrow predominant or specific national
interests (i.e. it promotes collective international goals) to determine the
disbursement of Programme funds:
119
(ii) Available UNDP Funds are voluntarily and unconditionally contributed by
member States and are not fixed or varied by the Programme;
(iii) The UNDP is legally bound or committed to assist its member States,
especially the least developed, to mobilise additional resources beyond the
IPF.282 on concessional terms, and to meet any special needs;
(iv) Individual State negotiation of country allocations could encourage use of
conditionalities or result in "discriminatory treatment" in favour of States
with greater negotiating power or "assumed need", contrary to the principles
of universality and equal participation. (Under UNDP practice, special needs
are submitted to the Programme review Committee which recommends a
position to be taken under the Administrators note283 to the Governing
Council.)
3.5 Implementation of Agreements - The Principles and
Procedures to guarantee Transparency and Accountability
including the Review and Evaluation mechanisms
The UNDP has evolved, in partnership with recipient Governments and
Executing Agencies, a framework to ensure certainty in terms when implementing
UNDP sponsored and related international technical co-operation activity. Member
countries which are signatory to the SBAA automatically become subject to the
procedures, non - SBAA countries have to sign the mandatory project document
annex which provides for, the same procedures, subject to the organisation, terms
of reference and timing being decided after consultation between the parties.
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3.5.1 Transparency 284
After a technical cooperation programme agreement between the Programme and the
recipient, implementation is under terms and conditions, including the juridical provisions of
the recipient State, to which all parties have free and public access, including all private party
contractors and non State organisations involved. Transparency is essential especially when
considering normally sensitive issues such as the role of non State and private parties in
technoeconomic development efforts in the recipient State. Since the 1970 Consensus, the
UNDP has encouraged285 non State party participation in international technical cooperation
to, inter alia, transfer skills recipient States286 (1970 Consensus).
Transparency is ensured by extending law to the entire process of technical
cooperation i.e. from pre-investment studies, negotiation, performance, to follow up and
dispute settlement. Such extension is based on the Programmes comprehensive experience
about the nature of the development process, especially due to its legal links to the numerous
development agencies. The UNDP has evolved in partnership with recipient States and
Executing Agencies, standards, rules, principles and procedures which are aimed at making
all parties, including non State and private parties,287 an integral part of the programming
process and the formulation, implementation and evaluation of projects, subject to those
private parties effective participation in the transfer of systematic knowledge and skills (such
as training recipient country nationals to execute feasibility studies, plant designs, civil
works, plant erection, quality control, plant management, marketing services, management
training etc.) to recipient State nationals. The UNDP
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and relevant Executing Agency instruct and control all the activities of the non State
or private party participants.
The requirement for transparency in recipient countries juridical and
administrative regimes has sometimes been criticised as a disguised conditionality,
for example, to liberalise,288 Encouragement of, inter alia, "liberalisation" of
recipient country transfer of technology or foreign investment legal regimes is not a
conditionality unless such a requirement is coercive, creates or perpetuates an
unbalanced relationships between the Programme and the recipient. Legitimate
transparency requirements, in accordance with international law, aim at ensuring,
inter alia:
(a) That technoeconomic skills provided by non nationals under the
Programme i.e. as technological skills or other investment are supplied
under balanced terms289 and conditions;
(b) Suppliers of skills under Programme sponsorship do not abuse their powers,
for example, by creating technological or skill "islands" in the recipient
State;
(c) That recipient countries provide legitimate reasons for rejection of or
exclusion of parties, especially non national private parties, from specific
technical co-operation projects. Where no reasonable grounds are
rendered in cases of such exclusion, the UNDP may then legitimately
withhold its financial contribution to a project, especially if such private
party exclusion is deemed by the programme to be vital to the success
of the project.290
Due to the importance that the UNDP attaches to transparency of measures
applied to international technical co-operation activity, various measures are agreed
122
between the programme and its member States to ensure such transparency. The measures
include:
3.5.1.1 The principle of equitable geographical distribution
In the selection of individual experts, private institutions or firms consistent with
maximum effectiveness of supplied technical skills, know-how etc. The UNDP and recipient
States ensure that firms of developing countries as well as national expertise, training
capacity, consulting firms and equipment in UNDP funded projects is fully utilised whenever
possible. The programme thus encourages recipient States to assess their own national
private enterprise potential through for instance the national technical cooperation assessment
programmes (Natcaps), transfer of knowledge through expatriate nationals (TOKTEN),
etc.291
3.5.1.2 The Model standard letter of agreement292
This agreement contains terms and modalities applied in cases of recipient
government execution of UNDP sponsored projects. It largely applies to non-governmental
organisations or local "agencies" and organisations that are not covered by the SBAA or
Specialised Agency agreements. Under the letter of agreement, the Government consents to
provision of services by the a co-operating agency, with appropriate provisions for "close
consultations" on all aspects of ht services to be rendered by the co-operating agency.293 The
Government, through its designated project co-ordinator, retains overall responsibility for the
implementation of UNDP assistance to the project. The agency provides project co¬
ordinators with "appropriate technical guidance and administrative support" and
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they remain accountable to the co-operating agency for the manner in which they
discharge their functions. The project co-ordinators have an obligation to co¬
operate closely with recipient government staff and assist in project
implementation in accordance with the overall directives laid down by the
Government in consultation with the co-operating agency.294
Upon acceptance of the letter of agreement and pursuant to the project
budget of the project document and the work plan, the recipient government agrees
that:
(1) The co-operating agencies, subject to the conditions set out in the
letter of agreement, may request advances of funds directly from
UNDP;
(2) The co-operating agency must submit reports relating to the project
as may reasonably be required by the project co-ordinator.
(3) The co-operating agency will enjoy the privileges, immunities and
facilities accorded to executing agencies and their personnel
under the agreement concerning assistance concluded by the
Government and the UNDP.295 This provision interprets as
providing functional privileges and immunities only.
Amendments to the arrangements under the letter are made by mutual
agreement and disputes are settled by consultation between the project co-ordinator
and the co-operating agency project personnel, with the Government project co¬
ordinator decisions prevailing until agreement is reached.296
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3.5.1.3 Transparency and promotion of Accountability and Stability of
implementation ofagreements
To ensure that all parties meet their obligations and especially that the supplier
of technical skills and or expertise effectively assists the recipient to acquire
technological capacity; a proper accountability system is used. Proper accountability
involves use of an objective monitoring, review, evaluation and reporting
procedure to ensure maximum contractual "transparency" and accountability by
all parties, facilitated by use of the extensive experience and data banks of the
United Nations System, which enable, among others, rating of technological
supplier firms according to past performance.
3.5.1.4 Country Programming
As Stated above, the United Nations development system operates on the
fundamental principles of interdependence and equal participation by all, that is,
promotion of collective international goals, reciprocal exchange, mutual assistance
and co-operation. These principles are promoted and applied largely through the
country programming process, especially to promote mutual co-operation among
recipient States.
Country programmes achieve or reflect these goals and principles with a
clarity that depends on the comprehensiveness of the programme (often set by
the technoeconomic level of "advancement of the developing country in question).
The programme encourages advanced countries to raise the level of regional or
South - South technical co-operation (i.e. co-operation among developing countries)
vis-a-vis national priorities for technical co-operation. For example, the Fourth
Country Programme for Brazil,297 sets out in paragraph 12 that "not all national
125
priorities included in the development plan need technical co-operation from
concessionaire sources, either because Brazil already had the technical and
managerial competence to solve its own problems, or because external technical
inputs could be acquired through commercial sources". The country programme
then sets out the criteria, determined by the Brazilian Planning Secretariat and
UNDP, for Brazilian participation in multilateral technical co-operation.
These include:
(i) Assisting Brazilian institutions to gain access to external knowledge, such as
technology, operational experience and policy objectives, building upon
the objectivity, management capabilities and sectoral experience of the
United Nations System;
(ii) Acquire a real transfer and national absorption of knowledge and know-how
in priority areas though adequate projects and foster independent innovation
and creativity;
(iii) Promotion of projects with a high potential for technical co-operation
among developing countries (TCDC).298
3.5.1.5 Monitoring
Among the mechanisms for promotion of transparency and accountability
adopted under the Programme is the monitoring process. Monitoring is a
supervision process meant to ensure continuous oversight of the implementation
of a country programme299 and to indicate whether that programme is progressing
towards its stated objectives, identify necessary changes in programme
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implementation, if any and suggest "corrective measures". Monitoring o the country
programme is a joint responsibility of the recipient Government and UNDP and is executed
by the project management, that is, the leaders of the national staff and international staff,
whether the project is Government, Agency or UNDP executed.300
The monitoring process is based on the principle of "complimentarity" of action
between the representatives of the recipient Government, UNDP and relevant Executing
Agencies and other "collateral" parties, especially in reference to the substance, effectiveness
of management and financial soundness of the country programme. Monitoring facilities
measurement of progress in "project" activities and production of outputs against established
indicators of progress,301 identification and assessment of factors affecting the progress of the
project's principle and collateral activities and also identify necessary actions and the party to
undertake them and the "time frame" for such action.302 Within this framework, the parties
can assess the extent to which original programme designs are implemented, whether
according to sector or technical cooperation objectives, ensure accountability for any
unplanned activity undertaken by a party, the type of "assistance" required to achieve
programme objectives such as transfer of special skills and technology, determine the mode
the levels of cooperation such as Government and Agency execution, use of direct support for
projects or use of long or short-term foreign expertise, etc.303
Thus while responsibility for any efforts to achieve development objective(s)
rests with the government, the UNDP, through monitoring, assesses collectively all technical
cooperation projects it assists and which are directed to the
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same, similar or closely related objectives, thus forming an information and
experience pool which member States can call upon in later projects.
3.5.1.6 Evaluation
We have just noted the role of project monitoring in determining inter alia, the
relevance, effectiveness and development impact of international technical cooperation
activity in the recipient State. The cooperation table in UNDP practice follows monitoring
with the process known as evaluation. The major objective of Evaluation is given as a
"learning and action - oriented management tool and a process for improving current
implementation and future planning and decision making".304 The value of such a system for
the information deficient developing especially the least developed, is apparent.
Using this process, the parties decide, inter alia, initiatives and/or corrective
measures to improve the effectiveness of on going projects, whether to continue with, revise
or extend a project especially in light of its impact and relevance to the programme of which
it is a part, formulation of responses to substantive concerns of public policy makers,
programme managers and other interested parties, etc.305 Evaluation is implemented
selectively, being restricted to the minimum essential for the improvement or follow-up of
the projects concerned, for the needs of Governments and for the improvement of the
Programme. The Evaluation process consists of three phases, that is:
(1) On going evaluation which is aimed at improvement of performance on going
projects;
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(2) Terminal evaluation which is aimed at improvement of on going project
as well as providing the basis for future action;
(3) Ex-post project evaluation, is carried out a minimum of two years after project
completion. It is used t convey to decision makers, normally in the recipient
country, the lessons learned from the project as an aid to the identification and
implementation of future projects and programmes. It also crucial to UNDP
"information and experience" pool for application elsewhere among its
member States.306
From this process of evaluation also emerges the Project Performance Evaluation
Report (PPER) which is prepared by the national project co-ordinator and/or senior officer of
the United Nations Executing Agency, for the Tripartite Review.
3.5.2 The Tripartite Review Process
The most important mechanism for ensuring that the parties involved in the
implementation of UNDP sponsored projects are in "continuous" consultation is the
Tripartite Review meeting. The process is not an alternative to the Monitoring and
Evaluation procedures but a means of assisting parties to consult on targets, project
objectives, contractual purpose and function of each party and ensure that the recipient
Government undertakes "enabling" (transparent) action for project execution such as "passing
necessary legislation", granting "privileges", guaranteeing diplomatic protection, issuing
import licences, etc.
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The Tripartite Review307 is a meeting of the parties directly involved in
the implementation of a project. It is a formal, planned and periodic mechanism
for taking joint decisions about the design and implementation of projects. The
review determines implementation of decisions and party responsibility or
accountability for particular decisions or acts.308 The Tripartite Review meetings
are, normally, annual and are mandatory only for projects where the total UNDP
budget equals or exceeds $400,000 (including cost sharing), otherwise the Tripartite
Review is held when requested by any of the parties or if justified.309
The first Tripartite Review occurs within the first twelve months of full
implementation. The Tripartite Reviews are initiated by the resident representatives
in consultation with the Government and project management and are project-
specific, that is, the "agenda" that is set for the review (by the Resident
Representative in consultation with the Government) reflects the views and
intentions of the Executing Agency and, as appropriate, those of the recipient
Government co-ordinating authority and those of the UNDP based on the
headquarters project performance evaluation report (PPER)310 prepared by a senior
project officer of the United Nation's Executing Agency and national project co¬
ordinator.
All parties immediately concerned with the project are represented at the
review, which is presided over by the appropriate Government official. The review
normally covers the issues of follow-up, project concept and design, progress,
operational issues, work plan, decisions and recommendations and need for
evaluation.311 After the meeting, a Tripartite Review report is prepared by the
Resident Representative in consultation with the parties concerned.
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Terminal review is prepared at the end of each country programme for purposes of
assessing the level of achievement of targets and set goals, including whether the target
groups and intended beneficiaries have been covered by the project. The same approach
taken in reviews of regional, inter country and global projects. Other main objectives of the
parties in carrying out Tripartite Reviews are:
(a) The building of an "information base for use in future projects";
(b) Ensuring proper coordination of "sensitive" issues in project implementation
including "structural adjustment or other policy reforms" which recipient
countries may be required to undertake as a result of UNDP related
specialised agency requirements such as World Bank or IMF
recommendations;312
(c) Achievement of set goals for the satisfaction of target group needs and special
beneficiaries;
(d) To enable the parties to reach agreement on the coordination of assistance
from different sources, for example, joint programming by various United
Nations agencies or organisation as well as integration of contributions from
bilateral sources, such as funds acquired through "round table conferences,
trust funds, etc.
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3.6 UNDP Technical Co-operation and the New
International Economic Order - Interdependence
Postponed?
3.6.1 UNDP and issues of regional technical co-operation
among developing countries (TCDC) or mutual self-help,
The inter - country programme -
The UNDP, in accordance with its constitution and subsequent mandates,313
for example, that under the Buenos Plan of Action for promotion and implementation
of technical co-operation among developing countries, co-ordinates most regional
and inter - country projects in accordance with the objectives of assisting the
Governments of developing countries to achieve through the United Nations
Development System, mutual or collective goals promotional of shared use of
technical resources, skills and capacities between and among them. Thus the
programme organises and supports inter - country programmes, funded through
special inter country programme funds (IPF's) allocated by the Governing
Council. Projects funded under this head are primarijy aimed at promoting use of
shared resources and institutions and achievement of shared goals. They are
prepared by UNDP regional bureaux in consultation with the relevant recipient
Governments, specialised Executing Agencies,314 regional commissions,
resident representatives and other interested parties.
The UNDP special Unit for TCDC formulates and prepares and finalises
projects in accordance with guide-lines established by the Governing Council.
These guide-lines are in accordance with recommendations made by the inter
Governmental reviews of TCDC activity within the United Nation's system,
reviews that are carried out by a high level committee for TCDC of all member
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States of UNDP.315 This ensures that TCDC activity is reviewed constantly as it
evolves to ensure that it meets the objective of furthering the national and collective self-
reliance of developing countries316 and enhances their innovative capacity to solve their
development problems without however turning TCDC activity into an end itself or into a
substitute for multilateral interdependent cooperation, (including international technical
cooperation) involving developed countries.317
3.6.2 UNDP and Technology as a Common Heritage of Mankind Principle
The UNDP, especially due to its network of formal legal arrangements with
specialised agencies, is central to the eventual realisation of the goals of the New
International Economic Order by developing countries. With reference to technology
transfer, the programme facilitates increased access to internationally available technology
for all developing countries. In pursuance of this objective the programme initially presumed
that benefits of discoveries made during UNDP assisted projects, if made solely by UNDP
financed experts, should be available to all developing countries, that is, all arrangements
under which the ownership of a discovery of discoveries, technical documentation,
computations or data of a particularly complex nature, design work of a specialised nature
etc., would automatically pass into the public domain318 at the termination of the project.
However, as after due consultation and negotiation with member States, this position was
modified to take into account recipient State's national interests in regard to specific findings.
Under the SBAA, Article IV (i) the recipient Government "shall furnish" the UNDP, upon
request, any relevant reports, maps,
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accounts, records, statements, documents and other information relating to any
UNDP assisted projects, its execution or continued feasibility and soundness, or
concerning the compliance by the Government with its responsibilities".319
However, documentary outputs or other information outputs from projects are
available to the recipient Government, Executing Agency, UNDP and other
organisations within the United Nation's system on a restricted basis. The
restricted status of the information may be maintained by the Government in cases
of information of a confidential nature or if it felt its national security would be
affected by "de restriction".320
However, because projects are performed within the developing countries
(which means that the information pool is largely from these countries) the UNDP
has only encouraged recipient countries to agree to minimum secrecy and
restriction arrangements and not full disclosure. The Programme places special
emphasis on minimum restriction of technical and/or scientific information
gathered during implementation of UNDP assisted projects, especially that which is
of special interest to other public and private organisations and institutions or
information emerging through substantive contributions by the UNDP. In such
cases, the programme encourages, in conformity with the relevant agreement(s)
governing the technical co-operation, the de-restriction of documentary outputs
for utilisation by all interested parties. Under Article IV (5) of the SBAA, the
parties agree to "consult each other regarding the publication, as appropriate,
of any information relating to any UNDP assisted project".
UNDP practice provides for "automatic lapse" of restriction. Automatic de-
restriction occurs six months after submission of a document to the relevant
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parlies unless the government submits a written request for the continuation of the
restriction. Further, when the Resident Representative "automatically" draws the
recipient government's attention to the restriction provisions, that government
may waive the restriction321 requirements as appropriate. Where a recipient
government stipulates for "documentary" secrecy but fails, after discussion or other
necessary measure with the Resident Representative to make a written
representation to justify the continuation of the restriction, the resident
representative applies the automatic de-restriction clause and on application of
such clause, promptly informs the UNDP headquarters "about the de-
restriction".322
3.6.3 The UNDP and Special or Preferential Treatment for
The technologically Least Developed Countries
Before the UNDP, some limited effort was made to accord special treatment
to newly independent and poor developing countries. Thus under the 1961 and
1962 regular budget, a sum of United States $5 million was set aside to be used
mainly to provide assistance to new States. However, such "special treatment"
was, as a rule, regarded more as "discriminatory" rather than as fulfilling tjre
requirements of re-distributive or substantive justice. The major principle observed
by the UNDP is equal participation by all member States, regardless of their
level of development: technological, political, socio - economic or cultural.
However, the need to remove material inequality between members is now
recognised (for example, Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial
Development and Co-operation)323 and preferential treatment is an accepted
international legal means for reducing such material inequalities. The UNDP
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therefore now jointly operates a variety of instruments, measures and programmes with other
intergovernmental bodes. The measures or instruments include co-financing, trust funds,
management support services, round tables, special funds etc. However, all contributions to
these funds and instruments must be consistent with the principles of universality or
multilateralism324 and non-conditionality. Thus programme preferential treatment for
developing countries, especially the least developed among them, is given,325 without
prejudicing the universality of the programme and its relevance to the needs of all developing
countries. This "preferential approach"326 undertaken under various measures such as the
Special Measures Fund for the least developed countries (SMF), Special Industrial Services
Programmes327 (SIS) - the more advanced developing countries328 do not receive allocations
from this fund-, Round Table conferences, etc.329
The special measures and mechanisms availed to the least developed countries
facilitate their faster acquisition of technological capacity. Thus for instance, SIS resources
are available only in relation to development needs of the relevant country and may be used,
inter alia, for:
(1) Acquisition of high - level experts to advise on "urgent" specific questions related
to the preparation and implementation of industrial projects330 and new
manufacturing projects at various stages of development, especially those
involving complex manufacturing projects and techniques;
(2) Acquisition of services of specialised institutions or consulting engineering
organisations which are not normally available in the less advanced developing
countries;
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(3) To acquire services of nationals with specialised knowledge etc.
However, they can also be available for acquisition of equipment,331 to meet effects
of natural disasters and consequent rehabilitation or reconstruction efforts.332
3.6.4 UNDP and advanced developing countries, the issue of Graduation
From its inception, the UNDP has faced the problem of security of resources relative
to the demand for its services and assistance. As a consequence, some member States have
often raised the issue of the "graduation" of the more advanced countries, that is, stoppage of
Programme resource allocation to the countries in question. However, despite the theoretical
soundless of "graduating" countries that have reached a certain stage of socio-economic and
cultural development, the usual problem of legal as well as socio-economic criteria for such
graduation always arises.333
Mandatory graduation or cut off under the programme has been rejected by both the
Governing Council and developing member States as contrary to the universality principle,
voluntary-ness and equal participation principles on which the programme operates.334 The
programme however has a mandate for "voluntary or ad hoc graduation" of some member
States from part of its technical cooperation programme. Under GAR 1240 (XIIO paragraph
56(b), passed under the EPTA/UNSF period but carried forward under UNDP - the
Governing Council
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"shall be authorised to consider allocating a part of the resources of the Special Fund for
assistance on a refundable basis at the request of Governments for projects within the terms
of reference for the Fund", that is, technical cooperation can be provided on a cost
reimbursable basis to those countries which can afford it. The objective of the resolution was
to preserve United System resources and re fundability was to be established, like all other
elements of country programmes and projects, in complete agreement with the recipient
Government. By consensus, recommendations to the relevant Governing Council for
projects under this head, on a fully or partially reimbursable basis are allowed only for very
unusual projects.335
However with the emergence of some highly advanced developing countries, the
programme has increasingly recommended the voluntary adoption of "net contributor" status.
Developing countries in a position to do so are required to make every effort to reach net
contributor status, either by increasing their voluntary contributions or y giving up their IPFs,
partially or wholly.336
3.6.5 UNDP and the Issue of Human rights protection in Recipient Countries -
conditionally?
The UNDP has specific mandates that include combating hunger, promotion of
scientific and technological development,337 the right to education, the right to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and take part in cultural life, the right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and take part in cultural life, the right to participate and other rights
enumerated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,338 the
Declaration on the Right to Development,339 etc. However, unlike some of the United
nations Specialised
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Agencies like FAO and UNESCO,-*40 UNDP has no specific mandate to promote
member States' observance of human rights.
Member States have contended that the withdrawing or suspension of
Programme assistance because of alleged "human rights" violations would constitute
a violation of the non - intervention principle and would be interpreted as
discriminatory or in bad faith by affected member States. For example, at the 19th
session (1975) of the Governing Council,341 several member States voiced their
regret that the Administrator should continue to approve projects for the Republic
of Vietnam, the Republics of Korea and Chile, after having stated that the giving
of assistance to the regimes in power in those countries was "contrary to the
purposes and tasks 0/UNDP'.342 A member of the Council replied that regarding
technical assistance to his country. General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI)
paragraph (4) recognised the right of every country to adopt the economic and
social system that it deemed the most appropriate for its development
without being subjected to discrimination of any kind as a result.
Further, States are not bound by legal obligations in respect of human
rights unless they have voluntarily ratified international conventions or covenants
on such matters and the United Nations system was not intended to interfere
with matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States unless such
matters posed a threat to international peace or a breach thereof or constituted an
act of aggression343 and under customary international law, no rule was clearer
than that a State's treatment of its own nationals was a matter exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of that State.344 It is contended that selective promotion
of rights violates the essential indivisibility of all rights.
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The foregoing arguments, while carrying "traditional" validity, are largely founded
on premises which seek to confine international relations within a "static legal framework", a
framework unresponsive to the increased number of "global issues", that is, interdependence.
Thus though UNDP international technical cooperation activity is basically consensual, and
is executed in partnership with the recipient State with provision for the suspension or
termination of cooperation, to react further to the "new dimensions"345 of interdependence,
the UNDP has taken a number ofmeasures, for example:
(a) Encouraging recipient States to take primary responsibility for the effective
protection of the rights of national and non - nationals within their jurisdiction;
(b) Encouraging measures such as poverty alleviation,346 the integration of women
into the development process;
(c) Promoting the right to access to scientific research and creative activity for all
groups, the right to education, the right to enjoy the benefits of one's own
research and creative activity etc.;
(d) Non reservation of allocations to countries which participate in "aggressive wars"
or which perpetrate "gross human rights violations",347 unless the
authorisation of allocation to the State in question cannot be construed as
encouraging the continuation of the violation in question,348 that is, UNDP
technical cooperation must promote or give effect to technoeconomic, social
and cultural349 development.
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These measures help to promote, inter alia, collective international goals such as
human skills development and institutional development in developing countries,
thus directly and indirectly promoting the acquisition of technological capacity350
within LDC States.
3.6.6 UNDP and the problem of donor "conditionality",
issues of developed member State control
From its inception, the UNDP has always faced the serious problem of the
insufficiency of its resources351 relative to the magnitude of its mandated tasks,
and the lack of predictability, continuity or guarantees for future resources.352
Programme funds are derived from a number of sources. The most important or
"core resources" are raised from the voluntary contributions of developed member
States or advanced developing countries that have achieved net contributor status.
Another source is the cost sharing mechanism between the recipient and
"donor" Governments, trust funds and earnings from management services for
bilateral and multilateral funding sources.353
The system of voluntary contributions was preferred by developed States354
as the best method for determining the amount of "aid" resources they could allocate
to Programme and other United Nations System bodies. It is stated that the
decision to offer aid is one that is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction and
discretion of the "donor" State355 and not an obligation erga omnes,356 though
donor states may not place conditions on the use of their contributions (UNDP
financial regulation 4.4). However, developed countries claims have to be
interpreted in accordance to the principle of interdependence. For example, 'overall
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reciprocal benefit is achieved by donating states by way of sub contracts, capital
equipment purchase order, etc., awarded to their nationals and developed countries concur in
many resolutions to ensure continuous assistance, including technical assistance, to
developing countries, to increase contributions, in conformity with continued negotiated
yp
cooperation between UNDP, donor and recipient states, it may become essential to link
JS"
effective voluntary contribution levels to UNDP contact awards.
3.7 Suspension or Termination of UNDP Assistance and the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism
We saw above that UNDP cooperation and assistance is not unilaterally terminated
or suspended, even in cases where the continuation of such cooperation is "contrary to the
35f
purposes and tasks of UNDP. However, provisions for suspension or termination of
assistance are contained under Article XI of the SBAA The provisions of Article XI are
ii>o
invoked only after the "fullest consultation" between UNDP and the relevant Government.
Suspension or termination of assistance is a measure of last resort and can only occur where
the parties cannot agree upon "changes" to a project or a country programme. The cause of
dispute should be due to unforeseeable changes that fundamentally alter the equilibrium of
the agreement or changes that are likely, from the very outset or over the course of time of a
project or country programme, to cause major delays or prevent achievement of project or
programme, to cause major delays or prevent achievement of the UNDP may, under Article
Xr(i), by written notice to the Government and the Executing Agency concerned, suspend its
assistance to any project if in the judgment of UNDP and circumstance arises The UNDP
Governing Council considers and approves all projects and programmes and the allocation of
funds, provides general policy guidance for the organisation and decisions are made by
majority vote. Member representation on the Council is based on the need for preservation
of equitable and balanced representation of the economically more developed countries on
the one hand and developing countries, suitably represented on a regional (geographical)
basis, on the other.
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which interferes with successful completion of the project or the accomplishment of
its purposes and may by subsequent notice indicate conditions for resumption of
assistance. Suspension continues until the recipient government accepts to eliminate
the dispute causes and the UNDP gives written notice of its preparedness to
resume its assistance. This requirement is not a conditionality but arises due to the
fact that the vast majority of UNDP projects fall into the institution building
category361 and consequently, require maximum government participation and
co-operation as a prerequisite for the successful continuation of UNDP activity
within the recipient State.
Programme assistance may thus only be suspended or terminated if the
recipient Government creates an atmosphere where the continuation of co-operative
or partnership activity is "excessively" prejudicial to either the achievement of the
desired technical co-operation and other goals and objectives or poses a continuing
risk to UNDP activity and Executing Agency project personnel. The UNDP
terminates its assistance by written notice if the situation in dispute continues for a
period of fourteen days (14) days.362
3.8 Institutional Mechanisms for implementing Programme
Technical Co-operation activity - The UNDP - Governing
Council
Under paragraph 4 of the resolution for the consolidation of the SF and
EPTA into a single programme, GAR 2029 (XX) of 1965, a single inter
governmental committee or Governing Council of thirty seven members was
established to assume the functions of EPTA Technical Assistance Board and SF
Consultative Board.
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The Council is supposed to make policy to implement the various mandates inherited
bylhf UNDP, as set out above. With regard to international technical cooperation, the
Council has since the mid 1970's formulated policy to promote self-reliance opting countries
have been helped to increase the availability of their local managerial, technical,
administrative and research capabilities, for example, through the appointment of qualified
developing country nationals as international project managers in their own states, enhancing
government formulation and implementation of projects vis-a'-vis Agency or UNDP directly
executed projects, increasing the use of the "structural approach" which aims at identifying
and removing structural obstacles to development etc. The programme has also focused on
"human beings" as the ultimate objective of development as part of the "new dimensions"
approach.
In 1970, the governing Council recommended, and the General Assembly endorsed
the recommendation in the same year, that Country Programmes365 should be drawn to
coincide with the recipient country's own development plan. This recommendation, which
was based on, inter alia, the Jackson Report was
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meant to emphasise that the UNDP country programming process is a
government led exercise leading to the integration of UNDP technical co¬
operation activities into the development plans and priorities of the recipient
country. The approach therefore simultaneously stresses the primary responsibility
of recipient governments for their economic, social and cultural development
and the importance of the complimentary role of international co¬
operation.367 Recipient countries have accepted the concept of country
programming as very positive368 and the UNDP has emphasised the lack of
unilateralism in the country programme process by ensuring that the UNDP
Advisory Note (formerly the UNDP position paper) is prepared with the intention of
initiating and focusing UNDP and recipient Government discussion on the
preparation of the country programme, reflects the view of the UNDP based
on the national development plan or the governments known economic and
social priorities, especially those development objectives where technical co¬
operation could play a critical or fundamental role.
3.9 UNDP and the Executing Agencies 369
The UNDP though acting as the central funding body for the United Nations
Technical Assistance activities, relies on specialised agencies and other
organisations for the execution of its projects. Initially problems arose because
several of the specialised agencies such as ILO, the World Bank and IMF have
constitutional powers that invest their organs with the competence to make
decisions that are legally binding on their members and in some cases, the
agency has power to suspend the membership of any member State that fails to
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fulfill any of its obligations.370 Further, as we have pointed out, the Bretton Woods
institutions, in their articles of agreement or their specialised agency agreements with the
United Nations, have affirmed and reiterated their autonomy. In the case of the Bank's loans,
the Bank's action is "a matter to be determined by the independent exercise of the Bank's own
judgment. The UNDP ensures that implementing Agencies do not upset the "balanced table
of rights and obligations" established between the programme and its member states.
This "autonomous or semi-autonomous" position of specialised agencies means that
without specific agreement, UNDP would not be able to influence the actual decision making
by the executing agencies as the agencies would follow their own separate,371 and established
procedures for evaluating development performance, selection, appraisal and supervision of
projects, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and follow-up on projects etc., or create cross
conditionality. To overcome these and related problems, it was suggested, mainly by
developed countries, that closer relations be established between the UNDP and specialised
agencies such as the IBRD.372 The UNDP - World Bank closer cooperation,373 in particular,
though enabling the UNDP to take advantage of the Bank's research capabilities, sectoral
surveys and technical assistance,374 was objected to strongly by developing countries, largely
on the grounds of the Bank's weighted voting and limited membership, its sourcing of funds
and the conditionality of its lending activities.
The Programme solution to the problem of "autonomy" of specialised agencies and
the likelihood of cross-conditionality has been that:
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(i) There must be preservation of the identity of the programme and the
principles that govern its actions, that is, that any co-ordination between
UNDP and "multilateral financing institutions" or agencies be of a
complimentary nature must not entail any conditionalities on the assistance
provided by UNDP;375
(ii) Formal agreement between the programme and the Agencies - UNDP enters
into agreements with each specialised agency or related agency as it becomes
an executing agency for technical co-operation activities of the UNDP. The
agreement, concluded between the Administrator of UNDP and the executive
head of the relevant agency, bestows an "independent contractor" status on
the agency vis-i-vis UNDP and provides for agency accountability to
UNDp 376 Further, the respective roles and obligations of the two
organisations are defined and rules set out regarding suspension or
termination of assistance to a recipient Government. Provision is made
for the obligations of the executing agency with respect to waiving the
immunities of operational experts or consulting firms it has retained.377
When the agreement between the UNDP and the specialised agency is
concluded, the agency becomes entitled to "cover" under the SBAA;
(iii) Special arrangements are executed whenever the relationship between the
programme and the Agencies is new, not clear or is to complex. Among such
arrangements are the "special interest" or the co-operative arrangements
with various development finance institutions, including the World Bank,
European Community, International Fund for Agricultural Development and
regional development Banks. Co-operative arrangements are used to provide
investment and/or technical assistance financing as a follow-up to UNDP
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assisted project with investment potential,378 provide information on projects,
especially draft project documents which are of significance to them in terms f investment
follow-up etc.
(iv) Agencies must declare special interest in specific projects. Thus for instance,
the programme has arrangements with the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) and EEC, under which direct consultations between the UNDP field
office staff and their counterparts in the field offices of these institutions are
undertaken. This process ensures, inter alia, complimentarity of country
programming and collaboration on the identification and use of UNDP
assisted pre-investment projects by these institutions. The agreement with
IDB also calls for consultations on projects and programmes at the IDB
headquarters prior to the monitoring of IDB country programming
missions;379
3.10 UNDP - UNIDO, a model arrangement for developing the technological
capacity of developing countries?
Among the many specialised Agencies whose role includes transfer of technology to
developing countries, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)
may be said to possess the most central and direct role UNIDO was constituted to "intensify,
concentrate and expedite" United Nations efforts to assist developing countries to
industrialise, for example, as provided for under GAR 1940 (XVIII) of December 1963.
Among its other mandates is the Lima Declaration380 which provided a special focus and an
industrial dimension to Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202(S-VI) ofMay 1974 adopted at the
sixth Special Session of ht General Assembly on the Declaration and Programme
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Lima Declaration charged UNIDO with, inter alia, the establishment of a system
of consultations between developed and developing countries to facilitate the
establishment of the New International Economic Order and the achievement of a
share 27% of total world production by developing countries by the year 2000,
through, inter alia, industrial restructuring and re deployment. The Declaration was
voted against by the United States while seven countries abstained381 and full
implementation of the mandate through the UNDP is opposed by some members as
ultra vires its mandate.
The agreement between the and UNDP and UNIDO 382 recognises the role
assigned to the UNDP by the General Assembly, that is, "to support and
supplement the national efforts of developing countries to accelerate their economic
and social development". UNrDO therefore agrees to enter into a "partnership role"
with the UNDP in order, inter alia, to help give effect to resolutions and decisions
of the General Assembly.383 Under Article 1(c) of the agreement; the parties
recognise "their separate and complementary roles" within the United Nations
System to achieve the desired objectives. This recognition of separate and
complimentary roles is important in the case of UNIDO whose mandates and
objectives were, as stated above, said by some member states to exceed UNDP
mandates and objectives.
The basic conditions of execution of UNDP supported technical co¬
operation activities by the Executing Agency (UNIDO) are thus those set forth in
the relevant and applicable resolutions of the competent UNDP organs and in such
Basic Agreements as UNDP may enter into with Governments384 and project
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documents. The agreement also provides for "termination or suspension of
assistance", in cases where it may be necessary to terminate technical co-operation
activity or the responsibility of the Executing Agency for such technical co¬
operation activity.385 Consequently, the Agency's role in terminating assistance is
limited to that agreed with the programme.
Under Article III of the UNDP - UNIDO agreement, UNfDO recognises
the "leader of the team" role of the Resident Representative in relation to allocation
and programming of UNDP resources in the relevant country except in cases of
resources directly assigned to UNIDO. The Agency also recognises the central co¬
ordinating role of the Resident Representative at the country level with respect to
technical co-operation programmes of the United Nations system. UNIDO agrees
to consult and inform the Resident Representative, to the extent feasible, on the
planning and formulation of its technical co-operation activity and to provide him
with reports on the execution of those activities.38^ Under Article V, the UNDP
and the Government may observe at any time the progress of any UNDP technical
co-cperaticn activities carried out by tiie Executing Agency and UNIDO "shall"
afford full facilities to UNDP and the Government for that purpose.387
Under Article XI(2), UNDP and UNEDO "shall consult" and the UNDP
will be "promptly informed" if any circumstance arises which, in the judgement of
UNDP or the Executing Agency, interferes or threatens to interfere with the
successful completion of a technical co-operation activity, or the accomplishment
of its purposes. The parties shall co-operate towards the rectification or
elimination of the circumstance in question, exerting all reasonable efforts to that
end, including prompt corrective steps by the Executing Agency where such
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circumstances are attributable to it or within its responsibility or control.
The UNDP may, after appropriate consultations, suspend execution of the technical
co-operation activities affected by written notice to the Executing Agency and the
recipient Government, without prejudice to the continuation of the fullest
consultations.
Under Article XI (4) failure to rectify the cause of suspension within thirty
days' results in a UNDP written notice to the government and the Executing Agency
terminating the technical co-operation activity or the Executing Agency's execution
of the activity in question, with, in the latter case, the UNDP taking over execution
or entrusting it to another Executing Agency. In case of "transfer" of the its
responsibilities, the Agency ensures the orderly transfer of its responsibilities and
UNDP reimburses all costs the Agency has incurred which are provided for in the
Project Document and reasonable costs for winding up of the technical co¬
operation activity.388 The Agency may withdraw from execution of and UNDP
technical co-operation activity if it deems that conditions have developed which
compromise or prevent the Agency's successful accomplishment of its role under
the project - Article XI (7). The Agency is reimbursed for costs incurred under the
legal commitments and costs provided for in the Project Document up to the
effective date of the withdraw.
In executing projects, UNIDO may waive the privileges and immunities of
operational experts or consultant firms or organisations to assist it in the execution
of a technical co-operation activity, under Article XII. Under the Basic Co¬
operation Agreement between UNIDO and member states receiving assistance
from389 UNDP, operational experts are solely responsible to, and are under the
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exclusive direction of, the government or the entity to which they are assigned but are not
required to perform any functions incompatible with their international status or with the
purposes of UNIDO. Waiver of operational experts or consultant firms or organisation
privileges and immunities under the UNIDO - UNDP agreement by UNIDO under Article
XII occurs when in the opinion of the Agency the immunity would impede the course of
justice and ca be waived without prejudice to the successful completion of the activity
concerned or to the interests ofUNDP or Executing Agency.
The above and other arrangements illustrate the point that UNDP technical
cooperation activity occurs under legally formal, transparent and agreed principles and
procedures that preserve the sovereign rights of the recipient State and yet promote
accountability, mutual assistance and balance of rights and obligations.
3.11 Conclusion
(a) The multilateral measures, principles, institutional mechanisms, etc., as practiced
under the UNDP Programme and related agencies, are strictly preserved and
promote collective international goals, especially the elimination of
technological and scientific disparities between states, thus promoting future
independence and interdependence of all States, preservation of international
peace, etc.
(b) Multilateral practice also reveals the principle of balanced commitments which
requires on the one hand technology owning states and their nationals who are
awarded contracts under the programme, to recognise lack of technological
and related skills by developing country recipients, to avoid abuse of powers,
guarantee full and effective transfer of skills (for example, by using the most
skilled and experienced firs), offer
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technical skills on free or preferential treatment to developing countries, participate
effectively in the technical development of the host State in accordance with its
laws and international law, etc. while on the other hand, developing countries
are to promote conformity of their national legal regimes, relating to
international technical cooperation activity, with international law obligations,
that is, observation of treaty arrangements with multilateral bodies or
international organisations, and provision of transparency and. fair treatment
for technological skill supplying parties in their national laws and regulations.
(c) Recipient Governments exercise their sovereign rights to safeguard primary
developmental goals, that is, in this context, developmental policy with regard
to acquisition of technological capacity. This goal is achieved by extending
formal legal measures and instruments to the entire process of pre-negotiation,
negotiation and acquisition (for example, through project implementation,
assimilation of technological skills etc.) of the desired technological skills.
(d) Promotion of preferential treatment and other special measures for developing
countries in order to assist developing countries to acquire technological skills
without coercion and coercion and on terms that mitigate or eliminate
bargaining and negotiating power disparities, for example, by providing a
negotiated, transparent and formal legal framework that regulates the terms for
supply of skills to developing countries by all parties both public and private.
(e) Promotion of mutual cooperation and collective self help between member states is
promoted through specific regional and national instruments and measures.
(f) Protection of developing countries, especially the least developed among them,
from the negative effects of the current unilaterally restrictive terms and
conditions otherwise used by technology owning states390 (or monopolistic
practices at the private level), when supplying any technical skills to
developing countries;
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(g) Encouragement of the adoption of the various principles, for example,
interdependence, equal participation, transparency, preferential treatment, etc.,
that have been developed under the programme's in multilateral practice, for
example, major multilateral arrangement for international technological
cooperation, (see the example of the Lome Convention and Andean Pact
arrangement for international technological cooperation, (see the examples of
the Lome Convention and Andean Pact arrangements, discussed in the next
Chapter).
Prom the foregoing, we may briefly conclude that the international context -
technological, scientific, economic, cultural conditions within each State and multilaterally
under which international development and transfer occurs is very crucial to the
determination of workable legal norms to regulate such activity. This context has however
previously been omitted from consideration, leading to the recommendation of norms or rules
which do not achieve desired results or promote balance of commitments between parties to
international technology development and transfer transactions. Because of the varying
conditions in most States, the multilateral framework as exemplified above has adjusted the
legal treatment of its members to promote their acquisition of technological capacity while
preserving multilateral or joint international goals and allowing modification of rules,
procedures etc. to fit new conditions.
The multilateral framework has therefore helped to adjust bargaining and negotiating
disparities, mitigated or eliminated abuse of rights by suppliers of technological skills to
developing countries while at the same time promoting the assumption of due obligations,




Multilateral391 and Inter Regional
Arrangements For Development and Transfer
of Technology, a Solution? The Example of
International Technological Co-operation under
the Lome Convention and Andean Pact
Arrangements
4. Introduction
"No other co-operation instrument in the world has
instituted such carefully planned, concrete and positive
ties. The originality of the convention of Lome lies in
the fact that it covers all forms of development aid:
preferential access to the Community market, the
financing of projects by the European Development
Fund, the stabilisation of export earnings and the mining
system cover all aspects ofdevelopment"2'92
[Lome is about nothing, if not about the practical
question of development facing the ACP states].393
[ Trade promotion measures are pointless if the products
do not exist].394 [The facts are there, palpably so, and
they indeed show that ACP economies have not
developed, quite the contrary. This goes for every sector
of the economy"].39^
Despite the relatively high effectiveness of international multilateral
arrangements to transfer technological skills to developing countries,396 the
majority of developing countries are still far ffom attaining local technological
capacity. This is largely due, to the financial and other non legal limitations that
have been imposed on the international multilateral programmes, especially those of
the United Nations. These limitations, as discussed in the previous chapter, may
limit a country's participation in programme activity even if such limitation is
detrimental its long term interests.
To compensate for the effects of the practical and non legal limitations
imposed on the multilateral system, developing countries have sought, and entered
into various international arrangements with the aim of, inter alia, enhancing and
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extending legal regulation to the entire technology acquisition process. Some of the
arrangements are between developing countries inter se, others are concluded with developed
countries. Two of these arrangements were hailed, at the time of their coming into force, as
of a "revolutionary legal nature" or even as models for future legal arrangements for, among
others, promotion of more effective acquisition of technological capacity by developing
countries whether between themselves or in partnership with developed countries. It is to
these two arrangements, that is, the Lome Convention397 a treaty between the Sub-Saharan
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific area states on the one hand and the member states to European
Community on the other and the Andean Pact arrangements,398 that we next turn in order to
show whether:
(i) Each arrangement contains any novel or innovative international
legal measures, instruments, provisions etc., which inter alia,
promote:
(a) Effective acquisition of technological capacity by developing member states:
(b) Extension of international legal norms to the entire process of international
technology transfer arrangements, as defined above,
(c) Preferential treatment and access to technology for developing countries and their
nationals, in accordance with the goals of a new international order;
(d) Adequate safeguards for developing countries seeking to acquire technology from
non State parties who are nationals of developed countries, for example, to
prevent the imbalance and discriminatory effects that would be caused if
developing countries member to the treaty arrangements were required to
extend national treatment to nationals from developed countries, regardless of
technological capacity acquisition goals or bargaining and negotiating power
disparities between parties;
(e) Transparency is ensured during the process to transfer to and develop systematic
and practicable knowledge in developing countries, that is
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during the pre-negotiation, negotiation, performance, follow-up and settlement
of disputes stages of and technological cooperation activity undertaken
between the parties.
(f) Mutual self-help between parties undertaken, that is, specific joint
mechanisms, measures, institutions etc, have been created to promote
acquisition of technological capacity by developing country members;
(g) The technology acquisition interests of developing country members, where the
treaty is between developed and developing counties, are subordinated to those
of the developed country members.
4.1 Lome, a Model Arrangement for North -South Technology
Transfer?
The Lome Convention,399 has been said to be a model example of the type of
arrangements that should characterise the New International Economic Order (NIEO). This
claim rests on various declarations and claims, made principally by the community or its
jurists and scholars. The arguments advanced by community jurists in favour of the
convention are numerous. These include claims that the convention obligates a lager number
of states to concrete NIEO - relevant conduct, with firm and tangible obligations for all
parties and offers ACP states access to a broad range of development aid instruments. The
Convention is further said to provide a secure framework for cooperation and implementation
of rights and obligations resulting from a freely negotiated contract.400
The establishment of common institutions is said to facilitate permanent dialogue
between the partners, for example, Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors, and
Consultative Assembly.401 The institutions are supposed to ensure that Lome is a partnership
of equals. It is further argued that the collective
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nature of the contract concluded between the two sets of country's rules out discrimination of
political, economic or other nature.402
From these and similar arguments, it is then naturally concluded that from the
Yaounde Convention to the current Lome Convention, "the parties are resolved to establish a
new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the
aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic
order."403 The "positive development provisions" of the Convention are well summarised by
the European Community in its General Agreement on tariffs and Trade (GATT) Trade
Policy Review Report for 1991.404 According to the report, Lome maintains and develops
traditional economic and commercial relations between EEC member states and developing
ACP states. To achieve this objective, the convention provides for "wide ranging"
cooperation agreements, including financial aid, technical cooperation 405 and specific non-
reciprocal trade preferences. 406 The Convention also offers, in principle, preferential and
favourable non reciprocal treatment to ACP member states in several areas, for example,
reduction of barriers to their trade,407 compensation for shortfalls in export earnings, 408 etc.,
using most established methods to this end, including trade and industrial cooperation,
financing and promotion of investments409 . Under "protocols" guarantees of market access
are given for specific commodities, for example, sugar, bananas, beef and rum.410 Lastly, the
Convention is said to "innovate" by granting special advantages to the least developed among
the ACP states and providing risk capital financing of industrialisation projects.
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4.2 Lome - technology transfer through technical aid?
The foregoing conclusions are largely a-historical and reflect a literal legal
analysis and interpretation of tike detailed armoury of provisions that is the Lome
Convention that leads to the conclusion that the Convention is equally, freely and
voluntarily negotiated by sovereign states. Under this interpretation, implementation
of Lome Convention development objectives is on the basis of priorities, strategies
and objectives established by ACP states.411
However, despite its prolific provisions (running to over 360 Articles and
various Protocols) even the latest Convention only modifies and preserves traditional
relationships between some of the world's most highly industrialised states and the
least technologically advanced states. Few of the Convention's provisions are
actually related to transfer and development of technology between the ACP and EC
states, a subject traditionally accorded little effective attention by the Community.412
Successive Lome Conventions have therefore continued terms which in effect
were first set out under Treaty of Rome (Part IV) provisions which provided for a
unique legal form of "unilateral association" between the Community and its member
states and Overseas Countries and Territories.413 Under the association policy,414
associated states and territories were to participate in free and exchange trade with
the EC through, inter alia:
(i) Mutual abolition by both groups of trade barriers;
(ii) Non discrimination between imports from all member countries and
territories;
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(iii) Offer of rights of establishment for enterprises from other member states by
each member State;
(iv) Guarantees of freedom ofmovement for labour and other economic factors;
(v) To offer all nationals of member States wishing to tender or supply under
projects financed by the Community, "open and equal" terms and
conditions.415 In technology transfer terms, this condition is particularly
important, as we shall show below since it facilitates, inter alia, the continued
monopoly over technological activity in ACP States by enterprises from EC
States. Almost all the above five "fundamental association " provisions are
mirrored under Lome IV.
4.3 Lome Conventions - technology development and
transfer related provisions
The various Lome Conventions have either omitted or inadequately provided
for technology transfer to ACP States. Under Lome, the EC in practice primarily
provides finance, and technical assistance (or co-operation) as a "package". This
interweaving of finance into all technical assistance activity in practice means that
Lome provisions are interpreted by the Community not as technology transfer or
technical co-operation but as the procedures and methods for use of funds it
provides to ACP States, except under STABEX.
Lome convention provisions which may be said to be of direct significance for
ACP - EC technology transfer are relatively sparse. However, Lome IV in principle
tries to meet much of the criticism that the previous Conventions did not address or
inadequately addressed. These include effective participation by ACP nationals in
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Fund-financed technologic activity in ACP states, promotion of technological
capacity in ACP states, promotion of mutual self help or regional intra ACP technological
cooperation, safeguards against imposition of technical "aid" by the Community, etc. The
major provisions and measures under successive Lome Conventions meant to promote
acquisition of technical skills and other skills by ACP state and their nationals include:
4.3.1 Industrial development, manufacturing and processing 4,6
The objectives under this head prioritise the agricultural, rural development,
"manufacturing", mining, energy, infrastructure and services sectors. Under Article 78,
industrial development cooperation activity would promote conditions conducive to
industrial enterprise development, local and external environment - Article 78 (b). Industrial
cooperation would also foster the creation ofjoint ACP - EEC enterprises, especially those of
a small and medium enterprise nature that produce and use local inputs- Article 78 (d), and
participation by ACP nationals in such enterprises would be promoted. This objective would
be achieved through, among others, promotion of increasingly close relations between
community and ACP states, especially through the establishment of industrial joint ventures -
Article 78 (f).
For the least developed, land locked and island States, Lome IV promises community
special attention to their needs. Such attention extends, inter alia, to their raw materials
processing needs, development, transfer and adaptation of technology, development of
industrial infrastructure, medium enterprises, provision of adequate training in scientific and
technical areas, etc. Funds to implement
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these provisions are to be availed through the Centre for the Development of
Industry.417
4.3.2 Investment Promotion.
The Lome (IV) Convention provides that enterprises should comply with the
objectives of development co-operation under the Convention. It also requires them
to comply with the requirements of the appropriate laws and regulations of their
respective States - Article 258 (a). In practice, the law of most EC States requires
liberalisation of the economies in favour of private enterprise, leaving issues such as
transfer of technology to be determined by parties. Proof of the dominance of the EC
view in interpreting the Article is present in further requirements of the Article which
in effect require ACP States to provide:
(i) Fair and equitable treatment to investors - Article 258 (b);
(ii) Provide transparent investment regimes, that is, take measures and actions
which help to create and maintain a predictable and secure investment climate
- Article 258 (c);
(iii) To promote, inter alia, technology and know-how transfer, co-operation is to
be encouraged between ACP and EC enterprises - Article 258 (d). These
provisions, while encouraging positive factors such as transparency of local
investment regimes, are nonetheless effectively binding on ACP States to
provide "liberal" investment climates, that is, provide, de facto, national
treatment to EC firms. To guarantee the liberal investment regimes, ACP
States are encouraged, under Articles 260, 261 and 262 to enter into
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bilateral agreements and special arrangements for the protection of EEC originating
investments.418
4.3.3 Technical Cooperation
In terms of transfer and development of technology, these provisions in principles
constitute the most important measures. However, as already stated, their impact is weakened
by, among others, their being integrated into the financial measures,419 the lack of specific
formal and transparent legal mechanisms to implement them, the lack of a formal joint
technological policy420 between the EEC and ACP states, etc., which effectively obstruct the
ability of ACP states to effectively negotiate for and participate in Fund financed
technological activity.
The Salient provisions for Lome technical cooperation are:
Technical cooperation is to assist ACP States in their national and regional development.
Consequently, such assistance is availed at the request is availed at the request of the ACP
State(s) on a cost effective basis,421 favouring the transfer of know-how and promotion of
national and regional capabilities.422 To promote national capabilities technical assistance
personnel "shall" be qualified for the specific tasks as defined in the request form the ACP
State and "shall" be integrated within the beneficiary ACP institutions.423 Technical
assistance personnel shall promote effective training of national personnel in ACP States,
enhance the capacity of ACP States to build local technical skills. The community would
further promote ACP State's technological growth by encouraging cooperation partnerships
between consultancy firms, consulting engineers, experts and institutions of the member
States of the community and those of the ACP States.424 Under Article 277, the Community
undertakes to take practical measures to increase and improve the information available to
ACP
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States. Article 278(d) requires ACP States and Commission delegates considering a
request(s) for technical assistance to compare costs and benefits of different ways of
transferring technology and increasing local technological capabilities. The above
outlined principles are the primary principles that govern Lome Convention technical
co-operation and any technology transfer activity. The provisions, while binding on
ACP States to undertake specific measures through their country programmes and
project submissions, do not bind the EC to any specific commitment except the
allocated sum under the EDF and EIB funds.
4.4 Lome and Technology Transfer to ACP States - the
Practice.
Lome Convention technology transfer objectives, like the objectives of the
association policy, are theoretically sound but flawed in practice because they, inter
alia:
(a) Do not include spxxific provisions and mechanisms for the elimination of the
gross material (especially technological) inequality between EC States
and ACP States;
(b) Prevent EC policy conflict with that of the associated States, for example,
under the Common Agricultural Policy;425
(c) Are increasingly, as detailed below, based on conditionalities, especially
"financial efficiency"426 and private property protection and promotion
requirements.
The impact of the Lome Convention's on the technological development of
ACP States can only be accurately assessed if the Convention's legal provisions are
weighed against;
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(1) The increased number of ACP least developed States during the life
of the Convention, and the decline of their share of the EC market
during the same period. The ACP - EC Joint Assembly Resolution
of March 1990427 (whose decisions are not binding on the
contracting parties),428 noted, among others:
(2) That since the Paris Conference on least developed countries (1981)
the number of ACP States defined as least developed, far from
diminishing, had in fact increased- clause (c) of resolution;
(3) That during 1981 - 1990 most ACP countries had experienced a
decline in their agricultural production, a considerable increase in
their imports of food products, an absence of industrial development
and a weakening of nascent industries - clause (d) of resolution,
(4) That 95% of ACP exports to the European Community consist of
Agricultural commodities and raw materials; with EC exports to
ACP States consisting of 80% manufactured goods - clause (g) of
resolution;
(5) That since the first Lome Convention, signed in 1975, the ACP
share of imports into the Community market had been reduced by
half - clause (h) of resolution;
We show below that the condition of ACP States, in terms of technological
development (through inter alia, technology development and transfer), as in other
areas of potential conflict between EC and ACP States interests, is due to the
continuation under successive Lome Conventioas of the 'traditional' lack of inherent
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safeguards for preservation of recipient vital interests429 unless they lie outside those
of the EEC. Yaounde and subsequent Lome Conventions legitimised and formalised near
unilateral determination by EEC States of the key' terms, conditions and institutions430 that
govern ACP - EEC technoeconomic relations. Such legitimating was rendered necessary after
the independence of now ACP States, since 1 few' bilateral treaties had been concluded by EEC
metropolitan States with the then dependent territories, leaving large areas of ACP - EEC
relationships covered largely by non binding informal arrangements.
With specific regard to technology development and transfer, the Lome Convention
does not significantly advance the position of ACP States beyond the inadequate positions
prevailing under bilateral treaties or informal aid and assistance arrangements. The terms and
conditions under the bilateral treaties, (many of which are still in force) whether the treaty
referred to technical assistance or cooperation, were essentially unilateral, excluding active
participation by ACP States or their nationals.431 This contention is supported, inter alia, by
the fact that Lome, despite provisions on programming of 'aid' project design and appraisal,
implementation of projects, evaluation of results, does not provide for a joint technology policy
between the EEC and ACP States432 or contain specific provisions and mechanisms for
formal negotiation of technical cooperation 433 (vis-a-vis technical aid), for example, by
providing formal opportunities for full negotiation of terms and conditions, including formal
opportunities for full negotiation of terms and conditions, including formal opportunity for
rejection of assistance by recipient States. For instance, the Lome IV Convention, Article 295
provides for general guarantees by the Commission to ensure equal participation by ACP local
consultancies, engineering firms, local skills, etc. In practice, as noted below, these general
guarantees are not accompanied by specific transparent procedures.
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The Convention also provides for fixing of total available aid for each country
by the Community,434 informal exchange of views on negotiation of indicative
programmes435 and inevitably, financing of resultant projects. Successive Lome
Convention's have contained other substantive provisions and institutional measures,
discussed below, which directly or indirectly restrict ACP States (that is, public
bodies or other nationals - natural and juridical) in their negotiation for, acquisition
and dissemination of foreign technology. Some of the most important of these
factors are:
4.4.1 EC Market entry controls and Technological
Development in ACP States
The granting of access privileges to the EC market almost exclusively for low
technology products43^ (non sensitive) including restriction of industrial (medium or
high technology) exports into the EC under voluntary export restraints (called agreed
quantity arrangements in Convention usage) or use of rules of origin and proof of
origin requirements.437
4.5 Rules of Origin, foreign resource flows and effective
transfer of technology
The Lome Convention's provisions on rules of origin438 require that products
be not considered as originating in ACP States for purposes of duty free entry unless
the components that originate in third countries are subject to sufficient working or
processing. Consequently the basic criterion requires a change of tariff heading as
between materials used and the finished product.439 Though these rules have been
modified under, for example, by lowering the value added requirement to 45% under
Lome IV down from 60% under Lome III and addition of an automatic general
168
derogation clause, the fundamental problems, in technology transfer terms, remains
untouched. This is due to the fact that the less developed a country is, the more vital
are external injections of resources. The traditional form of external resource
injection in LDC's is direct foreign investment or capital.440 Capital investments in
countries with weak structural and technoeconornic bases, though important in
themselves, nevertheless are of secondary importance to technological and
management know-how transfers.441
Rules of origin, by directly linking trade with foreign flows of resources into
ACP States, thereby ensure that the rate or ability of ACP States, especially the least
developed among them, to attract external technological and managerial know-how is
determined by their ability to negotiate for, acquire and assimilate such foreign
technological and managerial know-how divorced of foreign capital investments,
except those originating in the EC.442 Lacking a "capital base" the majority of
ACP States therefore, remain unable to acquire any technological know-how and
consequently are unable to diversify their export base or add value to exports, thus
preserving the traditional division of labour between the EC and ACP States;443
Because of the fore-mentioned presumption of equality EC natural persons,
companies or firms (who or which often own the majority of industrial rights granted
by ACP States) receive equal treatment444 in invitations to tender and award of
contracts for implementation of Lome funded445 projects. Such EC firms can also
be financially supported under the convention.446 Since the Commission determines
the level of technical assistance activity to be undertaken, it has often unilaterally
interpreted assistance or co-operation, for example, as supply of EC specialists447
and firms that may even be imposed when not requested448 by an ACP State.
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Consequently, ACP "recipients" are as a rule largely unable to participate in
execution of projects, procedures for recruiting specialists or consultants as
determined by the Commission are frequently not transparent,449 the cost of technical
assistance may be excessive in relation to a country's indicative programme and
there is no formal assessment of whether effective technology transfer to the ACP
State in question450 has occurred. Further, technical "aid" or assistance is
interpreted by the Commission as indefinite dn nature. This was noted in a report of
the Council of Ministers thus:
"...while the raison d'Stre of technical assistance is to
make systematic preparation for its withdrawal, it is often
instead an integral part of European Community's co¬
operation policy, with no time /imh"451
4.6 Lome, "Equal" Treatment for EC Enterprises and ACP
technological growth
Because of the underdeveloped nature of ACP States and the "exclusive"
nature of Lome "aid", such aid often takes up a large potion of technoeconomic
activity in these States. Not withstanding the above mentioned Convention general
provisions on enterprise compliance with the legal requirements of the recipient
State, in practice, ACP States are increasingly incapable of regulating the
technological activity of EC based enterprises operating on their territory, especially
those implementing Lome projects, since such activity is automatically approved
under general tender and project implementation terms.452 Consequently, in relation
to EC based enterprises, ACP States:
(a) Cannot encourage their local enterprises, through legislation or otherwise, to
take full opportunities to explore alternative sources of technology,
except within the EC,453
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(b) Have to abstain from regulating (to influence effectiveness) EEC base companies
technological activity on their territory, for example, through regulation of
collaboration agreements, joint ventures, etc. between ACP - EEC enterprises
especially through approval and assessment procedures.454 Consequently, EEC firms
are able to impose virtually any arrangement, for example, prohibiting ACP
enterprises to sub licence or share know-how, since ACP firms are, inter alia, left to
negotiate the terms of any technology transfer according to their own judgment, which
is at best commercially motivated and rarely fully informed;
(c) Legitimise and perpetuate tied' historical export arrangements under which
enterprises procure capital goods, components, spares, raw materials, etc. from the
EEC;
(d) Cannot control EEC private enterprise research and development activities or
facilities within their territory. Subsequently, most projects show inadequate or no
attention to development of such local facilities;
(e) Control increasing use of conditionalities, especially economic and financial ones,
such as requirements for an increased role for private enterprise455 in Lome
Convention EEC funded activity.456 The requirements for use of private enterprises
in major ACP - EEC technical cooperation' ensures that EEC based enterprises,
which own the majority of industrial property rights registered in ACP States,
dominate technoeconomic activity in those States without any specific policy for
regulation of their activity under Lome, though regulation, coupled with the
requirement for ACP States to allow an increased role for private enterprise in ACP -
EEC technical cooperation activity, negates chances of ACP nationals and enterprises
gaining ability to compete with EEC based firms, despite provisions such as those
under Article 295 of Lome IV for "participation on equal terms', thus effectively
reducing access to technology for ACP enterprises.
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From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the ACP - EC technological co¬
operation on the basis of equality and reciprocal relations, though assumed in Lome
Convention theory, is not achieved (vis-b-vis achievable) in practice. Rather, the
policy of the EC defining technical co-operation as a mixture of aid and technical
assistance and therefore linked inextricably primarily to finance rather than
development, which was initiated under the Yaounde Convention457 is continued. It
is in this light that provisions relating to programming as the basis for equal
participation in EC sponsored aid under Lome are to be viewed.
4.7 Institutional Arrangements for EC - ACP technological
co-operation -
Substantive Provisions
Institutional provisions for technological co-operation under the Convention
are at best weak. Existing Ix>me Convention institutions fall far short458 of
providing transparency, that is, in formal consultation, evaluation, review and
monitoring of technical co-operation undertakings (including rate of disbursement
of allocated resources to recipient States), and decision making between the EC and
ACP recipient States. The institutions do not deal with disparity in bargaining and
negotiating power and thus do not change historically created unilateralist decision
making structures, funded by the EC and extended to cover now independent ACP
States "technical aid" programmes originally executed under individual bilateral
treaties.459
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4.7.1 Institutional Unilateralism or non parity - the Practice
The Lome Convention in principle provides an institutional forum for
permanent dialogue through the three joint institutions,460 that is, the Council of
Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors and Joint Assembly. However, in relation to
technology transfer, all main institutions are centred on, and principally operate from
within the Community.461 No specific "joint" policy or provision exists to promote
institutional undertakings already in the ACP region to deal with Lome Convention
requirements.
Conditionalities, as noted above, are increasingly placed on industrial co¬
operation, requiring ACP States to adopt specific policies as a precondition for
favourable and continuing co-operation. These conditionalities are enforced by
substantive and procedural requirements over which the ACP States have no control,
that is, preconditions for assistance required by the European Investment Bank462
and the European Development Fund. For example, the European Investment Bank
(EIB) which is charged, along with the European Development Fund (EDF) with the
task of financing applications for projects or programmes in industry including
agricultural processing, mining, tourism and energy and infrastructure,463 may in
theory disburse funds through private, public or semi - public ACP or EC
enterprises. The negotiations for such assistance between the potential recipient ACP
State and the Bank are carried out in co-operation with the Commission and the
Bank's own borrowers.464 In theory proposals made by ACP States in their
Indicative Programmes,465 are not binding on either party and may be subsequently
altered. The EIB may grant loans only where the execution of the project contributes
to an increase in economic productivity in general.
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However, because the EIB is autonomous from its owner States and raises the
bulk of its resources on the capital markets, its participation in Lome activity is
fundamentally, commercially motivated.
The Bank has ensured that:
(i) Projects and programmes are appraised primarily on the basis of its statute,
that is, the Convention or the Internal agreement do not set down conditions
according to which the bank may make loans from its own resources, that is,
grounds for disbursal are in effect discretionary to the Bank. In practice, the
Bank exercises this discretion by offering loans from its own resources
principally to those most favoured (credit worthy) ACP States "whose
economic and financial situation enables them to borrow at more selective
condi tions";46^
(ii) Any risk capital to be provided by the Bank is to be availed only subject to
presentation of "acceptable" projects to the Bank and the type of financing
that is most appropriate, is determined by the Bank, that is, the decision to
fund the activity is made by the Bank's directors on the proposition of its
management committee.
4.8 Dispute Settlement
The Lome IV Convention contains relatively few provisions on dispute
settlement. Under Lome III and earlier Conventioas, ACP borrowers and guarantors
were offered, on signing the Convention, the choice of law of one of the EC member
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States. Under Article 181 of the EC Treaty, the European Court of Justice has
jurisdiction to give judgement pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a
contract concluded by or on behalf of the Community, whether that contract be
governed by public or private.
Under Lome IV, Article 307, disputes arising between ACP States and a
contractor, supplier or provider of services during the performance of a contract
financed by the Fund shall:
(1) In the case of a national contract be settled in accordance with
national legislation of the ACP State concerned;467
(2) In case of a transnational contracts, be governed, if the parties so
agree, by the law of the host State or "its established international
practices"
or
(3) By arbitration under rules established by the Council of Ministers,




The Lome technical co-operation provisions are very inadequate in relation to
actual needs of promoting transfer and development of technology to ACP States.
This is primarily because:
(i) Lome disguises command relationships under free choice, that is, the extreme
technological disparity between the two "partner" groups can only be offset
through implementation of comprehensive, transparent and formal measures
with specific mechanisms and institutions for their implementation.
(ii) Negotiation and implementation of arrangements between two groups of
States with very unequal negotiating and bargaining powers must contain
inherent safeguards for the position of the weaker party, that is, the effective
decision making bodies such as the EDF and EIB are not open to ACP
membership or formal legal participation, yet virtually all legal and other
policy for the implementation of Lome agreements must inherently comply
with the principles on which these institutions base their decisions.
Consequently, ACP States do not have formal and legally binding channels
under Lome for rejection of terms and conditions for "aid" set by the EC,
though politically, the ACP may state their case through the joint institutions
such as the Council of Ministers;
(iii) The legal presumption of juridical equality has been continued into the
technoeconomic sphere, requiring ACP States to offer national treatment to
EC enterprises, though for instance, the EC is aware of the imbalance and
discriminatory effect that may result from blanket application of the most
favoured nation treatment in all cases.468
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(iv) Lome, as an integrated 'package' of capital, trade and other legal and non legal
obligations, binds ACP States to EEC sources of technology and skills which can only
be departed from with the consent of the Community States. Further, the ACP States
suffer diminished ability to influence technology transfer and development activity of
EEC based enterprises undertaking Fund supported projects on ACP States territory
or regulate restrictive practices involving ACP - EEC enterprises, even if such
practices obstruct, inter alia, acquisition of technological capabilities in the ACP State,
especially since Lome obligations prevail over parallel national or bilateral measures
and arrangements.469
4.10 The Andean Pact Arrangements and Promotion of Transfer and
Development of Technology
Among developing countries, the use of a regional or sub regional measures,
technological policy and use of special and preferential treatment to promote technological
development in member States was pioneered by the Andean Pact countries. The sub regional
technological policy aimed inter alia, at local production of technology, redemption of know-
how already existing in the sub region, selection, importation, adaptation and assimilation of
foreign sourced technology, etc.470
These regulations471 passed under the Cartagena Agreement included measures for the
promotion of a joint or sub regional technology policy and provided for the establishment of a
sub regional technological information system (SAIT) and a system for promotion of
assimilation and development of technology relevant to or appropriate for the sub region
(PADT) which could promote local innovation and
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ensure local exploitation of protected inventions and processes.472 Further, to ensure
preservation of material and juridical equality among member States, special and formal
preferential measures were included to protect Bolivia and Ecuador. These measures included
special concessions in the industrial sector such as designation of plants, automatic assignment
of production, etc. These measures proved of practical value in promoting the technological,
trade, industrial and other sectors in these two member States.
The joint technological policy was meant to ensure adequate local exploitation of all
intellectual property rights protected in the sub region. The policy ensured that:
(a) International technology development and transfer contracts were in conformity
with legal requirements. This was to be achieved by requiring submission for
approval of all agreements involving import of technology and licensing of patents and
trademarks to the competent national authority;473
(b) That specific terms and conditions were incorporated into the technology transfer
contract. Though technology transfer contracts do not contain technological
information but only the legal terms necessary to provide balanced entitlements for the
parties,474 it is important for evaluating authorities to assess the potential contribution
of imported technology to the importing State, the price or royalties payable under the
contract, determine whether duration of the contract as agreed is equitable, in short,
ensure that the contract is in accordance with choice and not command;
(d) Harmonisation of technology development and transfer contractual obligations or
immediate goals with the general technoeconomic and legal requirements of the host
State. This requirement necessarily overlaps in practice with those of the foregoing
subsection . The Andean Pact provided the first extra1 national regime among
developing countries to try and control or eliminate restrictive practices,
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in technology transfer contracts involving non nationals, which could frustrate local
development of innovative capability or the assimilation and effective use of imported
technology, etc. Though now modified, the joint technological policy contained
various provisions to control, among others, tied purchases (that is, procurement of
technology, from sources set by the supplier), prohibition of use of rival technologies,
binding purchase of technology to an exclusive grant back of improvements made by
the recipients, payment for unused rights, etc. Further, to enhance technological
innovation and development in the region, the policy required that preferences be given
to products incorporating sub regional technology;
(d) Identification of the regional provisions and law of the host State as the law
applicable to all technology transfer transactions in the region.475
Among other measures in the joint technological policy for the promotion of local
technological capacity and fairness of agreed technology transfer contracts, were
(i) Under Article 1 of the rules, patents could be granted for new creations capable of
industrial application and for those which may complement such creations. This
measure was meant to ensure, inter alia, that countries wishing to promote local
innovation through import of technology, the patenting of local improvements and
local inventions that can be used to resolve a locally felt need but do not otherwise
meet an international inventiveness standard, were protected. Article 28 of the
regulations provided that a patent "shall not confer an exclusive right to import the
patented product or one manufactured under the patentee's process'. Local
exploitation of patented inventions was to be ensured through the initial grant of a five
year protection term for patents and if the patentee was interested in the extension of
the patent term to the maximum period of ten years, such
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patentee would have to prove to the competent national office that the patent
was being adequately exploited - Article 29.
(ii) Patentees were required to submit notice to the competent national organs
that exploitation had commenced within three years of the grant of the patent
Failure to submit such notice of initiation would give rise to a presumption of
non - exploitation, which could facilitate the grant of compulsory licences -
Article 30. Exploitation was defined to mean the "permanent and stable use
of a patented process, or the manufacture of a product protected by the
patent, to supply the market with its final results under reasonable trade
conditions, provided such acts were undertaken on the territory of a member
State or as part of the Sectoral Programmes of Industrial Development" -
Article 31. The holder of a compulsory licence could not transfer it or grant
sub licences without authorisation by the owner and proof of initiation was
also applicable to such holder of compulsory licence - Article 38. Under
Article 34, compulsory licences could be granted after the expiry of three
years from the date of patent grant subject to proof of certain acts having
occurred, for example:
(1) Non - exploitation within the relevant country,
(2) Suspension of exploitation for more than one year by patentee;
(3) Failure to meet reasonable requirements of quantity, quality or price
as demanded by the local market;
(4) Unreasonable refusal to grant contractual licences to an applicant
who could satisfy the needs of the national market in terms of
quality, quantity or prices; or, if granted five years from the date of
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the initial patent grant, without proof of the above acts having occurred. Applications
for compulsory licences were open to any person' though the national office could
give a justifiable, legitimate excuse for the refusal of a compulsory licence. Patentees
whose inventions were subjected to compulsory licences were to be given a hearing by
the relevant national office and could file a suit after the exhaustion of the
administrative procedures, though exploitation under compulsory licence or the
running of the time periods would not be influenced by the filing of the suit Article 36.
It may be useful to stress that the above outlined joint technological development and
transfer policy has not, like the rest of the sub regional policy relating to, inter alia, capital
investments, finance, trade, etc. been substantively modified476 since it was largely in line with
international obligations and sovereign rights. However, as noted in Chapter 5 above, related
provisions such as those dealing with procedural or financial obligations (for example, royalty
payments, repatriation of profits, ownership of enterprises, etc.) as contained in Decisions 24
and 58, have been modified under Decisions 311 and 313.
Lastly, modifications under Decision 313, are meant to promote territoriality and
enhance sovereign control over technology policy,477 for example, though voluntary extra
(national) protection for given technological rights. Thus for instance, under Article 119 of
Decision 311, Andean Pact countries could enter into industrial property treaties with non
member States, provided such treaties or commitments did not contravene the provisions of
Decision 311. Article 118 of Decision 313 changes this rule, by allowing a member State that
so desires to enter
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into intellectual property treaties with third States for the purpose of offering, among
others, higher levels of protection than that offered under the common regime, to
such third parties. Further, Decision 313 relaxes provisions on intellectual property
rights that are not central to technological development, such as trademarks or
product patents for products that involve mature technologies such as most
pharmaceutical products, that is, member States may now allow patentability for any
pharmaceutical product. Under Article 98 of the same Decision, member States may
only cancel trademarks that have not been in use in any Andean Pact country for the
preceding five years, while under Article 99 of the repealed Decision 311, trademarks
not in use in all of the Andean Pact countries were to be cancelled.
4.11 Conclusion
The Andean Pact arrangements have, inter alia, helped member States to:
(i) Promote technological parity and mutual self help amongst themselves, that
is, through a joint technological policy, specific safeguards and preferential
measures, thus safeguarding material and technological equality among the
member States and performance of common goals, in accordance with
international law and policy;
(ii) Adopt and enforce legal measures which mitigate bargaining and negotiating
power between technology owners and Andean nationals, that is, prevention
of abuse of rights granted to non nationals;
(iii) Ensure transactional transparency;
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(iv) That the price paid for imported technology is adequate and correct for the
technology supplied; (that is, recipients were allowed to accept restrictions if
they were convinced that the price corresponded to international levels).
(v) Recent modifications to the regime, while reversing or eliminating absolute or
mandatory regulations relating to the general foreign investment regime, have
only modified the joint technological policy in its financial and procedural
aspects and not its substantive provisions which are in line with international




Treaty Based State Practice
And The Progressive Development Of
International Legal Measures For The
Regulation Of International Development And
Transfer Of Technological Capacity: From
International Concession Towards Balanced
Commitments and Entitlements
Introductory Note
"The enquiries of the jurist are in truth prosecuted much
as inquiry in physics and physiology was prosecuted
before observation had taken the place of assumption"
Sir Henry Maine, The Development of Law - In The
Political Economy of Law - a Third World Reader,
edited by Yash Ghai, Robin Luckman & Francis
Synder, Oxford University Press, 1987 at p. 35.
In preceding chapters, we have examined, inter alia, the
traditional problems relating to the role ofpublic international law in
facilitating access by all States to advances in science and technology
while ensuring that all States observe their primary responsibility for
their own development and move towards law and co-operation away
from unilateralism and absolute sovereign autonomy. The role of non
- State actors in international technology development and transfer,
the legal impact of such actors acts on technology "recipient"
countries, the legal reaction of technology importing States to
international technology development and transfer activity and the
effect of such reaction on the progressive development of public
international law, remain as yet largely unexamined.
Below, we argue that international legal regulation (multilateral
vis-a-vis autonomous or private party regulation) of the entire
technology transfer process, for instance, formulation, negotiation,
acquisition, performance and follow up of international technology
development and transfer arrangements, is progressively crystallising.
Multilateral legal regulation is a response to the scale and importance
of international transfer and development of technology which has
decreed, in the past, State legal and non legal intervention, both in
developed countries (and trust laws and technology export prohibition,
for example, through COMECON)478 and developing countries
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national and regional measures (for instance, direct regulation statutes and other technology
transfer laws and measures). This State regulation is however increasingly influenced by
international legal growth created by various international technology development and
transfer related Treaties and Conventions (for example the Code on Restrictive Business
Practices, the Law ofthe Sea Treaty, etc.), various resolutions and Decisions ofmultilateral
organisations and institutions, etc. Further, the importance and role ofprivate technology
development and transfer agreements between nationals of recipient States and non
nationals in technological development ofmost LDC's has necessitated the revision of legal
presumptions in national laws, for example, in relation to application of recipient State's
sole legal jurisdiction to such arrangements and their resulting rights and obligations. As a
result of this influence on national direct regulation and anti-trust statutes, many important
legal principles of an international legal nature have evolved in the regulation of
international technology development and transfer. These include:
(i) The principle ofbalance ofcommitments, for instance, the legal determination of
rights and obligations vis-a-vis non legal determination
(ii) The principle of divisibility of rights and obligations vis-a-vis
package' transactions;
or
(Hi) The principle of transparency;
(iv) The principle ofaccountability;
(v) The standard offair and favourable treatment which recognises,
inter alia, the need to avoid perpetuation ofmaterial (technological)
inequalities between States, negotiating and bargaining power gaps
between State and non State parties, etc.
In addition to elaboration of the fore mentionedprinciples, we show the link between
the enunciation of international transfer and development of technology policy and goals,
the crystallisation of international law by States which imbues such policies and goals with
the
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force of law and impact of these measures on the continuing formulation of
international legal norms for the transfer and development oftechnology, for example, under
the United Nations Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology, The United Nations
Code on Transnational Corporations, The Uruguay Round, etc. In our discussion, we avoid,
on grounds stated, inter alia, in Chapter 1 above, the circular hard and soft law debate that
has characterised discussion of the nature ofany legal measures taken in this area and the
equally circular monist - dualist arguments on links between national and international law.
Instead, we examine the activity itself, the subjects and parties involved, the resultant
interacting processes and their impact on related State activity of an international legal
nature or result, for instance, the harmonisation of the collective interest with regard to




5.1 Technology Transfer, public interest in LDC technology
importing States and private property rights
The majority of States now accept the right of each State to take specific legal
measures,47*' compatible with international law, for the regulation of international
technology development and transfer; as part of the progressive development of
international law. Such measures, constitute a new form of treaty based law and
State practice that does not fit neatly into the sharply demarcated traditional
divisions and classifications of international law sources as set out under Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Such progressive
development of international law, especially with reference to international
technology development and transfer which now has a precedent in the Law of the
Sea Treaty,480 has, historically, met with resistance from the traditionalist schools
of international law.
In the past, technology exporting States have insisted, as absolute entitlements
and preconditions for the 'effective' transfer of technology, on the need for
recognition by host States of technology owners' rights - including the right to
contract and trade freely, under guarantees of fair and equal treatment. Further, the
law applicable to the settlement of foreign 'investment' disputes has been,
historically, of concern to technology exporting States. These States have therefore
called for the application of international law to freely negotiated contracts and the
settlement of disputes.
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Developing countries, especially those heavily dependent on technology
imports, have historically, insisted on their sovereign rights. These include:
(a) The right of the recipient State to autonomously apply its laws to ensure, among
others, that imported technology contributes to the development process;
(b) The right to invalidate or void contracts and/or agreements deemed restrictive,
obstructive or aimed at frustrating effective technology transfer;
(c) The right to apply national laws to the settlement of disputes relating to technology
transfer, according to, inter alia, the provisions of Article 2(c) of the Charter
on Economic Rights and Duties of States (which provides for settlement of
controversial questions of compensation to be settled under the law of the
nationalising State) and the provisions relating to settlement of disputes as
provided for, among others, under the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Convention (ICSID) for example, under Article 42.481
5.1.1 Re - Statement of the Problem, Historical Perspective
Under unorganised international society (pre United Nations Era), international
technology development and transfer did not form a separate or important subject and was
subsumed under foreign direct investment. Sovereignty was a necessary precondition for direct
foreign investment, with each metropolitan State largely investing in specific territories.482
The law applicable to such investments was largely that of the home State and its industrial
property legal regime was extra-territorially extended to control, inter alia, technological
development in dependent territories.483 Security of foreign investment was ensured
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through 'extraterritorial' extension of guarantees and special advantages offered by the home
State, largely under bilateral arrangements.484
Later, constitutional "guarantees" had to be given by newly independent States in
relation to then current and future foreign investments. Such guarantees required the newly
independent State to:
(i) Refrain from any actions calculated or likely to place non - nationals at a
disadvantage compared with nationals;
(li) Co-operate in the importation of any necessary machinery, equipment or materials;
(iii) Guarantee adequate compensation in any case of necessary taking of non -
national's property (with vary ing standards, for example, fair, full and time
limits for such compensation to be paid, for example, six months in the case of
Uganda),485 etc. The foreign investor did not primarily aim at building a
technological capacity in the host State, but at application of extraction and
exploitation techniques, especially in the mining and natural resources486
sectors. As a consequence, the legal norms that developed during the period
aimed primarily at the protection of sovereign States' nationals extraterritorial
investments.
While rights of protection abounded, guarantees to mostly 'dependent' host States,
were largely excluded. The imbalance between rights and duties of investors during the
period is adequately reflected in the international concession regime and the unilateralist
development of 'minimum' standards of treatment for aliens, and in the case of industrial
property, the rigid exclusive protection of industrial property
190
owners' rights, for example, under the Paris (1883) and Berne (1886) Conventions.487
5.2 From Concession towards Balanced Contractual Entitlements: Investor
Unilateralism and the Sleeping Partner Host State.
The concessionaire exploitation right and privileges were protected by the home
State with regard to their equitable or justifiable nature.488 The host State granted
concessions in return for 'rate' or 'fixed, royalty collection 489 and it's sovereign rights were
not extended to control over the resource development and exploitation activity of the
foreign enterprise which were thus, at all stages, insulated de facto from host government
control or interference.490 Renegotiation of such concessions or divisibility of rights to
ensure, interalia, transfer of technology, were alien to the concession regime.
Home country jurist and publicists insisted that whether as contracts or unilateral
grants, concession provided a delicate, synallagmatic and interlocking set of rights and
obligations that the grantor of the concession was under obligation not to upset in order to
enable or allow the concessionaire to work the concession491 . As late as 1958. it was still
urged that the theory that government are not bound by concessions is calamitous for the free
flow of capital.492
In short, in technology development and transfer terms, the host State had no control
over the kind of equipment or machinery applied under the concession, research and
development or adaptation of technology imports, training of nations.493 Having granted the
right to invest, the host State became a
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sleeping partner, leaving it to the discretion of the foreign enterprise to determine
when, what, where and which technology to introduce. The exclusive privileges
granted under concessions and the largely non - participatory nature of the host State
(whether as a source of legal regulation or as joint partner in technology
development and transfer decision making), gave the concession and post -
concession era's the single, indivisible or package contract, unilateral decision
making and autonomous law regulation framework which have largely governed
international technology development and transfers to date,494 for instance, the
technology development and transfer is largely ineffective and often implemented
under innominate contracts, especially when the negotiating and performance gaps
are large.
5.2.1 The Post-Concession regime, international
development agreements, development corporations and
the rise in demand for international technology transfer
The emergence of a large number of newly independent but technologically
under developed States, especially during the post United Nations era, led to
increased demand that "foreign investment" should not only result into use of
physical resources in the host State, but also promote local technical knowledge and
skills and dissemination of new organisational and operational modes. Further, it
was demanded that the investor should no longer operate an enclave in the host State
that responded to the legal, technical and socioeconomic demands of the home
State.495 Technology exporting States continued to stress the private and absolute
nature of technology rights, as set out above. Where a recipient State exercised
'eminent domain' rights over any technology rights including the grant of compulsory
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licences, the technology owner was entitled to prompt, adequate and effective compensation
for the destruction or value reduction of his rights. This heightened conflict of interest
inherent in the process of international technology flows496 required quick resolution.
Technology however, for some time continued to be expressed as part of and inseparable
from the general investment regime, for instance, as not to be specified or subjected to
separate authorisation, evaluation or approval requirements and procedures or other
measures. Terms and conditions for exploitation of technology in the host State were largely
unspecified, whether in investment agreements, development agreements etc., largely due to
the need to establish pioneer industries in the host States.497 Under these porous' national
regimes, consisting of various, sometimes conflicting legislative controls and measures (for
example, trade regulation policies - export and import controls, anti-trust laws, unfair trade
practice regulation etc.), loopholes in regulation were widespread, with autonomous or
unilateral private regulation remaining the primary mode of regulation,498 enabling
technology suppliers to subordinate host State legislative requirements to commercial
practice and goals.
The turnkey type contract characterises the immediate post concession period. This
was due to the fact that this type of contract enabled the supplier to provide a 'technological
package' wholly under his control whole also superficially meeting national legislative or
developmental requirements such as those relating to training of nationals and use of local
raw materials. The main feature of a classic turnkey agreement as a technology development
and transfer mechanism is the provision, by the supplier or technology owner, of embodied
technology in the form of physical plant components. The supplier is responsible for the
construction or setting up of
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the plant, initiating its operation, testing its efficacy and adjusting any defects during
a guarantee period. While other obligations may be incurred under the arrangement,
for example, agreements as the to training of the purchasers' employees and future
maintenance,499 technology development and transfer does not form a primary
factor under the package transaction. Technological motives are subordinated to
commercial objectives as when suppliers rigidly adhere to observance of given
technological specifications for any liability to arise against them. Even miner
deviations from agreed terms may thus result in liability exemption for the supplier.
Today, this mode of transaction in which technology development and transfer is
only secondary, is still common among the least developed countries where the
technical and commercial gap between the supplier is greatest.500
The introduction, among others, of international development agreements,
especially those implemented through joint ventures with host country development
corporations or agencies,501 facilitated the adoption of more equitable forms of co¬
operation and enabled greater host State participation in international technology
development and transfer, both at the level of recipient and as regulator.
Direct (sovereign autonomy based) regulation statutes appeared, especially in
the 1960 - 1970's among the now advanced developing countries e. Brazil, Republic
of Korea, Argentina or small industrialised countries such as Spain and Portugal, to
condition the conversion of extractive capital investment ventures, equipment supply
and maintenance, turnkey plant installation and other 'unilateral' or purely foreign
owned ventures, into arrangements beneficial to the host State, such as joint ventures
and industrial property licensing which would inter alia, allow greater use of local
raw materials and increase local production for export, eliminate the use of any
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practice deemed restrictive (general or specific), cause adaptation of technology, etc.
Such transformation was to be achieved through strict 'punitive' legislative
provisions banning approval or registration of contracts containing Clauses or terms deemed
as invading sovereign interests, for instance, sovereign 'authoritative' power was to be
applied to eliminate activity deemed contrary to development goals. Substantively, the
technology importing State tried to legislate against the 'negotiating and performance' gaps,
for instance, to offset:
(i) Recipients relative lack of ability to draft technical documents, make commercial
proposals, sustain complex technical and commercial negotiations and achieve
specific negotiating objectives such adaptation, modification of technology,
acceptance of local research and development obligations by the technology
owner;
(ii) Recipient's deficiency of ability to design, manufacture or use specific processes
etc. independently of supplier or owner of technology, especially in the least
developed countries;
(iii) Recipient's inability to resist technology supplier's imposition of restrictions
(gradually divided into general and specific) relating to entire contractual
obligations, for example, ranging from restrictions on source of design
modification or change of technology skills if not possessed by recipient, to
post contractual obligations such as period of maintenance of technical or
trade secrets or competition by recipient in given markets or generally;
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(iv) Recipient's management, marketing, production, organisation etc. skill
dependency on the supplier or owner of technology;
(v) Recipient's lack of technology assessment and evaluation skills, for instance, as
to whether the technology is the most cost effective in terms of price,
maintenance, hazard, etc.
All these objectives were to be implemented through strict application of approval
and registration measures or criteria to technology development and transfer agreement.
Contracts for transfer of technology were to indicate or show reason for purchase of
technology, the technoeconomic results expected, commercial motives, developmental value
etc., before approval.502 however, as we shall see below, the failure of most direct regulation
statutes to expressly link national measures to internationally agreed goals and objectives,
created an image of unilateralism. The failure to link was largely due to the fore mentioned
sovereign autonomy base of these statutes and their primary intention which was to
encourage import substitution of capital goods and not technology itself.
Despite the shortcomings of direct regulation (mandatory) statutes, they were
principally responsible for revealing the international legal problems posed by international
technology development and transfer. Apart from initiating agreement to newer formal
arrangements such as subcontracting, research and development agreements, management
and marketing, joint assembly - production arrangements, technical licence agreements,
production cooperation agreements etc., direct regulation statutes remained principally
national instruments, which rejected provision for special regimes for non - nationals.503
Naturally, suppliers of technology opposed the statutes on the grounds, inter alia, that they
were,
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substantively, unilateral and failed to provide even minimum guarantees to
technology owners such as national treatment. States possessing direct regulation
statutes countered such criticism by pointing out that the national treatment standard
does not apply, in virtually all countries, to sensitive developmental issues and that
special treatment for non nationals is justified only in terms of a felt pressing national
need and not according to the source of technology or nationality of parties.504
Due to the national and authoritative character of direct regulation statutes,
their rejection of applicability of international law or regulation to, inter alia,
technology development and transfer agreements entered into or executed on the
territory or within the jurisdiction of the legislating State, the lack of express linkage
of national measures to agreed international measures, technology exporting States
and private parties consistently opposed even the legitimate underlying principles
contained in these statutes and denied the statutes had any international legal content
The principal ncn State agent of international technology development and transfer,
for instance, the transnational corporation, while quickly ceding 'required' formal
powers to the host State enterprises,505 rejected or refused to accept 'joint' control
over technological rights, perceived as private and absolute entitlements not open to
host State ownership or 'redistribution' to other parties. While home country
support could no longer be relied on to legitimate or justify practices that were
obstructive or frustrating to the host State's efforts at technological import
substitution,506 the transnational corporation was still able to create the 'change of
locks to fit the key' phenomenon,507 for instance, the imposition of terms by the
supplier that oblige the recipient to adjust local conditions to meet the needs of the
technology rather than vice versa.
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Direct regulation was least effective in cases where the negotiating powers and
technological position of the transferee were greatly divergent, for instance, in countries with
the least institutional capability to formulate and implement laws and regulations or with the
least technically competitive local enterprises and skills. In these latter countries, for
instance, the least developed, many of which inherited uniform national laws and
regulations508 that stressed the private and absolute nature of technological rights, reinforced
in bilateral treaties;509 "unilateral implementation" as a pre - condition of effective
technology development and transfer was presumed.
5.3 The solution - The Evolution of "Mixed" jurisdiction
The type of regulation that is evolving after the above outlined process, we refer to as
mixed jurisdiction, for instance, national laws and regulations incorporating international
norms, especially as minimum standards and general principles thus allowing for joint
regulation of international technology development and transfer activity under municipal and
international law. With relation to international technology development and transfer, the
new mixed jurisdiction system requires;
(a) The recognition of existing international Conventions, Resolutions, Decisions etc.,
on the duty of all States to facilitate the transfer of technology among States
as a precondition for enabling all States to gain access to advances in science
and technology and eliminating gross material inequalities among them. Such
recognition is based on the fact that technology is a permanent and complex
reality in the development process;
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(b) The extension of international law to, inter alia, the formulation, negotiation,
performance, monitoring and follow up international technology development
and transfer contracts. This entails, among others, acceptance by technology
recipient and exporting countries that the body of authoritative rules of
international law and its implementation extends to and encompasses the
whole gamut of a State's institutions concerned with international technology
development and transfer, for instance, legislators, the judiciary and
administrators in a related process (thus, requiring national measures such as
approval, evaluation, registration and validation requirements and procedures
to conform to evolving international legal rules);
(c) The modification of the "circular" process of sovereign autonomy vis-a'-vis
absolute private rights assertion, for instance, in a technologically more
interdependent international community, recipient States must observe
transparency requirements, ensure balance of commitments etc. and
technology exporting States must in good faith, exert control over the
technological rights of their nationals whenever international cooperation
requires it;
(d) Recognition and respect for the fact that transfer of technology (with technology
as an appropriated, planned or regulated, confidentiality protectedform of
property), requires voluntary participation by the owner or holder of the
technology.
(e) The recognition and acceptance of the need to offer fair and favourable terms and
conditions to LDC's (and special treatment to the least developed among them)
seeking to import technology;
However, due to the complexity of the rights and obligations involved, the evolution
of mixed jurisdiction has been tortuous. The slow pace change is due to assumptions that are
made by each group as to what constitutes international law and how changes in international
legal regulation are wrought510 . Below, we set out some of the existing international or
multilateral treaties or Conventions, Resolutions
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and Declarations concerning international transfer of technological and scientific
knowledge as part of tire process of meeting the socioeconomic needs of developing
countries. We thereafter show that the basic international legal content of these
norms has become 'incorporated' through State practice, modifying national laws (for
instance, that such national laws now more than reflect a minimum international legal
content and show an implicit or dc facto acceptance of international regulation over
given issues).
The mixed jurisdiction rules which result from treaty based State practice
have, being wide spread, become 'candidate rules' for international legal
recognition. Such treatment of evolutionary rules as de facto binding, does not
constitute, as seen by some critics an attempt to legitimate otherwise unilateral
international rule making but serves to highlight the importance of such principles
and the willingness of States to implement them and also provides reinforcement to
the process of concluding international commitments.511
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5.4 The organised international community and multilateral legal
approaches to international technology transfer Issues
"Although some norms can be conveniently
traced back to a source, such as those created by a treaty,
the establishment of a pedigree of norm often depends
upon the logical closure of the legal system"
Friedrich Kratochwill, Thyrasmmachos Revisited, On the Relevance of Norms
and the study of Law for International Relations, in international Library
Essay in Law and Legal Theory, at p.53.
State practice under organised international law in necessarily characterised by the
phenomenon of international institutionalised law512 that involves the re-thinking of legal
principles regarding sovereignty of States,513 substantive and material equality between them,
as those principles relating to non governmental actors in the international arena, etc.
Further, organised international society, reflected in permanent international institutions and
frameworks, has also required change in the nature of international communication and legal
decision making among States.
Permanent international institutions and machinery have encouraged the growth of a
dynamic and flexible corpus of negotiated norms and rules, fixed in the form of instruments
such as resolutions, declarations, conventions or codes that are then adopted by the great
majority of States. The United Nations system forms a large part of the new international
permanent framework for international negotiation and legal rule making in pursuance of
universal mandates based on the underlying principles of the Charter as expressed, inter alia,
under Article 55 and 56.514 Detailed discussion of the problem, as already outlined above, fro
instance, the legal
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relationship among others, between Article 38 (ICJ) and the Resolutions of the
General Assembly, is likely to be unfruitful unless viewed from the context of the
content of specific new norms.515
United Nations resolutions have been regarded as either contributing to the
formation of international law through conventional sources516 or taken as a body,
providing an undoubtedly rich indication of source of evidence or indications of a
genera] customary international law.517 The degree of international legal
authoritativeness of United Nations resolutions is often opposed by developed
country "jurists" using criteria tinged with relative State status (for example, the
expectations governing the extent of permissible behaviour, the extent and quality of
consensus and the degree to which effective consensus is mobilised to implement the
claims adopted in a resolution). Having discussed the matter elsewhere above,518
here we only note that Mac Donald adequately summarises the debate when he
states that:
"whatever the most appropriate description of what is
everywhere acknowledged to be a changing and complex
situation, it is well known that the growth of (a)
crystalline Charter through resolutions on the non use of
force, on human rights, space and outer space, the use of
the sea and the sea bed, and on environmental protection,
to mention only a few examples, significantly affects the
mixture of traditional international law".519
The United Nations forum and related agencies have been extensively relied
on, especially by developing countries as technology importing and non - exporting
States, to forge and structure a legal regime ensuring, among others, full reciprocity
of benefit for all parties (for instance, balancing private rights and gain with public
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or developmental interests), deduction of the effects of disparity in bargaining power, fair and
favourable terms and conditions for access to technology by developing countries etc.
Many United Nations organs and agencies such as the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Intellectual property Organisation (WIPO), the
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), Food and agricultural
Organisation (FAO), etc., have played a key role in the shaping, through multilateral
framework treaty type institutions and arrangements, of various international resolutions,
decisions and declarations into legal rule form, for example, as model laws and guide¬
lines520 or models provide a guiding spirit and purpose for the formulation and elaboration of
individual rules, which helps to explain the relative uniformity of otherwise recent laws,
regulations and administrative requirements since the guide-lines, model laws or regulations
encode and reflect the specific policy goals and principles agreed by member States of the
organisation or their representatives.521
Early United Nations Resolutions, Declarations and Decisions did not deal directly
with the subject of international technology development and transfer. However, emphasis
was laid, in line with prevailing juridical and socioeconomic theory, on the need for
accelerated flows of capital and technical assistance to developing countries522 on basis of
mutual advantage,523 in accordance with Charter goals to remove obstacles to economic and
social progress in developing countries.
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Roughly, from the Second United Nations International Development
strategy, the legal nature of the international technology process and the need for greater
'overall reciprocity' of benefit was consistently raised. Thus, under General Assembly
Resolution 2626 (XXV) it was agreed, inter alia, that developed and developing countries
and competent international organizations would draw up a programme for promoting
regulated international transfer of technology that would include:
(i) Review of international conventions on patents;
(ii)Identification and reduction of obstacles to the
transfer of technology to developing countries;
(iii)Facilitating access to patented and non - patented technology for developing
countries on reasonable terms;
(iv)Facilitating the utilisation of technology transferred to developing countries in such
a manner as to assist these countries in attaining their trade and development
objectives;
(v)Development of technology suited to the productive structures of developing
countries and measures to accelerate the development of indigenous
technology,524 etc.
The programme of Action on the Establishment of the New International
Economic Order,525 reaffirmed the need for both home and host States to facilitate the
international technology development and transfer process, including the extension of
international law to cover all international technology development and
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transfer activity, through inter alia, the formulation of an international code on the
Transfer of Technology.
Further, the programme called upon developed countries to give developing
countries' access to modem technology on improved terms, promote acquisition of
technological capacity in the recipient host States. The Programme also called for adaptation
of commercial practices to recipient country needs to prevent abuse of rights by technology
owners, through the imposition of obligations such as tied purchases, exclusive grand backs,
prohibition of use of rival technologies, limitation of access to new improvements in the
technology made by the transfer of or exclusion from ownership rights in technological
improvements made in joint enterprises etc. Adaptation of commercial practices also implies
reduced use or elimination of 'obstructive' agreement forms, for example, indivisible
contracts for supply or technology, as was common in foreign direct investment forms such
as capital goods or equipment transfers, turnkey contracts and other traditional embodied
technology development and transfer modes that did not primarily aim at technology transfer.
The Charter of Economic Rights Duties of States (1974) (CERDS)526 states the need
for all states to facilitate access for developing countries to the achievements of modern
science and technology, including the transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous
technology for the benefit of developing countries. Article 2 (2) (c) of Charter the provides
that each State can nationalise, expropriate compensation, and in particular allows for the
settlement of disputes regarding such
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compensation under the domestic law of the nationalising State and by its tribunals.
This provision, though commonly followed under most direct regulation statutes to
subject all non national investors to exclusive host State jurisdiction, has been
modified to allow for exhaustion of local remedies and application of international
minimum legal standards rather.
Further, the declaration on the use of Scientific and Technological Progress in
the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind (1975),527 noting that
scientific and technological progress has become one of the most important factors in
the development of human society. The Declaration states that all States:
"...shall promote international co-operation to ensure that
the results of scientific and technological developments
are used in the interests of strengthening international
peace and security, freedom and independence, and also
for the purpose of the economic and social development
of peoples and the realisation of human rights and
freedoms in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations"528
Further, it provides that all States shall:
"...co-operate in the establishment, strengthening and
development of the scientific and technological capacity
of developing countries with a view to accelerating the
realisation of the social and economic rights of the
peoples of those countries". 529
Similarly, the international development strategy for the Third United Nations
Development Decade (1981) called on developed countries to take adequate specific
measures to give or facilitate as appropriate, free and fullest possible access to
technology. The strategy therefore recognised the need for improved legal regulation
over international technology development and transfer flows. Such regulation
would have to rely on new, universal and reciprocity based international minimum
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legal standards, replacing any decaying international minimum legal standard,
mainly in the Paris and Berne Conventions.
The Law of the Sea negotiations provides important precedent for the conversion of
widespread principles contained in national laws into specific State or private subject
oriented international legal concepts such as the concept of balance of rights and duties of
parties, requirements for transparency,530 fair and just treatment, etc. National measures are
in specific cases made equally effective with international rules or standards, for example,
with regard to pollution531 health hazards, etc. With reference to "marine" technology
transfer, the Convention sets out a requirement for preferential treatment for developing
countries based primarily on the sovereign duty to co-operate532 and need for balance of
rights and duties. Such preferential treatment is qualified, that is, based on the capabilities of
each member State to transfer marine technology.
Under United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Resolutions 39(iii) of 1972, 87(iv) of 1976 and 112(vi)of 1979, among others, the duties of a
home State were set out as:
(i) Facilitation of efficient flows ofmarket information;
(ii) Facilitation of technology development and transfer in aid packages and
encouragement of enterprises533 based on their respective territories to
participate in the developmental activities of recipient States, including
support for the technology import substitution programmes in the recipient
countries by undertaking research and development in such countries,
imparting technical skills etc.;
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(iii) Facilitating the non - commercial transfer of technology in the public
domain, especially to the least developed countries, that is, developed
countries and competent international institutions should assist the institutions
of the least developed countries in obtaining the results of scientific and
technological development appropriate to their requirements, on favourable
terms;
(iv) Encourage diversification of technology supplies, for example, through
prevention of the formation of technology supplier concentrations among a
few enterprises.
Under various Resolutions, for example, Resolution 31(vi) of 1985,534 the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has consistently
called for the development and transfer of technology under the principles of
universality, non-discrimination and respect for mutual advantage, as reflected, inter
alia in the Draft Code ofConduct on the Transfer of Technology.535
Many other specialised agencies have passed resolutions or decisions dealing
with transfer of technology, within their specific areas of competence. Thus the
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), which is charged
with assisting in the industrial development of developing countries, through inter
alia, the relocation of industrial production as envisaged in the Lima Declaration, has
passed and implemented many resolutions and decisions on the subject of technology
transfer. Thus, UNEDQ Resolution 47 (XI) of June 1977 called for the
strengthening of, among others, national, sub regional, regional and inter - regional
technology centres for the transfer, development and practical application of
industrial technology and proper selection, adaptation and evaluation of transferred
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technology to ensure conformity to technical, economic, commercial and development
implications.
The United Nations Conference on Science and Technology, Vienna
(1979)536 resulted in various resolutions on measures and mechanisms for the
strengthening of the scientific and technological capacity of developing countries.
The representative of the European Community called upon developing countries to
adopt measures for the regulation and guidance of the of technology import activity,
not only in respect of its direct transfer, but also with respect to technical assistance
contracts, engineering services, investment and re-investment and other technology
transactions.537 Under Article 12 of the Resolution passed at the Conference,
developing countries should, in accordance with their national policies and priorities,
establish and strengthen national mechanisms for the assessment, transfer and
acquisition and adaptation of foreign technologies. To achieve this purpose,
developing countries would have to, inter alia, establish S} stems for compulsory
registration of contracts and other technological transactions with foreign suppliers-
Article 12 (g), establish an integrated system for the selection and assessment o
technologies and for the development of a capacity to unpackage technologies to be
acquired - Article 12 (b), promote the reorganisation of the national legal structures
for the transfer of technology, including the revision where necessary, of the national
legislation relating to industrial property, to promote domestic innovation - Article 12
(d) and promote the adaptation and assimilation of technologies and encourage
increased utilisation of local inputs, particularly national resources and sub
contracting. Further, developing countries were to establish, as appropriate,
machinery to effectively monitor, screen and evaluate imported technology including
that from transnational corporations, with a view to ensuring maximisation of
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domestic technical inputs (reservation made by the European Economic Community
States {EEC}).
Such machinery was to ensure, among others, that
f
(a) Transnational corporations do not impede but contribute to, the diffusion of
technology in the host State;
(b) Subsidiaries carry out research and development in developing countries and
associate in this process local personnel;
(c) Priority was given to the use of local raw materials, intermediate products,
technology and personnel, etc.
At the conference, it was proposed by the United States that Article 13bis of the
resolution should provide that national measures should be consistent with obligations under
international law treaties, agreement be applied equitably and without discrimination, in
accordance with fundamental fairness and established procedures of law. Further, national
measures should be supported by a legal framework that promotes a favourable and
beneficial climate for technology transfer, acquisition and development. The framework
should encourage and facilitate transfer technology to take place under mutually agreed, fair
and reasonable terms and conditions, and should give proper regard to existing rights and
obligations of all parties concerned. In short, though disagreement existed about what the
measure were to constitute, all States, technology importing and exporting, were in favour of
national measures forming a part of the legal frame work for regulation of international
technology development and transfer activity.
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5.5 State Practice and the Crystallisation of a treaty based
international legal regime for the regulation of international
technology development and transfer
The tendency away from sovereign autonomy towards international law is
reflected in the reduction or elimination of command structures and dictates. The
use of law against legitimate entitlements diminishes with the growth of international
legal rules to guide activity, promote collective self- interest and interacting goals.
National measures become viewed as contributory to the process of crystallisation of
international law given the absence of specific mandated international institutions to
regulate the activity in question and its complexity which renders treaty making
intractably difficult.538
The mixed jurisdiction regime, reflects the progressive crystallisation of an
international legal regime for the regulation of international technology development
and transfer in that the various 'new' or modified national technology development
and transfer laws and regulations539 are based on international agreements and
consequently, are 'harmonised' or very similar in many respects, that is:
(i) Their scope of application extends mainly to international technology
development and transfer contracts;
(ii) They aim at removing the negotiating and performance gap between
suppliers and recipients by ensuring greater balance of commitments or their
protection for all parties;
(iii) Their principal objective is to facilitate the recipient's acquisition of
technological capacity within the framework of agreed or negotiated
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international goals and policy objectives and under fair and favourable
treatment;
(iv) The main legislation differentiates primary development goals, that is, in
this case technology development and transfer from development related
goals, for example, capitalisation of assets, repatriation of profits, purely
financial or commercial provisions. National law is the law primarily
applicable to primary goals, international law applying development related
issues.
(v) The juridical and administrative framework of each State lays down broad
guide-lines and bestows broad, discretionary powers upon regulating
authorities (such as technology development and transfer centres or agencies),
which lay down detailed rules and regulations and make individual
adjustments on specific terms, in accordance with international law.
The foregoing factors are inherent in the various mixed jurisdiction measures,
though their extraction as either principles or standards from individual legislative
acts is not essential to their existence. The existence of the new international legal
principles and standards is also unaffected by the fact that the scope of national laws
on the subject of international technology development and transfer depends on the
level of technological and socioeconomic development in each State.540 Thus, while
developed countries technology development and transfer laws deal with special high
- tech requirements and joint research aspects,541 and advanced developing countries
(such as Brazil)542 legal measures' centre on sector specific issues, with the aim of
enhancing transfer and absorption of technology into those sectors perceived as
technologically weak or as likely to contribute to the further acquisition of
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technological capacity, the majority of developing countries measures aim at
improving (or in case of the least developed countries, establishing), legal and
institutional infrastructure necessary for the import substitution of technology;543 the
under lying international legal principles, policy and rules are conformed to and
balance of commitments for all parties and achievement of favourable treatment for
recipients is explicitly stated as a primary goal.
5.6 Mixed Jurisdiction : Meaning and Substantive results
(principles and standards)
5.6.1 Mixed jurisdiction- Meaning
Because of the complexity of the international technology development and
transfer activities of non - nationals in a host State, such activity has to be governed
by intertwined international and municipal rules. Under such regulation, the
application of general international legal principles, minimum standards and
procedures acts as a floor or threshold level below which a host State, applying its
national laws to the regulation of international activity must not fall. In practice, this
means that national authorities dealing with any disagreement(s) relating to
international development and transfer of technology transactions, actively involve
the relevant multilateral institutions, taking advantage of the full range of established
mechanisms and instruments for settlement of disputes (good offices, consultation,
mediation, negotiation or even arbitration), short of adjudication, with the express
purpose of maximising non litigational settlement of disputes and rule making. In the
event of any actual litigation (which is rare due to the high efficacy of the multilateral
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non adjudicatory process), the simultaneous application of municipal and all relevant
m Itilaterally developed rules and procedures would be natural and in accordance
with 'new' and current international practice of States to achieve balanced regulation
of international development and transfer of technology activity. The nature and
standard of treatment achieved under such balanced or Mixed jurisdiction is therefore
substantively and procedurally different from that achieved under anti trust
regulations or 'direct regulation' statutes,544 since it relies on balanced standards
and not 'auto determinism' or unilateral determination or enumeration of
commitments and thus, entitlements.
Mixed jurisdiction also differs from the strictly nationalistic anti - trust and
direct regulation statutes in a few but important respects. Firstly, mixed jurisdiction
is flexible, reflecting the desire of States, at all levels of development, to establish
legally balanced entitlements for parties involved in complex and highly dynamic
international technology development and transfer activity and relationships with
inherent conflict of interests.545 Unlike direct regulation statutes or anti trust
regulation which normally enumerate the rights of one State vis-^-vis those its
nationals or non - nationals, Mixed jurisdiction ensures balance of commitments
through guarantees of international minimum legal standards of treatment for
technology owners and recipients and provision for fair and favourable treatment to
developing country technology recipients according to their technical and
socioeconomic needs. Under Mixed jurisdiction, functions such as registration or
evaluation agreements do not only demand for exercise of good faith in the
formulation, negotiation and performance of agreed obligations and rights, but also
imply the acceptance of a duty to ensure balance of commitments by the recipient
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State. These regulatory functions are increasingly taken, as stated above, with legally agreed
or consensual participation by relevant multilateral agencies.
5.6.2 Balance of Commitments
The balance of commitments principle, as it has developed in State practice, means
that overall rights and obligations are dynamically equal, legally determined and not imposed
but negotiated. At the national level, it implies that implementation of national legislative or
policy measures is subject to or conforms to some form of multilateral standard and that
disputes are resolved in accordance with international law. The principle also implies a case
by case approach, under which favourable treatment can be accorded to recipients in
accordance with technological and socioeconomic needs in each State. Thus, specific
'restrictive' practices may be treated as permissible, where the recipient has a predominantly
commercial motive (that is, where the recipient's intent is to dominate a market and not a
technology546 as when a recipient enterprise licences technology with a principle motive of
acquiring commercial advantages such as the use of trademarks in local or export markets);
or where the obligations are justifiable and specifically defined, for example, in relation to
licensee's exports, right to sell improvements to third parties, contest validity of industrial
property rights or acquire competing technology, carry on independent research, etc.
Balance of commitments and fair and favourable treatment, when constantly applied,
prevent the perpetuation of material inequality that would otherwise result when the
traditional principles of freedom of contract, non - discrimination, reciprocity, university and
equality are applied indifferently to unequal parties,
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that is, as under the traditional industrial and intellectual property conventions.547
The acceptance of balance of commitments as modifying traditional principles and minimum
standards, means in relation to international technology development and transfer:
(i) Cooperation and observance in good faith of certain duties by home and host
States in addition to those of private or juridical parties involved in the
technology development and transfer process;
(ii) Transparency of all laws and regulations applicable to transfer of technology;
(iii) Separation of primary development regulatory issues (to which national law may
be exclusively applicable) from development related issues such as
international technology related - trade and commerce, finance, etc., (regulated
primarily under international law),
(iv) Accountability of all parties;
(v) Reasonable and non - discriminatory terms and conditions in the formulation,
negotiation and performance of technology development and transfer
agreements;
(vi) Fair and favourable treatment for all recipient parties;
(vii) Adequate and effective protection of legitimate interests of all parties;
Balance of commitments therefore, in practice implies, negotiation, performance and
follow up of agreements in good faith, under reasonable and non - discriminatory terms and
conditions. For the owner of technology, conclusion of
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agreements should not result in unjust enrichment or giving of access to technology
on a discriminatory basis (except under a few widely accepted and established legal
departures from the general principle such as under the most favoured licensee
Clauses).
5.6.3 Transparency requirements: Meaning and Relevancy
Mixed regulatory measures are taken in the light of the technological and
negotiating power gaps. The initial approaches to improvement of negotiating and
performance requirements of recipients, especially under the authority based direct
regulation statutes, were primarily to restrict supplier powers. However, under
Mixed jurisdiction, balance of commitments requires the exclusion of only general
impositions that fundamentally frustrate the purpose of import substitution of
transferred technology. Further, because it is often necessary for the recipient to get
favourable, that is, preferential access to technology and technology supporting
mechanisms such as trademarks, marketing, management and other devices; supplier
co-operation "must" be guarantied.
Consequently, guarantee of transparency of the legal measures undertaken by
the recipient State is a precondition for balanced legal relationships between supplier
and recipient. The principle of transparency therefore requires a recipient State to
publicly disclost and clarify all legal and administrative measures that affect the
operations undertaken during the technology development and transfer process,
especially with regard to exercise of the eminent domain, law applicable and dispute
settlement.548 Defined, transparency therefore means non - discriminatory and open
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access and availability in correct form of the relevant rules and policies, to all parties. Such
rules and policies should be in accordance with international law principles, rules and
standards or policy regarding international transfer or use of, intellectual property (including
industrial property), know-how, etc. Consequently, the recipient States should ensure
transparency ofall its laws and regulations with international law.
The necessity for transparency in national measures arises because such measures
link international development law and policy, national development objectives and public
and private commercial objectives. Further, through transparent measures compatible with
international law and policy, private parties are made aware of internationally "agreements"
and these are given the force of law. Transparent provisions are essential also because legal
standards compliance is based on the assumption that parties subject to a rule know that
behaviour is required of them in order to avoid excessive or under compliance, arbitrary
assessment of claims or discriminatory enforcement, over regulation of given activities,549
etc.
The foregoing is affirmed by an UNCTAD study which shows that legal provisions
in national measures which are in accordance with international law and policy greatly
influence private arrangements and facilitate the actual incorporation in technology
development and transfer contracts of specific detailed requirements and the implementation
of those requirements.550 Thus, where the conventional autonomous contract provides
generally that the supplier will be responsible for training of nationals, operation and
maintenance of the supplied plant, the new
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legislation encourages the supplier to train nationals in the application of ah aspects
of the (suppliers) current technology, for example, basic process design, detailed
equipment design and procurement, construction, testing, start - up, operation and
maintenance and improvement techniques, making it easier to legally monitor,
quantify and determine the actual performance of the various rights and obligations
under the contract.
5.6.4 Accountability
Traditionally, international technology development and transfer was
characterised by unilateralism with observance of duties flowing mainly against the
recipient. Accountability is aimed the limitation of such imbalances. Accountability
is closely related to transparency since it arises and attaches when there is an
intentional failure to meet transparency requirements by a private or State party.
Thus at State level, accountability as a principle requires a home State, in
accordance with international commitments551 to exercise in good faith, effective
control over its national enterprises (that is, those with head or principle office
established on its territory) in order to facilitate developing countries legitimate
import substitution of technology efforts and guarantee their right to benefit from
advances in science and technology. Further, the principle requires such home State
to prevent, inter alia, the export of polluting, hazardous or dangerous obsolete
technologies.
The recipient State, on the other hand, should provide effective protection for
legitimate interests of all parties, that is, those which do not obstruct the effective
219
'import substitution' of technology or acquisition of technological capacity. Such
protection should be in accordance with reasonable international expectations based
on the effective capacity of each State to comply with and meet its international
obligations.
For private parties, the supplier of technology should be per se accountable
for use of any coercive measures, for example, use of general tying Clauses, use of
exclusion Clauses to avoid legitimate obligations such as giving warranties or
guarantees, refusal to re-negotiate oppressive agreements and allow divisibility of
rights and obligations, that is, the burden is on the supplier to prove such provisions
are not restrictive. The supplier should per se be liable to compensate the recipient
where obsolete, dangerous or polluting or hazardous technologies are supplied.552
The recipient should per se be accountable for failure to maintain confidentiality
with regard to rights under transfer, failure to make correct and prompt payment for
technology, ensure adequate performance of his obligations under the agreement in
accordance with reasonable expectations.
5,6.5 Fair and favourable treatment, (qualified special and
preferential treatment)
As already stated, technology is today largely appropriated as private
property. Fair and favourable treatment for all recipients, does not mean free access
or special treatment for them but only requires full co-operation in good faith from
all parties in accordance with their capabilities, to promote development and transfer
of technology, on fair terms and conditions, taking into account specific conditions
(for example, technoeconomic gaps between States, social and cultural factors,
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negotiating power disparities, etc.). Thus the owner or supplier of technology should strike
and appropriate balance between technological and commercial motives. The supplier or
transferor should also adopt the most effective means and channel)s) for the transfer of
technology. For the recipient, fair and favourable treatment means treatment that results in
effective technology development and transfer or legitimate commercial activity and not
unjust enrichment. In practice, it is accepted that in the case of the least developed countries,
special (preferential) treatment is required if the recipient is to acquire a technological
capacity.
5.7 The evolution of a mixed jurisdiction Regime illustrated two
examples
The above attempts to outline the progressive formulation and articulation of
international legal norms for the regulation of international technology development and
transfer and the general effect of such formulation on State practice in the crystallisation of
such norms. Below, we highlight some of the most visible specific effects of such
progressive international law formulation on national regulatory arrangements for example in
the modification of formerly 'strict' direct regulation statutes to streamline them with the
evolving standards and legal expectations.
5.7.1 From absolute sovereign authority towards cooperation,
Demise of general mandatory or direct regulation? The Andean
Pact and Latin America example
In the Andean Pact countries the primary aim of the legislation for the regulation of
technology imports we, initially, balance of payments considerations.
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The local "production of technology, utility of know - how already existing in the
sub - region, selection importation, adaptation and assimilation of foreign technology, etc.,
were secondary.553 Emphasis on balance of payments interests meant that national industrial
property systems were designed to ensure that imported technological rights were of foreign
exchange earning value or capable of stimulating the creation of mass production capacities
vis-a'-vis their more effective role in promotion of local innovation.554 Consequently,
national industrial property systems roles, for example, as innovation promotion tools and
therefore technology development and transfer goals, were subordinated to immediate
economic priorities. Because of this linkage to the general investment and financial regimes,
legitimate provision under the joint technological policy that dealt with control of technology
import and transfer were also regarded as contrary to international law, that is, as part of the
absolute sovereignty based direct regulation status. However, as pointed out in chapter IV of
this work, this presumption is largely inaccurate in relation to the substantive provisions of
the joint technological policy which are largely in accordance with international law, as
further shown below.
Under the joint technological policy, national industrial property offices concentrated
their powers on evaluation and approval of all international contracts for technology
development or transfer, for example, those for the licensing of industrial property. Foreign
technology suppliers objected to mandatory examination, especially due to the Andean Pact
member countries' insistence on the Calvo clause, that is, self determination for each state,
including exclusive subjection of non - nationals to the juridical regime of the host State.555
Evaluation was however in line with the "overall" national interests of all member States.
The 'overall;; reciprocity' between interests was
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monitored and enforced through, interalia, the above mentioned programme for the
promotion and safeguard of the production of sub - regional technology, adaptation and
assimilation of existing technologies Article 23 of Decision 24.
In 1987, the Andean Commission passed decision 220, replacing Decision 24, the
common Foreign Investment and Technology Licensing Code. In relation to international
technology development and transfer, Decision 220 in effect separated the substantive basis
of the Andean pact countries joint technological policy from the purely commercial,
financial, trade, etc. aspects of technology imports (that is, development related aspects that
as noted above, may include sale of technology, processes and financial aspects of
technology development and transfer transactions such as royalty payments, repatriation of
profits, etc.). This separation under modifying Decisions 220 and 291 of primary
development issues, for example, trade, capital and commerce, is illustrative of the
recognition in State practice that national laws and regulations may apply exclusively only to
primaiy development issues.
The foregoing well illustrates by the Andean experience. Under Decision 24, host
countries reserved the right to exclude technological investments from given sectors and "all"
restrictive practices considered non legal. The 'primary development' regulatory issues were
then 'fused' with commercial, financial or trade issues such as:
(i) Intangible technological contributions such as industrial models, technical
assistance know - how could not form contributions to capital;
223
(ii) Local enterprises in the host State were to have free access to foreign technology,
capital equipment, raw materials and working capital at normal international
cost;
Decision 291 separates primary development regulatory issues and development
related issues. Primary development issues such as public policy, impact of transferred
technology, development of national technological capabilities, conditions affecting use of
transferred technology, etc., then take precedence over issues such as adequate compensation
for technology owners, capitalisation of technological property, repatriation of profits, etc.
State practice now shows that the former are regulated strictly under national laws, while the
latter are regulated under international minimum legal standards.
Thus, under Article 12 of Decision 291, the member States competent entity shall
register and evaluate the effective contribution of imported technology, the transferor or
technology owner has to comply with specific minimum legal obligations by inter alia,
giving specific guarantees, making adequate disclosure of domicile and nationality,556
contractual value of the technology to be transferred, the means of such transfer and make a
separate evaluation of the elements involved in the technology transfer.557 as well as the
duration of the contract. The technology on a reciprocal basis - Article 14.
The decision then goes on to balance these duties by giving certain international
legal guarantees to the technology owner, in relation to technology
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related issues. Under Article 15, the technology owners right to payment for
intangible technological contributions not forming contributions to capital or capitalise
accrued royalties upon payment of prior taxes is recognised, even if such contributions form
part of intra - firm transactions.558 Given arrangements in technology development and
transfer transactions may therefore not be regarded as restrictive if they do not conflict with
primary national socioeconomic goals, etc. Further, in the Latin American region outside
the Andean Pact, there are many other examples of the separation of primary development
and development related issues, leading to direct acceptance of international minimum legal
standards to regulate the latter. Examples of 'modifying' legislation include the Argentina
Technology Transfer Law (1981), Mexico's Technology Transfer regulations (1990) which
modify the 1992 Law on the Control and Registration of technology transfers and use and
exploitation of patents and Trade Marks, Venezuela's Decree 727 of 1990, modifying Decree
746 of 1975, etc.
5.7.2 From non - legal regulation towards minimum legal
standards, the example of the Organisation for Economic
Corporation and Development (OECD)
Ever without the law. Never without friends
(Monopolies) Coke 3 Inst. 182.
Traditionally, technology exporting states, that is, largely the industrialised countries,
left international technology development and transfer flows to be governed voluntary non-
legal 'national good corporate behaviour standards' and autonomous law or agreement of the
parties,559 thus allowing technology owners,
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through large numbers of patents or other exclusive intellectual property devices and
arrangements, to control international technology development and transfer activity. This
non-legal regulatory approach allowed the growth of international division of technology
"markets'" that is, growth of concentrations, control over technology prices and rates of
introduction of new technologies, transfer of obsolete, polluting, dangerous or potentially
harmful industrial plants, processes and designs, etc. The technological relationship between
parent companies and subsidiaries was particularly deemed outside legal intervention (that is,
the receipt of technology packages from parent companies adapted exclusively on
commercial grounds, was perceived as justified by the home State).560
Non - regulation over international technology development and transfer was further
justified on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction and the non - compulsion of states to
regulate, that is, it was claimed that direct imposition of regulatory requirements by the home
state over extra - territorial activity would conflict with the host country's jurisdiction over,
inter alia, environmental, health and safety matters.561 However, the majority of technology
exporting states opposed the CERD's requirement of exclusive application of host country
legislation to technology transactions occurring within the host country's territory.
However, following the high rise in international technology flows, increased extra
territorial effects of technologies, growing technological disparities between large and small
industrialised countries, the rise of illegal international restrictive arrangements providing for
inter alia, cross licensing and non - opposition of patents, joint prosecution of third parties or
potential competitors, price fixing,562 increased acceptance by developed
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countries of the need to facilitate primary' development in LDC's, etc., the majority of
technology exporting state's practice indicates implicit movement towards multilateral legal
controls of international technology development and transfer, including the curtailment of
artificial or general restrictive practices.
Despite the above outline recognition of the problem within the special regime of the
OECD, most or the organisation's members stress, (in a way identical to the circular "hard'
and "soft' law debate) that what is accepted is "international' minimum quasi - legal standards
necessary for the general regulation of economic activity by global actors where it impacts
for example, on taxation, health and environmental controls,563 and not mandatory imposed'
national legislative requirements. The recognition of the need to preserve exclusive national
regulation over primary development regulatory issues is therefore only reserved as
applicable to OECD States.
Through the measures for the regulation of intra OECD technology development and
transfer activity are labeled as quasi - legal and non binding, OECD countries have gradually
moved from the former purely "moral obligation' standards such as good corporate behaviour
towards distinctly legal "format' guidelines and standards. The OECD Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976) to which the Guide-lines for
Multinational Enteiprises are annexed,564 makes "recommendations' to transnational
corporations that, though stated to be based on a pragmatic rather than a legal approach,
create procedures which enable OECD institutions (the OECD Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises - CIME) to apply the guide-lines as part of a
consultation and clarification process, that is, as de facto minimum legal
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standards aimed at achieving reciprocity of benefit by balancing national treatment with
adequate socioeconomic responsibility by enterprises.
The recommendation's voluntary requirements are applied jointly with national laws,
regulations and administrative practices in consistency with international law, especially the
national treatment principle. Thus in practice, within the OECD special regime, the Guide¬
lines. especially through an evolutionary review mechanism, have established de facto legal
minimum multilateral standards in relation to transactional transparency, joint technological
research, competition , taxation, employment and technological innovations.565 etc.,
standards that are denied as containing legal content, even within the special regime.
However, it can be concluded that OECD States now recognise and international legal duty
to prevent enterprises based on their territory subverting primary development goals of other
States, which in the case of developing countries involves technology development and
transfer activity.
5.8 Extension of International Law - Impact of mixed jurisdiction
principles on the technology development and transfer process,
from assessment of needs, formulation of agreements, performance
and follow up
5.8.1 Assessment
Successful import substitution of technology requires possession of a domestic
capacity by the recipient State to assess the required technology. Traditionally, technology
importing countries inadequately recognised or ignored the
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fact that consequent benefits and obligations of the recipient parties and therefore the
definition of entitlements, slows right from the negotiation and formulation stage. This
stage determines the extent of effective acquisition of technology, assess to industrial
property rights, secrets and goodwill and effectiveness of performance guarantees or
warranties recipients may expect from suppliers, especially on hazardous technologies, the
degree of divisibility of entitlements under the contract, nature of access to re-negotiation of
terms and conditions, limitation of contractual obligation and prevention of use of coercive
measures or general restrictive practices by the technology supplier,5*6 etc. The divisibility
of rights and obligations in technology development and transfer contracts is also determined
at this stage because of the differing nature of transferred rights, that is, the transfer of
technological skills is different in nature from licensing of bare patents or process(es) which
also differs from simultaneous transfer of two or more rights. Due to the concentration of
international technology transfer activity between developed countries (North transfers) the
provision of pre contractual know-how and technical expertise (for example, in the feasibility
studies, plans, diagrams, models, instructions, guides, formulae, engineering designs and
specifications, including technical advisory and managerial personnel training) at the
formulation stage of international technology transfer was left virtually to private party or
autonomous law regulation, unless such transactions formed part of bilateral treaty based or
multilateral technical cooperation agreements. One practical effect of non regulation under
international law of the formulation stage was the above noted failure of commercial
international technology transfer flows, (which in quantitative terms form the largest category
of technology flows between developed and developing countries), promote effective
acquisition of technological capacity
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in developing recipient countries, especially when compared to far smaller
international technical co-operation sources567 that are subject to international or
multilateral legal regulation.
The lack of international norms for the regulation of the formulation and
negotiation stages of international technology development and transfer agreements
has various effects on developing countries, including:
(a) The attempt to "internationalise" the entire technology development and
transfer agreement by the supplier, especially in the law applicable to
consequent rights and obligations and the counter use of direct regulation
by host States for all aspects of the agreement;
(b) Experience of high degrees of 'unacceptable or non reciprocal terms and
conditions' in agreements, including those submitted for registration [see
Table A], especially in the least developed countries which have very
weak institutional legal and technoeconomic structures.568
(c) Poor contractual negotiation or even frustration of technology development
and transfer intent or purpose,569 especially due to the inequality of
bargaining and negotiating powers of the parties;
These effects are best illustrated from the experience of the least developed
countries where bargaining and negotiating disparities between supplier and recipient
are greatest. For instance in the countries of the South African Development Co¬
operation Council (SADCC), it was established that despite national legislative and
policy requirements incorporating strong national legal 'incentive' treatment for
foreign technology owners and the involvement of SADCC governments public
enterprises in the major technology development and transfer contracts and
arrangements, the majority of the production or service enterprises set up in the sub -
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region, after due approval of the technology development and transfer contracts, are 'turnkey'
or imported equipment installment operations, that is, installment or final stage assembly
plants.570 In theses ventures, the imposition of general restriction of extent of the supplier,
for example, in the form of 'tied purchases', specification of extent of incorporation of local
raw materials, suspension or elimination of recipient independent research and development
efforts, use of high-tech solutions was often not subject to any international legal standard,571
though the supplier preferred international law as the law applicable to the agreement.
From the foregoing, clearly, non legal regulation of the pre-contractual or
formulation and negotiation stages of international technology development and obligation
and transfer arrangements creates, ab initio a "continuing imbalance" in rights and
obligations between supplier and recipient States have now adopted legal requirements for
the formulation and definition of the "contractual basis" on which actual technology
development and transfer is to be conducted and regulated be in accordance with sovereign or
primary developmental, (technological) goals and other recognised international legal norms
or practices. The new mixed jurisdiction requirements legally condemn or discourage, inter
alia: "generally restrictive" or coercive arrangements whether made in bad faith or not, non
re-negotiability and or re-formulation of agreements,572 imposition of 'unwanted' technology
packages on recipients, etc.
5.8.2 The Demise of Indivisible Arrangements fall of packaging
The divisibility or degree of unpackaging of technological rights and duties of the
parties determines to a large extent and efficacy of the technology
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development and transfer process. Where the supplier refuses to 'itemise' the
technology supplied, the recipient is often deprived of necessary technological and
related rights. Frequently, such refusal is justified by suppliers as necessary to
protect their technological property, including confidentiality and not an arbitrary
restriction of the recipient's acquisition of independent technological capacity, export
potential or limitation of the competitiveness of such recipients' products.
Though each case should be judged on its merits, clearly, indivisible
provisions that traverse both primary development and development related objects,
are perse, restrictions amounting to illegitimate intervention in the recipient State's
ability to execute its development programmes, import substitute technology or
compete internationally thus perpetuating technological and material inequalities
between States and are therefore unjustifiable. For the same reasons, as explained in
Chapter 7, the Draft International Code on Transfer of Technology, provides under
section 2 (c) for the unpackaging of technology and requires that the recipient retain
freedom to acquire technological inputs from other sources.
In practice, package transactions often reflected the gap in the negotiating
power and technological capacity of the recipient and supplier of technology.
Though developing technology countries now, as stated above, waive package
transactions involving non primary (technological) development objects, in the case
of the least developed countries such waiver may disguise oppressive agreements
cloaked in equitable names. This may be the case even if the technology development
and transfer arrangement is concluded with a public enterprise.573 Two examples of
such "waivers" may suffice to highlight this point.
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The first example is that of the 'joint venture' agreement between Valmet - Oy
and Tanzania Tractors Manufacturing Company. Arguably, it was entered into
before Tanzania passed her Investment Act of (1990)574 which provides for a mixed
jurisdiction structure providing for balanced benefit for all parties while requiring
fair and favourable treatment for nationals.575 The joint venture was concluded
between Tanzania Tractors Manufacturing Co. (TRAMA) and Valmet - Oy of
Finland in which the local public company held up to eighty per cent of shares. This
1980 joint venture agreement was concluded after the Tanzania government failed to
getmajor international tractor firms to agree to invest in Tanzania (which had a strict
direct regulation legislation regime viewed as arbitrary and contrary to international
legal standards of protection for non national investors). Under the (TRAMA)
Valmet - Oy joint venture agreement, the supplier was to transfer patents,
trademarks, know how and technical assistance necessary for the manufacture of
Valmet - Oy tractors.576 Though the tractor had certain aspects that made it
unsuitable for tropical use, such aspects, under the agreement, were to be notified to
Valmet - Oy as licensor without the licensor being bound to follow the licensees'
recommendations. The licensee was, inter alia, to grant back improvements over
technology transferred on a royalty free, non exclusive basis, comply with quality
and standard specifications, safeguard confidentiality, undertake not to transfer
patent or technical information to third parties and all research and development was
to be executed at the licensor's facility in Finland.
The second case is that of the waiver of an otherwise restrictive agreement by
the Nigerian government. The waiver concerned a 'joint venture' agreement between
a United States chemical transnational corporation and a Nigerian venture. The
agreement, which involved the production of agricultural chemicals in Nigeria,577
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though containing various restrictive practices, was consented to by the State
government as conforming to the national interest. The agreement provided that the
transnational corporation would provide manufacturing and product technology,
technical assistance, top and part of middle management, in addition to control over
production, financial, marketing, organisational management and policy formulation.
The Nigerian nationals, though trained played no key role in operating the venture,
though they would assume technical and managerial roles in the long term. Similar
cases characterise transactions involving serious disparities in negotiating and
bargaining powers,578 when the recipient is often largely techno - economically
dependent on the supplier.
It may be correctly inferred that special preferential treatment and active co¬
operation from a home State is necessary to achieve balanced entitlements for least
developed country technology recipients. According to an UNCTAD assessment,
widespread State practice through legislative and administrative measures dealing
with the negotiation and pre-performance stages of international technology
development and transfer agreements has had significant influence on the course and
outcome of the negotiation process for the transfer of foreign technology579 and
therefore the outcome of technology import substitution strategies. In practice, the
favourite method for enforcement of pre - performance and negotiation requirements
is now the assessment of technology development and transfer agreements, before
approval, to ensure that they were negotiated, formulated and guided by the principle
of balanced entitlements, that they fully reflect the goal of effective technology
transfer580 and incorporate preferential treatment, whenever necessary.
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5.9 The Performance stage
Traditionally, legal regulation, especially under the direct regulation statutes
centred on controlling or "policing" technology development and transfer activity,
per unirversitatem, away from the inherent conflict of interest between supplier and
recipient (which is especially manifest during this stage), towards compliance with
national development goals and objectives. Such national development goals, outside
primary developmental interests, were not always in accordance with international
law. However, under mixed jurisdiction which emphasises international co-operative
or partnership behaviour,581 the legal measures applied in the recipient State should,
inter alia\
(a) Establish transparent rules and policies for the regulation of international
technology transactions;
(b) Conform to ratified international intellectual property Conventions and other
treaty requirements, if any;
(c) Provide balanced evaluation, review, approval and registration of
international technology development and transfer agreements.
Primarily, the technology development and transfer contract should:
(1) Provide a possibility of balanced entitlements(s), that is, utility of
technology to recipient, reasonableness of remuneration levels,
protection of industrial property and stable and fair implementation
of agreement - elimination of innominate or coercive contractual
elements, including general restrictions;
(2) Comply with traditionally accepted 'public order' criteria, for
example, protection of public health and safety by, inter alia,
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ensuring non conveyance of hazardous technologies as well 'new'
international issues such as environmental control;
(3) Assist the recipient State to import substitute technology by offering
recipients technology on fair and favourable terms and conditions.
Performance of international technology development and transfer agreements
is undertaken through various complex channels.582 Detailed analysis of each of
these channels is not necessary here. Rather, we indicate how the principles and
minimum standards discussed above, especially balance of commitments,
transparency and accountability, divisibility of rights and obligations (un-bundling or
unpackaging in practice), fair and favourable treatment (or special treatment for the
least developed countries), operate in practice to ensure that international
development and transfer of technology conforms to development of scientific and
technological capacities in all countries in the interests of international co-operation
and interdependence.
5.10 Common or widespread legal provisions in National
and Regional Measures for the Regulation of Performance
and Follow up of Technology development and transfer
Agreements
It is not necessary to enumerate all common legal provisions and measures,
(reflecting or based on international agreements) in widespread usage nationally,
bilaterally or regionally for the regulation of international technology development
and transfer transaction. However, citation of a few of such provisions may serve
to illustrate our arguments above, that is, the emergence of specific principles of a
legal nature that are regarded as binding or highly persuasive by States and or parties
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to international technology development and transfer. The principles discussed include of
balance of commitments, transparency and accountability, divisibility of rights and
obligations, and the fair and favourable treatment standard, among others. In the next section
below, we highlight some of the important provisions now widely accepted in State practice
relating to international technology development and transfer.
5.10.1 Duties primarily to the Recipient, examples.583
Unpackaging and itemisation (that is, divisibility ofcontracts)
(i) Upon request of the potential acquiring party, the potential supplying party should,
to the extent practicable, make adequate arrangements as regards unpackaging
in terms of information concerning the various elements of the technology to
be transferred, such as is necessary for technical, institutional and financial
evaluation of the potential supplying party's offer;
(ii) Parties specify the compensation agreed upon for each item agreed upon or covered
by the transaction;
(iii) Parties specify nature of decision making in technology development and transfer
ventures and provision for possible re-negotiation of terms and conditions;
(iv) Provision be made for different sourcing, whenever necessary , of technical;
(v) Know-how, technical assistance, components of raw materials, patent licences,
trademarks, industrial technology etc. Should be availed, if necessary from
third party' sources;
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5.10.1.1 Most Favoured Licensee and Non • Discrimination Clauses
(i) Supplying party to furnish all relevant information helping potential recipient
to determine whether it is discriminated against or not;
(ii) The terms and conditions, including price or consideration charged, to be non
- discriminatory and in accordance with recognised professional, technical or
service charges;
(iii) Supplier to be offered same treatment as all other 'competitive' suppliers;
5.10.1.2 Description ofthe technology
(i) Agreement shall or should contain a detailed description of the technology
made in balance of commitments;
(ii) Technology should meet the description contained in the agreement and
should be correct and complete for the purposes of the agreement and up to
date at the time of transmission;
5.10.1.3 Validity and ownership of industrialproperty involved
(i) Warranty that potential supplier owns industrial property rights to be
transferred or is otherwise entitled to transfer the industrial property rights
involved;
(ii) Supplier make and render a valid and correct list of titles of industrial
property involved in the agreement;
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5.10.1.4 Suitability for use
(i) Correct and transparent specification of the purposes of the transaction;
(ii) Guarantee that the supplied technology will meet agreed legal and technical
standards and needs for the purposes it is supplied, and be in accordance with
established and ac cepted professional standards and specifications;
5.10.1.5 Confidentiality
(i) Recipient to keep technical know - how confidential and use it only for its
own production;
(ii) Transfer of rights and obligations to be undertaken only after consultation
with supplier and on agreed and correct terms and/or conditions - restrictions
to end after performance and expiry of rights and obligations;
5.10.1.6 Training ofpersonnel
(i) Shall include, whenever possible, comprehensive, appropriate, well-defined
personnel training and development programmes for nationals of the recipient
State.
5.10.1.7 Provision ofcomponents and spare parts
(i) Provision for supplies of components, spares and services associated with
technology to be guarantied, at the request of the recipient or according to
internationally recognised or established professional standards;
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(Li) Delivery to be in a prompt and orderly manner;
5.10.1.8 Use of local resources and personnel
(i) Supplier to take into account and agree to make correct use whenever
available or identified of local materials, technologies, technical skills,
consultancy and engineering services and other resources;
5.10.1.9 Performance guarantees
(i) Specification of technical and professional performance standards, agreed and
expected supplier and recipient's standards of skill, care, method and level of
expertise;
(ii) Assurance of efficiency and maintainability of the technology to be supplied;
(iii) Supplier disclose risks that may result from utilisation of technology
supplied, (especially in relation to health and environment);
5.10.1.10 Form and calculation ofpayment
(i) As provided for and determined under national law, in conformity with
accepted multilateral or international legal standards, procedures or rules.
5.10.1.11 Restrictive practices
(i) Agreements for transfer of technology not to contain a universally condemned
restrictive business practice or general provision that freezes, eliminates or
obstructs recipients rights or imposes non - reciprocal obligations;
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(ii) Supplier shall not negotiate for or demand for restriction of recipient's
present or future competitive ability with regard to relevant supplied or
improved upon technology or know - how;
(iii) Supplier shall not obstruct the acquisition of technological capacity by
recipient;
5.10.1.12 Exceptions
(i) The relevant evaluating or approving authorities may allow parties to
undertake specific obligations or rights, for example, to remedy market
failure, increase efficiency of natural monopolies, safeguard the national
interest or reduce administrative burdens imposed on parties.
5.10,2 Duties primarily to the Supplier, some examples
5.11.2.1 Performance guarantees
(i) Specification of technical and professional performance standards, agreed and
expected supplier and recipient's standards of skill, care, method and level of
expertise;
5.10.2.2 Quality standards
(i) Recipient to observe and maintain agreed quality standards and/or levels
except those which are contrary to the public interest of the host State or
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constitute abuse, damage, prevention or hindrance to the technological
development or entrepreneurial freedom of the recipient;
5.10.2.3 Pricing obligations
(i) Level of pricing: should be fair and reasonable, having regard to nature of
technology, value to the national economy and overall contribution to
acquisition of technological capacity and reciprocal benefit by recipient;
or
(ii) As evaluated by third party and agreed upon by parties;
(iii) Recipient to observe and maintain agreed quality standards and/or levels
except those which are contrary to the public interest of the host State or
constitute abuse, damage, prevention or hindrance to the technological
development or entrepreneurial freedom of the recipient;
(iv) Adequate and effective protection of any rights under transfer or as agreed to
be necessary;
5.10.3 Dual Rights, that is, for Supplier and Recipient
5.10.3.1 Form and language ofthe Agreement
(i) All transfer of technology transactions should or shall be in the form of a
written contract;
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(ii) The text of the contract to be in the language of both the supplier's and
acquirer's country;
5.10.3.2 Duration ofarrangements
(i) Prohibition of unduly long duration for transfer of technology arrangements,
in accordance with internationally recognised standards;
(ii) Extension of expired agreements to considered in cases of national interest,
that is, where extension would promote recipient's acquisition of
technological capacity or where new improvements are likely to occur
especially in joint ventures.
5.10.4 Choice of Law and Forum
Determined primarily by consideration of whether issue falls into the primary
(technological) development or development related area. National law (sovereign
right) is the law of first instance in the former case. International law norms
primarily apply in the latter case, that is, to be valid, national measures dealing with
commercial, financial or trade (technology development related aspects) of the
technology development and transfer agreement, should be in accordance with
international law. Therefore:
(i) Disputes between parties to be settled through use of conciliation, arbitration
and other judicial procedures, in conformity with national law and minimum
international legal standards;
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(ii) Judicial recognition and enforcement of awards validly rendered in the host State
by an international tribunal applying relevant national legislation and
recognised or agreed minimum standards of international law;
5.11 Summary and Conclusion
The above cited provisions provide backing for the our main discussion and show
that the general principle of balance of commitments now underlies most of or all of the
provisions that have evolved during the era of organised international law. The principles
and standards of transparency, accountability, preferential treatment, divisibility, etc.,
discernibly modify of enhance the traditional principles of freedom of contract, caveat
emptor, reciprocity, national treatment, non discrimination, or the prompt, adequate and
effective compensation standards, etc., as applied to international technology development
and transfer contracts, thereby helping to ensure gradual evolution towards extension of
international law to the entire technology development and transfer process through:
(a) Separation of primary (technology) development goals from development
(technology) related ones resulting in greater balance of entitlements or legally
defined benefits for recipients, for example, through more effective technology-
development and transfer due to improved access (terms and conditions,
including lower techno-economic costs), greater transparency of agreement
terms and conditions etc., and for suppliers, a clearer transactional
environment due to improved transparency and greater compatibility with
international law of the "Mixed jurisdiction" regimes;
(b) Freer and wider choices for recipients as to supplier, type of technology required
etc., due to elimination of indivisible or package arrangements;
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(c) Formulation of equitable arrangements that take into account negotiating and
bargaining gaps by offering technology on unconditional fair and
favourable terms to recipients and for the least developed countries, due
to their lack the technoeconomic resources to take advantage of fair and
favourable terms, offer of special preferential terms.584
Finally, the foregoing discussion goes towards proving that
balance of commitments, transparency, accountability, divisibility, fair
and favourable or special treatment, are, among others, more than
candidate rules for future legal recognition, that is, they already form
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The World Intellectual Property Organisation system, it has been
recently alleged by developed countries, provides an inadequate
system of protection and enforcement mechanisms, that is, a level of
enforcement and protection, especially for new rights, which is below
that necessary to meet current and future developments in intellectual
property. These claims are contrary to our conclusions in Chapter II
and the ongoing attempts to revise the major multilateral intellectual
property Conventions to mitigate the effects of exclusive private rights
on the primary (especially technological) development interests of
developing countries.
Though protection of intellectual property rights under the
multilateral Conventions is already meticulously and comprehensively
defined,585 developed countries (which include those which most evade
GATT disciplines), have moved the issue of protection and
enforcement of 'trade related' intellectual property rights, from the
proper forum of WIPO to that of GATT because the former forum
seeks more actively to protect balance between private entitlements
(legal rights) and those of private consumers of protected rights and
technology import dependent states, that is, the organisation seeks,
inter alia, to maintain and improve:
(a)Differential and favourable treatment for developing countries
seeking access to knowledge (including state of the art knowledge) and
special treatment for the least developed among them;
(b) The international transmission and diffusion of knowledge and
the preservation of independent and unrestricted development and
exploitation of ideas;
(c) The right of each country, in accordance with its primary
development needs, to determine the subject and level ofprotection for
intellectual property rights, without material reciprocity;
(d) Gradual reduction of the technoeconomic cost of "import
substituting" technology for developing countries;
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(e) Balance of private rights interests with public interests, through, inter alia,
control over abuse of intellectual property rights by owners and improved
transparency of host State juridical and administrative regimes to ensure
compatibility with international law, etc.
Below, we show, in relation to international technology transfer, that the inclusion
of "metamorphosed" intellectualproperty rights (herein after TRIP'S), that is, as trade-based
rights or measures, within the GATT framework, is highly objectionable to developing
countries because, inter alia:
(i) Inclusion of TRIP'S into a North-South Trade system which is based mainly on
national treatment and material reciprocity (offering only conditional preferential
treatment to LDC's in their international trade relations) us likely to upset the
balance between private rights and the public interests of states seeking to import
substitute technology, thus negating attempts (such as the revision efforts undertaken
tinder WIPO) to control abuses during the production and dissemination of new
works and inventions, thus ultimately increasing the technological and material
inequalities between states;586
(ii) Just as it is important to protect and maintain the incentive to innovate, it is
equally important to guarantee the right to independent origination and exploitation
of ideas, that is, no one should be protected universally' from the independent
origination of ideas. The GATT - TRIP'S proposals, by eliminating territoriality and
emphasising the exclusivity of the economic rights of IPR holders, will create
absolute protection for ideas and expressions' that is, a universal first past the post'
system of inventing, registering and exploiting ideas. Such a system would
automatically favour the technologically most advanced states, and thus increase the
cost of importing technology for developing countries and frustrate their efforts to
achieve technological capacity through international technology development and
transfer.
(Hi) The reforms will impose a "reverse burden ofproof on developing countries,
especially the most advanced, to show needfor
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differential and favourable treatment in transfer of technology' and technical assistance
issues, contrary to already established international legal norms;
(iv) Since basic questions about intellectual property protection for information
technologies such as computer software, are still basically unansweredf87
(for example, what to protect, how much to protect, duration ofprotection,
against what, extra) and since only a novelty and not - obviousness or the
copyright test for originality-).58S to accord such property universal
protection is unjustified:
(v) The near unilateral (international) and exclusive (private) ownership oflPR's 589
by development needs of LDC's by private IPR owners, renders GATT
theories offair and free trade inapplicable to North - South "trade and
exchange" in IPR's.
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6.0 Metamorphosis of IPR's into Trade
Issues and Measures, impact on
Developing Countries Technology
Development and Transfer Policies and
Practice
"...low level protection results in general leakage of
technology that could have been prevented under high
level protection. ...There is no basis for such a theory as
long as we stick to general principles of intellectual
property law according to which competition outside the
claim of a patent is lawful as is the experimental use of
a patented invention"
GATT or WIPO, New Ways In the International
Protection of Intellectual Property, Friedrlch - Karl
Belcr and Gerhard Schrlcker (editors) Max Pianck
Institute 1989.
6.1 The Movement to GATT; WIPO, a failing or
obstructed forum for the international regulation of IPR's ?
The WIPO, is a framework organisation which addresses sovereign member
states as partners of international intellectual property agreements. It is responsible
for the administration of the two major intellectual property Conventions, that is, the
Paris and Berne Conventions. The Conventions ascribe to nationals of member
states certain rights (in intangibles) and the conditions for their ownership and
exploitation, thus entitling those nationals to raise claims and invoke Convention
rights based on certain minimum rights and standards. These minimum standards
are sanctioned primarily by private litigation and only as a last resort is recourse
made to retaliatory means of international law.
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6.1.1 Movement towards GATT - A Renewal of Economic
Rights Protection ?
The protection of IPR's has become an increasing pre-occupation for major
technology owning states. This renewal of interest is primarily due to the fact that
the development of new technology, that is, technological innovation, is increasingly
regarded as the basis of economic development Consequently, it has become the
common practice of states, especially the highly industrialised, to heavily subsidise
technological innovatioa590 These subsidies are the direct result of the triumph of
the argument that incentives are a precondition to innovative activity over the
traditional arguments advanced against the need for incentives.591
Developed countries, after subsidising the "production" of private intellectual
property rights, are now taking steps to ensure extra-territorial protection of the
exploitation of such rights. These steps are not aimed at resolving primary
(technological) developmental needs in developing countries and it is denied that
heavy subsidisation (as incentive) of technological innovation in developed countries
has an important bearing on the question of domestic technological innovation in
developing countries/'''' international technology transfer terms and conditions,
international trade and ultimately, maintenance of sovereign independence by
developing countries.
6.1.2 Movement towards GATT & The Issue of
Enforcement under WIPO; WIPO enforcement of IPR's
inadequate or unsuitable ?
The issue of inadequate enforcement under the WIPO administered
conventions, raised by developed countries largely in response to their 'industry
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demands'593 is largely groundless in strict legal terms. Under the Paris Convention,
a member State which fails to carry out its obligations under the Convention commits
a wrongful act, thereby entitling an aggrieved member State to take appropriate
counter measures, that is, to the extent necessary to correct the effects of the
wrongful act. These counter measures may include retorsion whereby the aggrieved
State limits its sanctions to merely unfriendly acts or resort to reprisals and retort
against the breach of the convention's obligations with acts which would otherwise be
illegal.594 The Berne Convention, implicitly provides for authors to enforce their
rights, though such rights, due to the territorial nature of the convention (and
therefore copyrights), are not spelled out. These enforcement mechanisms have been
sufficiently efficient to ensure continued protection of industrial property rights of
non - nationals even in countries which perceived the Paris Convention system as
unresponsive to their interests.
6.2 WIPO and Balance of Commitments: developing
countries technoeconomic needs vis -a- vis technology rights
owners interests
The WIPO administered intellectual property protection (IPP) convention
system aims at achieving balanced interaction between national laws aimed at the
regulation of conditions for use of granted IPR's595 and the international collective
interest in maximising, through international law, gains from innovative and
inventive activity . To achieve this goal, WIPO has promoted a "progressive
harmonisation"596 approach.
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WIPO, as a specialised agency of the United Nations.597 has duties
which transcend mere administration, unlike its fore runner the Bureaux Internationaux
Reunis pour la Protection de la Propiete Intellectuelle (BIRPI). The organisation's
duties, set in accordance with its nature as a framework organisation charged with
promotion of protection of IPR's at the global level (through, inter alia, co-operation
among member states), also include the duty of WIPO as a permanent legal - technical
programme for the acquisition by developing countries of technology related to
industrial property.598 (for instance under its permanent Committee for Development
Co-operation related to industrial proterty).599 The services offered to developing
countries under WIPO include:
(a) Support in preparation of their intellectual property laws and regulations,
to ensure inter alis, compatibility with multilateral legal regimes,
including WIPO administered Conventions;
(b) Support for human resources development in the field of intellectual
property, for example, through the training of their national and
strengthening of national and regional institutions and organisations
and other measures in the field intellectual property;
(c) Support in legal and technical matters such as automatic information
systems, patent documentasion services, search system development in
Patent and Trademark offices, extra.
Such support primarily aims at gauranteeing eventul techbological parity
among all states, by enhancing the abilities of developing countries to negotiate for,
select, apply and develop imported technology and effectively defend them against the
effect of increased international privatisation of technological ownership.
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WIPO duties to assist developing countries have delicately coexisted with others
such as the clarification of questions arising from new technological developments,
facilitating the establishment of a global intellectual property regulatory system that
is as uniform possible600 (for example, in the area of elimination of formalities as a
condition of protection)601 and maintenance of adequate protection for intellectual
property rights, especially through balance of private and public rights. This last
objective, that is, that protection of rights cannot be without limit or in perpetuity
but with due regard to the interests of the consuming public and the technoeconomic
goals of all states, whether developing or developed,602 is regarded by technology
owning states as contrary to promotion of intellectual property rights production and
international "free and fair" trade in or exchange of such rights. It is for this reason
that developed countries have sought to metamorphose intellectual property rights
into a "free trade" issue.
The 'effective' metamorphosis of IPR's into a trade "measures" issue,
especially in its enforcement aspects may:
(i) Impose an international trade re-interpretation of multilateral intellectual
property principles and norms for example, the recognition of the law of the
granting State as naturally governing substantive rights, terms, remedies and
ownership or transfer issues that arise expressly out of the territorial
sovereign grant,603 a position accepted by many developed country jurists
and scholars in the field of intellectual property rights;604
(ii) Promote developed country industrial interests according to which, the
GATT initiative, though not constituting a miracle cure, is important in that it
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Provides a broad negotiating context under which package deals can be
reached, thus creatin a situation of leverage "totally" lacking within a
WIPO negotiating framework.605 This approach has an underlying
rationale to the effect that the new GATT trade concessions, market
access, extra, should in practice replace WIPO enforcemtnt measures
which are based on proportionality, non - coerciveness and unanimity
with a leverage enforcement system.
From the foregoing, it already clear that a GATT Trip's regime would not be
primarily concerned with elimination of technological disparities between states, that
is, by promoting developing countries' acquisition of technology development and
transfer, but with weakening or elimiting developing countries "territorial" balance of
intellectual properth rights interests with the public interest.
6.3 The GATT, Traditional Principles of relevancy to the
international regulation or IPR's and the possible impact of a
new GATT - TRIP'S regime on international technology
transfer flows
The GATT has hitherto overseen a common set of rules and procedurs for
international trade in goods. Though unratiried and therefore strictly not in force as an
international agreement, the agreement has a legally hinding character, deriving from
various protocols,.606 on its members. The scope of application of the GATT is vast,
since the agreement is applied under an extensive number of annexes, schedules, tariff
concessions, side agreement amendments and unratified
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amendments, etc.607 It is noted in passing that this vastness of possible trade and
trade related applications (including enforcement) of the agreement constitutes a primary
reason why developed countries, have shifted IPR's towards GATT. Further, GATT is a
very appropriate forum for countries wishing to conclude new individual and supplementary
arrangements with special rules (such as may be concluded by developed countries with
newly industrialised countries)
Detailed analysis of the GATT Agreement is not necessary for our current purposes
since it would entail repetition of issues and principles discussed in Chapter ii of this work.
However, it may be useful to note some of the principal objectives technology by developing
countries. These may include:
6.3 (a) Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN)
The main general principle of the GATT agreement is conditional most favoured
nation treatment (MFN) - Article 1(1).608 Under the MFN principle, GATT contracting
parties are required, in their external trade policies (abroad), to offer the same treatment to
imports from all third countries without discrimination, for example, with respect to customs
duties and other charges. The main theoretical function of MFN is to ensure that 'resource
allocation' on the basis of 'comparative advantage' is not distorted in favour of some member
states, that is, an approach that compares the totality of benefits received with concessions
made. International technology development and transfer requires balance of commitments
whereas current international trade in technological goods and processes, as discussed below,
is characterised by a perpetual tendency towards unilateral flow of benefits which the
principle ofMFN does not mitigate.
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6.3 (b) The Principle ofNational Treatment
The principle of national treatment requires member states to offer equal
treatment for foreign and domestic products with respect to internal taxation and
regulations. Below, we show that the likely full and rigorous application of this
principle, due to the recognised non observance of GATT part IV provisions609 (the
provisions being implemented optionally or discretionary by the granting State) 610
would obstruct or eliminate LDC local technological development and research
potential.
6.3 (c) Reciprocity in GATT
Reciprocity, has been argued to be a 'corner' stone principle of the GATT.
Today, international trade in industrial property rights is under taken in a global
environment of states with grossly unequal economic strength, differing levels of
development and socioeconomic systems as well as the largely unilateral ownership
of technology by developed countries. The combined effect of these conditions
makes the application of material or abstract reciprocity to breed increased
inequality.
6.3 (d) Transparency
Another major principle is that of transparency - Article X of GATT. For our
purposes, transparency is defined as predictability, stability and public availability
of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application affecting owners of technological rights.611 The principle requires that
government regulations affecting both internal and external trade (in IPR's in this
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case) should be open and public so that every party affected by them will know what
rules exist. The principle, with regard to intellectual property (in GATT) would in
effect demand that provision should be made for adequate standards and principles
concerning the availability, scope and use and trade in intellectual property rights.
While strict observance of transparency requirements is desirable and
legitimate,612 in practice, the introduction of a GATT - TRIP'S regime incorporating
transparency, could expose LDC governments taking and effecting technoeconomic
and related decisions, to speculative private party actions by intellectual property
owners in addition to 'unfair trade actions' instituted by home states of such IP
owners. On the other hand, private IPR's and practices are by their very nature not
amenable to regulation under transparency requirements, that is, since they are not
internationally 'registered'.613 Consequently, the GATT - TRIP's provisions would
impose a further constraint on developing countries sovereign ability to control
technological activity on their territory or within their jurisdiction, since GATT
retaliatory measures could be taken against them by a technology exporting State on
"trade based" grounds.
6.3 (e) The GATT dispute settlement measures
The GATT dispute settlement mechanism614 provides the major basis few-
developed countries 'forum transfer' initiatives for IPR's. Though in principle
seeking to improve the system's enforcement measures, developed countries in
practice have sought to institutionalise measures that otherwise would have had to be
instituted unilaterally against parties allegedly violating IPR's. The United States
has led this institutionalisation proceeding after the majority of states objected to its
unilateral 'unfair trade' actions under the amended Trade and Tariff Act,615 which
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introduced an international reciprocity requirement with regard to intellectual
property protection, that is, the Act requires that intellectual property protection be
considered in awarding benefits under the United States Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP).
The GATT dispute settlement system whose procedure is set out in Article
XXIII, in principle encourages members, before asking for panels, to first try to
reach mutually satisfactory solutions to disputes through bilateral or plurilateral
consultations, that is, it offers a dual opportunity to a country wishing to protect its
commercial and trade interests to achieve its aims. Developed country intervention
to ensure 'required' extra-territorial treatment for their nationals intellectual property
rights would be possible because GATT bases its dispute settlement procedures on
the concept of nullification or impairment of any benefit the complaining country
might expect under the agreement,616 Article XXIII that is, if any contracting party
should consider any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the Agreement
is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement
is being impeded as the result of:
(1) The failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or
(2) The application by another contracting party of a measure(s),
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of the Agreement, or
(3) The existence of any situation...;
it can institute dispute settlement proceedings against the exporting country.
Consequently, an invaluable opportunity for linking importing countries trade
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measures to IP 'violation' or technology policy 'distortion' in exporting countries is
offered under the dispute settlement mechanism.
The GATT - TRIP'S enforcement mechanism would be based on domestic
enforcement of the new norms. The burden of proof would remain with an alleged
infringer, with remedies including injunctive relief, damages, seizure and destruction
of infringing goods. Such provisions, coupled with product patents and developed
country use of trade concessions or market access conditionalities, would
effectively protect developed country IP owners against potential competition from
developing countries' innovators and manufacturers, thus perpetuating developing
countries role as technological goods importers.
Though developing countries, as discussed below, have pointed out, inter alia,
that the application of GATT sanctions to a violation of IPR's would call for
difficult financial calculations to assess the economic importance of a given treaty
violation, for example, the difficulty of assessing the 'economic value' of insufficient
protection standards, and that GATT responses to IPR's violations would have to be
specific, that is, intellectual property related,617 these arguments are gradually being
eliminated from negotiation under developed country pressure.
6.4 GATT, the appropriate forum?
Hitherto, GATT arrangements have almost exclusively centred on
liberalisation of trade and commerce in goods, that is, progressive elimination of
barriers, tariff and non tariff, on the basis of reciprocal and mutually advantageous
concessions and not protection of 'intangible' private property rights. Previous
GATT attempts to formulate and conclude a Counterfeiting and Piracy Code proved
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abortive.618 The current GATT - IPR related provisions contained in the agreement, (in
accordance with the international law requirement that GATT perform functions for which it
was established), are skeletal,619 for example under Articles I, III, IX, X, XX, XXI and
XXIII.
Because of the strong emphasis on unconditional most favoured nation treatment,
transparency and reciprocity in the GATT, developed countries, as detailed below, have
found the Agreement a convenient forum to extend 'weighted control' over the formerly
residual' trade in invisibles, that is, control over international trade involving contracts for
processing, maintenance or repair, intellectual property, tourism, air and land transport,
insurance and banking etc. Charges of premature rule making are rejected by developed
countries despite the fact that even in these countries, the legal scope for protection of certain
IPR's protection is as yet largely undetermined.620
For developing countries, successful import substitution of technology depends on
acquiring preferential access to technology, on the grounds that technology is a pre-requisite
for and development in LDC's. However, if technology is turned into a trade measure (that
is, becomes development related), higher levels of protection for IPR's and the corresponding
rise in private appropriability of such rights (the level of private appropriation being taken to
rise with the level of protection, degree of exclusivity of rights, etc.621 will guarantee greater
future disparity in material and technological equality between developed and developing
countries, whether member to the GATT or not.
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6. 5 The Negotiating Mandate, an ignored agenda? Relevancy to
Intellectual Property Needs of Developing Countries
The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration provided the negotiating basis for
the new Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round).622 The stated aim
of the negotiations was to 'preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives
of GATT to develop a more open, viable and durable multilateral trading system.
The relevant part of the declaration stated that the objective of the Round, with
respect to trade related aspects of IPR's, Including trade in counterfeit goods was:
"...to reduce the distortions and impediments to
international trade,...taking into account the need to
promote effective and adequate protection of
IPR's...ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
IPR's do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT
provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and
disciplines...without prejudice to other complementary
initiatives that may be taken in the World Intellectual
Property Organisation and elsewhere..."6^
The negotiating objectives would be conducted in accordance with the principles
of:
(a) Transparency, mutual advantage and increased benefits to all participants;
(b) The indivisibility of undertakings, that is, the different sectoral agreements
would all be accepted as a package undertaking and not partially;
(c) Balanced concessions, that is, balanced rights and obligations;
(d) The principle of differential or preferential treatment in accordance with part
IV of GATT;
(e) non reciprocity from developing countries in return for tariff and non - tariff
barrier removal as part of undertakings made by developed countries
during the Round;
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(f) Progressive negotiated "graduation" of advanced countries towards reciprocity;
(g) Special treatment for least developed countries: etc.
During the Uruguay Round, the negotiation mandate hasn't been followed, since
developed countries have applied a ' reverse burden of proof to developing country negotiation
proposals, that is, developing countries have been required to prove the need for non -
compliance with the full rigour(s)of a new GATT -TRIP's regime. Conditionalities require
developing countries to accede to the GATT IP arrangement, unconditionally accept to respect
and enforce "private party agreements on terms and conditions" for transfer and development
of technology, etc.
Under the Mid - term Review of 1989,624 the section dealing with IPR's concluded that
during the Round, certain issues had to be discussed, that is:
Section 4:
(i) The applicability of the basic principles of the GATT and of relevant
international intellectual property agreements or conventions;
(ii) The provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the availability ,
scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights;
(hi) The provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade
- related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in
national legal systems;
iv) The provision of effective and expeditious procedures for the multilateral
prevention and settlement of disputes between governments, including the
applicability ofGATT procedures;
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(v) Transitional arrangements aiming at the fullest participation in the results of
the negotiations;
Section 5:
...The negotiations would give consideration to concerns raised by participants
related to the under lying public policy objectives of their national
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including their
developmental and technological objectives;
Section 6:
...in respect of 4<d) above (immediate), the ministers emphasised the need to
strengthen multilateral commitments to resolve disputes on trade - related
IP issues through multilateral commitments;
Section 8:
...the negotiations had to promote a mutually supportive relationship between
GATT and WIPO;
The foregoing mandate merely instituted negotiations. The latent legal
intentions behind the creation of the new GATT trade - technology linkage and the
likely practical effects of such a linkage on, inter alia, acquisition, selection,
negotiation and adoption of technology by developing countries may be determined
only by analysing the dynamic negotiating positions and strengths of technology
exporting (mainly developed states) and those of technology importing countries (the
majority of developing countries).625 The functioning of the resultant international
intellectual property and trade system, and the continued effective or non - reactive
participation by developing countries in that system, depends on the perceptible
balanced nature of the results achieved. A brief but critical examination of the
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problem as viewed by developed and developing countries and the approach of each
group to the international resolution of the issues involved therefore follows.
6. 6 The Problem - Developed countries' perspective - why
GATT?
"Perhaps the most difficult question to determine is how
much to decide by rule and how much to leave to
discretion. It is an advantage, and not a disadvantage, of
the scheme that it invites the member states to abandon
that licence to promote indiscipline, disorder and bad -
neighbourliness which, to general disadvantage, they
have been free to exercise hitherto";
John Maynard Keynes - Proposals for and
International Currency or Clearing Union (1942) in J.
K. Horsefleld (editor) The International Monetary
Fund (IMF)1945 - 1965, IMF 1969, Volume III, Page
6, 36.
States must be reconciled by rules propriety and not
disorder. To create disorder or attempt to reconcile
disorder through disorder, leaves no room for regulation
and consequently, for propriety";
Csaba in Law and Economics, Volume 1, edited by
Jules Coleman and Jeffrey Lange, Dartmouth, 1992,
Volume 1, at p.229 (italics added).
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The above quote from Keynes, though made in a different context and in
relation to a different subject, may still sum up the nature of the positive arguments
as expressed by developed countries in relation to the subject of the international
regulation of trade related aspects of EPR's. The quotation from Csaba may also
indicate the problems of applying a dual standard to a common problem, that is, the
major examples of 'bad - neighbourliness' and indiscipline, (even with relation to
trade in counterfeit and pirated goods),62* may be traceable to the doors of the major
proponents of the "new" GATT - TRIP'S regime.627
Developed countries resort to forum hunting, (specifically to the GATT which
was regarded for long, especially by the United States, as designed for trade in goods
and not services or intellectual property), is due to domestic 'protectionist' industry
or private intellectual property interest "economic or commercially" motivated
pressure, that is, largely non legal. Economic and commercial interests in developed
countries wish to stem the correction of the WIPO system628 (which administers
many conventions now widely regarded by the majority of states as grossly
imbalanced in their comprehensive and meticulous definition of private rights
protection (vis-^-vis public interests). Further, within the GATT framework,
developing countries can be "negotiated" into offering protection for new objects of
industrial property (such as computers and information technologies),629 without
LDC's being able to link such new protection to reform of the multilateral industrial
property system.
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Further, the technology access - international trade linkage will be ensured in
practice by, inter alia:
(a) Developing countries technological and trade dependency on developed
countries;
(b) The complexities of GATT negotiation rules, that, inter alia, require that
entire negotiated packages be accepted or rejected as a whole.630
(This requirement is however currently acting as a saving factor
preventing the adoption of the "reforms" due to continued disagreement
among developed countries, especially over the issue of agricultural
subsidies.)
6.6.1 Developed Country proposals for GATT based (IPR)
"reforms"
The various proposals for the 'reform and strengthening' of the international
trade system cannot be usefully or effectively analysed here since they cover a
massive range of issues related or linked to trade in textiles, services, information
technology and 'trade related aspects of intellectual property'.631 The proposed
reforms in the area of 'trade related aspects of intellectual property' may however be
outlined briefly in order to determine their possible impact on international
technology development and transfer to developing countries, that is, the possible
future extent of limitation or restriction of access to technology in developed
countries.
The 'reform' position of the developed countries may best be analysed from the
view point of the leading reformist states, that is, the United States and the European
Communities. Ironically, countries in this group have in practice been responsible
for the majority of violations of GATT rules and procedures.632 Before analysing
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the reform proposals, a brief history of their making in a leading proponent home
State, that is, the United States, may assist in our highlighting of the underlying
theoretical and substantive goals and purpose behind the proposals.
According to a United States Congressional Report (1981),633 if the United
States was to continue financing research and development, to maintain its
technological leadership and improve its balance of trade, it had to encourage other
countries to provide United States innovators the right to obtain enforceable patents
and stop the continuing steady erosion of patent protection.634 A principal finding of
the Committee was that to stimulate or encourage investment in innovation and the
commercialisation of inventions, the risks involved in decisions to commercialise had
to be reduced, for example, by making inventions the subject of reliable patents
internationally and reducing uncertainties relating to the utilisation of patents rights
through quick and inexpensive dispute resolution mechanisms.
The report also noted that since foreign trade in the form of direct exports,
foreign investment subsidiaries and manufacturing facilities is an ever increasing part
of United States enterprise, it was important to ensure that United States enterprises
were not exposed to unfair competitive pressures by host country enterprises, for
example, when such host country enterprises were allowed to exploit successful
innovations without permission from the rights owner. To ensure reliable patents
abroad for United States inventors, other countries, notably in Latin America, Asia
and Oceania (with the exception of Japan, Australia and New Zealand) and Africa
(with the exception of South Africa) had to be convinced that the "largely United
Nations Agencies inspired view that a strong, efficient patent system was contrary to
their interests", was erroneous. Developing countries would in the long run benefit if
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they offered protection for intellectual property, especially industrial property rights,
under the national treatment principle, by attracting investment, creating employment
and encouraging the transfer of technology. The report concluded, inter alia, that
the United States government action to support the re - establishment and
maintenance of a full and effective patent system in foreign countries, (which would
in all likelihood be supported by other industrialised nations):
"would no doubt trigger resistance and protest from third
world governments, various international organisations
and United Nations agencies. The United States might
be accused of serving its own narrow self - interest
The good faith of the United States in striving to assist
developing countries in their rapid development and
industrialisation might also be questioned".
The foregoing outlined intentions of the United States could not however be
easily implemented for various reasons. Principal among the obstacles was the
historical non membership of the United States to the Berne Convention.636 The
principle reason often cited for United States non membership to Berne is that the
Convention included various concepts at variance with United States law, for
example:
(i) Automatic recognition of copyright without any formalities;
(ii) The protection of moral rights;
(iii) The retro-activity of copyright protection with respect to works already in
the public domain of the United States.
However, the historical reasons are more revealing. The United States
declined to participate in the 1886 Diplomatic Conference, (only sending an
observer) because foreign works were not protected in the United States under its
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copyright law.637 From 1891 to 1952 when the United States joined the Universal
Copyright Convention, protection of foreign works was achieved through bilateral
treaties. For United States works, from 1891 until its accession to Berne, United
States copyright owners were able to take advantage of National treatment and the
so called backdoor to Berne, to obtain Berne protection through simultaneous
publication in the United States and a Berne country (often Canada) in accordance
with requirements under Article 3(1) of the Berne Convention that extends protection
to the works of authors of non Berne countries, if the works are published
simultaneously in the country of origin and in a Berne country.638 However, in order
to raise its legal-political profile in future GATT negotiations, Berne Convention
membership was essential, especially if Berne standards were to be promoted for
recognition as 'the minimum standards of protection for copyright'. Further, an
advantage of Beme membership is the provision which allows Convention members
to retaliate against the works of non - member States which would provide further
legal 'leverage' when seeking to enforce IPR's through the GATT mechanism against
uncooperative States.
The European Community proposal, largely focuses on questions of
enforcement of EPR's at the national level and border measures.639 Generally, it
addresses the GATT - WIPO interface and the application of GATT general
principles and mechanisms to ensure trade liberalisation, the application of the
GATT - MFN and NT standards, dismantling of trade barriers, transparency,
consultation and dispute settlement to IPR's. However, in response to its smaller
industrial members,640 the proposal mentions in its introduction the possibility of
excessive protection of IPR's and the need to prevent misuse of rights.641 Despite
the implicit recognition of the possible abuse of IP rights,642 such abuse is thought
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best controlled through minimal if any imposition of limits on private or individual
judgement.
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that:
(i) The leading "reformer" nation, that is, the United States, was historically able,
in its earlier stages of development, to take advantage of "territoriality" based
measures to protect its nationals wishing to exploit otherwise protected
intellectual property (technological) rights belonging to non nationals, an
option being denied to LDC's;
(ii) Commercial and trade interests in the United States, due to the increased
privatisation of technology (that is, that variety of processes which result in
a resource, product or a technology being moved out of the public domain
into the control and/or ownership of private parties, whether individual or
corporate),643 have increasingly prevailed over United States public
international obligations to promote international technology development
and transfer, except on private commercial terms and conditions.
6.6.2 The Proposals
Since the substantive legal and policy position of other leading industrialised
and trading nations does not now significantly vary from the "pro - private rights
owner" position of the United States, except on a few specific issues,644 separate
treatment of each proposal would only be repetitive, though substantive differences
are pointed out in context below.
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The proposals aim to establish a regime which "increases" levels and standards of
international protection for intellectual property (patents, trademarks, industrial designs,
geographical indications of source, copyright and neighbouring rights and integrated circuit
layout designs, 645 etc.) and the effectiveness of the enforcement of such rights. The stated
objectives of major developed countries' proposals are centered 646 on:
(i) Increasing protection through extension of economic rights
contained in the conventions;
(ii) Ensuring future adaptability of a GATT regime to protection of
new and emerging technology;
(iii) Causing all parties to incorporate and observe the "agreed
measures".
Safeguards against abuse of increased levels "protection" by IPR's owners are
referred to only in the negative sense, for example, as "possible barriers to trade". Affected
countries would correct such abuse only through non exclusive measures, such corrective
measures being detailed and comprehensively set out in the laws and regulations.647
6.6.3 The principal objectives of developed country GATT -
TRIP's proposals.
The developed countries have the following objectives in instituting the GATT -
TRIPS reforms:
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(a) The creation of effective economic detenent(s) to international trade in goods
and services that infringe intellectual property rights through the
implementation of border measures;648
(b) Causing further recognition and implementation of standards and norms that
provide adequate means of obtaining and maintaining IPR's and
providing a basis for the effective enforcement of such rights;
(c) Extension of protection beyond the traditional forms of intellectual property,
that is, patents, trademarks and copyrights, to include trade secrets and
"information technologies", despite the undetermined legal nature of the
"new rights",649
6.6.4 SpeciOc Substantive Aims
Patents
(a) Patentability: Patents are to be available for all products and processes
which are new, useful and non - obvious. This position exceeds the Paris
Convention territoriality standards which allow determination of
patentability by member States.650
(b) Term of protection; Protection to extend for a minimum term of twenty years.
Such protection extends beyond Paris Convention standards since the
Convention does not include a minimum term.
These two - (a) and (b) above - are further examples of the erosion of the
important principle of territoriality.
(c) Rights conferred: The proposals maximise the patentee's rights. The patentee
is to be protected against infringement (copying, using or selling the said
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invention) and be legally empowered to import, use or sell the direct results of
the process, 651
(d) Use without authorisation from patentee: Traditionally, the Paris Convention
stresses non - revocation of patents on the grounds of non - working. Grant of
use rights by granting States to private parties without patentee's authorisation
is to be non - exclusive and 'limited' to cases of national emergency or to
remedy an adjudicated violation of anti -trust laws.652 Patents may also be
exploited without authorisation for governmental purposes or compelling
purposes.653
Copyright
(a) Subject matter: Copyright inheres in a work from its creation. The proposals
extend the Berne and Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) requirement that
works of a literary, scientific and artistic nature be protected, to protection for
all forms of original expression. The new proposal intends to ensure protection
for all possible future forms of IP, (expressed as 'forms yet to be developed in
the United States 1987 proposal), in tune with the rapidly changing
commercial technology market, centered in developed countries.
(b) Protection for rights: The Berne Convention standards, that is, automatic extension
of protection in all member countries for all original works protected in a
member State, are extended to protection of all original works upon creation
without any subjection to formality requirements - publication, communication
or dissemination. Economic rights under copyright "shall" be freely and
separately exploitable and transferable. Transferees (assignees and exclusive
licensees) shall e entitled to full enforcement of their acquired rights in their
own name.
(c) Limitations to rights: The Berne Conventions provisions (reproduction,
translation, adaptation, etc.)654 on limitations and exemptions are largely
conformed to in the proposals. Compulsory licensing is however, to be
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non - exclusive and limited to instances where legitimate local needs cannot be met by
voluntary actions of copyright owners and to works and uses set forth in the
Berne Convention. Transparency requirements are to e satisfied and the
owners be notified and given an opportunity to be heard before non -
consensual use of their right. Prompt payment of royalties consistent with
those that would be negotiated on a voluntary basis and workable export
prevention systems, are to be maintained by the issuing State (of a non -
voluntary licence), etc.
These proposals contradict the Berne Appendix (Protocol) which has regulated
developing countries resort to compulsory licensing of rights of translation and reproduction
of copyright able works655 . Most important to developing countries, the proposals would
"curtail" the Convention position which allows member States to determine the scope of
reproduction rights under their national legislation - Article 9(1) of Berne.
Information Technologies (for example, Semiconductor Chip Layout-Designs
protection).
Among others, the proposals under this head are speculative (that is, they involve
rights of as yet largely undetermined legal nature, even in the technologically most advanced
countries) or are intended to internationalise national laws. An example of the latter is the
United States proposal on integrated circuits which if accepted, would "internationalise"
United States municipal law 656 on semi conductor chip protection.
(a) Rights conferred: The owner of layout design would've the exclusive rights to
reproduction, design incorporation into a circuit (s), importation and
distribution of integrated circuits incorporating the design and to assign or
authorise use of such rights, etc. Exceptions to these rights are primarily
identical to those applied to copyrights.
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(b) Enforcement procedures: Remedies would include seizure, compensation,
forfeiture, injunctions, as well as criminal sanctions. Because these procedures
are primarily aimed at the Newly Industrialising Countries (NIC's),657 which
are technologically competitive, affect third country markers or possess large
domestic markets, a due process of law clause, that is, guarantees of notice,
NT for non - nationals, access to judicial and administrative authorities,
written submissions, etc., is included in order to reach within the borders of
these countries. The clause would require judicial review of initial judicial
decisions and of final administrative decisions, on the merits of a case.
Trade Secrets
Trade secrets would be protected internationally for the first time. Trade secrets are
primarily constituted as private contract rights and hitherto have received protection only
under national trade secret or business information laws. The new rights to be conferred
would relate to protection from 'actual or threatened misappropriation', that is, disclosure or
acquisition in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices. The incorporation into the
multilateral legal framework of GATT would complete the circle of home State extra
territorial legal protection of the economic rights and interests of their nationals (IP owners).
6.6.5 Summary of latent objectives in developed countries proposals.
Overall, the major developed countries' position advocates maximum implementation
ofmeasures to protect or enforce IP rights, unless such measures "create barriers to legitimate
trade",658 or constitute forms of abuse recognised under anti - trust rules (for example, as
under the patent - misuse or exhaustion doctrines), prevails. Given implementation of the
proposals, developed countries will achieve
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effective control over developing countries' technoeconomic development, by interalia:
(a) Subordinating developing countries primary development goals such as the
promotion, through international cooperation, of technological research and
development on their territory, maximisation of exploitation of foreign owned
IPR, importation of technology on preferential terms, etc., to development
related objectives of international trade.
(b) Limiting their capacity to resort to 'non voluntary' methods and tools of enforcing
exploitation of granted rights, whether to prevent abuse of such rights by IPR's
owners or to achieve development goals not deemed by rights owners or their
home States as vital659 to the operation of the intellectual property system or
"free trade";
(c) Turning intellectual property rights into a trade measure, enforceable in line
with home country interests. Such enforcement would be facilitated by the
GATT - TRIP's regime's expansion of the grounds for initiating a complaint
under GATT about another country 's policy measures (that is, the possible
new grounds would include unfair trade practices, inadequate protection for
intellectual property, 'unacceptable' Labour standards, etc., all of which have
hitherto been outside the GATT).660
(d) Limiting developing countries' ability to resort to safeguard action such as under
that now available under GATT Article XVIII (which allows a country to
impose trade barriers to manage adverse balance of payments and other
problems) due to fear of "arbitrary" retaliation.
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6.7 The Developing Countries, why not GATT: Developed
Country GATT - TRIPS proposals a reversal of the Paris
Convention Reform efforts?
"Presently, only few countries are in position to take
greater advantage of a very strict protection of IPR's.
That is so because these countries maintain a monopoly
of technical knowledge, dispose of a long tradition in
managerial capacity as well as wide financial resources.
Those which are not able to take advantage of the
incentives provided by it are obliged to use such
protection in a way that ensures the safeguard of
domestic technological development"
Brazilian Submission to the Negotiating Group on
Trade - Related Aspects of IPR's (1988)66*
The position of developing countries, which is steadily being eroded, is in
favour of progressive evolution and observance of speciality of function for
international institutions.662 Developing countries point to the growing tendency to
treat intellectual property as a purely commercial issue (including the widening of the
mandate to commercial secrets), without taking into account the primary
development aspects, that is, technology development and transfer or the need to
acquire technological capacity by developing countries.663 Therefore, in relation to
the creation of new standards and principles concerning the availability, scope and
use of intellectual property rights, developing countries have stated some of their
principal objections to a GATT - TRIP'S regime in terms of international transfer of
technology as being:
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6.7.1 Threat to Territorial Sovereignty:
Developing countries assume the historically supported argument that all
States should have the sovereign right to ensure a proper balance between rights and
obligations of intellectual property rights holders, and thus to determine the level and
scope of protection of these rights, in particular in sectors of special public concern
such as health, nutrition, agriculture and national security.
The territorial limitation of EPR's664 as traditionally understood, ensures that
every literary, scientific or artistic work should be protected outside its country of
origin according to the same laws as rights of nationals are protected (Paris Societe
des Gens de Lettres, 1878) with rights being enforced and remedies sought in each
country, according to its laws and recognised minimum international legal
standards. Consequently, it has been assumed that subject to the minimum
standards as provided for under the international intellectual property treaties, the
legal effects in the granting State are to be determined in accordance with the vital
national interests of the granting State.665 Such a position respects the sovereign
discretion of the granting State in determining its primary interests and enforcing
them under its national law (for example, under the terms and conditions for use of
the rights it grants).666
Under the Punta del Este Declaration,667 the Ministers recognised that
negotiations on trade - related aspects of IPR's would give consideration to, inter
alia, concerns raised by participants related to the underlying public policy
objectives of their national systems for the protection of intellectual property,
including developmental and technological objectives. Though this consideration is
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in principle recognised under the Preamble of the Draft Agreement668 submitted to
the parties by the GATT Director General for consideration, the rest of the Draft
terms and conditions take little account of the practical conditions of 'unilateral'
international technological ownership which forces benefits to flow unidirectionally.
Developing countries therefore face under the GATT measures a reinforced
introduction of the equivalent of conditional MFN669 (that is, material reciprocity),
into the international EPR's regime.670
6.7.2 Re-interpretation of GATT rules by developed
countries?
The application of the national treatment principle as understood in GATT to
trade related aspects of IPR's, that is, "treatment no less favourable than that
accorded by a party to its nationals671 and any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted to nationals must (shall) be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the nationals of all other parties",672 requires that a government
uses no means other than those authorised by the GATT to discriminate between a
foreign and domestic innovator or supplier of technology. Such measures can have a
variety of damaging effects on developing countries' technology development
transfer goals, that is:
(i) Since tariffs (the normal GATT major tool) do not apply to most IPR's and
therefore cannot be used to protect domestic technology suppliers or
innovators, the proposition that national treatment should apply to exchange
and trade in IPR's implicitly requires removal of protection for domestic
innovators or suppliers673 of technology vis-i-vis foreign competitors, that
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is, there should be no effective protection for local innovators against foreign
innovators or technology suppliers. Such a situation would increase the
already abundant opportunities for imposition of restrictive conditions and
terms by suppliers of technology.
This problem will remain even given the suggested GATT - TRIP'S equivalent
for "emergency674 protection", subsidy and dumping actions,675 that is, Article VIII
of the Draft Agreement on trade - related aspects of DPR's. The Draft provides, inter
alia, that parties may provide under their municipal laws and regulations, measures
necessary to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio¬
economic and technological development,676 since such national measures must be
consistent with the provisions of the GATT Agreement limitations or
exclusions (for example, regarding protection of computer programs and
compilations of data),677 must not conflict with 'normal exploitation' or
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder.678 Consequently,
the GATT agreement will provide an extension of private rights into international
obligations, thus reinforcing the requirement of States to abstain from measures
incompatible with such private rights which shall be expressed as international
obligations).
(ii) Developing country's sector and product exclusions shall be curtailed
denying them of the same mechanism now developed countries have
historically resorted to and still use to protect their vital national interests.679
(iii) The achievement of a high standard of protection for IPR's, at the global
level, reduces the level of local technological ownership in the developing
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countries. This condition arises because standards of novelty, inventiveness and utility
arc higher under a universal standard, thus reducing the actual level of grants
by developing countries to their nationals.680
b-gt
(iv) The "non consensual" inclusion of issues concerning standards and principles
affecting the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights (herein
after IPR'S) with liberalisation of international trade and not protection, can
only reinforce, especially in the long run. growth ofmaterial and technological
inequality between developed and developing countries;
(v) Though the GATT proposals by developed countries arc apparently based on free
trade assumptions, opposing any intcrvcntionism. the heavy subsidisation of
technological innovation in developed countries and the prevalence of intra-
firm trade between large affiliations of firms from developed countries (which
already accounts for over fifty per cent of international trade) introduces
strong elements of "private interventiomsm."682 Such private interventionism,
backed by unilateral or arbitrary^83 home country support for exclusive
economic rights of IPR's oyvners, shall limit developing countries ability to
force regulations against technology' owners who are non nationals, specially
in relation to disclosure of inventions, local working requirements and
remedies for lack of use or inadequate use or inadequate use of patented
inventions,684 etc.
The heavy subsidisation 685 of 'new technologies', though currently not as essed and
therefore unopposed in GATT,686 nullifies any claims to a 'level playing field'687 in the field
of trade related aspects of IPR's. Devek ned countries have argued that subsidies for the
development of new
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technologies differ from those granted to keep obsolete industries open,688
that is, that, inter alia, the Subsidies Code provides for the admission of
subsidies whose objective, is inter alia, the encouragement of research and
development programmes, especially in the field of high - technology
industries.689 However, the "unilateral" international ownership of
technology would cause developing countries to suffer increased dumping of
technological goods or products made with "subsidised" technology, thus
further restricting or development in the affected countries.
While developing countries could refuse to offer protection for heavily publicly
subsidised technologies, that is, treat such technology as an "unfair practice", such
action would be open to retaliatory trade sanctions.690
(vi) GATT principles primarily apply to countries at similar levels of
technoeconomic development. Developing countries stress their routine
adherence to the most favoured nations and reciprocity principles in trade and
economic relations amongst themselves, whether at the bilateral or
multilateral level.691 These principles are not therefore objected to in their
proper context, especially when their effect is to extend reciprocal advantages
and facilities such as reduced tariffs and orderly quotas to all countries
involved in trade or economic co-operation on a materially equal basis.
Though GATT now recognises "differential and more favourable treatment of
developing countries' as a 'new' regulatory principle692 the principle is in
practice, as noted above, honoured "more in the breach" than observance, by
developed granting countries, that is, developed countries circumvent the
provisions of GATT Part Four under various so called managed hade "grey
measures"693 and escape clauses694 or by unilaterally insisting that
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developing countries that have achieved "production efficiency and competitiveness" reflect
such achievement in the assumption of "some commitments"695 . The integration of IPR's
into the international trading system, while legitimising the international mechanism for the
appropriation of new knowledge, would thus institute an unbalanced international technology
exchange and trade regime between developed and developing countries. This would further
enhance developed country regulation and control over the international diffusion of
technology. 696
6.8 Resume of developing country position
Briefly, developing countries have argued that there must e no harmonisation of
national intellectual property systems except in so far as is necessary to establish general
standards to which members would "gradually" adjust697 . Territoriality must be respected
and primary development needs, especially for technology development and transfer, must be
safeguarded through product and sector exclusions, use of mandatory enforcement measures
(for example, compulsory licensing) to ensure, inter alia, exploitation of protected rights, etc.
6.9 The Draft "Agreement"
It may be concluded that not withstanding resistance by developing countries,
developed countries will have trade related aspects of IP incorporated within the GATT
framework, proof of such a proceeding is available from a reading of the current Draft
Agreement,698 (though it has been alleged to be unsatisfactory to both groups of
countries).699
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The agreement, (which has to be accepted or rejected along with the rest of
the negotiated package which includes tariffs, non tariff measures, tropical products, textiles
and clothing, natural resource based products, agriculture, services, trade related investment
measures - TRIMS), closely echoes the United States proposals in vital respects.
Fundamental substantive issues relating to balance of public and private rights and measures,
development and transfer of technology, etc., have been circumvented or left unresolved. The
provisions that greatly affect LDC's acquisition of foreign technology include 700
(a) The effective scope of application of GATT - MFN provisions - Article 4 of the
Director General's Draft;
(b) The scope of and need for protection of certain information technologies,
especially the new extension of protection (especially through Copyright)701 to
computer programmes and compilations of data - Article 10 of Director
General's Draft, rental rights - Article 11, etc.,
(c) The duration of protection for now or original industrial designs (including textile
designs protected under industrial design or copyright. Article 25, which shall
be at least ten 10 years, Article 26, of the Director General's Draft. This
measure would strengthen developed country control over, inter alia, the textile
industries of developing countries which are already subject to the extra
GATT multifibre arrangements.
(d) Patentable subject matter. Patents to be available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step (non - obvious) and are capable of industrial
application (useful), without discrimination as to place of invention, field of
technology, and whether products are imported or not - commercial
exploitation may only extend to:
285
(1) Measures necessary to protect the ordre public or morality, including protection of
human or animal or plant or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by domestic law - Article 27(2);
(2) Diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals - Article 27(3)(a);
(3) Plants and animals other than micro organism - Article 27(3) (b);
(4) Effective resort to compulsory licences, (restricted to a narrowly defined
public interest and subjected to a prompt compensation standard),702
(5) Admissible limitations on abusive anti - competitive practices related to
intellectual property rights (which inhibit international trade or technological
development in the technology acquiring country, for instance imposition of
territorial restrictions, including restrictions of trade in or export of patented
products, tied sales etc.);703
(6) Trade secrets, scope of and need for protection.
The Director General's GATT - IPR draft also follows the developed country position
and provides for a GATT council on trade - Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
which is, inter alia:
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I
(i) To function alongside GATT and the proposed Agreement on
Trade in services;
(ii) Establish co-operative arrangements with WIPO;
(iii) Monitor operations of the Agreement (including compliance);
(iv) Facilitate consultation on TRIPS;
(v) Provide assistance requested in the context of dispute
settlement procedures;
(vi) Receive notifications or submissions from parties concerning
their national laws, regulations or agreements affecting the
agreement, in pursuance of transparency enhancement;
(vii) Facilitate enforcement, etc.
6.10 GATT - IPR provisions and the Transmission of Technological
Capacity to Developing Countries, Conclusions
Developing countries right to apply the intellectual property system as a
N
defensive' mechanism against further restriction of international access to
industrial property available in developed countries, is inherent in the concept of
sovereignty and is preserved in territoriality and long standing practice of all
countries.
Consequently:
(a) GATT reforms would, by enhancing the commercial elements of
IPR's, erode the power of the granting State to ensure that all
rights conform to the quid pro quo arrangement underlying all
exclusive rights, that is, the service of the public interest rather
than a primary guarantee of private income to creators.
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(b) The GATT - IPR regime would in effect directly link IP protection
levels in developing countries to access to technology by those
countries. Such a link would legitimate the use of further
"conditionalities1 or "sanctions' by developed countries to further
restrict access to technology. By increasing pre-conditions for
acquisition of technology, the levels of remuneration for
technology owners would be artificially increased.
(c) The Gatt system is primarily based on material reciprocity and only
offers discretionary preferential treatment for LDC's. GATT also
deals with international trade, which is a development related and
not primary development issue. Therefore, GATT would not
offer adequate balance between protection of IPR's (including their
commercial use), with primary development interests of
developing countries (including the need for fair and favorable
treatment for developing countries and special treatment for the
least developed among them, in their technology development and
transfer requirements).
(d) The introduction of product and process patents704 as a defacto
universal right for IP owners, will open the potential for
application of trade measures in virtually every instance products
are made (competing or not) by a developing country national or
enterprise applying reverse engineering or other experimental
methods or processes of making the same product. The GATT
"reforms', by bestowing universal rights on IPR's owners, will in
effect afford them universal protection against independent
evolution of similar technological products or designs. Such a
situation would amount to the above mentioned conditioning of
technoeconomic conditions and markets in developing countries,
that is, the GATT reforms would enable the use of IPR rights to,
inter alia, segregate markets by for instance facilitating the
elimination of parallel imports, restricting licensed rights, etc.
(e) Control over developed countries technoeconomic development will be
achieved by limiting their capacity to resort to "non voluntary'
methods and tools of enforcing exploitation of granted rights,
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whether to prevent abuse of such rights by IPR's owners or to
achieve development goals not deemed by rights owners or their
home States as "legitimate', such legitimacy being principally
determined on the commercial grounds. Consequently, developing
countries ability to enforce local technology development
regulations against technology owners who are non nationals,
especially in relation to disclosure of inventions, local working
requirements, lack of use or inadequate use of patented inventions,
etc. will be curtailed.
Below, we argue that, there must be no linking of member State's
acceptance of GATT - TRIPS measures to technology development and transfer
and technical co-operation, unless developed countries offer equivalent
concessions, for example, in the area of agricultural trade, textiles, etc. As shown
above, trade related aspects of intellectual property affect the acquisition of a
technological capacity by developing countries. The effects may range from the
general, such as restriction of the developing countries technological choices,
ability to regulate trade related abuses of intellectual property rights that restrict
technological growth, to the specific such as elimination of developing countries
issuing of special patent rights, making of patent or sector exclusions, etc.
Therefore, only the adoption of equivalent concessions under the GATT -TRIPS
regime in accordance with the balance of commitments principle would guarantee
that the international trade regime would not worsen the technology imbalance
between developed and developing countries. Further, without balanced
commitments (which excludes international trade conditioning), developing
countries cannot make free technological development and regulatory choices
unlike the now developed countries which were, historically, able to do so without
imposed restriction. This means that developing countries must be allowed more
than time periods to adjust their intellectual property regimes to the required
international standards, that is the factors
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surrounding their technological development are considered and effective
implementation of preferential access to technology is undertaken, the standard of
such preferential treatment being in accordance with the level of technological
development. Further, home States must undertake to assist developing countries in
the regulation of the technology and trade related activity of enterprises based on
their territory, that is, to ensure that such enterprises effectively participate in the
technological development of developing countries.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The United Nations Code705 Of
Conduct On The Transfer Of
Technology
7.0 Issues
"...the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century is
being paralleled, in its effect on international relations,
by the technical revolution of the twentieth century; as
new conditions are produced, or old conditions changed,
need arises for new law...customary guidance does not
fully serve this need; nor are courts able to fill it".70*'
The Code of Conduct raised a great number of "new" international legal
issues, especially in relation to the role of international law in the facilitation of a
new international order. Many of the legal issues have already been answered, either
by States' practice or through various international technology transfer related
international agreements.707 Thus, according to a recent UNCTAD report,708
informal consultations have revealed that the major part of States's policy practice
and conceptual approaches, at the national and multilateral level, shows that States
would now accept a framework treaty type Code. Such a Code, concluded as a
global or universal framework of rules and principles on development and transfer of
technology, would reflect all parties needs, legal and non legal, in accordance with
balance of commitments. It would provide for normative flexibility and institutional
follow up of the dynamic changes in a technological environment.709
A few issues however remain unresolved before an international Code that can
facilitate the crystallisation and extension of international law norms to the regulation
of all international technology transfer transactions is concluded.
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The remaining issues, as shown in the discussion below, do not go to the very
heart of the formation of a Code, as thought by some legal critics of the Code
negotiations. The issues include:
(a) Whether an international Legal Code for the regulation of international
technology transfer is necessary;
(b) Whether if a Code is necessary, it should have legal provisions of a binding or
voluntary nature, be passed by consensus (majority) or consent
(unanimity). If passed as a voluntary instrument, to what extent would it
depend on national adoption for implementation;
(c) Whether the Code should contain self executing provisions or contain general
provisions which can be generally and discretionary applied;
(d) Whether the Code should facilitate full harmonisation of various national
regulations or promote international minimum legal standards,
(e) Whether the Code can adequately define international technology development
and transfer, for purposes of extending international law to cover the
entire process;
(f) Whether technology should be regarded under the Code as part of the
"common heritage ofmankind".
(g) Whether the Code contains adequate provisions to reduce the effects of the
disparity in bargaining and negotiating powers between suppliers and
recipients of technology;
(h) Whether the Code's provisions would actually promote transparency710 in
recipient countries technology development and transfer regimes and
improve balance of legal entitlements and mutual confidence between the
parties;
(i) Whether the Code's provisions would be of any relevancy to the regulation of
restrictive practices in international transfer of technology transactions;
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(j) Whether the Code's provisions would fully resolve the choice of law issues
commonly raised by international development and transfer of
technology transactions;
(k) Whether the Code should contain provisions for preferential treatment for all
developing countries and define the standard of such preferential
treatment, that is, whether special or fair and favourable;
(m) Whether the Code would facilitate LDC "mutual self help", that is, through
South-South technological co-operation;
(n) Whether the implementation machinery and co-ordinating instruments created
under the Code could in practice play any meaningful role in the
establishment of pre - peremptory norms for the regulation of
international transfer of technology transactions.
The issues are not discussed in the order set out above and a few are
rhetorical. Instead, the form of the current Draft Code is followed since it provides an
adequate arrangement for discussion.
7.1 The United Nations Code on Transfer of Technology -
Why the need for a Code of Conduct
The objective conditions that gave rise to the debate7" on the need for legal
regulation of international transfer of technology are multifarious and cover both the
national and international arenas.712 Despite often intense discussion of the issues at
both the national and international levels there is a continuing failure or impasse in
dealing concretely with the legal problems created by international transfer and
development of technology, especially in the "North - South" Context. The Code, as
a future legal global framework providing norms and standards, though currently in
still waters, provides a continuing hope of the extension of international law to cover
the entire international technology process.713 In its entirety, the Code is an
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instrument structurally and procedurally directed at protecting developing
countries, assisting them in acquiring technology on appropriate terms and
conditions, thus facilitating their assimilation and use of such acquired technology
to achieve technological capacity (technology development).714
The issues which proved difficult to resolve during negotiation were
mainly caused by developed party concentration on:
(i) The issues of quantitative technology flows and the commercial
motives underlying the flows, that is, the protection of rights of
supplying parties;715
(ii) Objection to the definition of internationally restrictive
practices;
(iii) Continued resistance (especially by major technology
exporting nations)716 to the extension of international legal norms
to cover the entire process of international technology
development and transfer;
and for developing countries: (i) Continued failure to
distinguish between fundamental development and development
related issues, especially for purposes of determining law
applicable, impact of States and private party international
technology development and transfer practice717 on international
legal norm formation and extension, etc.
Further, negotiations were hindered by the historical dearth in
international negotiation and law of multilateral measures, instruments and
procedures for mutual and co-operative resolution of development problems718 and
continuing preference by developed countries to "aid1 rather than technologically
co-operate with developing countries.719
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In its many positive aspects, the Code mirrors the United Nations
perception of an organised and increasingly interdependent international
community720 and does not simply juxtapose contrasting views or unilaterally
create new law,721 as often charged, though the tendency to paper over problems
is sometimes strongly evident. The Code approach is to consolidate earlier
fragmented or uncoordinated international or multilateral legal efforts (such as
provisions on restrictive practices in the Havana Charter, the Code on Restrictive
Business Practices, the Law of the Sea Convention,722 etc. into a single concrete
coordinating legal document reflecting the interests of an organised international
community.723 Such a goal is in line with the primary goals of the United Nations
Charter, specifically the extension, through lawful means, of the benefits arising
from science and technology, to all countries. It is also in line with the objectives
of the specialised United Nations Agency mandated to facilitate the development
and extension of international legal norms in the area of international development
and transfer of technology, that is the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).724
The elaboration of the Code of Conduct was effectively undertaken in the
1970's in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development forum with
"minimum' participation by developed countries.725 The continued lack of
consensus lent an adversarial dimension (North - South) to a problem which is
otherwise universal. At the start of the negotiations, developing countries called
for a legally binding Code, on grounds, inter alia, that technology forms part of
the common heritage of mankind,726 a demand, which has been gradually
abandoned due to the declining negotiating and bargaining power of developing
countries,727 Similarly, the claim for absolute right to regulate, under national
law, all aspects of technology transfer transactions occurring on the territory
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of the host States is now modified in practice,728 that is, to distinguish between
fundamental development goals.
Developed countries, have shown little willingness to admit the
inappropriateness of some of the traditional international law "obligations" when
applied to a wider technologically unequal international society.729 Such laws
include principles derived from anti-trust and competition laws, principles that were
developed to meet the particular socio-economic needs of developed countries. Thus
for instance, home States show a disinclination, to accept the duty to co-operate with
host States to prevent enterprises based on their territory (especially transnational
corporations) from abusing their negotiating and bargaining monopoly positions.730
As a result, the controversy over the central issue of restrictive business practices
continues unresolved, especially since developed countries "interpret" it to be largely
ultra vires the primary scope of the Code.731 Similarly, special treatment for LDC's
is also opposed as contrary to the private rights of technology owners.732
7.2 Preamble
In interpreting the Code, it is vital to give a proper interpretation to the
preamble provisions since the preamble affects the rest of the text of the Code.733
Many early authorities regarded the preamble as part of the preparatory work., that
is, not forming part of the context of a multilateral instrument.734 Today, the main
objects or intentions of the parties to a multilateral agreement is often sought for in
the Preamble. The intention of the parties is very important since it is the basis on
which the parties base the interpretation of their obligations when implementing a
multilateral instrument.735
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The Draft Code has been claimed to contain deliberate ambiguities (so called
"constructive ambiguity"),736 in an attempt to balance the interests of the parties.
The result of such ambiguities, the critics maintain, is only to achieve "negotiated
successes" which prove to have little value beyond the ceremonial.737 The contents
of the Preamble were negotiated in detail, in order to avoid a resultant Code that
would maintain the legal "status quo" on the one hand or avoid creating a legally
binding Code, on the other. If there are ambiguities in the Preamble, they reveal the
"effective intention" of those States which hold the large part of intellectual property
and related rights, since it is this latter group of States that can guarantee the success
of the instrument Developing countries attempts to influence the legal nature and
form of adoption of the Code (article 11 and 12), have gradually withered,738
reflecting their declining negotiating and bargaining power position.
The decline in negotiating power position of developing countries is also
reflected in the exclusion of the phrase "common heritage of mankind" ffom the
Preamble.739 The current agreed draft of the Code,740 however, like earlier drafts,
recognises the fundamental role of Science and Technology in the socio-economic
development (taken to include technological development) of all countries. Under
Paragraph 2 of the Preamble, the right of all peoples to benefit from advances and
developments in technology in order to improve their standards of living is affirmed.
Suppliers and recipients of technology are to "respect each other's rights".
Transactions are to be conducted on "justifiable" and "reasonable" terms.
Paragraph 4 calls upon "all countries" to facilitate the adequate transfer and
development of technology and to strengthen the scientific and technological
capabilities of developing countries. Such States co-operation is a necessary
precondition for the establishment of a new international economic order.741 The
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importance of technology transfer to the continued maintenance of international
peace and co-operation is reflected in the call to promote peace, security and
international independence through international scientific and technological co¬
operation.742 Recognition is given to the mutual inter dependency of national and
international measures if increased levels in technological flows are to be
achieved743 under a universally applicable Code.
However while the parties are agreed on the need for a "universal" Code,
developed and developing States attach a different interpretation to the duties and
rights arising under such a universal Code. Specifically, developing countries
interpret a universal Code as requiring home States, inter alia, to control and prevent
enterprises based on their territory from using restrictive practices. Developed
countries stress freedom of contract and performance of contracts according to party
agreements.744 However, to achieve balance of entitlements, it is necessary to weigh
non monopolistic competitive abilities745 and national security considerations of
home States against a duty to avail access to technology for all peoples. These
duties of home States should be specified or delimited, rather than referring to them
as a general duty on home States to encourage compliance with the Code, that is,
even if it's agreed as a non binding instrument, the Code should establish norms and
standards capable of implementation.746
Tentatively, we may conclude here that the Preamble in its current form, is
based on the need to achieve general compromises between adversarial positions.
The Preamble hardly distinguishes between fundamental developmental goals and
development related issues, with a resultant effect, among others, of over emphasis
on the commercial aspects of technology transfer flows throughout the Code. The
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non distinction has also complicated resolution of the issue of the exact
interrelationship between national laws and regulations relating to international
technology development and transfer and a new comprehensive multilateral
regime.
Consequently, the major objective of the Code, that is, extension of
international law to cover the entire technology development and transfer process
by inter alia, assisting developing countries to acquire technological capacity and
import substitute technology safely and on adequate or appropriate terms and
conditions while guaranteeing adequate protection for intellectual property rights
and promotion of fair and equitable remuneration for use of such rights, etc. have
become inter linked with the soft - hard law debate and traditional issues of the
foreign investment regime such as standards of compensation for compulsory
acquisition of property rights belonging to non nationals, etc. For resolution of
these and related issues, as stated above, it is important that the general principle
of balance of commitments be applied to use of sovereign rights by developing
countries to ensure strict legal compliance with their primary development needs
on the one hand, and the need to ensure, through international law, adequate
continuous production and international dissemination of ideas, on the other.
Adequate protection for technological property rights of non nationals in recipient
States or standards of compensation in cases of compulsory acquisition, etc. must
be judged in the light of these two conditions.
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7.3 Definitions and Scope ofApplication (Chapter 1)
7.3.1 Parties
Party in the Code covers inter alia, any person, whether natural or juridical, of
public or private law, individual or collective as well as States, government agencies
and international and sub-regional organisations regardless of the economic and other
relationships between and among them.747 The definition attempts to cover all
possible foreseeable parties to international technology transfer transactions,748
though States are the primary addressee's. Developed countries, as in other
forums,749 have consistently objected to the inclusion of entities under common
control, that is, subsidiaries, incorporated branches or affiliates of transnational
corporation's as separate parties for the purposes of the Code as unreasonable
intervention in private party activity.750 The objections are frequently buttressed by
the implied restriction of "direct private foreign investment" in those countries
wishing to regulate intra - firm activity, whether under a legal Code or not.751 As
stated above, the objective test is whether the intra - firm transaction promotes
international development and transfer of technology.
7.3.2 Definition of International Technology Transfer
The Code does not define technology. However, a legal definition of
technology as systematic knowledge usable in the manufacture of a product,
application of a process or the rendering of a service752 is now widely accepted.
Technology transfer is defined under the Code as the transfer of systematic
knowledge for the manufacture of a product, application of a process or rendering
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of a service, excluding the sale or lease of goods753. The latter part of the
definition excludes mere sale or delivery of technological goods or processes in
which the recipient plays a passive, non learning role. In our introduction, we
interpreted the definition as excluding "technological islands', that is ventures
established in recipient States and are then operated exclusively by non nationals,
whether such ventures are subsidiaries754, turnkey plants, assembly plants, etc.
The Code's examples of what constitutes an international technology
transfer contract do not explicitly show that the element of acquisition by the
recipient of technological capacity in the technology acquired, in addition to the
sale of a technological right, is what constitutes a transfer. It is because of the
omission of explicit reference to the learning or development aspects (demand
satisfaction) of the transfer in the definition, that subsequent consideration of the
issues of restrictive practices, "un-packaging', etc. can be criticised as unrelated to
the primary objectives of the Code. Examples given under the Code have
therefore to be viewed with this omission in mind.
Paragraph 1.3755 enumerates examples of international technology transfer
transactions. These include assignment, sale and licensing of all forms of
industrial property except trademarks, service and trade names756; provision of
technical expertise in all forms including feasibility studies, designs, personnel
training, etc. While the examples include the acquisition, installation and
operation of plant and equipment to any level,757 the effective participation by
nationals in such transactions and the resultant acquisition and assimilation of
transferred skills is only presumed.
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The universality of application of the Code, that is, its international scope is
set out in paragraph 1.5,758 thus reaffirming the applicability of the Code beyond a
"North - South" dimension, or specific techno-economic, social or political systems.
Some member countries to the negotiations proposed inclusion in the Code,
whenever reference is made to "States", "governments" or "members of UNCTAD";
regional groupings of States to the extent that they are competent. Such inclusion
would enhance the position of regional groups to have regional regulations related to
the subject dealt with by the Code, "incorporated" into the Code as existing
international law or norms. Unless the regional laws take into account the collective
interests of all States,759 the potential for conflict is obvious.
7.4 Objectives and Principles (Chapter 2)
The general objectives and principles under the Code are agreed. However,
specific issues, referred to, especially in "hard - soft" law terminology, as
fundamental, remain unresolved.760 The Code aims at establishing general and
equitable legal norms and standards for the regulation of international transfer (and
development) of technology transactions.761 To accomplish this objective, special
notice is given to the needs of LDC's. Fundamental differences have increasingly
been papered over in this area, especially due to the failure to separate general from
specific issues coupled with the declining negotiating and bargaining powers of
developing countries as consumers of international technology flows.762
To promote mutual "confidence" between the parties and their governments763
there is a call, among others, for the improvement of the bargaining position of
LDC's, and avoidance of abuse of stronger position by developed countries. An
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improved bargaining position for LDC's would result, inter alia, from the
reduction of technological disparities between States, for example, through
encouragement of enterprises to undertake adequate research and development in
host LDC's, facilitation of effective equity participation in joint ventures by LDC
nationals, etc.764 The Code also requires all States to promote LDC participation
in world production and trade,765 through inter alia, facilitation of LDC
acquisition of technology on fair and equitable terms or on special terms and
conditions for the least developed among them. It has been incorrectly asserted766
that the call for preferential treatment for LDC's to promote their increased
participation in "world production and trade', imports the market idea into the
Code. As already stated, a Code for the regulation of international development
and transfer of technology does not deal with exclusive "sale or purchase'
transactions but with the transmission of technological capacity.
7.5 Establishment of Principles - Universality, non Conditionality,
Consent, non Coercion, etc.
The important principle of universality is comprehensively set out under
paragraph 2.2 (i). Under the sub paragraph, States would be allowed the right to
adopt all appropriate measures to facilitate and regulate the transfer of technology
in a manner consistent with international obligations,767 under mutually agreed,
fair and reasonable terms and conditions. The reference to international obligation
is the result of compromise. Developing countries objected to the use of
"international law' as a standard since such international law in reference to
technology transfer would imply incorporation of many of the current standards
and norms, norms and standards which are
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not representative of the wider interests of the new international community and
which the Code therefore seeks to replace. However, implicit recognition is given to
the above mentioned need to apply international law to development related aspects
of international technology development and transfer transactions alongside
continued application of national laws and regulations to fundamental development
issues.
In implicit recognition of the need to safeguard primary (technological)
development needs of developing countries, the Code outlaws use of conditionality
through express recognition of the techno - economic, social and political
independence of States.768 The members are to co-operate according to the science
and technology goals contained in the Charter of the United Nations,769 especially
where those goals are a precondition for the establishment of the NIEO.770
7.6 Identification of Responsibilities and Obligations of
parties
7.6.1 National Regulation (Chapter 3)
National regulation of international technology development and transfer
agreements is now a well-established legal right.771 The Code, like other multilateral
instruments that contain "minimum norms and standards" or general guide-lines, has
to rely on mixed jurisdictional implementation.772 The Code however provides
general guide-lines which are a distillation of existing internationally agreed legal
principles and policies relating to international technology (development and)
transfer. If followed, the guide-lines should facilitate the extension of international
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legal norms and standards to cover international technology (development and)
transfer agreements by facilitating the creation of a mixed jurisdiction framework.
The code attempts to convert already agreed international legal principles and
policy relating to international technology transfer, as set out in various international
resolutions and decisions and elaborated in States practice773 into legal norms and
standards. Through the national regulation provisions, the Code recognises the
inseparability of joint national and international implementation of any
international norms and standards that would be agreed. Paragraph 3.2 (vi)
reiterates the need for all States operating regulatory schemes to operate them in
accordance with their "international obligations". Decisions made by competent
authorities should be fair, equitable and applied on the same basis in accordance with
established procedures of law.774 Again, implicit recognition is given to the
identification of fundamental development goals which technology importing States
have full sovereign rights, recognised under international law, to regulate.
International obligations apply in the first instance to any issue beyond these
fundamental or primary areas of recipient States' competence.
Because technology importing States must give adequate guarantees to protect
technological rights of non - nationals involved in technology development and
transfer activity on their territory, the Code promotes the application of the principle
of transparency. In accordance with this principle, host States are required to ensure
ready public availability of clearly defined laws and regulations.775 The principle is
covered, "implicitly", by provisions under Paragraph 3.3. The sub paragraph
provides that while host States should take into consideration their socio-economic
development when adopting legislation for the protection of industrial property, they
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must also ensure effective protection for all rights recognised under international
law and regulation.
7.6.2 Restrictive Business Practices (Chapter 4)
The provisions under this Chapter have been referred to as the heart of the
Code, or the basis for acquisition of international support for the Code.776
Developing countries promoted the inclusion of provisions on restrictive practices
under the Code on the grounds, inter alia, that lack of provisions on such practices
(RBP's) under the Code would imply the inapplicability of general norms or
guide-lines to the regulation of s restrictive practices' occurring during
international technology transfer transactions, thus validating the need for direct
multilateral rules (derived largely from competition and anti - trust regulations of
developed countries) for the regulation of such practices. Such a position would
correspond to that provided for under the Set of Mutually Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for The Control of RBP's, which are "voluntary" based and
have proved ineffective in regulating RBP's. Developing countries, supported by
UNCTAD experts, stress that adoption of the derived Set has not resulted in any
effective action for the elimination of generally restrictive practices, especially by
developed countries.777
However, the issue of restrictive practices, as noted above, must be
approached by considering whether the practice in question obstructs or frustrates
international transmission of technological capacity to developing State's nationals
in question and whether, in general context, the practice is contrary to the
declared United Nations aim of promoting access to science and technology for all
nations and peoples. Given this approach, it is possible to develop criteria for
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distinguishing practices which are contrary to primary developmental interests
from those legitimate practices which aim at promoting and protecting technical,
commercial, financial, etc. efficiency or capacity in the recipient State.
Due to the non distinction between primary development rights (for
example, acquisition of technological capacity in the relevant technology) and
development related rights, specific and general practices, the debate between
developed and developing country parties on the issue of restrictive practices,
though protracted, has not resolved the issue of what constitutes an RBP or what
criteria are to be applied for control of such practices. The Code lists specific
practices such grant-back provisions, non challenges to validity of technological
rights, exclusive dealing, restrictions on personnel use, research and adaptation,
price fixing, exclusion sales or representation agreements, restrictions on
publicity, post contractual obligations after expiration of industrial property rights,
export restrictions, etc. as per se, restrictive.778 As seen below, references to
"adverse effect' on national economy or "restrictive of development' are too
general and thus hard to define or implement. Equally, continued non multilateral
regulation is legally indefensible.
To illustrate the inadequacy of both existing approaches, the example of a
Code prohibited provision, that is, grant-back provisions, may be used. Grant-
back provisions are, inter alia, requirements by the supplying party or his agent
that the recipient "pass back' too the supplier, any improvements to the
technology supplied to the supplier, without charge for such improvements. Grant
back provisions form part of the common legal armory deployed by enterprises,
commonly TNC's, to gain and retain control of state of the art technology -
intensive, patent, design or copyright protected product lines.
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According to an UNCTAD study where such rights are fully controlled by the
supplier, such supplier can prevent the recipient from obtaining competing
technology, entering into sales or manufacturing agreements, etc.779
Disagreement exists as to whether the practice should be deemed acceptable if:
(i) The provision is not exclusive of third parties, that is, if the
recipient can sub licence, assign or sell improvements to third
parties without restriction;
(ii) If reciprocal obligations are undertaken by the supplying party;
(iii) If such conditions would not result in the abuse of dominant
market position by the supplying party,780
(iv) If the contract involves new technology which the supplier is
still in the process of developing or refining;
Even from this single example and resultant issues, it becomes apparent
that practices may not always be classified legal or illegal without specific
reference to a recipient state's level of technological development, the
technological and related negotiating and bargaining powers of the direct parties,
the scope and effect of the restriction, etc.
Failure to agree, under the Code, as to what constitutes an RBP, is
assumed by some scholars to be a reflection of a "fundamental ideological and
juridical' divide between the parties. In the original drafts,781 the Group of 77
gave the criteria for determination of restrictive practices and arrangements
involving the transfer of technology as those with adverse effects on the national
economy of the recipient State or those limiting the development capabilities of the
receiving country. Such
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practices were subject to national regulatory legislative control. Group B insists
that their juridical and administrative experience782 with regulation of restrictive
practices shows that only in a few cases could such practices even when defined,
be prohibited or effectively controlled through legislation.783 However, it is useful
to note that competition and anti-trust laws, regulations and precedent do not
allow the use of general practices that are restrictive of "competition' or
efficiency, that is, the factors responsible for continued growth and development
in developed countries.784
Other outstanding issues in this area include those of regulation of
transactions between affiliated enterprises, especially as to whether national
legislation should be the exclusive legal mechanism for the regulation of intra firm
practices deemed restrictive, whether the test of reasonableness should be applied
in determining whether a practice is restrictive or not, etc.785 With regard to intra
firm transactions (for example, patent pool or cross licensing agreements, that is
agreements that contain restraints on territory, quantity, prices, marketing etc.)786
the Group of 77 holds that for purposes of scope of application of the Code to
such transactions, the holding company or head office of the transnational
corporation (TNC) and its subsidiaries form different units. Group B countries
which claim competency to govern the legal internal affairs of corporations whose
principal office is located in their jurisdiction and to command the allegiance of
the nationals who run such corporations,787 holds the view that equal treatment for
foreign held subsidiaries and local enterprises in relation to technology transfer
transactions within the TNC should be accorded the same treatment as transfers
between local firms in a host State.788 For example, in cases where technology is
supplied by a subsidiary under a transaction involving restrictive practices, if
technology causes, for
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instance, serious environmental damage, the host State would be expected to want
to sue the subsidiary as a joint entity with the head office, while the home State
would encourage the denial of liability by the head office for joint liability with
the subsidiary.789
It was suggested by Group B countries that to define restrictive practices,
the un-ratified Havana Charter790 provisions on the subject should be resorted to.
The standard set in the Charter defined restrictive practices as those which affect
international trade, restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster
monopolistic control or have harmful effects on the expansion of production or
trade.791 The Group of 77 has objected to this standard as too narrow, being
derived from developed countries' anti-trust and competition laws and regulations
and reliant on international trade "effects' criteria that do not take into account
primary development needs. Though not ideal, the unratified Charter provisions
which dealt with, among others, monopolistic international trade by firms,792
prevention by agreement of the development or application of technology or
inventions, whether patented or not, abusive use of granted rights such as patents,
trademarks, industrial designs or copyright, etc. could be modified to meet current
and future needs, especially if they are re-framed to take into account the
transmission of technological capacity as a primary development goal.
In conclusion, the current Chapeau is inadequate as a framework
containing basic norms for the regulation of restrictive practices since it is
preoccupied with outlawing specific practices rather than the streamlining of
multilateral objectives of States with those of private parties and non governmental
organisations. Paragraph 4.1 requirement that the parties "voluntarily' avoid
certain
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practices that are "unduly restrictive"793 or those which unduly restrict international
technology transfer flows, can hardly promote the evolution of international legal
norms and standards in this area.794 It may be reiterated that rather than adopt
general voluntary standards, it is necessary to set criteria for distinguishing between
general and specific practices, between their effects and form795 and for determining
the compatibility of a given practice with the eventual reduction or elimination of
material (especially technological) inequalities between States.796
7.7 Legal Status of the Code
Continued negotiations on the Code, in line with the decline in the negotiating
and bargaining power of developing countries, have been possible only on the
grounds that a future Code would be voluntary. The group of 77 originally insisted
on a binding Code or one adopted through a final Act of the Conference and endorsed
by the General Assembly,797 but this position has been gradually abandoned.798
The unwillingness to adopt the Code as a binding instrument may point to at
least three factors. Firstly, lack of effective will, in practice, by technology
exporting States, to extend international law to the entire international technology
transfer process. Secondly, the concession by the parties that any resultant
instrument must depend for its implementation on joint national and international
jurisdiction.799 Thirdly, the anxiety of some of the States parties to disassociate the
Code from legal authority which could be implied from a multilaterally negotiated
instrument.
The current draft Code is in legal content, a broad compromise which in
practice would allow parties to interpret most provisions according to their perceived
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interests. The need for a compromise instrument was stressed by a representative
at the sixth conference (with approval by the conference) thus:
"it was not a treaty that was being negotiated
but a Code of Conduct that is, a non binding
instrument seeking to place a maximum of
useful elements at the disposal of the parties
to the technology transfer transactions in their
contractual relationships — unlike a treaty, a
number of positions could be included to
reconcile divergent positions".800
Such views indicate lack of understanding801 of the processes through
which international law norms are created in organised international society, that
is stress is laid on the binding and non binding provisions in instruments.802
Further, such views are based on the assumption that the Code negotiations are a
unilateral attempt by developing countries to impose new international legal duties
on owners of technology. From discussion in previous Chapters, clearly, some
duties or obligations such as the obligation to offer preferential, fair and favorable
or special terms and conditions for access to technology by LDC's, the need to
eliminate general restrictive or coercive terms and conditions in international
technology development and transfer arrangements, the duty to strictly comply
with primary development goals of developing countries by non nationals, the
duty to maintain a transparent national legal framework for the regulation of
international technology development and transfer is compatible with international
law, etc., are already established international obligations.803 Further, it is now
established that absolute free market and contract principles should, in
international relations, be promoted exclusively between parties of equal or
comparable bargaining power. A preliminary conclusion is that the adoption of a
voluntary Code based on general duties or obligations of moral authority or which
outlaws specific
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practices "across the board", will not facilitate the extension of international law to
cover the entire international technology transfer process, that is, through the
establishment of international legal norms and standards on the subject. Neither
would such a Code enhance the reduction and mitigation of bargaining and
negotiating power disparities between parties or prevent the growth of further
technological disparities between States. It is therefore essential that an adopted
Code, even if of voluntary legal nature, should include specific principles, standards
and criteria for the regulation of international technology development and transfer
activity which are already well established through multilateral and multi-bilateral
practice.
7.8 Transfer and Development of Technology and Private
Technological Property Rights (Chapter 5)
Some of the obligations envisaged in this part of the Code, according to their
original sponsors, are based either on principles or norms of international socio¬
economic justice (a continuing subject of international legal controversy,804
especially under the soft - hard law debate) or derived from traditional international
law principles. The result is a set of principles whose probable effect is difficult to
assess.
The Code sets forth obligations and duties that are addressed to all "parties"
to international transfer transactions, including States acting under a purely
commercial status (iure gestionis). The Chapter is primarily aims at safeguarding
private property rights against "arbitrary" or discriminatory States action. In return
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for guarantees of fair and transparent treatment by host (and home) States, private
suppliers of technology are:
(a) Required to respond to the economic and social objectives of both the host
and home States;
(b) Observe fair and honest business practices;
(c) Take into account the stage of technological development of the recipient and
technical capability of such party;805
(d) Guarantee, among others, that the technology supplied is suitable for use,
obligations and rights are divisible (including unpackaging of
technology),80* disclosure of any information which would show that
the technology supplied if used in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the proposed agreement would not meet with particular
health and environmental requirements.807
The recipient's duties include:
(a) Respect for "confidential information" during negotiations and performance
of the contract;808
(b) Observance of quality levels agreed upon, preservation and promotion of the
suppliers existing "goodwill";809
The chapter also stresses pre-contractual relations of parties, a stage of the
technology transfer transaction that has increasingly been noted by recipients to be
vital to the determination of consequent entitlements.810
The Code calls on the parties to negotiate in good faith with the aim of
reaching, in a timely manner, agreements based on "fair and reasonable commercial
terms", including the price.811 During the contractual phase (lifetime of the
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contract), the acquiring party is to accord to the supplying party, access to
improvements made to the technology supplied -paragraph 5.4(i). As we saw
above, the LDC's stress that to ensure balance of commitments, the supplier
should provide reciprocal rights to the recipient in return for the right
improvements. The supplier should offer, among others, minimum guarantees of
technical assistance, training of personnel, adaptation, etc.812
7.9 Preferential Treatment for Developing Countries (Chapter 6)
We have already pointed out various ways in which the Code tries to
promote technology transfer to developing countries. The inclusion of the
Chapter in the Code reaffirms the recognition by the negotiating parties of the
obligation to accord preferential treatment to LDC's as technologically unequal
sovereign States.813 However, despite commitments made in principle by
developed countries to promote the extension of international law to the entire
international transfer and development of technology process,814 effective
implementation of agreed principles and standards is curtailed by national
interests.
The Code attempts, at State level, to improve the LDC's bargaining and
negotiating powers vis-a-vis private parties by enlisting home state support.
Developed countries are called upon to, inter alia, facilitate international
technology (development and) transfer through various ways.815 These include:
(i) Facilitating of access to information on availability,
description, locations of technology;
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(ii) Extending help to developing countries in order to enable them
to assess and adapt technology under transfer, especially by giving
access to scientific and industrial research data;816
(iii) Under paragraph 6.1 (ii) and (iii), developed countries are to
promote the transfer of technology which is subject to private
decision making and that which is not, etc.
All such measures, it is assumed, would cumulatively help to reduce the
cost of transfer of technology and increase the technological self reliance of the
recipient country. These goals are to be promoted, inter alia, through the reform
of the legal and other regulatory institutions of developing countries -paragraphs
6.1 and 6.2 (vii).817
Paragraph 6.2 incorporates principles developed under the United Nations
Technical Assistance Programme.818 This implies that contracts for the transfer of
technology must be fairly negotiated, provide for full participation by LDC
nationals. Requests for experts, training of local personnel in research engineering
and design, administration of laws and regulations (especially for environmental
safety protection), project support, etc. are to proceed from the host or recipient
States, which pays the local costs for establishment of the project.819 However,
South - South technology transfer (mutual self help measures) receives little
attention under the Code.
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7.10 International Institutional Machinery, Implementation
(Chapter 8)
The Code negotiations point towards the establishment of a 'framework treaty'
type of Code, that is a Code that would enable the setting up of institutions or
arrangements by or in accordance with which decisions regarding the international
development and transfer of technology can be taken on behalf of all States. Because
of the complicated and dynamic nature of the subject matter under the Code, many
issues will have to be determined in time, according to changing circumstances and
the developing, dynamic relationships between parties. Consequently, the framework
set up under the Code, is a non judicial institutional machinery, that is, an
intergovernmental group of experts who are to act as the institutional machinery
within the UNCTAD frame work, making operating decisions which add to or alter
the rules now being agreed.820 The intergovernmental Committee would in practice,
subsume and expand the functions of the UNCTAD Committee on transfer of
technology.821 Though the Committee's competency would be limited to that of
UNCTAD, the institution of the intergovernmental group would give the new
machinery an international aspect reinforced by consensus. It would therefore be in a
better position to exercise "facilitating pressure" than the existing Committee which
has a very general mandate, though continuity would be achieved and the experiences
of the current Committee passed on to the new body.
The Committee would on formation undertake to, inter alia:
(i) Gather relevant data on transfer of technology and carry out necessary
studies for the promotion of such goals;
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(iii) Assist in the implementation of Board decisions and carry out
coordination activity with other UN agencies:
(iii) Persuade members to undertake appropriate steps to meet their
obligations under the Code;, etc.822 However its activities would not include
any formulation of substantive policy of a juridical nature on any issue, as is
expressly provided for under paragraph 8.2.2 of the Draft Code. The
Committee would also undertake periodic studies and research in order to
provide information to member States and increase exchange of experience,
thus enhancing the application and implementation of the Code's provisions.823
A voluntary intergovernmental procedure for consultation and conciliation824 would
be the main mechanism for the settlement of any disputes as to the interpretation of the Code
provisions due to the lack of any jural authority by the intergovernmental committee. The
Committee would help to disseminate information on agreed international legal principles
and policy relating the development and transfer of technology. Dissemination and
consultation would assist the parties, in addition to the settlement of technology development
and transfer disputes, to harmonise national laws, especially through incorporation of the
agreed standards and principles. The Committee would not be empowered to give hearing to
private parties in their individual or organisational capacity, though past UNCTAD and
United Nations practice points toward the gathering of and dissemination of views, opinions,
etc., by he Committee through consultation with the private parties. Consultation with
private parties is very essential in implementing multilateral Codes of Conduct or guidelines
dealing with new and complex subjects, as past practice indicates, that is application of
international guidelines to private parties can only
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be improved if the Committee's opinions on behaviour or action by an individual
enterprise deemed contrary to the Code or guidelines takes into account the specific
views and practices of such parties.825
7.11 Law Applicable and Settlement of Disputes (Chapter
9)
States have a sovereign right and jurisdictional autonomy to apply legal
regulation to the evaluation, approval, negotiation of contract terms and conditions to
be observed by parties to international technology transfer transactions. In principle,
the consequences of such rights is that technology transfer contracts must not contain
terms or conditions that are contrary to the odre public of the host States826 and
that the host States can require exhaustion of local remedies or exclusive application
of its own laws and regulations to any transaction undertaken on its territory or
within its jurisdiction. However, these rights increasingly have to be exercised in
accordance with international law obligations and duties.
Initially, the theoretical power of States to exercise complete legal control over
international technology transfer transactions underlay the impetus to negotiate and
conclude a Code of Conduct for the transfer of technology, in both home and host
States. Home States, especially for transnational corporations, required a voluntary
Code that would, among others:
(1) Promote transparency in national laws of host States;
(2) Promote non-discriminatory, and equal application of national laws
and regulations to technology transfer transactions;
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(3) Guarantee vfree choice' of law for performance of agreed obligations
and settlement of disputes arising out of technology transfer
transactions;827
(4) Exclude purely commercial aspects of transactions, such as price and
terms of payments from regulation under public policy rules, etc.
For developing countries, the position in relation to choice of law and
settlement of disputes were almost opposite. The major aims of developing
countries on this issue included:
(a) The prevention of v international isation' of contracts for the transfer of
technology, that is, the determination of all rights and obligations
under vfreely' negotiated contracts in a forum selected by the
dominant party when the parties are grossly unequal in bargaining
power.
(b) To ensure that contracts and agreements for the transfer of technology
conformed to national public interest and development (especially
technoeconomic) requirements;
(c) The need to guarantee States autonomous decision making and ability
to pass and enforce its own laws and regulations - the Calvo
Doctrine position - and govern technology transfer transactions by
the law that has the most significant connection or forms the
centre of gravity of the transaction, that is, that of the host States
where the technology development and transfer contract is
performed and on whose territory the effects are felt, etc.828
Though lack of concensus still prevails between the negotiating
groups as to the proper law applicable and the correct forum for
the settlement of disputes arising from technology transfer
transactions, original absolute autonomy positions have been
gradually modified, largely against the developing
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countries.829 Developing countries position shift has not only been due to
weakening of their negotiating and bargaining power but also due to extension of
emphasis beyond performance and post performance rights and duties to include
effective pre-performance of agreed obligations. Consequently, apart from
pecuniary or immediate cost of transferred technology, improved legal and
technological assessment in developing countries now includes other factors such
as the nature of the technology supplied, the ability of the supplier to effectively
transfer technological capacity to the recipient, promotion of specific vital sectors,
environmental and health preservation, etc.830 An increasingly practical
consideration for the compliance with international law in dispute settlement
issues, particularly in the least developed countries, is that of v instrumentality', or
the use by a developed country based technology supplier who holds an arbitral or
other award, of procedures which secure payment from a home State insurance or
export credit scheme.
However, improved participation in contractual forms of technology
transfer, such as joint ventures, co-production and specialisation arrangements,
etc. by developing country nationals, except in the least developed countries, has
reduced the pressures to internationalise contracts. As discussed in Chapter V,
mixed jurisdiction now provides a more practical frame work for the resolution of
issues that may arise under a technology development and transfer contract. The
Code therefore promotes, inter alia, resort to channels that already encourage
application of international law by choice or exhaustion of national remedies, for
example, under United Nations Convention of the Recognition and Reciprocal
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.831
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A tentative conclusion would be that choice of law and mode of dispute
settlement are increasingly less contested between the two groups of negotiating
States, due especially to changes wrought by States practice.
7.12 Conclusion
The need for extension of international legal regulation to cover the entire
international transfer and development of technology process is undoubtedly critical.
The opportunities presented to States, via the Code negotiations, to provide at least
minimum international legal norms and standards, were initially wasted by the
negotiating parties assuming absolutist legal stands, often divorced from States
practice and even already agreed international legal policy and principles. The
stands were antagonistic to the adoption of an instrument capable of promoting the
evolution of a legal regime are largely due to the parties failing to perceive that a
'framework type treaty' is required rather than static treaty law.
Further, because the main negotiations were based on the formulation of a
'treaty law' type of agreement, many issues were erroneously regarded in a static
framework and as requiring permanent legal rules for their resolution. Among those
issues most unsuitable to a static rule approach are:
(i) The conflict of interest between private property holders and LDC host
States, especially with regard to restrictive practices, protection of private
intellectual property rights, price of technology;
(ii) The effect of incorporation of a preferential treatment standard in the code,
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(iii) The effects of " internationalisation of contracts' in regard to
their negotiation, performance, settlement of disputes, etc. or
choice of law and forum;
(iv) The need to avoid institutional machinery with any juridical
powers to admnister the Code's provisions, even though it is a fact
the the Code is not meant to be and cannot stand as a single
instrument for the regulation of the entire gamut of inter
relationships in international development and transfer of
technology transactions;
(v) The need to maintain the "traditional' subjects addressed by
the Code as State actors only;
(vi) The need for a Code that would only contain general
voluntary and nationally implemented rules and standards;
(vii) The extent or scope of any specific duty or duties to be under
taken by home States.
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CONCLUSION
C.l Legal Regulation of Inter State Technology Development and
Transfer - A Global Problem ?
Until recently (post 1970's), technological development and transfer was
viewed as a problem exclusively affecting developing countries, that is, developed
countries viewed it not as a problem of international interdependence but one of
national choices, legal and non legal. However, with continued growth of the
organised international community and the increasing centrality of international
technology development and transfer in inter State relations (basically due to the
central role of technology in national development and growth) the legal responses
to inter State technology development and transfer are increasingly multilateral,
institutionalised and intended to employ the whole gamut of legal intervention
mechanisms such as good offices, mediation, conciliation, consultation,
negotiation, arbitration, litigation and progressive development of law (for
example through framework treaties and State practice in multilateral
organisations).
During the course of this work, we have attempted to illustrate how the
organised international community can extend and has extended legal relations vis-
a-vis non legal or unregulated relations in international development and transfer
of technology. However, though developed countries have in principle undertaken
multilateral commitments which in effect extend legal regulation to inter State
basic technology development and transfer activity, the same States have,
apparently, due to non legal national commitments,832 obstructed the multilateral
and multi-bilateral
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implementation of resultant commitments. Because of this divergence
between multilateral legal and national, essentially non-legal commitments,
developed countries have followed a convenient hard - soft law approach that
facilitates denial of the existence of inconvenient norms or assertion of the
presence of a legal obligation wherever the national interest is not adversely
affected.833 This argument is not rhetorical for we illustrated (Chapter 5) that
developed countries' member to the OECD have developed a quasi- legal
regime with reference to regulation of inter - State transactions between
firms, including the firm's technology development and transfer activity.
Even "new" or proposed legal arrangements among developed countries
themselves reflect this dichotomy between the recognition of
interdependence goals (such as technology development and transfer) whose
fulfilment is a precondition for maintenance of material (and increasingly
juridical) equality between states and national absolutist claims. This point
can be illustrated by reference to the technology development and transfer
arrangements under the proposed "Maastricht Treaty".834
Under the proposed Maastricht treaty research and technological
development provisions, the European Community aims to strengthen the
scientific and technological bases of Community industry and promote its
competitiveness at international level - Article 130f. The legal measures to
achieve this objective would include:
(i) Definition of common standards and removal of legal and fiscal
obstacles to joint technological, research, development and co¬
operation - Articles 130f (2) and Article 130g (b);
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(ii) Co-ordination (inter State) of technology research and
development policy - Article 130 (h)(i);
(iii) Adoption of institutional measures and instruments, that is,
multi annual framework programme to be adopted by the Council
of Europe in order to determine and set objectives - Article 130
(i), disseminate results - 130 (g), determine rules of undertakings,
research centres and universities and lay down the rules governing
the dissemination of research results - Article 130 (j), adopt rules
for governance of dissemination of knowledge and dissemination
of research results by other member States -Article 130 (k) and
promotion of participation in structures (such as joint undertakings
and technological institutions) - Articles 130 (1) and 130 (m).
(iv) The joint undertakings and structures necessary to implement
Community research and development policy would be set up by
the Community - Article 130 (n).
These proposed technological v interdependence' legal measures and
standards, like similar provisions in other areas of the Treaty, aim at promotion of
joint technological development and research within the Community (that is, with
equal participation for all members, guarantied through preferential measures for
the weaker States), are opposed by national interest v commitments' which has
temporarily frustrated implementation of the proposed Treaty goals. This problem
of v conflicting' commitments is magnified in the international multilateral
framework involving developed and developing
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countries, where developed States re-interpret commitments to satisfy non legal
national interests.
The point made immediately above is that promotion of international
technological development and transfer through legal means and within the context
of interdependence, though now a permanent feature of inter State relations, is
obstructed by non legal principles, measures, rules, etc. which reflect
interdependence and balance of commitments, for example, transparency and
accountability, preferential treatment, divisibility of rights and obligations, etc.
The purpose of this work has been to lay out those international legal
principles, standards, institutions, measures, etc. that organised international
society, whose future development and growth is technology centered, has
deployed to promote the transmission of technological and scientific capacities
between States, especially between developed and developing countries. Without
further application of multilateral legal solutions to promote transmission of
technological capacities to LDC's, there would be no achievement of
"
normalcy '835 among States with a resultant future lack of even juridical equality
between LDC's and developed countries, (as indicated by the present lack of
material equality between developed and developing countries), with a consequent
collapse of (the) organised international community.
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C.2 The Multilateral and Multi - Bilateral Legal Responses
to the Problems of Technological inequalities between
states, Evaluation The Traditional Framework
We saw, in Chapter II that the traditional multilateral legal framework
for the regulation of inter - State intellectual property flows, governed
principally under the WIPO administered Conventions, that is, the Paris,
Beme and UCC Conventions, does not operate in accordance with balance
of commitments and consequently entitlements. The imbalance between
rights and obligations of technology owners and LDC's primary development
interests therefore persists. The static traditional treaties therefore fail to
meet the needs a large group of technologically dependent countries. The
principle weaknesses we identified in the regime include:
Patents and related rights
(a) The Paris Convention being inherently aimed at defining (private)
intellectual property rights and standards for their protection vis-a-vis
the primary (technological) development interests of developing
countries and the general public interest, is balanced in favour of
technological rights protection. Consequently, developing countries
are constrained in their sovereign right to, inter alia:
(i) Enforce exploitation of protected rights to ensure technological
development;
(ii) Encourage local innovation, research and development of
technology, by, among others, enforcing local exploitation, for
example, through issue of compulsory licences or excluding from
330
protection of certain "products and processes', prevention of import and local
exploitation of hazardous technologies, etc.
(b) The maintenance of "absolute' and abstract legal principles such as
reciprocity, national treatment, exclusive rights, etc. which
causes, inter alia, virtual absence of provisions or mechanisms in
the Paris Convention to correct technological and material
inequality between States. This encourages, among others,
importation as exploitation, disregard for inequality in bargaining
and negotiating powers between LDC nationals seeking to select,
acquire, adapt or develop foreign owned technology and related
know how, and owners of such rights who are principally,
developed country nationals.836 It also promotes use of indivisible
technological rights, for example, patent, trademark, copyright
industrial designs "packages', general restrictive practices, etc. by
technology owners.
Copyright
(a) The Berne and UCC Convention's provisions on preferential terms of
access for developing countries to intellectual property works, for
example, through compulsory licensing of rights of reproduction
or translation, are defeated by the deliberate complexity of their
provisions which are meant to preserve high levels of protection
for private intellectual property rights. Consequently, unlike the
unlike the ratified Stockholm Protocol, the UCC revised
provisions and the Berne Appendix are conditioned and balanced
against LDC's to the extent that very few developing countries
have been able to use the compulsory licensing or other
"facilitative provisions; found in the Conventions.
some of these and other weaknesses, especially detailed in Chapter II
above, were to be eliminated through further revision of the Conventions.
However, as explained in Chapter VI, developed countries, under largely non
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- legal pressures, have sought to halt or reverse further reform of the WIPO
administered Conventions (thus negating their multilateral commitments and
obligations) by instituting "new" reforms under GATT. The GATT based
reforms are detrimental to developing countries' technology development and
transfer goals because they seek to promote trade related aspects of
intellectual property rights, a development related (commercial) goal, as
overriding technology development and transfer policy of developing
countries, a primary development goal, that is, they require developing
countries to undertake commitments that effectively cause an imbalance in
commitments.
Specifically, the GATT reforms aim, inter alia, at increasing standards
of protection for intellectual property rights, for example, through greater
duration of protection, that is, 20 years and extension of the Paris
Convention's definition of working (currently territorially defined) to include
importation. The reforms would restrict the right of states to determine the
nature and scope of rights they grant by, defacto, linking exercise of
sovereign rights to promote technological growth and development to
international trade, investment, finance and other conditionalities. Thus for
example, use of local trademarks alongside foreign owned marks, which is
illegal under the national law of some technology exporting states, would
render the authorising state liable to "trade measure" retaliation, creating a
condition where techno-economic development in LDC's would be subject to
control by technology exporting states.
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Further, the reforms, by extending periods of non use, uninterrupted or
not, before cancellation of patents, trademarks or other rights (especially by
allowing owners to resort to subjective "valid reasons" to justify non
working) would further restrict developing countries' ability to enforce local
technology development regulations against technology owners who are non
nationals. Such restriction would apply especially to disclosure of inventions,
local working requirements, lack of use or inadequate use of patented
inventions, use of "indivisible rights" packaging and general restrictions on
technology recipients by owners of technological rights.
In short, the reforms, if implemented, would curtail the developing
countries' right to apply the intellectual property system as a "defensive"
mechanism against further restricted international access to industrial
property available in developed countries, a right that is inherent in the
concept of sovereignty and is preserved by territoriality provisions and long
standing practice of all countries. Such an outcome is contrary to the
requirements of interdependence and balanced commitments, that is, because
a country's interest in international protection of fPR's depends largely on
the size of its own intellectual property pool, the contribution of foreign
owned intellectual property (rights) to its techno-economic and social cultural
development as well as the perceived goodwill of other states.
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C.3 The Alternative Option, the Organised
International Legal Community, Progressive
Development of Law and International
Transmission of Technological Capacity to
LDC's
As already noted, we reject the "radical" approach to international legal
problem, that is, the suggestion of alternative "absolute" remedies such as the
mandatory exercise by developing countries of their sovereign powers to
guarantee technological development or the unilateral adoption of legal
measures regardless of their extra- territorial impact or their effect on balance
of commitments and thus entitlements.
We therefore took the approach to new and complex issues that has
progressively been adopted under the organised international community, that
is, the employment of the whole gamut of international legal "intervention"
mechanisms, that is, from good offices, mediation, conciliation, consultation,
arbitration, litigation, and gradual evolution of law to resolve perceived
problems of a multilateral character and impact. These legal measures are
applied through permanent international forums or institutions, with the
intention of effecting the extension of international legal backing towards that
state or states whose claim most accords with interdependence, respect for
sovereignty and preservation of international peace,837 In relation to the
transfer of technological knowledge and skills to developing countries, the
multilateral framework encourages developed countries to pay for
technological knowledge and skill flows to developing countries as a measure
of guaranteeing future international co-operation and peace.
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Consequently, we discussed the legal measures (which are of a multilateral
or multi-bilateral character) that the organised international community has
evolved, within permanent international forums and their interaction with State
practice, to address the need of developing States for technological and scientific
knowledge. These legal measures, institutions, instruments, etc. are not
primarily, meant to promote or enforce legalism or claims of absolute sovereign
or exclusive rights, by any State or private party exporting or importing
technology.
Using the example of the UNDP multilateral framework, we illustrated,
inter alia, that:
(i) Multilateral measures, principles, institutional mechanisms, etc.
are strictly preserved and aimed at promotion of collective
international goals, especially the elimination of technological and
scientific disparities between States, thus promoting future
independence and interdependence of all States, preservation of
international peace, etc. in accordance with the goals of the new
international order.
(ii) Governments "importing' technological know-how and skills
exercise their sovereign rights to safeguard primary developmental
goals, that is, in this context, developmental policy with regard to
acquisition of technological capacity. This goal is achieved by
extending formal legal measures and instruments to the entire
process of request for and offer of multilaterally sponsored
technological knowledge and skill flows, negotiation and
implementation of resulting (international technological co-
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operation) agreements, guarantees of transparency and accountability, adequate
review monitoring and evaluation, equal participation by all parties, etc.
(iii) Promotion of preferential treatment for developing countries
and special measures for the least developed among them to
ensure, inter alia, that LDC's acquire technology without coercion
and terms that mitigate or eliminate bargaining and negotiating
power disparities, for example, by providing a negotiated,
transparent and formal legal framework that regulates the terms
for supply of skills to developing countries by all parties both
public and private, and especially ensure that private party
suppliers of technology participate positively in the technological
development of host States.
(iv) Specific regional, sub regional and national multilateral legal
instruments measures are taken to promote mutual co-operation
and collective self help among member States.
We then showed the extent of incorporation of the various international
legal principles, rules, practices, etc. such as interdependence, equal
participation, transparency, preferential treatment, that have developed under the
framework treaty type arrangements under the programme and its related agencies
practices and decisions relating to international technological co-operation, into
similar arrangements at the regional and sub regional levels such as the Lome
Convention and Andean Pact arrangements.
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Discussion of these arrangements revealed that, in the case of the Lome
Convention arrangements;
(a) Though the legal principles as applied within the multilateral
framework are adopted, in principle, under the Lome technical co¬
operation arrangements, in practice, they are inadequately
implemented to promote technology development and transfer to
ACP States. This arises not out of inherent shortcomings in the
multilateral legal solutions but due to the peculiarities of the Lome
Convention arrangements, that is, the Convention inter alia:
(i) Disguises command relationships under consent and multi-
bilateral consensus, that is, the extreme technological disparity
between the two v partner' groups can only be offset through
comprehensive implementation of the legal measures under
specific " permanent' mechanisms and institutions in which the
ACP States participate equally and effectively.
(ii) Negotiation and implementation of arrangements between two
groups of States with unequal negotiating and bargaining powers
must contain inherent safeguards for the position of the weaker
party. However, under Lome arrangements, ACP states have
access to formal and legally binding channels, for example, to
reject terms and conditions for " aid' set by the EEC. Politically,
the ACP States may however state their case through the joint
institutions, such as the Council of Ministers.
(iii) Through in principle preferential treatment is applied to all
ACP - EEC technological and other co-operation activity, ACP
States are required to offer national treatment to EEC
enterprises,838
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which diminishes the ability of ACP states to influence technology
transfer and development activities of such EEC based enterprises
undertaking Fund supported projects on ACP state's territory or
regulate restrictive practices involving ACP- EEC enterprises, even
if such practices obstruct, inter alia, acquisition of technological
capabilities in the ACP state.839
There are few similar shortcomings under the Andean Pact
arrangements which have more effectively, within a binding sub-regional
framework treaty law, adopted and applied most of the legal principles
adopted within the multilateral framework to promote technological parity
and mutual self help amongst all members, that is, through a joint
technological policy, specific safeguards and preferential measures. The
Andean technological policy has, inter alia, promoted:
(a) Mitigation of bargaining and negotiating power between technology
owners and Andean nationals;
(b) Transactional transparency;
(c) Payment of the correct and adequate price for technology acquired;
(d) More balanced techno-economic growth among the member states,
thus preserving material equality amongst them, with a subsequent
greater preservation of national sovereignties within a framework of
interdependence and co-operation.
However, because the Andean joint technological policy was
implemented jointly with a general foreign investment and international
finance regime containing absolute sovereignty claim aspects, for example, in
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relation to the law applicable to foreign investment, capital or technology
development and transfer transactions being stated as limited exclusively to
national or sub - regional law (referred to as the Calvo Clause),the joint
technological policy was perceived as based on national or sub regional legal
principles contrary to international law. However, those elements of the joint
technological policy that were in conflict with international legal requirements
have gradually been modified to fit international legal requirements for balance of
commitments and thus entitlements.
The modification process of national regulatory regimes through
incorporation of legal principles, standards, minimum rules, etc. developed
through state practice(either widespread or through permanent multilateral forums)
was discussed under Chapter V in which we showed, inter alia, that:
(a) a general principle of balance of commitments, reflecting the wider
principle of inter dependency, now underlies most of all the legal
measures, institutional provisions, standards, rules or practices
that have evolved during the era of organised international law, as
applicable to international transmission of technological capacity
to developing countries. Thus for instance, principles or
standards such as transparency, accountability, preferential
treatment, divisibility of obligations and rights (commonly
referred as unpackaging, re negotiation, etc.)which discernibly
modify the traditional principles of freedom of contract, caveat
emptor, reciprocity, national treatment, non discrimination, or
standards of compensation (the so called Hull formula)^* all
derive from or aim at guaranteeing balance of commitments among
technology exporting and importing States, thus preserving
balance of entitlements between non State parties.
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(b) International law has gradually been extended to cover the entire
technology development and transfer process through:
(i) Separation of primary (technology) development goals (to which
absolute sovereignty applies) from development (technology)
related ones which arc primarily governed under international law.
(ii) Widespread and consistent compliance with transparency
requirements by technology recipient governments, as promoted
through the legal activities of multilateral organisations842 such as
UNDP, UNCTAD, WEPO or the various United Nations agencies
including the World Bank.
(iii) Increased recognition of the need to offer technology to
developing countries on equitable terms and conditions that take
into account negotiating and bargaining gaps. In practice, this has
meant that the majority of developing countries are offered
technology on "fair and favourable terms" and the least developed
among them (which face a greater negotiating and bargaining gap),
are offered special preferential terms.843 However, even though
considered as an issue of inter dependence, the "graduation" of the
most advanced LDC states from preferential treatment, even given a
"sectoral" capacity in a technology by an LDC, is still "beyond"
legal solution. However, taking UNDP practice as a yard stick,
that is, net contributor status, it is suggested that preferential
treatment may only be modified and not "eliminated" from
international technology development and transfer activity involving
advanced developing countries.
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(iv) Incorporation of multilaterally developed legal principles,
mechanisms, measures, etc. into national regimes has resulted into
the development of a mixed jurisdiction regime that is
substantively different in content and operation from the direct
regulation statutes regime which was inherently absolute
sovereignty based.
We concluded, inter alia, that the above process of incorporation through
state practice has created more than candidate rules for future legal recognition,
that is, the rules, standards, instruments, principles, etc. as they have evolved
already form quasi legal norms, recognised as binding in practice. If extension of
the rules, standards, principles, etc. as set out above were to follow the logical
pattern of the norm formulation in organised international community, that is, the
legal standards, rules, principles, etc. which are shown to be widespread**^ are
incorporated into treaties, conventions or multilateral agreements; the formulation
of an international legal and comprehensive document for the regulation of
international technology development and transfer is natural. It is for this reason
that we found a discussion of the Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology
Negotiations, as a current and future logical step, inevitable.
The Code on Transfer of the technology would meet the need for
extension of international legal regulation to cover the entire international
technology development and transfer process. However, as stated above, legal
development towards a Code has been slowed principally by:
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(i) Developing country's initial insistence on a 'static' treaty law
approach which fails to take into account the dynamic nature of international
technology development and transfer relationships;
(ii) Developed country's rejection of a Code that provides a universal
framework of legal rules and principles that contain normative flexibility and
are institutionally 'continuously' implemented. The developed country's
preferred 'voluntary based' Code would not meet the requirement that balance
of commitments and interdependence be the starting points of reference for
any legal provisions in this area.
The Code on transfer of technology is meant to meet the need for
extension of international legal regulation to cover the entire international
technology development and transfer process, that is, it is to be implemented
as a 'framework treaty law or agreement'. As stated above, all states have
now accepted the need to finalise such a 'framework treaty type' of Code.
A Code implemented as a 'framework treaty' type agreement or
arrangement allows for flexible decision making and adjustment of agreed
rules in accordance with complex dynamic relationships and requirements.
Implementation of the Code would be within an inter-governmental
institutional machinery. Such machinery, even if of a merely quasi-legal
character, would administer the 'framework' Code's provisions in a way that
would be indispensable to the continuous evolution of rules, procedures and
standards compatible with the legal regulation of complex and dynamic
international technology development and transfer of technology transactions.
Further, the Code 'institutional forum' would facilitate the gradual resolution
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of issues of such a nature of legal participation by non traditional subjects of
international law in a technology development and transfer regime, the nature of
implementation of the Code rules and standards, for example, to guarantee that the
technology "transferred' is adequately assimilated by recipients, adequate
remunerated for technological rights owners, the extent of enforcement of any
specific duty to be undertaken by home or host states, etc. Such an institutional
framework would also facilitate legal interpretation of effects of Code related
international activity, what specific or general practices are contrary to the
promotion of international transmission of technological capacity, etc. while
providing a "permanent' forum for discussion, monitoring of technology
development and transfer related activity, dissemination of information, etc.
Lastly, a permanent institutional forum based on guaranteeing balance of
entitlements and promotion of interdependence, would help to prevent
unilateralism, including linkage of technology development and transfer, to
international market access and international trade measures, thus promoting the
eventual attaining of technological "normalcy' among States.
C.4 Summary of Conclusions
This work illustrates that technology is indeed now a separate and central
factor in national and international development. We have argued that when
technology transfer is defined as sale of technological processes, products, etc.
there is often no actual effective transfer or development in
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the host state. The acquisition of a technological capacity by the recipient is the
full and effective incorporation of the supplied technology by the recipient,
enabling such recipient not only to apply the technology usefully, but to adapt and
innovate on it if necessary, thereby making the recipient independent of the
supplier in regard to that particular level of technology.
The traditional international multilateral intellectual property legal regime
has proved inadequate in responding to the needs of a large group of
technologically under developed States because of the weaknesses set out above.
To bring this regime in line with the needs of a technologically interdependent
international community, several issues must be addressed. The major ones
include the need to incorporate the principle of balance of commitments when
considering traditional issues such as balance between protection of intellectual
property rights and the "developmental interest' of the host states, such as the
need by those states to create special intellectual property regimes for particular
sectors, develop specific product or process categories, enforce working of
granted rights or make provision for grant of special patent rights to nationals.
Such development interests are different from the development related aspects
such as royalty payments, repatriation of such royalties, piracy, distributorships ,
counterfeiting, etc. as noted above. Preferential treatment, must be fully
incorporated into the framework of the conventions as a minimum legal
requirement and not as a voluntary choice for intellectual property owners. The
standard of preferential treatment should accord with the level of technological
development of the recipient country. Such a course, maintained over time will
concretise the
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current multilaterally inspired effort by developing countries to fully conform their
national legal systems to international law requirements.
Because of the methodological approach, we did not ignore the complex
factors linked to the acquisition of technological capacity by developing countries.
We therefore noted the link between publicly and privately sponsored international
technological flows and the surrounding issues such as those of the new
international order, that is, environmental concerns, the role of technology in
development and maintenance of political and economic independence, the role
and effect of international trade on developing countries' acquisition of
technological capacity, etc. Specifically, we were able to trace the link between
multilaterally developed legal principles, standards, procedures, procedures, etc.
and national, sub-regional and regional state practice in relation to acquisition of
technological skills from extra territorial sources.
The major new general principle that has out of international organisation
and national state practice in relation to acquisition of technological capacity is the
balance of commitments principle^5 which requires state parties, inter alia, vis-a¬
vis to exercise good faith, prevent unjust enrichment and/or extra-territorial abuse
of rights by nationals, for example, by supplying dangerous or obsolete
technologies or using general restrictive practices. Further, the principle would
require home states as part of their undertaking to promote access by all countries
to advances in science and technology, to assist developing countries, especially
the least developed to acquire a technological capacity in relevant technologies,
through offer of preferential treatment in accordance with the level of
technological development of each country. Developing countries are to conform
their national laws and regulations to international law, that is, provide transparent
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technology development and transfer regimes, offer non discriminatory treatment
to non nationals and allow them to fully participate in the technological
development of the host state as part of joint international technological co¬
operation, etc. In short, the principle calls for equality of overall commitments,
as legally determined.
Within this framework, the conflict between private party technology
owners and host states becomes muted, since standards of treatment are
multilaterally determined and legal settlement of disputes is available through
multilaterally determined channels. The determination of rights and obligations is
therefore multilaterally moderated, instead of being undertaken through traditional
absolute laissez-faire legal principles such as freedom of contract, caveat emptor,
etc. International technology transfer practice has shown that the modification of
the traditional principles without violating private rights is guaranteed through the
joint international (organisation) host state implementation of multilaterally agreed
principles (mixed jurisdiction). The use of such joint implementation has resulted,
in addition to the modification of traditional principles, in the creation of new
terms and channels by private parties involved in international technology
development and transfer. These new channels and terms show that private
parties have responded to their state's recognition of the existence of new
international technological conditions and new international obligations relating to
technology. Taken as a whole, an international legal regime is gradually
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concretising, extending to deal with the problem of transmission of
technological and scientific 'systematic' knowledge to all countries, especially
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enhanced ability of states to understand the nature of the otherwise complex international
technology development and transfer transactions.
35. The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine by Gordley James, Clarendon Press,
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Nations. 4th edition 1949, at p. 62; Hudson , Article 24 of the Statute of the
International Law Commission , United Nations Doc. A/CN.4/16, rep [1950] 2 Year
Book of the International Law Commission, 24, 26, United Nations DOC.A/CN.4
Ser....A/1950/Add. 1.
50- North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. V Den: Ger V Neth) 1969 I. C.L 2. 41
51- Though the two elements of opinio juris and consistency seem necessary, under
unorganised international practice, they always seemed to conflict , a problem still
encountered by jurists insisting on consistent evolution as the standard for judging
existence without taking into account the changed nature of inter - Stale
communication through permanent multilateral institutions, which among others,
speeds the dissemination and adoption of uniform multilateral rules, standards,
procedures, etc.
52. For the reduction in value of the time element, see Cheng, United Nations
Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant Customary Law? 5 Indian Journal of
International Law 23,35 (1965); Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 Recueil Des
Cours 25, 44 (1970).
53. The principles of international law are the product of the collective consent of states
in the norm creation process - The Lotus Case. France V Turkey (1927) P.C.I.J
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The standard of general consent is not absolute and general uniformity of the views of all states or
the dissent of a single state is insufficient to prevent the creation of custom. However, the practice
in question should be uniform among states which should mutually regard recurrence of such
practice as the result of a compulsory rule; See Judge Negulesco Dissenting Opinion in the case of
jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14 at 105
(advisory Opinion of December 8).
54. According to D'Amato, since there is no metaphysically precise (such a seventeen repetitions) or
vague (such as - in the Court's Discretion -) answer possible [and] States simply do not organise
their behaviour along absolute lines [having] no international constitution specifying when acts
become law; states resort to international law in claim - conflict situations when they attempt to
cite as many acts [instances of] as possible to prove the existence of the custom - See A. D' Amato,
The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971).
55. According to Kennedy, in increased emphasis upon individual consent increasingly identifies
custom with treaties, see Kennedy, in International Law and World Order opcit. note 39 at 305;
T.O. Elias, The International Court of Justice and some contemporary problems (1983) at p.
235.
56. Friedrich Kratochwil, Thyrasmmachos Revisited - On the Relevance of Norms and the Study of
Law for International Relations, In International Law. Editor Martti Koskenniemi, opcit. not 39, at
p.55. In Trendtex Trading Corp V Central bank of Nigeria [1977] Q.B. 529, Lord Denning noted
that rules of international law change and international law knows no rule of stare decis.
57. See for instance, Dr. Khan, International Right to Development, in Science Technology and
Development. Journal of the Third World Science, Technology and Development Forum, Volume
17, No. 1, August 1989 at p. 12; Does anyone still ask the question 'is international Law really
Law', by Robert MacLean, in The Juridical Review. The Law Journal of Scottish Universities,
1991, @. Green, Publishers, Edinburgh, pp. 230-249.
58. Friedrich Kratochwil, Thyrasmmachos Revisited - On the Relevance of Norms and the Study of
Law for International Relations, In International Law. Editor Martti Koskenniemi, opcit. note 39,
at p. 49; also - Dworkin, Taking Rights seriously, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
59. See Dr. Koskenniemi, opcit., note 14, at p. 6.
60. The United Nations lies at the centre of this network of new and complex legal inter-State
relationships. Despite disclaimers to the contrary, no single comprehensive international or
multilateral body lacks a legal link to the United Nations.
61. According to Koskenniemi, Inter dependency posits a causal law (E.g. of economic behaviour or
environmental degradation) that makes it possible to over rule statehood, See Theory and the
Practitioner, opcit. note 14; The ICJ lists, as the most important standards of inter - State
relations:
(i) Non - use of force;
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(ii) Non - intervention;
(iii) Self - defence;
(iv) Respect for Sovereignty :
See US Military and Para Military Activities Case. ICJ Reports 1986, 97, para's 183
- 215.
62. The norms formed through this process have variously been reffered to, inter alia, as
recommendatory norms - See Grigory I Tunkin, International Law and Other
Social Norms Functioning Within the International System, in Contemporary
Problems of International Law - Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenbergcr,
edited by Bin cheng and E. D Brown, London, 1988; The Political Economy of Law,
opcil note 32, at p. 406.
63. Is International I .aw Really I .aw. by Anthony D ' Amato, in Martti Koskenniemi,
(editor) opcit. note 39.
64. Code on the Transfer of Technology - Preamble.
65. Frequently, especially in the least developed countries, the factor of mistake may
often be assumed to be a failure of the recipient (who is often inadequately informed)
and the loss lies where it falls.
66. See Chapter V for a discussion of the relationship between state practice and
evolution of and international legal regime for the regulation of international
development and transfer of technology.
67. The negotiation or performance gap of a specific country may be indicated by the
level of intellectual or industrial property rights held by nationals vis a vis non
nationals. See Table B, annexed.
68. The World Intellectual Property Organisation is a specialised agency of the United
Nations, established under the Stockholm Convention of 14 th July 1967 [herein after
WIPO]; Other reform efforts (regarded as parallel or even contrary to WIPO
reforms by many developing countries) are currently under way in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) see chapter 4 of present work.
69. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and artistic Works (1886), completed
at Paris (1896), revised at Berlin (1908), completed at Berne (1914), revised at Rome
(1928), Brussels (1948), Stockholm (1967), Paris (1971), Universal Copyright
Convention (1952) revised at Paris 1971.
70. See Chapter VI of Current Work.
71. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), as revised at
Brussels (1890), Washington (1911), The Hague(1925), London (1934), Lisbon
(1958) and Stockholm (1967) amended in 1979, with 100 members as of the 1st., of
August 1989. For an outline of the main features of the Convention, see The Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, main features and revision,
National Seminar on Industrial Property, WIPO/Kla../89/16, 1989; World
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Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO Background, Reading Material on
Intellectual Property 1988.
72. See Chapter III of this work.
73. For discussion of this concept, see Legal Features of Multi-bilateral Aid by Sergio
Marchisio in The Italian Year Book of International Law, Volume 7, 1986 - 1987. In
this work, this term is applied only to regional or inter regional arrangements and is
not taken to include purely multilateral arrangements such as those under UNDP.
74. See Chapter V of this current work for discussion of the incorporation of the
multilaterally evolved requirements for transparency and the impact of the principle
on the clarification of the 'mixed jurisdiction' concept and its meaning in relation to
legal regulation of international transfer and development of technology.
75. Technology Transfer Mechanisms in the United Kingdom and Leading
Competitor Nations, Innovation Working Party, National Economic Development
Council, 1989 p. 11 - 17.20; He Changing Technological Scene Trends in Selected
Developing Countries prepared by International Industrial Licensing Consultants,
United Nations IPCT. 138 (SPEC) at p. 101 - 106.
76. See - Transnational Corporations in World Development, Trends and Prospects,
UNCTC, ST/CTC/89, 1988, p. 178, (UN, New York) and Table 1.
77. WIPO Licensing Guide.
78. WIPO ; Licensing Guide..: Also, Workshop on Industrial Property Rights in Joint
Venture Arrangements, held in China, Lecture No. 2 - Methods for the Commercial
Transfer and Acquisition of Technology and their Relationship to Joint Venture
Arrangements, Lecture prepared by the International Bureau of the World
Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO DOC. WO/BW/2, Geneva, October 1982.
79. Report of the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for
Development, Vienna August 1979 , New York, United Nations; see Chapter VII of
the Vienna Programme of Action on Science and Technology for Development,
p.48, para 1; Science and Technology in Developing Countries, Proceedings of a
Conference held at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, December 1967,
Cambridge University Press, 1969, at pp.493 - 519, especially at p.570.
80. Traditional Foreign Investments constituted principally of : Concession agreements,
extra-active ventures or exports of capital. See Chapter V of current work for a brief
discussion of a few of the issues involved in the regulation of Foreign Investments
debate.
81. S e Chapter Seven of current work.
82. Para. 1.2, TD/Code TOT/47, Chapter 1.
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held at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, December 1967, Cambridge
University Press, 1969, at pp.493 - 519, especially at p.570.
84. See for instance, International Right Iq Development by Dr.K .R. Khan, in Science.
Technology and Development. Journal of the Third World Science, Technology and
Development Forum, vol. 7, No.l, August 1989 at p.15.
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on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, of the Committee on the
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Representatives, 101st- Congress, Second Session, testimony of Dr. James W.
Curlin.
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113. GATT or WIPO, quoting view of United States - Japanese - European Industry, at
p.91.
114. For a discussion of the economic rights of intellectual property holders vis a vis host
states, see, inter alia : WIPO, Sixth Consultative Meeting on the Revision of the
Paris Convention, Geneva, WIPO .Doc. PR/CM/Vi/1, 1989; Multilateral Trade
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152. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and artistic Works (1886),
completed at Paris (1896), revised at Berlin (1908), completed at Berne (1914),
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190. The view of copyright as a freely alienable economic right is in line with United
States statutory and common law - See Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1987. Hearings, opcit, p.83.
191. Article 8, Beme Convention.
192. See for instance, Information Technology. The Challenge to Copyright. London,
1984, Protecting and Exploiting New Technology and Designs, Keith Hodkinson,
London, 1987.
193. Article II (1) of Berne Appendix.
194. Article V ter of the UCC (1971) and Article II of Appendix - See Ricketson opcit at
pp.611 -613.
195. UCC Article V; Berne Article 11(1).
196. UCC Article V; Beme Article II (2).
197. See Bogsch - Commentary to Article V, The Law of Copyright under the UCC,
Leyden, New York, 1964 especially p.64.
198. 1 World Intellectual Property Report 1987 at pp. 3 - 5.
199. Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Uruguay Round MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/12 (1987)
para. 39; Copyright Bulletin, 1982 at p. 8 - 9, Article V ,er UCC (1971) and Berne
Article II (9) (a).
200. UCC (1971), Article V and V ter <]); Beme Appendix Article II (2) (a).
201. UCC (1971), Article V ter 1(b) ; Articles II (2) (b) and II (3) (a) of the Berne
Appendix.
202. UCC 1971, Article V ter (1) (b), Article II (3) (b) of the Beme Convention (1971).
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of Beme Paris Act 1971.
204. UCC 1971, Article V ter (4); Beme Appendix Article II (4) (a) (ii) and Article IV (2)
of Beme Paris Act 1971.
205. UCC 1971, Article V ler (6) and Article II (6) Beme Appendix.
206. See David Ladd - Copyright and the International Technological Environment,
17 Copyright Bulletin 1983 at p.21.
207. UCC (1971) Article V 9uater and Article III of Beme Appendix.
208. See Riketson, ocpit, at p. 649, for a discussion of issues relating to the determination
of a reasonable or normal price, especially given sometimes extreme differences in
value of hard and soft currency, the effects of monopolistic activities on the part of
overseas or local publishers or distributors etc.
209. UCC (1971), Article V 9uater; Beme AppendjXi Article III (2) (a).
210. Beme Appendix, Article III (3) (i).
211. 17 Copyright Bulletin, 1983 at p.8.
212. UCC (1971), Article V ter 4 (a), 4 (b) and V quater 1 (f) and 2 (a) ; Beme Appendix
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214. UCC (1971) Article V ter (4) (c) ; Beme Appendix, Article 4 (c); see Article II and
III of Beme Appendix for exceptions to ban on export of reproductions and
translations respectively.
215. 20 Copyright Bulletin, 1986, at pp. 15 - 20.
216. The suggestion of such reversal is very strong in the current trade related "reforms"
of the international intellectual property system under GATT - See, Appropriate
International Forums. Meeting lh£ Challenges cf ih£ World Information Economy.
Geza Feketekuty and Jonathan D. Aranson, Advance Technology Alert System
(ATAS), Centre for Science and Technology Development, United Nations, New
York, 1986; Technology. Trade Policy and the Uruguay Round. Papers presented at a
Round Table at Delphi, Greece, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development - UNCTAD, Doc.ITP/23, United Nations, new York, 1990;
Technology Selection. Acquisition and Negotiation. UNCTAD Doc.ITP/TEC/22.
217. For discussion of North - South Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, see
Chapter 4 of present work. Also WIPO Licensing Guide for Developing
Countries, WIPO, Geneva 1977; Technology Transfer Mechanisms in lite United
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Kingdom and Leading Competitor Nations Innovation Working Party, National
Economic Development Council, 1989, pp. 11-17.
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE
218. This formal feature, in which the history of international technical co-operation
programmes existed before only in an informal way under the "Colombo Plan",
distinguishes, more than any other feature, the UNDP technical co-operation
arrangements form those offered under other multilateral treaties such as the LOME
Convention arrangements of the Andean Pact - See Chapter IV of this Work.
219. The Governing Council rejected graduation of members or co-operating States in
1970, See Portrait of the United Nations Development Programme, 1950 - 1985,
UNDP, New York, 1985, atp.21.
220. Schachter in 1976 pointed out that what was striking about the concept of co-
responsibility or sense of obligation was that "
it is not so much its espousal by the large majority of poor and
handicapped countries but the fact that it has been accepted ...
by the more affluent countries to whom the demands are
addressed as evidenced by (i) assistance to LDC's (ii)
concurrence in resolutions;
See O. Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law, 1976, pp.4-10; However, developed countries have
largely resisted this sense of obligation. According to Dr. Herbert : A sense of
obligation has won its way in the world to the effect that a wealthy country has a call
of vague dimensions to provide means to assist poorer countries. [But] to give free
admission to (it) would bankrupt us and demoralise others; [though] to ignore the
obligation wholly would be out of accord with the effort in which we are engaged, to
bring together the nations of the world in peaceful and co-operative understanding -
See International Economic Outlook, Proceedings of the Academy of Political
Science, New York 1953, at p. 53. Development, Human Rights and The Rule of
Law, Report of the Conference held in the Hague, on 27th. April - May 1981,
International Commission of Jurists, Pergamon Press (1981) for detailed discussion
of the evolution of the right development as an international right. The basic goal of
UNDP technical co-operation is to establish and/or promote, among others :
Technological capacity self sufficiency, among LDC's through maximisation of
external resources use while also encouraging Technical Co-operation among
developing countries (TCDC) as well as proper "partnership" between newly "self-
sufficient" countries and the established developed countries. See Technical
Assistance in Brief, United Nations Department of Information, New York, 1954;
Report of the United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation Among LDC's
1978, Buenos Aires, A/Conf/79/13/rev.l, New York, 1978, s.8.
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221- See Governing Council decisions DP/1989/5, and DP/1988/70, 34th. Session and
87/25 of 19 June 1987, 88/8 of 19 February 1988 and 88/31 of lst\ July 1989.
222- The EPTA was established under GAR 304 (iv), of 16 Nov. 1949 and was to involve
other members of the United Nations family, and was to be financed by a special
fund and was to be administered by the Technical Assistance Council and Board.
The Programme was carried out jointly by the United Nations, the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) , the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United
Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the
World Health Organisation (WHO), the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU). EPTA was financed
by the voluntary contributions of the Member states of either the United Nations or
the participating Specialised Agencies, a mode of financing which has been
diversified under the UNDP, See The Structure of United Nations Economic Aid to
I Inderdeveloped Countries by Kirdar U, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; The
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic Development of
Underdeveloped Countries, TABl/Rev.4, The EPTA, UN 1964, Sales No.64.II.H.2.
223- World Trade and Development Report, UNCTAD/TDR/7, 1987, at p.92.
224- Firs? United Nations Development Decade at Mid-Point, appraisal by the Secretary
General, United Nations, New York 1965.
225- The TAB was established by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC)
on recommendation by ECOSOC under resolution 222A(ix) which invited the ACC
to set up the Board, subject to General Assembly approval. The participating
agencies included the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration
(UNTAA) as the UN organ within the UN secretariat established to administer
technical assistance in fields not covered by other agencies or falling positively
within the scope of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)-For a detailed analysis of the juridical nature and functioning of the of the
TAB, See , The Structure of United Nations Economic Aid to Underdeveloped
Countries by Kirdar U, The Hague pp.30-63; and The World Bank since Bretton
Woods: The Origins, Policies, Operations and Impact of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Developmen, by E. S. Mason and R. E Asher, 1973, Washington,
D.C. Brookings Institution, at pp.564-565.
226- The Structure of United Nations Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries. Uner
Kirdar, opcit. pp.25-28. 32. Note 5, pp.49-50; citing Article 1, Sect.l of the Revised
Standard Agreement, UNTS, Vol. 189, p. 11.
227- For analytical discussion of the concept of Standard form Contracts in national legal
systems, see Slawson W. David, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
I ,aw Making Power. Harvard L.R, Jan 1971, Vol.84 (1) pp.529-566; Trebilock,
Michael J, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post Benthamite
Economics in the House q[ Lords. U Tor. LJ, Fall 1976, Vol.26(4), pp.359-385;
Kronhauser, Lewis. A, Unconsionahilitv in Standard Forms. Cal. LR, Sept. 1976,
64(5) pp.1151-1183; Kesseler, Friedrich, Contracts of Adhesion, Some Thoughts
about Freedom of Contract. Col. LR, July 1943, Vol.43(5), pp.629-642; Goldberg
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Victor. P, Institutional Change and the Quasi Invisible Hand - J Law & Ec, October
4 1974 Vol.17(2) pp.461-492.
228- See Article VI sect. 2 of the Standard Agreement under EPTA, cited by UNER,
opcit. at p.53.
229- For a discussion of the controversial concept of unequal treaties, see for instance -
Unequal Treaty 1898 - 1997. China. Great Britain and Hong Rone's New Territories,
by Peter Wesley - Smith, Oxford University Press 1980, rep. 1983.
230- Second Session of ECOSOC, Official Records, A\rsi session, supp.No.l l.A, June
1966 at para 178.
231- The country programme, which formed the basis for EPTA disbursal of assistance to
a recipient country was the sum total of the number of expert advisors, consultants,
trainers and fellowships, which could be financed each year out of the country's
share of global "programme" resources, resources which could be deployed among
those fields of activity which the recipient government considered most beneficial,
Fifteen Years and 15Q.QQQ skills. An Anniversary Review of ih£ United Nations
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, prepared by the Technical Assistance
Board, UN, NY 1965, E/TAC/153 REV.l, P.41.
232- The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, Uner opcit, P. 14.11. Potrait of
the United Nations Development Programme, 1950-1985, New York 1985, p.13.
233- Developing countries were often able to achieve parity with develop countries in
international forums because of numerical strength and decision making by
consensus or a two thirds majority.
234- For discussion of regional (bilateral - multilateral arrangements) see Chapter IV of
this work.
235- See U.N.J.Y.B 1974 at p.25, quoted in Legal Problems oflnteraational Organisations
by Felice Morgenstem, University of Cambridge, Research Center for International
Law, Grotious, Pub. ltd. 1986.
236- For detailed analysis of the SUNFED proposals, See Report on the Special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development, E/2381 (Nov.18, 1953), UN Sales
No.1953 II.B.l; Uner, opcit at pp.202-224; The Issue of Capacity of Developing
Countries to absorb Technical Assistance, UN Technical Assistance Committee, 5th
report of the TAB, ECOSOC Official Records, 16th Session, supp. No. 10, E/2433.
237- See GAR 724 (VIII) A.
238- For a detailed account of EPTA and UNSF, see The Structure of United Nations
Econoinic-Aid 1q Underdeveloped Countrie^ by Uner Kirdar , The Hague Martinus
Nijhoff 1966.
239- See Second Session, June 1966, Ecosoc, Official Records, 41 rst. Session, supp.
No.llA at Para.232. The main functions of the Special Fund were:
(i) Surveying available resources and their economic potential for development
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(ii) Strengthening or establishment of applied research institutes;
(iii) Promotion of better use of local materials and improvement of production
techniques;
(iv) Establishment of Training Institutes;
See - The United Nations Development Decade at Mid-Point, appraisal by Secretary
General, United Nations, New York 1965 p. 13. In a Governing Council Debate a
delegate expressed the view that Developing Countries, through the Fund, were,
among other things, "subjugated to private capital from abroad, which constantly
sought outlets for its industries and went on to allege that "the establishment of the
Special Fund had been designed to paralyse efforts to set up a special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development, and the Special Fund's links with private
capital were aimed at facilitating the exploitation of developing countries by
monopoly capital"', ECOSOC Official Records, 41rst Session, June 1966, Supp.
No.l 1A, 2nd Session, para 232.
240- The term "conditionality", largely employed in reference to the International
Monetary Fund Policies, was not defined in the original IMF Articles and is not a
legal term of art, but describes a set of policies with no absolute standard. Under the
first Amendment the objective of IMF policy was given under Article 5, S.3 (c) as
inter alia, to assist member states to resolve Balance of Payments in a manner
consistent with the purposes of the Fund and safeguard Fund resources. This policy
has been frequently criticised not only for confusing "instruments" with "targets" but
also for adopting policies and programs "carved in stone", which inter alia, assumed
optimal growth rates, optimal expenditure distribution between the public and
private sectors, lack of foreign exchange constraints on economies and optimal
income distribution in recipient countries. On these "rigid" assumptions, the IMF
offers technical assistance to requesting countries undertaking its programs,largely
if such states are seeking to implement advice already given by the Fund e.g
structural reform programs that the recipient country is embarking upon with
financial resources made available under the IMF extended Fund facility. The
country receiving assistance should have demonstrated ability on earlier occasion(s)
to absorb Fund Technical assistance. Lastly, it may be noted that such
conditionalities are imposed under Standby Agreements under which the Fund can
ensure "efficient" use of its resources without the recipient having any significant
power to negotiate the conditions of use of the resources that is the Standby
Agreement, is not a multilateral instrument neither is it governed by international
law but by the law of the Fund. See IMF Conditionalitv: Ineffectual Inefficient.
mistargeted by John Spraos, International Finance Section, Essays in International
Finance, No. 166, Dec. 1986 at p.27; Criteria for IMF Technical Assistance, Pamphlet
Series, No.30, IMF Washington 1979 at p. 16, Conditionality. by Joseph Gold,
Pamphlet Series, No.31, IMF, Washington 1979 at p.2; Bretton Woods Revisited.
Evaluations of the IMF and the IBRD, Conference Papers, Queens University,
Canada, ed. Keith Acheson, J.F Chant and Martin.F.J.Prachowny, Mcmillan 1972;
The World Bank Since Bretton Woods. Opcit. at pp. 539-41.
241- Under the agreement between the United Nations and die Bank, the Bank
maintained the need for its independence and autonomy as an international
organisation by virtue of, among others, "the nature of its international
responsibilities and the terms of its articles of Agreement" and confidential
information "which would otherwise interfere with the orderly conduct of its
operations" would be with held by the Bank. The Bank"s institutions would accord
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only due "consideration" to the inclusion on their agendas of items proposed by the
United Nations etc. See Agreement Between United Nations and the World Bank,
IBRD, Second Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Proceedings, (sept.11-17,
1974) pp.25-27.The Bretton Woods institutions were often accused of taking little or
no recognition of the importance of economic development or trade as an engine of
economic growth. According to Mr. Robert MacNamara, the World Bank criteria in
disbursing a loan were (i) A loan must meet a high priority development requirement
in the recipient country (ii) There must be a high rate of return (never less than
10%)(iii) There must be a clear indication of repayment - International Energy
Negotiations...at p.41.According to the International Labour Organisation, much of
the World Bank's freestanding 1 echnical Assistance will probably continue to linked
to structural adjustment and other policy related activities - See, The Role of the ILO
in Technical Co-operation. International Labour Conference. 73rd Session, 1987,
report Vi at p.10. Thus many LDC"s objected to the Jackson Report's
Recommendation of the use of the World Bank as the chief arm of the United
Nations system in the field of capital investment, in spite of the Bank"s use of
weighted voting and limited membership and sourcing of funds from private
investors who wished to secure high interest rates contrary to developing country
interests See UNDP Report of the Governing Council, 9th. Session, ECOSOC, Supp.
No.6, United Nations, Jan. 1970, para 105; A Study of ihe Capacity of ihe United
Nations Development System , by Jackson, vol.1 at p.21.
242- Under Article 57(1) of the United Nations Charter, the various specialised agencies,
established by inter governmental agreement and having wide international
responsibilities, as defined in their basic agreements, in economic, social, cultural,
educational, health and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the
United Nations in accordance with provisions of Article 63. However, under Article
63, the ECOSOC may enter into agreements with any of the agencies reffered to in
Article 57 that is specialised agency, defining the terms on which the agency
concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations.The IMF
Agreement Between the United Nations and IMF of 15th. Nov. 1947 making the
IMF a specialised agency simultaneously gave independent status to the Fund in its
operational mandate since "by reason of the nature of its international responsibilities
and the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Fund is and is required to function as
an independent organisation - See the Third World and Decision Making in the IMF
by Tyronne Ferguson at p.58.Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development - Dec 27, 1945, Amended Dec. 17, 1965, Article
l(i)The Purposes of the Bank are: (i) To assist in the reconstruction and
development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for
productive purposes, including the restoration of economics destroyed or disrupted by
war, the re-conversion of productive facilities for peacetime needs and the
encouragement of the of the development of productive facilities and resources in
less developed countries.Though the Bank has evolved into a development
institution, the implementation of this role has been limited by-
(a) limitation on membership that is the East European Countries were largely
excluded
(b) the application of narrow criteria that is the "efficiency based" approach to
development
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(c)Weighted Voting, Article III, S.8 (a) : The Bank, within the terms of this
Agreement, shall co-operate with any general international organisation and with
public international organisations having specialised responsibilities in related fields.
Any arrangements for such co-operation which would involve a modification of any
provision of this agreement may be effected only after amendments to this Agreement
under Article V (iii).
243. The United N tions and Domestic Jurisdiction of States. Interpretations and
Applications of the Non-intervention Principle , by Goronwy. J. Jones, Cardiff 1979, at
pp. 200 - 205.
244. The Structure of United Nations Aid to Unde developed Countries, opcit, at p. 219.
245. Uner Kirdar, opcit, cites reservations to Basic Agreements as having been made by
Yugoslavia, Turkey, Vietnam, Lebanon, Thailand, Laos, Ethiopia, Netherlan Is,
Brazil, China and Egypt - at p.219.
246. The United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction Of States , at pp.200 -204. In practice,
decision; were made by consensus.
247. Under United Nations General Assembly 2029 (xx) para.2 : re-affirmed the continuity
of principles, in relation to relevant UNDP activity, which had governed the EPTA
and UNSF, if such principles were not inconsistent with the present resolution. Basic
principles Go erning the. EFTA were set out in ECOSOC Resolution 222A (IX),
Annex 1 a: d ior Special Fund in Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) part B(l) (II) (IV)
(V) para. 31 - 33. The continuity of the Basic principles from the two Agencies by
UNDP has been highly successful. The Governing Council of the UNDP which
constitutes the legislative arm of the programme, preserves the basic principles
through the maintenance and observance of the principles of Universality,
Voluntariness and Grant nature of assistance, Multilateralism and equality of
members, respect for self-determination, and rejection of "cross - conditior.alities"
form other multilateral or bilateral financing institutions and agencies, See UNDP
Report of the Governing Council, 15th. Session ECOSOC, Supp. No.2, 1973, para. 31.
248. Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme. Report on the
Organisational Meeting for 1989. The Special Session and 36th. Session, ECOSOC,
Official records, 1989, E/1989/32, Supp. No. 13.
249. Report of the United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among the
Developing Countries. Buenos Aires. 1978 UN Doc. A/Conf/79/13/Rev.l; UNDP,
from 1950 - 1985, at p.69.
250. The United Nations General Assembly during its 20th. Session, December 1965,
having considered the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
recommendation contained in Resolution 1020 (XXXVII) of August 1964 which
approved the merger of the United Nations Special Fund (UNSF) and the Expanded
Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) into a single body, passed Resolution
2029 (XX) at its 20th. Session to allow the merger.
27
251. See 20th. Session , Official Records, opcit. note 250, Decision 1.
252. For example, the World Bank participates in the African Capacity Building initiative
which is a joint effort of the African Development Bank, UNDP and the World Bank.
The Executive Board of the World Bank approved participation by the Bank in inter
agency training initiative which aims at strengthening the weak indigenous human and
institutional capacities in Sub - Saharari Africa which are a legacy inappropriate
investment and pricing policies, to enable nationals in the region to participate
effectively as partners in their own developmental activities. The Institute, aims, inter
alia, at (i) creating a consultative forum in which Africans can participate as full
partners in their own developmental activities and the development of policies to
promote capacity building goals (ii) establishment processes for co-ordinating
capacity building initiatives, greater efficiency and effectiveness of on going "donor"
efforts (iii) increase level of funding and resources available to enhance on-going
capacity building interventions, as well as to finance promising new activities (iv)
establishing systematic links between research and training institutions and
governments to foster greater understanding between the two groups. See text of the
Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Bank, IBRD, Resolution 124
(II) of UNGA 1947, Second Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Proceedings,
1974, quoted in The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, opcit, p.54 - 59, esp. p. 56.
253. Governing Council/UNDP, Organisational Meeting Report for 1989, opcit, note 248.
254. Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme, Report on the
Organisational Meeting for 1989, opcit, Decision 1 and 3. Structural adjustment is
held in UNDP practice to include government efforts to (i) improve budget and debt
management (ii) liberalise markets and pricing policies (iii) increase public sector
efficiency (iv) strengthen entrepreneurial and export programmes (v) address social
aspects of structural adjustment.
255. Technical co-operation projects and programmes co-ordinated by UNDP are
government led exercises leading to the integration of UNDP co-operation activity
into the development plans and priorities of recipient countries, though the UNDP
programming process may serve as a frame of reference for any cooperative activity
and assistance provided by or through the United Nations system if a member state or
co-operating country so desires - See Governing Council of the UNDP, Report on the
Organisational Meeting for 1989; the Special Session and 36th. Session, ECOSOC,
Official Records 1989, E/1989/32, supp.No.13. Programmatic accountability is
defined as the achievement of results or progress towards proposed objectives. Under
current UNDP policy, technical co-operation should ensure Social accountability or
management by social objective, defined as the extent to which specific social goals
have been fulfilled in the performance of the project. Performance accountability
refers to the procedures or methods used or applied when outcome or progress is
difficult to evaluate. Proper systems of accountability always aim at achieving
equilibrium between independence and control, incentives and constraints, conflict and
co-operation and benefits / rights and duties, and also involves material disclosure,
proof, establishment of a set of minimum core requirements and norms of I havior,
practice and decision making, independent reviews, etc. For legal definition of the
principle of transparency and accountability, See Chapter V of Current work.
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256- The United Nations system has always emphasized, in principle, the urgency of the
need to expand substantially the education and training of national personnel of
developing countries especially through fellowships, training courses, seminars,
the provision of teachers and instructors, study tours etc.As early as 1962, the
Economic and Social Council urged the Technical Assistance Board (EPTA), the
Special Fund and other organisations participating in the United Nations technical
co-operation programmes to consider seriously for their 1963-64 Budget
programmes and give priority to education and training as well as industrial
development of LDC's-See ECOSOC, Official Resolution 898 (xxxiv) of ECOSOC,
1962, ECOSOC Official Records, 37th session, 3 July 1962, Resolutions Supp.
No.l, United Nations, Newyork 1962, at p.l 1.
257- William Prynne defined fundamental rights of peoples in 1658 as:
(a) The privileges and Freedome of their Parliaments and their members;
(b) The safety and liberty of their persons;
(c) The propriety of their estates;
(d) The free course of common law, right, justice. Consequently, fundamental
rights do not only encompass individual rights but also involve "non - interference"
with the governance of peoples;
See Demophilos, or the Assertor of the Peoples Liberty by William Prynne Esq.
Lincoln"s Inn , London, Prt. Francis Cole 1658. Also - Article 2(1) of the
Declaration on the Right to Development provides:
"the human person is the central subject of development
and should be the active participant and beneficiary of
the right to development".
According to UNDP development policy, the basic purpose of technical co-operation
is the promotion of self - reliance in the recipient country in the managerial,
technical, administrative and research capabilities in addition to the provision of the
traditional project package offoreign experts, fellowships and imported equipment.
The Declaration on the Right to Development GAR 41/128 OF 4th DEC. 1986,
recognises the creation of conditions favourable to development of peoples and
individuals is the primary responsibility of their states - Article 2(3) provides that
stales have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development
policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well - being of the entire
population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting
there from, Article 3(1) states have the primary responsibility for the creation of
national and international conditions favourable to the realisation of the right to
development. Also see - Potrait of the UNDP 1950 - 1985, New York 1985 at p.46;
Popular participation in decision making for development, United Nations Report,
Sales No.E.75.10 (1975) P.4.
258- The principle of management by objective is largely undefined in UNDP practice or
policy. However, implementing specialised agencies such as UNIDO have given the
principle an operational content that is that the principle operates in accordance with
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the higher level development objective which is derived from the hypothesis that if
the project objective is effectively achieved and is proper, then the development
objective will be complied with, See - Design and Evaluation. A Manual of Policies.
Procedures and Guide-lines for T TNIDO. executed projects and programmes, vol.1,
Projects 1984 at p.6.
259- For the Basic text of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA), see Doc.
UNDP/ADM/LEG/34 of 6th. March 1973; DP/107, Annex 1 of 7 April 1975.
260- Industrial Training (GAR 2090, 1965), Combating Hunger (GAR 2096, 1965),
Natural Resources Development (GAR 2158, 1966), Stimulating Development
Investments (GAR 2280, 1967), Scientific and Technological Development (GAR
2318, 1967), UN Conference on Science and Technology, Vienna, Australia 1979),
Industrial Development (GAR 2528, 1969, UNIDO, Lima, Peru 1975), Facilitating
Regional and International Regional Co-operation (GAR 2513, 1969), Fostering and
Co-ordinating TCDC (GAR 3251, 1974, UN Conference on Technical Co-operation
Among Developing Countries (TCDC), Buenos Aires, Argentina 1978).
261- See - UNDP/LEG/SBA/Listing/1, updated; and UNDP, Report of the Governing
Council, 19th Session 15th. Jan. 3 February 1975, ECOSOC Official Records, 59th.
Session, Supp. No.2, United Nations 1975, Para 165.
262- Uner, opcit., pp.55-59
263- UNDP, Report of the Governing Council, 20th. Session, 11-30 June 1975, ECOSOC,
Official Records 59th. Session, Supp No.2A, E/5703/Rev.l, para 566.
264- See General Council of the United Nations Development Programme, Report on the
Organisational Meeting for 1989, The Special Session and 36 Session, ECOSOC,
Official Records 1989, E/1989/32, Supp.No.13, Part III - Co-ordination.
265- Forms of Assistance, SBAA, Article I.
266- Conditions for Project Execution, SBAA, Article III.
267- Privileges and Immunities, SBAA, Article IX.
268- Information Concerning Projects, SBAA, Article IV.
269- Participation and Contribution of Government in execution of Projects, SBAA,
Article V.
270- Use of Assistance, SBAA, Article VIII.
271- Relation to Assistance from non - UNDP sources, SBAA, Article VII.
272- Suspension or termination of Assistance, SBAA, Article XL
273- Article 4(a) of the SBAA, Provides, inter alia, that the UNDP may maintain a
permanent mission, headed by a Resident representative to represent the UNDP
therein and be the principle channel of communication with the government on all
Programme matters. The resident representative "shall have" full responsibility and
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ultimate authority, on behalf of the UNDP administrator, for the UNDP programme
in all its aspects in the country. He shall assist the Government, as may be required,
in the preparation of UNDP country programmes and project requests as well as
proposals for country programme or project or project changes and assure co¬
ordination for all assistance rendered by the UNDP through various executing
agencies or its own consultants.
274. The resource pool the UNDP consists of;
(i) Core resources;
(ii) Cost-sharing with both recipient and donor governments;
(iii) Trust funds;
(iv) Management services for bilateral and multilateral funding sources.
Governing Council of the UNDP, Report on the Organisation meeting for 1989, opcit
- Annex, S (c) terms of reference for funding strategy.
275. See Chapter IV of the current work, in relation to Lome Convention arrangements
276. For instance the patent clause which was originally meant to make the benefits of
discoveries available to all developing countries by means of arrangements in which
the ownership of the discovery would pass into international public ownership. The
clause would only apply to discoveries achieved through the sole efforts of a UNDP
financed expert . Recipient states argued that such a provision could violate, inter
alia, their national security and Sovereignty. However, the clause was modified into
the current "information" provisions - Article 4 of the SBAA - which as we shall see
provides for intellectual property rights to belong to the recipient Government under
arrangements which would enable UNDP to get access to such rights for the purpose
of making them available to other developing countries.
277. Consultant firms which sub contract to carry out UNDP supported projects, act under
the instructions of and are subject to direction from the UNDP or its executing
agencies, thus acquiring "agent" status rather than "independent contractor" status.
The "restructuring Resolution" of 1978, inter alia, widened the responsibilities of the
UNDP's Resident Representative under the title of "Resident Co-ordinator" which
automatically meant a more central role for the Resident representative in the co¬
ordination of the UNDP recipient country relationship. For consulting organisations,
the privileges and immunities extend to the "consulting organisation" and not the
private individuals it employs. Such functional privileges and immunities are meant to
establish a climate conducive to speedy and efficient execution of UNDP supported
projects as provided for under Article 4 (a) of the SBAA. The special representative
role of the Resident Representative that is his/her full responsibility and ultimate
authority on behalf of the Administrator of UNDP for allocation and programming of
UNDP resources in the country concerned other than resources and the central co¬
ordinating role for all technical co-operation activities, require diplomatic immunities
and privileges to ensure effective execution of his/her duties, though the scope and
extent of some of the privileges may be determined after "negotiation" with relevant
Governments - UNDP Governing Council Report, 1989, paras 562 - 571.
31
278. Jackson. A Study of The Capacity of The United Nations Development System. Vol.1,
p. 21, especially paragraphs 55 - 56.
279. UNDP, Programme and Projects Manual,1988, s. 20205, ss. 1.0 (1).
280. UNDP, Programme and Projects Manual 1988, s.20205, ss. 2.0 (1) (4).
281. UNDP, Programme and Projects Manual 1988, s. 20205, para 3.0 (4).
282. The Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) is defined as : "An order of magnitude of the
resources expected to be available from UNDP during a specified period for the
financing of assistance to country and inter country projects, established for the
purposes of forward planning and determination according to established criteria, the
IPF does not imply a commitment to allocate funds up to the limit of the figure
UNDP, Programme and Projects Manual, 1988, Glossary of Terms.
283. Administrators Note : Each Country Programme with combined IPF and other
resources of $ 10 million or more, taken into account in programming is submitted to
the Governing Council with the Administrator's observations and recommendations
contained in a note prepared by the regional bureau.
284. For discussion of this principle, See Chapter V of this current work.
285. General Council, UNDP, Report of The Organisational Meeting 1989, 36th. Session,
opcit, Annex GC, Decision (6).
286. For the Consensus see Official Records, 49th. Session, 6.31, 1970, Resolutions, Supp.
No. 1, E/4904; also GAR 2688 (XXV), Annex.
287. The UNDP, in principle favors liberal use of consulting firms, on a contractual basis,
for the execution of the entire project or components of projects under the
supervision of the executing agency. This alleviates "increasing" difficulties in
recruiting qualified experts and enhances prospects for the timely delivery of project
inputs - See UNDP, Programme and Projects Manual, 1988, S.30403, 1.0. UNDP
collaboration with the private sector has especially been influenced , as discussed
below, by World Bank policy, that is, from the very first developing country study
undertaken by the Bank as executing agency - the Argentine Power Survey project ,
sub contracting by consulting firms, whether private or government owned, have
always been liberally used since the Bank's long standing view, unlike some executing
agencies like FAO and WHO, is that the use of consultants tends to provide, inter
alia, teams of higher quality, to focus responsibility and Programmatic Accountability.
The Bank maintains files on the experience, independence and capabilities of the
firms, Edward Mason & Robert, opcit, pp. 308 - 309.
288. The liberalised regimes are supposed to provide, among others, incentives such as
greater participation by non nationals in formerly reserved sectors E.g. under
Nigeria's Companies and Allied Matters Decree (NEPD) 1976/77, the Schedules for
enterprises which can invest in Nigeria are reduced from 3 to 2. Under the NEPD,
Schedule I covered reserved sectors for wholly Nigerian owned enterprises, Schedule
II covered 40 % foreign and
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60% local and Schedule III foreign investment. The 1990 Decree reduces these
Schedules to 2, with Schedule I covering sectors with monetary limit in Naira 20
Million on foreign participation and Schedule II for mixed ventures (that is foreign +
local or joint ventures) or separate investments, guarantees against nationalisation,
internationalisation of contracts and acceptance of international arbitration, etc. The
success of these measures largely depends upon the level of technological capacity and
institutional bargaining capabilities of local enterprises. Also, see Trade and
Development Report 1987, p. 108 and Chapter V for discussion of the concept of
mixed jurisdiction and Balance of Commitments.
289. See Chapter V of Current Work.
290. An example of such withholding of UNDP financial contribution is the case of the
Food Packaging Centre, a project executed by UNIDO in the state of Sao Paulo,
Brazil. The project was intended to improve the national packaging system by
reducing food losses and minimising production costs, in order to meet the
requirements of expanding the Brazilian foods and beverages. Though the project
was approved in September 1988, the UNDP contribution was only released after
participation of the privatised sector was guarantied in February 1989 - See General
Council of the UNDP, 34th. Session (26th. May - 19th. June 1987) Item 5(b) of the
provisional agenda, 4th. Country Programme for Brazil - DP/CP/BRA/4, 1987.
291. The issue of reverse transfer of technology is of significance to most developing
countries and various initiatives have been instituted to counter the phenomenon -
See among others, UNCTAD Report of the Fourth Meeting of Governmental
Experts on the Reverse Transfer of Technology, 1988, UNCTAD DOC.TD/B/1169,
1988.
292. For the Text of the Model Standard Letter of Agreement between the Government
and Co-operating Agency, See Programme and Projects Manual, 1988, s.30503, ss.5.3.
293. Model Standard Letter of Agreement opcit, para 2.
294. Model Standard Letter of Agreement opcit, para 5.
295. Model Standard Letter of Agreement, para. 14.
296. Model Standard Letter of Agreement opcit, paras. 6 and 16.6. Brazilian Country
Programme, opcit. para. 14 (a).
297. Brazilian Country Programing opcit, para. 14 (c) and (f).
298. General Council of the UNDP, 35th. Session (6th. June - 1st. July 1988) Item 5 (b)
(iii) of the provisional agenda, Country Programme for Uganda, DP/Cp/UGA/3,
1988, paras. 1 and 13.
299. Programme and Projects Manual, S.30602, ss.1.0 (1).
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300- Activities and projects assisted by UNCDF, UNRFNRE, UNFSTD and UNSO may
require different monitoring arrangements which are worked after consultations with
the recipient government, UNDP and the relevant executing agency.
302- Programme and Projects Manual. S. 30602, ss.3(b) (c) & (d). The parties may
monitor progress by examining, inter - alia, established indicators of progress,
Financial statements, technical and other reports, comparing records of completed
tasks and outputs with forecasts in the work plan, physical examination of project
operations etc.
304- Programme and Projects Manual. S. 30608, ss.1.0; DP/1983/1CW/6.22 December
1982.
305- Programme and Projects Manual. S. 30607. s.f.31 & (4t S. 30609.
306- Programme and Egqecis Manual, S. 30608, ss.2.0(l) (a) - (e).
307- The term Tripartite review is used because it covers most UNDP practice. The
principles developed under the "tripartite review" however, are also applied to
bipartite (projects executed by government or UNCDF) or multi-partite (inter
country, regional, inter-regional and global) agreements and arrangements - See
Programme and Projects Manual, opcit, 1988, S.30604, footnote (a).
308- Programme and Erojscia Manual, Opcit, S.30604 (l).
309- Programme and Projects Manual. Opcit, S. 30604, ss. 3.0 (1) to (4).
310- Programme and Projects Manual. Opcit, S. 30604, ss. 5.0(1) and (2).
311- Programme and Projects Manual. Opcit. S . 30604. ss.5.0 (4).
312- Programme and Projects Manual. Opcit, S . 20500, ss. 2.4 (iv).
313- Programme and Projects Manual. S. 30802. ss.2.0.
314- UNIDO, Report on the Industrial Development Board on the work of the 12th.
session: General Assembly Official Records, 33rd. Session, supp.No.16 (A/33/16),
UN 1978, S.173.
315. Programme and Projects Manual - S.30802. ss. 2.0 (4) (aV
316- Boththe developing countries - through the High Level Committee for TCDC - and
the UNDP have laid emphasis on use of developing country capacities including
experts, training capacity, consulting firms, local raw materials etc. in UNDP
supported projects. Thus for example the programmeoffers preferential
treatment, modelled on World Bank practice, by granting up to fifteen percent
(15%) of quoted prices from developing country bidders when bids for equipment
or services of consultants are evaluated under the international competitive
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bidding system for supply of services and/or equipment to UNDP supported
projects.
317- Speech by the Deputy Administrator, UNDP, Report of the Governing Council,
opcit., s.566.
318- Article IV(5) of the Draft Basic Text of the SBAA, DOC.UNDP/ADM/leg 34 of the
6 March 1973.
319 SBBA, Article IV (I), UNIDO/IDB.1/9, Annex to Annex II, p.23.
320- Programme and Projects Manual - S.30601, ss.5.0 (1). 5. Programme and Projects
Manual - S.30601, ss.6.0 (1).
322- Programme and Projects Manual - S.30601. ss.6.0(3).
323- Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development Co¬
operation, PI/38, UNIDO, Vienna, June 1975; also Programme and Projects
Manual. S. 30607, s.(3) & (4), S. 30609.
324- UN Director for Development Aid, UNGA, ECOSOC DOC.A/38/258, E/l983/82 pp
42 - 44.
325- Programme and Projects Manual. S. 20501. ss. 2(al - tel.
326- ProgrammeandProiectsManual.S. 30608,section. 1.0; DP/1983/ICW/6,22 December
1982.
327- Programme and Projects Manual, s. 30608, ss.2.0(1) (a) - (e).
329- Further measures in UNDP practice to assist the poorest countries include the
acceptance of "non - convertible currencies, from the recipient Government to
meet its assessed programme costs as provided for under Articles (V) and (VI) of
SBAA. Article V provides terms for the recipient Government financial
contribution and participation and co-operation in execution of projects assisted by
the UNDP and Article (VI) provides for the recipient Government's payment for
local costs or facilities in the amounts specified in the relevant project document or
otherwise determined by the UNDP in pursuance of relevant decisions of its
Governing Council . Though the recipient Government is supposed to meet the
local costs of services and taxes including transport, telecommunications, salaries,
medical, accommodation etc. for advisory experts and consultants assigned to
projects in the recipient country , the General Assembly requested the UNDP ,
under GAR 2814 (XXVI) to exempt the least developed among die developing
countries form the payment of local costs as long as required by their special
situation.
330- Programme and Projects Manual. Opeit. 8.30604 CIV
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331- Programme and Projects Manual. Opcit, S . 20500, ss. 2.4 (iv).
332- The projects covered under the SIS are normally of the three - six months duration
with a value not exceeding $75,000 and projects covered, except in exceptional
cases, are national projects that is not inter country, regional or global.
333- Advanced developing countries have emphasised the"dangers" inherent in
preferential treatment in view of the presence of under developed sectors in such
countries. 80% of UNDP resources go to the poorest 65 developing countries, with
LLDCs taking up to 30% of the resources; UNDP, Report of Governing Council,
9th. Session, Ecosoc, Official Records, 49th. Session: Britain's stake in the United
Nations Development Programme. UNDP, July 1983.
334- For details of the "humanist approach" sec UNDP Doc. DP/261, cited in UNDP,
24th. Session, ECOSOC Official Records, 63rd. Session, supp. No. 3A, UN 1977
(NY) E/6013/Rev.l at Para.132.
335- See GAR.2953 (XXVII) of 11th. December 1972, para. 5; Programme and Projects
Manual. S.30802. ss.1.0.
336- Lima and New Delhi Declarations and Elans of Action ; Retrospective and
perspective. UNIDO, ID/Conf.5/17 and ID/Conf.5/14.
337- Among the United Nations agencies, some have mandates which specifically call for
their formulation and adoption of standards and procedures for the promotion of
Human Rights. The agencies include ILO, WHO and UNESCO.
338 The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, especially
Articles 13(1) and 15, signed and ratified by 95 states and signed by 5 states (that is
The United States, Israel, Liberia, Democratic Kampuchea and Malta) as of March
1990 - Human Rights, Status of International Instruments as at 1st. March 1990,
ST/HR/5.
339- Declaration on the Right to Development 1986, opcit..
340. The agencies such as FAO, WHO, ILO and UNESCO have a strong mandate,
through the United Nations Charter, their Constitutional Documents, various
resolutions and Declarations, to 'encourage' member states to implement multilateral
and related human rights instruments. Most clearly, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (GAR 2200 A (XXI) of December 1966 - UN
Doc. A/6316 (1966), Article 18 empowers the Specialised Agencies to make progress
reports, within the scope of the agencies activities and powers, on the
implementation of the Covenant. See also, Making and Breaking Human Rights,
The United Nations Specialised Agencies and Implementation of tire International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights by Philip Alston, 1979, Anti-
Slavery Society, London.
341- UNDP, Report of the Governing Council, 19th Session, 15th. Jan - 3rd. February,
1975, ECOSOC, Official Records, 59th. Session, Supp. No.2, United Nations 1975,
E/5646 at Para. 15.
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342. Some agencies apply their own policy in this regard. Thus at the IBRD Fifth Annual
Meeting of the Board of Governors (September 6 - 14, 1950) Summary Proceedings,
Statement on Technical Assistance Activities of the International Bank, p.49 :
"The Bank recognises that when it sends out...a mission it
assumes a moral obligation to help, with its financial resources,
in the development of the country concerned, provided that
country does its own part in formulating and carrying forward a
properly balanced development program."
Edward Mason and Robert, opcit, p.302.
343. See Article 2 (7) and Article 39, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, also
Articles 13 (16), Article 62 (2) and (3) and Article 68 - The United Nations and The
Domestic Jurisdiction of States , Interpretations and Applications of The Non -
Intervention Principle, Gronmy J. Jones, Cardiff 1979.
344. J. L Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th. Edition, edited by Sir Humprey Waldock,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, at p.291.
345. For instance, under Article 11 (2) of the International Covenant on Social and
Cultural Rights, 1966, the parties to the Covenant, recognising the fundamental right
of everyone to be free from hunger .. under take to : (a) Improve methods of
production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and
Scientific knowledge.
346. UNDP, Report of the Governing Council 20th. Session, opcit, para. 571, Statement by
Chief of UNDP Legal Services.
347. See for instance UNDP Report of the Governing Counci) 9th. Session, ECOSOC,
Supp. No.6, United Nations, 1970, paras. 36 -38.
348. At its 357th. meeting, in approving the country programme for Israel, the Governing
Council took note of the Administrator's assurance that : "the programme did not
relate in anyway to any territories occupied by Israel and the Administrator would not
authorize expenditure which could be construed as encouraging continuing Israeli
occupation of those territories" - UNDP, Report of the Governing Council, 15th.
Session, Supp. No. 2, UN, 1973, para. 15.
349. The rationale of facilitating the ability of the recipient country to implement
economic, social and cultural rights vis-a'- vis a punitive stoppage of allocations, is
illustrated by a statement made by the Chief of UNDP Division for Eastern and
Southern Africa to the Resident Representative in Uganda in Uganda, that is : We
note that many prospective bilateral donors have cited Human Rights violations as
justifications for withholding development assistance to Uganda. It is possible
therefore, that a small investment of UNDP funds in human rights area might pay a
large dividend in increased aid flows" - See Letter dated 15th. July 1983 from the
Chief of the UNDP Division for Eastern and Southern Africa to the resident
representative in Uganda; in Report of the Secretary General on Advisory Services in
the Field Of Human Rights Assistance to Uganda , UN DOC. E/CN/4/1984/5.
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P. 12 quoted in Human Rights and Development. International Views, David. P.
Forsythe, Mcmillan, 1989.atp.130.
350. See New Technologies and Global Industrialisation - Prospects for Developing
Conntries. prepared by the regional and country studies Branch PPD.141, UNIDO
1989, at p.17, quoting Ergas 1987, at p.233; also, GAR Resolution 40/205 -
Implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action for the 1980"s for the
Least Developed Countries- Annex, Part 1 (B) (18) stresses the development of
Human Resources as an essential pre-requisite for the development of the least
developed countries - General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Resolutions and
Decisions, 17th. Sept.- 18 Dec. 1985, 28th. April - 20th. June 1986, Supp. No.53
(A/40/53) UN, New York 1986.
351. For an analytical review of the UNDP financing process - See legal Features of
Multi-bilateral Aid by Sergio Marchisio in The Italian Year Book of International
Law, Volume 7, 1986 - 1987.
352. The 566th. meeting of the General Council, 4th February 1977 expressed deep
concern over the limited resources availablefor programme purposes in 1977. In
the 1970"s, Governments agreed to a 14% growth a year in money terms for UNDP,
a commitment not fulfilled.
353. Government Council of the United Nations Development Programme, Report of
Organisational meeting for 1989, the Special Session and 36th. session, Official
Records 1989, E/1989/32. supp.No.13, Annex, Terms of Reference for funding
strategy item (c).
354. The £ian of International Development Co-operation in die United Nations 1945 -
1952 by Jaap Van Soet, Van Gorcum Assen, 1978 at p.84.
355. The United Nations and the domestic Jurisdiction of states -pp.196-198.
356. For a discussion of the issue of obligations in international law see - The question of
a reference to International Obligations in the United Nations Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations. A different View, Detlev F Vagts, UNCTC, Series A
No.2, September 1986 and Barcelona Traction Case (I.C.J. Rep 1964, p.6), also
357. The need to preserve international Competitive bidding on a multilateral basis was
stressed by the UNDP - UNDP.DOC.DP/1982, BFC/L.3 Add.22, June 1982.
358. The evolving International Law of Development. O.Schachter, Columbia, Journal
of Transnational Law, 1976 pp.4 -10.
359. Programme and Projects Manual. Opcit, S 20100, ss. 7.2 (1).
360. SBAA, Articles V and VI.
361. Sec Programme and Projects Manual. S.30803. ss.4.0.
362. SBAA, Article III (2).
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363. United Nations Development Programme, Report of the Governing Council, 19th
Session, 15th. Jan 3 Feb.1975, ECOSOC Official Records, 5th Session, Supp. No.2,
UN 1975, Para 167. In 1966, the Administrator of the Programme noted that the
work of "development assistance" could only be successful when it involved the full
participation by LDC's themselves - UNDP, Report of the General Council, first
session, Jan 1966, ECOSOC, 41rst Session Supp. No.l 1 at para 25.
364. Decisions of the General Council, 20th. Session during which it was decided to
implement the "new dimensions". Also see - Coherence of the United Nations
Development System , Official Records of the ECOSOC, 31st. Session, supp. No.2A,
E/5846/Rev.l
365. The Country Programme is a multi year framework of country focused technical co¬
operation efforts which indicates the proposed use of UNDP resources towards the
achievement or furtherance of selected national development objectives during the
period covered by the country programmes, UNDP, Programmes and Project
Manual. February 1988, Glossary of terms.
366. A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System at p.21-27.
367. See UNDP Report of the Governing Council, 15th. Session ECOSOC, Supp.No.2,
1973 especially Para.31.
368. Thus according to the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Planning and
Development, Zimbabwe;
"...the concept of a country programme in itself has an
impact [We] can sit down and plan, and that relieves the
pressure from other parts of the Administration.We can
map out a strategy and distribute our resources..."
See - Bniaini slake in die United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, The
Developmem Connection, 1983 at p.10.
369. SBAA, Article XII (2).
370. For example, the IBRD, the Board of Governors has the right, under Article V(2) of
the Bank's Articles of Agreement, suspend membership of any member state which
fails to fulfil any of its obligations to the Bank, by decision of a majority of the
Governors, exercising a majority of the total voting power.
371. The Bank at this time carried the policy that its function was not to convene
conferences, collect figures, set standards etc. but to make loans; for the agreement
between the IBRD and United Nations, see - IBRD, Second Annual Meeting of
die Board of Governor . Proceedings (September 11-17, 1947), pp.25-27, quoted in
Edward & Robert at p.58.
372. UNDP report of Governing Council, 1st-session , January 1966, ECOSOC, Para
52.
373. UNDP, Report of the Governing Council, 9th. Session, ECOSOC, Supp.No.6,
UN, January 1970, especially para.131.
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374. Britain's stake in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), July 1983 at
p.28.
375. Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme - Report of the
Organisational meeting for 1989, The special session and the 36th. session,
ECOSOC, Official records 1989, E/1989/32, Supp.No.13, part III, Decision 4.
376. See infra notes 377 and 378.
377. For Draft Agreement, see. Industrial Development Board, 1st. session (part two),
Vienna 4 -15 November 1985, Item 8 of the provisional agenda, DOC.UNIDO.1/9,
10th. September 1985.
378. Special interest or co-operative arrangements have been established the UNDP and :
The World Bank; Asian Development Bank (AsDB), African Development Bank
(AfDB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), IslamicDevelopment Bank(IsDB),
European Economic Community (EEC), International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) and Nordic Investment Bank (NIB).
379. Programme and Projects Manual. S.30901. ss.1.0 (2).
380. Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development Co¬
operation, opcit note 323.
381. Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, UK and
Northern Ireland, Report of the Second General Conference, U/CONF.3/31,
UNIDO, Vienna 1975, p.70.
382. Agreementbetween UNDPand UNIDO, (Draft) Doc.UNIDO/IDB. 1/9, Annex II.
383. Preamble to Agreementbetween UNDPand UNIDO, opcit, note 382.
384. Agreement, opcit., note 382.
385. Agreement, opcit., note 382, Article, XI (I).
386. Agreement, opcit., note 382, Article III.
387. Agreement, opcit., note 382, Article, V (2).
388. Agreement, opcit., note 382, Article, XI (5) & (6).
389. Draft Agreement, Industrial Development Board, First Session (part two) Vienna,
1985, UNIDO/IDB.1/13, Annex I, Article IV (7).
390. See Legal Features of Multi-bilateral Aid by Sergio Marchisio in The Italian Year
Book of International Law, Volume 7, 1986 - 1987 for a discussion of the
unilateralist trends of developed country technical assistance contributions.
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FOOT NOTES FOR CHAPTER
FOUR
391. For definition and discussion of this term, see, inter alia, legal Features of Multi-
bilateral Aid by Sergio Marchisio in The Italian Year Book of International Law,
Volume 7, 1986 - 1987.
392- Excerpt from speech by Michel Rocard, Prime Minister of the French Republic,
President of the Council of the European Community, at Lome (Togo), 15 December
1989, at the signing of the Fourth Lome Convention, quoted in The Courier, No.
120, April 1990 at p.5.
393- Excerpt from speech by Michael Sefali, President of the ACP Council of Ministers at
Lome (Togo), 15 December 1989, at the signing of the Fourth Lome Convention,
quoted in The Courier, No. 120, April 1990 at p.7.
394- From I -ome 1 towards I rime 2» Katharina Focke, Texts of the Report adopted by
ACP - EEC Consultative Assembly - 1980, citing statement by J. E. David to the
Club of Dakar on the Transfer of Trade Technology, at p.20.
395- From I rime I iq Ix>mc IV. View Point by Lucien Pagni on the signing of Lome IV,
The Courier, No.120, April 1990 at p. 17; "The effects of the Lome arrangements are
the severest criterion for judging the Conventions, since the Conventions are not an
end in themselves but a means" - Zartman, in - Jhe European Community's
Development Policy: The Strategies Ahead. College of Europe, 1986, p.65;
396 See Chapter III of current work.
397- The Lome Convention, now in its fourth phase, is an update of the 1963 Yaounde I
Convention (EEC - and 18 AASM's or associated African States and Madagascar),
1969 Yaounde II Convention, (EEC - 20 AASM's), 1975 LOME I (1975)
Convention (EEC - Afro - Caribbean and Pacific States, ACP)[1976] O.J.L 25/2,
LOME II 1979, [1980] O.J.L 347/2, Lome III and IV. The Fourth Lome Convention
has 69 signatory ACP states. For a full text of current Lome IV Convention, see,
Compiled Texts of the Fourth Lome Convention, signed at Lome 15 December
1989, ACP - EEC Council of Ministers, Doc. BX - 71 - 91 - 073 - EN - C (catalogue
number), Official Publications of the European Communities, Brussels, 1992; The
Courier (Magazine), No.120, March - April, 1990.
398- For a detailed analysis of the national and regional regulatory measures used in the
Andean Pact countries until the mid-1980's, set Transfer q[ Technology in Latin
America, a Decade of Control, by Carlos M. Correa, JWTL 1981; and for new
reforms in this region to take into account international legal obligations see -
Chapter V of this current work; Latin American Integration and Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, Eduardo Gitli and Gunilla Ryd, JWTL, August 1992; Private
Investment in Lalin America. Rn negotiating Jim Bargain. Joseph .J. Jova, Clint .E.
Smith and T. Frank Crigler (1984), Private Investment in Lalin America. Texas
International Law Journal pp 3 - 32; Regional Industrial Co-operation. Experiences
ami Perspectives of Asean and Andean Pact United Nations industrial Development
Organisation, UNIDO.ID/309.
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399- The Lome Convention, opcit, note 397.
400. The Europe Asia. Latin America Dialogue: Financial & Technical Co-operation
1976- 1989. Commission of the European Communities, Olivier Retout, 1991 at
p.10.
401 ■ See Part IV of the Fourth Lome Convention.
402. Community Development Policy, an Unknown Quantity? European File, August -
September 1990.
403- Annual Report of the ACP - EEC Council of Ministers, April 1977, at pp.6 - 7;
Gamble and Frankowska , International Law's Response 12 ili£ NIEO. An Overview
9 B.C.I.C.L.R, 257, 274 (1986); Benedek - The Lome Convention and New
International Law of Development ; A Concretisation of ihe New International
Economic Order ? 26 Journal of African Law, 74 (1982).
404. See inter alia, GATT - Trade Policy Review, The European Community. Volume I,
1991 at pp.67 -70.
405. The use of this term, as explained below, is different under the Lome Convention
from that under the UNDP programme. Under Lome, the term is synonymous with
technical aid flowing from and determined by the Community, aid in which the
recipient states nationals, institutions and enterprises are often participate only as
"sleeping partners".
406. The Report cites the Financial protocol under Lome IV which provides for ECU
6,215 million for 1990 - 1995. This sum is to be used for national and regional
development programmes, structural adjustment export earnings stabilisation in the
fields of agriculture (STABEX) and mining (SYSMIN) and emergency relief.
407. in principle, ACP exports are granted unrestricted and duty free access to the EEC
market, except for agricultural products which are subject to the Common
Agricultural Policy of the Community, textiles and clothing and European Coal and
Steel Community Products, Lome IV Title 1, Trade Co-operation, Article 177 and
Protocol 9, article 3; also Part Two, Title X, Lome IV Convention; Trade Policy
Review, The European Communities 1991, GATT, Geneva 1991, Volume 1, p.68.
408. un(ier the STABEX arrangements in the Convention, ACP states are provided with
the right to be compensated by the EEC for shortfalls in their export earnings from
specified primary products, under certain circumstances and up to given limits - See
Part Three, Title II, Chapter 1 of Lome IV, Articles 186 - 212, for the special
Financing facility for mining products (SYSM1N), Chapter 3 of same title, Articles
214 - 219, and for the special undertakings on sugar, Chapter 2 of the same title,
Article 213.
409. Sgg pgj-j Two of Lome IV, Titles 1 - XII, covering environment, agricultural co¬
operation, food security and rural development, development of fisheries, co¬
operation on commodities, industrial development, manufacturing and processing,
mining, energy, enterprise, services and trade development,
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410- Access opportunities under some protocols such as beef and veal are confined, by
various health, voluntary export restraint (agreed quantities in Convention language)
or quota system, to a few countries. Under other protocols dealing with high or
fairly demanded products which suffer no competition from EEC common
agricultural policy products,"unlimited" traditional market access is guarantied - E.g
Banana Protocol Article I provides that "no ACP state shall be placed, as regards
access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less
favourable position than in the past or present".
411- E.g Lome IV, Title III, Chapter 1, Section 2, Article 221
412. jhe various Declarations annexed to the Convention deal with definition of
appropriate technology and copyright.
413. iv Df the Treaty of Rome Articles 131 - 136, provides for associate states, thus
formalising the maintenance of EEC states traditional links to former possessions.
Part IV of the treaty also set up the European Development Fund which provides
resources for Community Financial and Technical Co-operation and the bulk of
resources for funding Lome Convention generated activity.
414- Though initially challenged as contrary to Article 1 of GATT since it did not
constitute a free trade area as defined under Article XXIV, objections to the
Convention were gradually abandoned, especially due to the eventual non realisation
of increased ACP share in the EEC market - see Europe and the Developing
World, Association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome by William Gorell
Barnes.
415. while ACP states are required to observe the need for national treatment, the EC
safeguards itself from making binding commitments to offer MFN treatment to ACP
states at all times, see Annex XXXIX which sets out the ACP declaration on Article
168 of the Lome IV Convention to the effect that the Community would offer ACP
products treatment equivalent to that offered to third state products, to avoid MFN
treatment which would cause imbalance and discriminatory effects.
416- Lome IV, Title 5, Articles 77 - 98, especially (with Article 97 on the special needs
of the least developed countries.
412. Lome IV, especially Articles 87 and 97.
418. por typical terms of agreements concluded under such treaties, see - Bilateral
Agreements Oil made and Economic Co-operation Concluded by Developing
Countries. Volumes I and II by Alfredo Castillo - Gomez, UNCTAD/ST/ECDC/36,
1988.
419- See Financial Protocol, Lome IV.
420- Under general co-operation provisions, information and documentation instruments,
particularly for the exchange of know-how, methods and experience between ACP
states and between them and the Community are to be set-up (Article 276) and ACP-
EEC universities, research and training institutions are to be "twinned" (Article
276).
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421 • Lome IV Convention, Article 275 (a) and (b).
422- Lome IV Convention, Article 275 (c) and (e).
423. Lome IV Convention, Article 275 (j).
424. Lome IV Convention Article 279.
425. Agriculture is recognised as a sector closely linked with the EEC economy as a
whole. Therefore the rules which govern agriculture derogate from those governing
the common market and there is no co-ordination at the Community level of the
various national policies but of the one policy at Community level - Ijw and
Institutions of the European Communities. 5th- Edition, Butterworths by D. Lasok, J.
W. Bridge at p.480.
426. a very favourable assessment of the European Investment Bank's activities in the
ACP states is made by Philippe Bourin in his article - The European Investment
Bank's Activities in the African, Caribbean and Pacific under Lome III, in Current
Issues in International Business Law, edited by David Perrott and Istavan Pogany,
Avebury 1988.
427. Resolutions of the ACP - EEC Joint Assembly on 22 March 1990, Port Moresby
Papau New Guniea, 67 for, 20 Against with 4 abstentions, in Annual Report of the
ACP - EEC Council of Ministers (1990), Luxembourg 1991, Annex 1.
428. Tjje Council of Ministers Decisions are binding on the contracting parties can only
conduct valid proceedings if half the members of the Council of the European
Communities, one member of the Commission and two thirds of ACP government
representatives are present - Article 339 (1) of Lome IV Convention.
429. jn principle, the Lome Conventions are not short of declarations of equality between
the co-operating states. For example, with reference to technical co-operation -
Lome TV, Chapter 4 section 295, Article 295; Article Lome II - Annex IX and
Article 64.
430. £)uring Qje negotiations to form the first Lome Convention, an ACP request for a
separate fund to facilitate industrialisation and technology transfer was "denied" by
the Community. The subsequent Centre for Industrial Development (CDI), is
situated in Brussels where it is supposed to encourage or promote links between the
private sectors in the EEC and ACP states - See The Lome Conventions and their
Implications for the United States. Joanna Moss, west view 1982.
43^- The UK technical co-operation or assistance programme was generally regarded as
more beneficial to recipient states than that of other EEC states, yet the recipient
states participation in decision making, actual technical activity, setting of terms and
conditions by the recipient state even in these cases was reduced to a minimum, die
recipient states being required to give guarantees of non - interference with technical
personnel from the working in the recipient country. Such guarantees typically
concerned non taxation and personal immunities for skilled personnel - See for
example : Agreement Between the Government of the UK and Sudan, Concerning
the provision of certain Technical Assistance by the UK, April 1970, CMND 4599,
1970 - 71 XLI1, Treaty Series Number 11 (1971); Agreement on Technical Co-
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operation between the Government of the United Kingdom and Egypt, November
1974, CMND 6264, Volume XXXIV, 1974 - 1975.
432. Under article 325 of Lome IV, a joint ACP - EEC Development Finance Co¬
operation Committee is established within the Council of Ministers. The Committee
has a wide ranging mandate which includes review and examination of issues such
as conditions of award of contracts to ACP enterprises - Art. 325 (i), promotion of
ACP - EEC private foreign investment and flow of private capital - Art. 325 (k) -
(m), etc.
433. Articles 158 and 159, among others, Lome IV Convention; also Chapter 3 on
UNDP Technical Assistance for discussion of formal provisions and mechanisms
under country programmes.
434. Lome 4, Chapter 5, articles 281.
435. Lome 4, Chapter 5, articles 281 - 293.
436. under the general safeguard clause - Article 177 of Lome IV, market access may be
withdrawn (i) if serious economic disturbances" in a sector of the EEC or of member
states; or (ii) difficulties which jeopardise external financial stability or which may
result in deterioration thereof. For the technologically more important coal and steel
products, if the conditions of competition from the ACP suppliers as regards prices
are likely to be detrimental to the functioning of the common market, the EEC can
unilaterally "withdraw" concessions Protocol 9, Article 3 of Lome IV.
437. The basic rule of rules of origin (Title 1, Protocol 1, Lome IV) is the requirement for
a change of tariff heading as between the materials used and the finished product
Specific product working and processing requirements may also be imposed by the
Community if it considers the product insufficiently covered by the general rules.
Proof of origin (Title II, Protocol I, Lome IV). See also Nigeria - Trade Policy
Review, GATT, 1991, Volume II at pp.50 -51.
438. Lome IV, Title 1, Article 168 - 169 and Annex II of the Treaty.
439. eec Commission (1989) Fourth Lome Convention, Information Memo, Brussels, 13
December, 1989.
440- See for instance - Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer in India,
UNCTC/Doc. ST/CTC/117, United Nations, New York, 1992. The advanced
developing countries are now capable of importing only capital since local
technological capabilities are sufficient
441 ■ This point is made in an economic analysis of this problem - The Impact of 1992 and
Associated Legislation on lll£ Less Favoured Regions of EEC. Regional Policy
and Transport Series, 18, European Parliament ( Directorate) at p.39.
442. The Second enlargement of the European Economic Community. The Integration of
Unequal Partners edited by Dudley Seers, C. Vailsos 1982, at p.237.
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443. Mytelka K. Lynn and Dolan Michael: The Lome Convention and a New International
Division of Labor. Journal of European Integration, Volume I, Number 1, 1977.
444. Under Article Chapter 3, Section 1, Article 258, ACP states and the Community (that
is in effect ACP states) are to implement measures that encourage participation in
their development efforts by private investors who comply with the objectives and
priorities of ACP - EEC development co-operation and with the appropriate laws and
regulations of their respective states.
445. Lome IV, Chapter 4, Section 5, especially Articles 294 (1) and 297.
446. Lome IV, Title III, Chapter 1, Article 230 (2) (c); Also Chapter 4 of the same
Convention, Article 275, especially clause (c).
447. This approach is also applied to the ad hoc arrangements made with Latin American
- See The Europe Asia Latin America Dialogue : Financial and Technical
Cooperation , 1976 -1989, Commission of The European Communities, 1991, at p.35.
448. Report of Article 108 Committee of 24 th. April 1986 on specific and general
difficulties of implementing financial and technical co-operation, at section vii (ii), In
EEC Council of Ministers. Compilation of Texts Relating to ACP - EEC Financial
and Technical Co-operation , DOC BX- 71-91-073-EN-C, Official Publications of The
European Communities, Brussels, 1992.
449. Opcit, note 448.
450. Opcit note 448.
451. Opcit note 448, at p. 235.
452. General criteria for EEC supported projected implementation have for long included
theoretical requirements for those implementing projects in ACP States to take into
account adaptation of technical components to economic and social conditions of the
country or territory concerned - See for instance, EEC Regulation No.7 - Official
Gazette of the European Coimnunities of the 25th. February 1959, Article 24.
453. Under Article 296 of Lome IV, non ACP - EEC enterprises or even third countries,
may be authourised to participate in contracts financed by the Community, if , inter
alia, such non ACP -EEC enterprises are more competitive in terms of pricing ,
delivery times, offer better adapted technology, etc. However, in practice, it is
unlikely that such EEC firms which have a first opportunity to tender and bear the
goodwill of the donor states, will be rejected by an ACP recipient state. However, if
this provision was implemented, it could offer ACP states the opportunity to access
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cheaper and belter adapted technology from advanced developing countries,
including a "new" South Africa which is currently not a member to the Convention.
454. See chapter 5 of current work.
455. xhe EEC holds a presumption that private party, commercial technology transfer on
terms "freely" agreed between parties forms the ideal basis for technology transfer.
Little research, especially in relation to ACP states, has been undertaken to prove
this contention - See He Political Economy of European Community Relations with
African. Caribbean and Pacific States. Contributions 1q Ltic Understanding of lilC
Ixtme Conventions on North - South Relations, edited by Frank Long, Oxford 1980,
at p. 126.
456. Economic and Social conditionalities are now a permanent component of EEC
official aid policy. The conditionalities include requirements for observance of
certain economic policies such as structural adjustment, social policies such as
human rights etc. - See, Decisions of the European Community Development
Ministers, December 1991.
457. The European Economic Community Convention of Association between the
European Community and African Malagasy states associated with Community,
London, HMSO's 1965, (Yaounde Convention), Doc. 64/346/EEC.
458. por discussion of a legal framework that guarantees transparency, formal
consultation, safeguards etc. see Chapter 3 of current work (UNDP).
459. The Community's Development Co-operation Policy Encompasses a range of tactics,
resources and instruments - European Development Fund Procedures, Collection
Dossiers Number 4, Brussels 1981 pp. 6-8.
4^0- See Part Four of Lome IV, articles 338 - 352, and articles 30 -1
4^1 • These include the Centre for Development of Industry, European Investment Bank,
462. The Bank was established under the Rome (EEC) Treaty (1958), Article 129 to
finance capital investment projects that promote the balanced development of the
Common market in the interest of the Community - Rome Treaty, Article 130 .
Under article 18 of the Bank's Statute ( a protocol integral to the Rome Treaty), the
Bank may operate in non member countries. Consequently, under previous Lome
Conventions, the Bank has operated in ACP states, and the current Fourth Lome
Convention, it manages 20% of total assistance under the five year Protocol.
463- The European Investment Bank. Financing Facilities under the Fourth ix>me
Convention. European Investment Bank Publication, 1991; Articles 233-238,
especially Article 236 of Lome IV Convention; 20th. General Report on the
Activities of the European Communities, 1986, point 941.
464. See Article 12 of the Internal Agreement.
466- indicative Programmes specify, inter alia : (i) The main sector to be assisted; (ii)
Measures necessary to achieve the development objectives of the sector(s); (iii) Time
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table for implementation; (iv) Project proposals for regional projects; (iv) Support for
structural adjustment - where applicable.
4<S6- European Investment Bank. Annual Report 1985. n.113.
467. Article 307 (a) - This provision recognises the right of recipient states to regulate
transactions occurring on their territory, under their national law, See - Chapter V
of current work.
468- See Annex XXXIX of Lome IV Convention, which allows the EC to apply a third -
country preferential treatment to ACP products which, if offered MFN treatment
would cause imbalance or discriminatory effects on the Community market.
469- See Article 356 of Lome IV Convention.
470. Preamble to Decision 84, Andean Commission; For the Common Investment Regime
and Technology Licensing Code, See 27 I.L.M 974 (1988).
471- For the Common Investment Regime and Technology Licensing Code, See 27 I.L.M
974(1988).
472. Article 5 of regulations.
473. For a discussion of the value of evaluation and assessment of technology transfer and
development of technology contracts in mitigating bargaining and negotiating power
disparities - See Chapter V of this current work.
474. Correa refers to the rights and obligations of the parties as reciprocal duties.
However, this term does not indicate the frequent need for preferential treatment by
the recipient to ensure balance of entitlements - See Correa, Transfer of Technology
in Latin America, opcit., at p.394.
475. For modifications of this and other requirements, to inter alia, take into account
international legal obligations and legitimate rights of technology owners, see -
Chapter 5 of Current Work, and Commission of the Cartagena Agreement Decision
220, reproduced in ICSID, Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 2, Number 2,
fall 1987.
476. See also Decision 313 of February 1992, amending Decision 311 of December 1991
which modified Decision 85. Decision 313 Articles 1-52 dealing with patents and
Articles 52 - 70 dealing with utility models have not reversed the provisions of the
joint technological polk y but have only modified them in respects like recognition of
intangible property as a separate item of "transfer".
477. Such a development is in accordance with the progressive ability of each state
member state to the Andean Pact to control its own technological development
within the framework of interdependence. Thus the major industrial property
owning state in the sub-region, that is Venezeula, which did not adopt Decision 85,
can exercise greater discretion in implementing its technological policy E.g the offer
of higher levels of protection to third countries, without defeating common goals -
Sec WIPR, Volume 16, p. 119.
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FOOT NOTES FOR CHAPTER
FIVE
478■ I^aw and Politics of West - East Technology Transfer, edited by Hiroshi Oda,
Martinus Nijhoff, Graham and Trotman, 1991.
479. See Policies. Laws and Regulations on Transfer. Application and Development Of
Technology: UNCTAD/1 I P/TEC 16, 1990 and rest of text in current Chapter.
480. The Law of the Sea, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Imv of
the Sea and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Croom Helm, 1983, United Nations, especially Articles 203, 207, 208(3), 266
and 269(b).
481. Under Article 42 of the Convention, an arbitral tribunal must decide a dispute in
accordance with rules of law agreed by the parties which can therefore be the law of
the host state, thus the practice that a host country's relationship with foreign
technology owners or suppliers, among others, will be governed by the law of the
recipient state, is not inconsistent with the Convention - See News From
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Volume 1,
Number 2, 1984 at pp. 2- 3.
482. For an economic review of this period, see, International Investment. Edited by Peter
J. Buckley 1990, especially pp.38 & 166.
483. For example the British Industrial Property System continued to be applied by many
former British territories in Africa. Reform of laws in such countries does not
automatically terminate the application of the foreign 'controlling' system in practice
- See 5 World Intellectual Property Reports, Volume 5, No.9 at p.231 and chapter
on industrial property system.
484. Bilateral Investment Treaties. United Nations Centre for Transnational corporations,
UNCTC, ST/CTC/65, especially pp.346 - 351; Collection of Treaties. Alliances and
Conventions relating Iq Security. Commerce and Navigation of ihs British
Dominions. London, .S. Buckley (Printers) 1717; State Responsibility and Bilateral
Investment Treaties by M. Sornarajah, p.80; Technology Trade, Joint Hearings
before the Committee on Science and Technology and the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, United
States House of Representatives and the House Task Force on Industrial Innovation,
96th. Congress, June 1980.
485. See Uganda Industrial Charter, Sessional Paper No.l, Second Session (1964),
Uganda Foreign Investment Protection Act 5 Laws of Uganda Cap.160 (1964).
486. Re - Orientation of Industrial Strategy in Developing Countries and selection and
Application of Industrial Technology. Papers Reviewed at United Nations Industrial
Organisation (UNIDO) Second Consultative Group on Appropriate Technology,
UNIDO Secretariat, IDAVG.279/4, 1978; British Overseas Investment in the
nineteenth Century by P. L. Cornell, Economic History Society, 1975.
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487. See Chapter 2 of this work on the Multilateral Industrial Property System and its
traditional impact on Technology Transfer.
488. View taken by, among others, Oscar Schachter, in Review of The United Nations
Code of Conduct For Transnational Corporations Hearing Before the Sub-
Committee on Human Rights and International Organisations of the Committee of
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1987 at p.36.
489. Concessions have continued, when the negotiating and bargaining power disparity is
wide, disguised under more equitable names such as joint ventures. For example, the
United African - American Corporation (UACC) established in 1953, adopted the
label of "Joint Venture" (LAMCO -JV) 1960, though only one quarter of the
produced surplus remained at the disposal of the Liberian Government while the rest
was transferred abroad - See Contract Law, The Free Market and State Intervention
by Robert Siedman, In The Political Economy of Law. opcit, note 32.
490. See For instance, Legal and Institutional Arrangements in Minerals Development,
Mining Journal Books, 1982, at pp. 56 - 57.
491. Report of the 48th. Conference, International Law Association, New York 1959,
Contribution by Dr. Tatian Guldberg (Sweden) , pp. 172 - 174, also other 237 - 238.
492. International Law Association Report of the 48th. Conference, opcit, note 491.
493. See Carlston, International Role of Concession Agreements 52 NW, U.L.Rev 618,
(635), 1957.
494. Innominacy occurs in technology contracts if the agreement is adapted to the subject
matter involved as well as the special unilateral wishes of the party offering the
technology, See - Reflections on The Structure of the Modern Law of International
Trade, A Collection of Essays, Edited by Petar Sarcevic, Graham & Trotman/
Martinus Nijhoof, 1990.
495. Private Enterprise and The East African Company , Edited By Aneurin Thomas,
Tanzania Publishing House, p. 165.
496. See Table Con Conflict of Interest.
497. In many of the newly independent countries, technology transfer was regarded
principally as capital equipment imports and regulated in terms of Balance of
Payments considerations, offer of incentives such as profit tax holidays, pioneer status,
etc. Thus exchange control legislation formed the basis for screening "foreign
investments" with the Central Bank acting as the approval authority, See for Instance
Technology Transfer Regulation in Ghana, by Ruth Nyakotey, In Joint Ventures as a
Channel for the Transfer of Technology United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, UNCTAD Doc. ITP/TEC/9, Moscow, 1988, New York 1990, at p.57;
and for an example of the kind of legislative approach applied in such countries, see
Nigerian Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act 1958, Amended as Decree
No. 22 of 1971; Investment Laws and Regulations in Africa, United
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Nations, Legal frame work for economic development, especially sections 69 - 70, on
guarantees of Foreign Investment.
498. World Investment Report, 1991, The Triad In Foreign Investment. United Nations,
New York 1991, UNCTC, ST/CTC/118, p.76; United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations, Environmental Aspects of Transnational Corporations,
A Survey, New York, 1985.
499. For a modern example of a turnkey contract which has been the subject of
International Arbitration, See Klockner et al V United Republic of Cameroon and
Societe Camerounaise des Engrais fSOCAME) S.A (Case ARB/81/2) award of
October 1983, Published in Journal du Droit International, 1984, p. 409.
500. Industrial Co-operation Through the Southern Africa n Development Co-ordination
Conference (SADCC) UNIDO/IS.570, 1985, at p.90.
501. See Private Enterprise and The East African Co ., Edited by Aneurin Thomas,
Tanzania Publishing House Ltd. 1969; The oldest Development Co-operation in
Africa, The Uganda Development Co-operation, initially highly successful, was
established in 1952.
502. See note 503, infra.
503. For example, See Portuguese Foreign Investment Institute, Decree Laws 239/76 and
348/77 and regulatory Decree 53/77, Articles 5 -7.
504. Situations which have been regarded as justifying special treatment by developing
countries include :
(i) Introduction of advanced technology not available in the recipient state;
(ii) Opportunity to train specialised local personnel;
(iii) Manufacture of products using suppliers state of the art technology and
producing products very dissimilar to those available locally;
Critical technological investments exceeding locally available resources;
For example, See Foreign Investment and The Development Process. The Case of
Greece , by George A. Petrochilos, Avebury, 1989, at pp.58 -60.
505. In the Case of Anaconda V Opic. the ability of the Transnational Corporations to
maintain control of host country socio- economic activity was discussed. It was held,
inter alia, that even though the transnational corporation, Anaconda, had been
stripped of part of its equity and made a minority shareholder in its subsidiary, it still
retained effective control - Anaconda Co. and Chile Copper Co . V OPIC, American
Arbitration Association, ILM (14) 1975, pp. 1237 -1238.
506. Multinational Investment In Developing Countries by Thomas Anderson, Routledge
1991, at pp. 7 -11.
507. Technology Transfer activity by Transnational Corporations has often been said to
resemble the insertion of a key into a lock, but with the opposite profile of the one.
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need to open it, thus obliging the recipient to change the lock in order to acquire any
benefit - Development. Environment and Technology i Towards a Technology For
Self Reliance. by John Galtung, UNCTAD DOC/TD/B/C.6/23/Rev.l, Geneva,
1979, at p. 19, world Investment Report, opcit. pp. 76 - 77.
508. See, among others, The Multinational Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in
Nigeria, by Owe Adikibi, in World Development, Volume 16, No.4, at p. 512;
Transfer of Technology to Nigeria and the Patents and Designs Act 1970, S K Date
Bah, Journal of African Law, Volume 25, No. 2, 1981;WorId Intellectual Property
Report, Volume 5, No. 9, p.231 etc. Thus for example, Gambia's Trade Mark
Legislation, modeled on pre- 1938, British Acts.
509. See, Bilateral Investment Treaties, United Nations Conference On Transnational
Corporations, UNCTC/ST/CTC/65, especially preface and Sections 346 - 352; The
proto type bilateral investment treaty's major objectives are normally to:
(i) Provide guarantees to foreign investors with a view to
stimulating traditional foreign investment flows;
(ii) Extend Most favored Nation or National Treatment to
foreign investors, especially in certain sectors;
(iii) Permit repatriation of profits and returns;
(iv) Lay down conditions governing expropriation or exercise of
eminent domain powers by the host State.
(v) Prescribe methods of dispute settlement;
(vi) discourage 'performance requirements';
See Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Comparative Analysis , by Istavan Pogany, In
International Business Law, Edited by David L. Perrott, Avebury, 1988 at p. 155; The
United States Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, A Proto - type for Future
Negotiation. Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 16, 1983, p.305.
510. See Chapter 1 of Current Work.
511. For example See - National Legislation. Regulations and Supplementary Documents
on Marine Scientific Research in Areas Under National Jurisdiction. United Nations,
New York, 1989, Sales, No.E.89.V.9.
512. See For Example See - The Domestic Application of International Human Rights
Norms, Judicial Colloquium, February 1988, Common Wealth Secretariat; Legal
Problems of International Organisations by Felice Morgenstein, p. 4 - 20.
513. The problem of re-assessing the relationship between states has received theoretical
attention for some time now. Sovereignty, is understood to be the whole body of
rights and attributes which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all
other states, and also in its relation with other states. Sovereignty confers rights upon
states [that is sovereign authority] and imposes on them [that is sovereign co¬
operation] duties, all of which should evolve to fit new conditions of social life.
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Sovereignty can no longer be regarded as an absolute and individual right of every
state, as used to be done under the old law founded on individualist regime [that is
sovereign authority]. Today, owing to social interdependence and to the
predominance of the general interests, the states are bound by many rules which have
not been ordered by their will [that is sovereign co-operation]. Judge Wellington Koo
: in Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. Ltd , Preliminary Objections,
JUDGMENT ICJ 1964 Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1964, pp.62
- 63 noted, inter alia, that International Law, being primarily based upon the general
principles of law and justice, is unfettered by technicalities and formalistic
considerations which are often given importance in municipal law. It is the reality
which counts more than the appearance. It is the equitable interest which matters rather
than the legal interest. In other words it is the substance which carried weight in the
international plane rather the form. However, respect for and preservation of
sovereign authority is inherent in the optional clause of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice - that is Article 36 (2).
514. For discussion a discussion See Contemporary Problems of International Law
Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenberger, Edited by Bin Cheng and E.D Brown,
London, 1988.
515. Various theoretical attempt to link General Assembly resolutions to Article 38 are
made in the following ways:
(i) By assuming the expression of consent or acceptance
through recommendations as constituting a modern extension
of the law of treaties;
(ii) regarding General Assembly Resolutions as an
authoritative or authentic interpretation or concretisation of
the provisions of the Charter;
(iii) By linking General Assembly Resolutions to one of the
elements of customary international law, equating resolutions
with an expression with an expression of opinio juris which
results in the formation of customary law;
(iv) Regarding resolutions as part of the general principles law
recognised by civilised nations;
See The Charter of The United and Nations the Development of Fundamental
Principles of International Law , by R.St. MacDonald, in Contemporary Problems of
International Law, p.205.
516. See - J. Brierly. The Law of Nations 5th. Edition, 1955 at p.l62;The Effect of United
Nations Resolutions on Emerging Legal Norms. 1979, American Society of
International Law Proceedings 300 and opposing views, Virally, The Sources of
International Law, in Manual of Public International Law 116 (M. Sorenson, Editor)
1968.
517. R. Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of
The United Nations , 1963, at p.5
518. See Chapter 1 of Current Work.
519. R. St. MacDonald, in Contemporary Problems of International Law , at p. 206, also
see General Assembly Resolution 95(1) of 11 December 1961.
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Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognised by the Charter and
Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, United Nations Year Book 1946 - 47, at p.254.
520. See for instance, United nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Compilation of Legal Materials Dealing with Transfer and Development of
Technology. UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/C.6/81; UNCTAD Restructuring the
Legal Environment, International Transfer of Technology Common to Laws and
Regulations on the Transfer and Acquisition of Technology, UNCTAD, Secretariat
TD/B/C.6/91, 1982; United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
(UNIDO) Guidelines for Evaluation of Transfer of Technology Agreement;
Development and Transfer Technology Series, No. 12, N.Y 1979; World Intellectual
Property Organisation, Licensing Guide for Developing Countries, Geneva, 1977,
Draft Joint Inventive Activity Guide, prepared for the Committee of experts on Joint
Venture Activity, Geneva 2-6 (May) No. JIA/II/2, etc.
521. For example of recent "liberalising" national legislation which brings Direct
Regulation statutes in line with minimum international standards in Latin American,
see inter alia, Developing Strategic Partnerships and Joint Ventures in Latin America
by Anthony Carty, Manchester University 1991; and globally - Policies. Laws and
Regulations on Transfer. Application and Development of Technology, opcit. Among
countries which passed new mixed jurisdiction laws are - Kenya, Law On Industrial
Property, Gazette Supplement No.95 of 15 December 1989; Egypt, New Investment
Law No. 230 (1989) reproduced in ICSICD review, Foreign Investment Law Journal,
Volume 4, Number 2 Fall 1989; Zambia Investment Act, No. 5 of April 1986;
Tanzania Patents Act of 1987; China, Rules for implementation and regulations on
the Administration of Technology Import Contracts, reproduced in the European
Intellectual Property law review, 1988, p. 248; The Phillipines, Executive Order No.
226 of July 1987, on the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 & Department of Trade
and Industry, Bureau of Patents, Trade Marks and Technology Transfer, Department
of Administrative Order No.5, series of 1988.
522. See, Landmark UNGAR Resolution 200 (III) of the 4th. of December 1948;
Accelerated flow of Capital and Technical Assistance to Developing Countries,
GAOR, 16th. Session, Supp. No. 17, December 1961; and for principles of
International Technical Co-operation and Assistance, See Chapter III of this work.
523. During the run up debate to the passing of Resolution 200 (III) opcit. note 40, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) proposal that assistance or aid should not
result in any advantage for the granting state was defeated, on the primary ground
that "interest by western [developed] nations would otherwise soon have been reduced
to zero - See The Start of International Development Co-operation in The United
Nations, 1945 - 1952, Jaap Van Soet, Van Gorcum Assen, 1978 at p. 84; Se also
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Resolution 143
(VI) DOC.TD/277 and DOC.TD/B/C.6/L.73 under which overrode the idea of de-
commercialisation of technology transfer but emphasised giving access to technology
without discrimination.
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524. See UNCTAD, Committee on Transfer of Technology, Geneva, Item 6 (e) of the
provisional agenda, Access By Developing Countries To Technology in The Public
Domain, TD/B/C.6/122 at p.4, 1970.
525. New International Economic Order (NIEO), Programme of Action, 6th. Special
Session, May 1974.
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Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), United Nations, Official Records, 16th
Session, Supp. No.llA, New York.
656. US Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, see Copyright Hearings, opcit note 587,
Article on Computer Software and Intellectual Property. The integrated circuits
proposal seeks to acquire protection for original layout - design, incorporated in a
semiconductor chip, for a term of at least ten years from die date of first commercial
exploitation and date of registration.
657. For example, Brazil, India, South Korea etc. see GATT or WIPO, opcit, note 24,
pp.149- 156.
658. United States - proposals - GATT, Doc.MTN.GNG/NGl l/W/14, Rev.l- Objectives.
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659. The suggested solution tmder the Dunkel, GATT - IPR's Draft, (opcit) Article 8, is
inadequate to enable developing countries to apply 'non - voluntary' measures
unless such measures are deemed acceptable to developed countries.
660. According to UNCTAD, the current IPR's reform drive, will, like the earlier market
disruption provisions, provide developed countries with a valuable tool to be wielded
against those developing countries which do not rely on governmental intervention
in technological innovation and development any more than industrialised countries
but achieve a greater ability to offer on the international market, competitive lower
priced goods or services, See Trade and development Report, UNCTAD/TDR/4, at
sections 66 - 67.
661. GATT. Doc. MTN. NG1 l/W/30, of 31 October 1988, section 18.
662. Various options have been suggested by developed countries for the incorporation of
IPR's into the GATT framework that is:
(a) Through amendment of GATT Articles;
(b) Implementation of the draft Counterfeit and Piracy Code;
(c) A new GATT Code, outside the existing product GAIT, open to GATT
signatories and others, and designed to 'promote effective and adequate, protection
of IPR's' in order to 'reduce distortions and impediments to international trade' -
current round approach;
(d) Inclusion of IPR's into a Service GATT or Service Constitution ;
GATT or WIPO, opcit, note 24, pp. 105 - 109, especially page 107.
663. Brazilian proposal, GAIT. Doc. MTN. NG11AV/3Q, of 31 October 1988 , section
12.
664 See Chapter 2 in present work (on the Internationa] Intellectual Property Regime
and Commercial technology Transfer).
665. International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law , Volume XIV, Copyright and
Industrial Property, Chapter 1, General Questions, IlA Intematiflaa). Conventions.
Eugen and Ulmer, at p.5.
666. Technology Selection. Acquisition and Negotiation, opcit, note 23 at p.99.
667. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Declaration of 20 September 1986 ,
see Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 33rd Supplement, (BISD) GATT
1987, pp,19ff; For analysis, see for instance, The New GATT Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and Economic Problems'. Edited by Ernst
- Ulrich Petersmann and Meinhard Hilf, Kluwer, 1991, Declaration reproduced from
p.581, and also GATT or WIPO, opcit, note 24.
668. See Preamble Draft Agreement ( Dunkel - GATT/IPR,s), of the 20 th. December
1991.
67
669. Sec Hart, The Mercantalist's Lament : National Treatment and Modern Trade
Negotiations, note, 682, infra .
670. For unilateral actions based on this premise, see especially actions under Section 301
of the United States Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Public Law
No. 100 -418 amending the Trade Act; and potentially, the European Community
New Commercial Policy Instrument 1984, Regulation No. 2641/84; Examples of
conditional MFN which similarly will in effect be extended to IPR's, include the
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) 1974 as subsequently renewed, Sectoral
Arrangements (for example, steel), Subsidies etc. See - World Trade and
Development Report (1984), UNCTAD/TDR/4 (volume II); United States
Congress, Improving Enforcement of Trade Agreements : Hearing Before the
Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 1st session, march
1987; Pursuing United States Goals Bilaterally : Intellectual Property & Special 301,
Business America, Volume 110, No. 19, September 25 1989, p.6.
671. Dunkel - GATT/IPR,s Draft), (opcit) Article 3 (1).
672. Article 4, Dunkel - GATT/IPR,s Draft (opcit). The exceptions - Article 4 of the
Draft - to this requirement are:
(a) Article 4(a) those deriving from international agreements on judicial assistance
and law enforcement of a general nature and not particularly confined to the
protection of IPR's,
(b) Those exemptions made under the Berne (1971) or Rome Conventions
authorising that the treatment accorded be a function of not of national treatment
but of the treatment accorded in another country,
(c) In respect of the rights of performers , producers of phonograms and
broadcasters not provided for under the GATT agreement,
(d) Existing rights (at the time of the agreement) deriving from international
agreements relating to the protection of intellectual property, provided that such
agreements are notified to the Council on Trade Related Aspects of IPR's and do
not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other
parties.
673. In International Trade and Global Envelopment. Essays in Honour of Jagdish
Bhagwati, Edited by Koekkoek and L.B.M Mennes, at p. 124.
674. GATT Article XIX.
675. GATT Articles VI and XVI.
676. Dunkel - GATT/IPR's Draft, (opcit) Article 8 (1), pp. 42 - 45.
677. Dunkel - GATT/IPR's Draft, (opcit) Articles 9 - 14.
678. Article 13 (copyrights), Article 17 (Trade Marks) , Articles 30 and 31 (Patents), etc.
of the Dunkel - GATT/IPR's Draft (opcit).
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679. For exclusions from patent protection in relation to inter alia, pharmaceutical
products and processes, animal and plant varieties, biological processes, food
products and processes, computer programs, chemical products, etc. see WIPO
Document HL/CE/TV/INF/1 Rev.l, also reproduced as annex II, in GATT or
WIPO. New Wavs in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, opcit, note
24.
680. Despite the low level of grants to nationals, in the majority of developing countries,
especially the least developed, the exclusion of alternative innovation promoting
intellectual property instruments, such as 'utility patent' grants (for low level, low
cost technological inventions of local or regional interest, developing countries have
not included on the negotiating Agenda of either the Uruguay Round or the Paris
Convention Revisions, such alternative mechanisms - For a discussion of the value of
utility patent grants, see Ullrich, The Importance of Industrial Property Law and
other legal Measures in the promotion of Technological Innovation, Industrial
Property, 1989 at p. 102; Utility Models : the Experience of the Federal Republic of
Germany, Industrial Property, 1987, Hausser, p.314 . Many countries grant utility
patents in various forms, the most famous being Federal Republic of Germany and
Japan - See Industrial Property Laws and Treaties. Multilateral Treaties, 1-008.
681. Various bilateral and unilateral 'pressure measures' have forced developing countries
to seek canalisation of such pressures into a multilateral framework.For example
United States pressure actions against specific developing countries under Section
301 of its Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, is well known, see for instance, action against
Argentina 36 PTCJ 406 (8-18-18), Brazil 36 PTCJ 745 (10-27-88) etc.
682. Hart, Hie Mercantalist's Lament : national Treatment and Modern Trade
Negotiations 21 (6) J.W.T.L 39 & 59 (1987); M.Wolf, Fiddling While Ui£ GATT
Bums The World Economy, 1986, 9 (1), 1 - 8; and for an alternative view, J .
Culbertson. The Folly of Free Trade. Harvard Business Review 1986, 64 (5), pp. 122
- 128.
683. In a 1974 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Council report, the Council identified barriers to legitimate trade that could result
from abuse of IPR's as including:
(a) Territorial, quantity or price restrictions imposed by patent pools or cross
licensing arrangements;
(b) Export prohibition of patented products or restrictions of such exports to
specified areas established by licensing agreements;
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(e) Fixing of prices of patented products by means of patent licences, etc.
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(0 Due to the increase in the information content of transferred technology, it is
likely that such restrictive practices can only increase.
See - Technology, Trade Policy and the Uruguay Round, opcit note 23, at p.251.
684. See, inter alia, Developing Countries and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, by Abdulqawi. A . Yusuf, in Technology Selection. Acquisition
and Negotiation. UNCTAD, ITP/TEC/22, at 97-100;
685. Under GATT, subsidies have traditionally been defined to include any form of price
support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product .. or
to reduce imports of any product, Article XVI (I) GATT, Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents (BISD), 1961, 185 ss. The development of new technologies,
which are increasingly regarded as central to socio - economic development, is to a
large extent publicly subsidised, especially in the industrialised countries -
International Encyclopedia of Comparative law: Volume XVII, State and Economy,
especially at P.56.
686. The Preamble to the Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
recognises that:
(i) Subsidies are used by governments to promote important economic objectives,
(ii) May have harmful effects on trade and production,
(iii) Emphasis should be on effect of subsidies;
See- Edward M. Graham, World Trade Law and Government Subsidies to
Industrial Innovation, in Technology and International Relations. Edited by
Hieronymi, McMillan, 1987, pp. 27 - 36.
687. Phrase popularised by the United States in its international trade practice and policy.
Under this concept, (which does not primarily address material inequalities) all
countries trading with the United States are expected to maintain:
(a) Open, equitable, and reciprocal market access,
(b) Reduce or eliminate barriers and other trade distorting policies and practices,
(c) Maintain more effective systems of international trade disciplines and
procedures.
See - United States Trade Act of 1974, Section 301; United States Omniuus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. By transferring the authority of
determination, decision making and implementation under Title III ( ss. 301 - 309)
of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended from the President to the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), the policy of unilateral pressure became institutionalised as
a permanent active policy trade measure of the United States.
688. Edward . M. Graham, opcit, note 686, at p.34 and Reflections on Technology,
International Order and Economic Growth, by Otto Hieronymi, at p. 93 - 94;
Member states of the Africa Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (AR1PO),
most of which still run 'dependent' national intellectual systems based on former
governing metropolitan states models, have suspended decision on whether to grant
utility patents on the grounds that they want to reward 'inventors' rather than simple
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'utility modellers', See GATT or WIPO, opcit, note 24, at pp. 153 - 157; 6 WIPR
231, No.l, 1992 and 5 WIPR, No.9, 1991. According to Hieronymi, the issue of the
introduction and control over technology policies is even more complex than that of
tra ; liberalisation, since governments tend to advocate free trade in areas where
thcr nationals have strong market positions or even monopoly power while
favouring technological policies or other exceptional measures in areas of national
weakness.
689. See, Article II lit.d of the Subsidies Code, amended in 1979, GATT, Basic Selected
Instruments and Documents, No.26 (1978 - 79), Geneva 1980.
690. Unfair because the relevant subsidised technology would protect the profitability of
the home countries subsidised activity rather than individual rights; Trade sanctions
include compensatory and retaliatory withdrawal of trade concessions, (including
product or country graduation from preferential treatment under for instance a
developed country Generalised system of preferences) imposition of tariffs and
quotas etc.
691. See. Bilateral Agreements on Trade and Economic Co-operation. Concluded by
Developing Countries, by Alfredo Castillo - Gomez, UNCTAD/ST/ECDC/36,
Vol.11, 1988, at p.248, especially pp. 247 - 257.
692. Even after its revision in 1955, the General Agreement contained superficial
provisions relating to trade problems of developing countries and these were mainly
to be found under Article XVIII (infant industry protection measures and Balance of
Payments provisions), Article XX lit (1) (measures undertaken in pursuance of
commodity agreements), Article XXVI (5) lit (c) (concessional terms of accession for
former dependencies), Article XXVM bis para.3 lit (b) (more flexible use of tariffs
by developing countries to promote their economic development) - See International
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume XVII, State and Economy . Part of IV
of GATT, entered into force in June 1966 applied from 1965. Initially implemented
through waivers of 25th May and 26th November 1971, under Article XXV (5), it is
now implemented under the enabling clause.
693. See UNCTAD Doc.TD/B/979, on improvement of the GATT safeguard system.
694. Thus for example, while Article XXXVII imposes an obligation to refrain from the
introduction of new customs duties, quantitative restrictions and consumer taxes on
developing countries exports and the obligation to liberalise existing barriers of this
nature, such obligations apply only 'to the fullest extent possible, except when
compelling reasons, which may include legal reasons, make it impossible to give
them effect. See for instance - Deepak Nayyar, Towards a Possible Multilateral
Framework for Trade in Services ; Some Issues and Concepts. In Technology,
Trade Policy and the Uruguay Round, opcit note 23, Papers and Proceedings of a
Round Table, at Delphi, Greece, UNCTAD/ITP/23, United Nations, New York ,
1990, at p. 133.
695. GATT BISD 1969 supp. pp. 93 - 94; The Uruguay Round and Bevond. the First
Report from the Ford Foundation supported project on developing countries and the
global trading system, edited by John Whalley, McMillan 1989, pp. 111-116.
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696. See, Trade and Technology ; Issues al Slake for Developing Countries by Ruben
Ricupero , in Technology, Trade Policy and the Uruguay Round, opcit, note 23, at
p.193.
697. See Dunkel - GATT/IPR's Draft, (opcit), Article 65; Under the draft transitional
arrangements provision is made for:
(a) Lapse of one year before parties are obliged to apply provisions of the
agreement - Articles 65;
(b) Non application agreement by any developing country for four {4} years, except
in relation to provision of National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation Treatment
and compliance with WIPO concluded multilateral Convention obligations. Same
period applies to centrally planned economies in transition to market free -
enterprise economies;
(c) Non application of the agreement's provisions on sector and product exclusions
for a five year period by a country possessing, at the date of application of the
agreement, laws allowing such sector or area exclusions. Under Article 66, special
provisions are made in favour of the least developed countries that is: Ten year
transitional period for the least developed countries , (extendable by the GATT
Council on IP), during which these countries would not be required to implement
the agreements provisions. Developed countries would also provide incentives to
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting
technology transfer to the least developed countries. These free enterprise and
market based provisions are a token recognition of the technological non-
competitiveness of the least developed countries and developed countries belief that
private parties are best suited to transfer technology to this group of countries.
698. Dunkel - GATT/IPR's Draft, opcit
699. WIPR, Vol.6, No.2, February 1992.
700. The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and Economic
Problems, edited by Ernst - Ulrich Petersman & Meinhard Hilf, Kluwer, 1991,
especially 572 - 573.
701. For a Socio - economic evaluation of the new role of information technology in
technology transfer, see - Information Technology and International Relations:
Perspectives for South and North, by Cees . J. Hamelink, in Information
Technology and the New International Economic Order, by Jorg Becker, 1984 at
p.41 -.
702. For example, as under Dunkel - GATT/IPR's Draft, opcit, Article 8.
703. See for instance, Brazilian Proposal, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay
Round, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/30, October 1988.
704. Dunkel - GATT/IPR's Draft, (opcit) Section 5, Article 27.
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FOOT NOTES FOR CHAPTER
SEVEN
705. Code refers to Draft international Code of conduct on the Transfer of technology,
TD/Code TOT/52, 1988 or the draft Code TD/Code/TOT/47, as stated; Sec also
Reports of the Secretary General of UNCTAD on the Consultations held in 1986 -
TD/CODE TOT/50 and 1987 in TD/CODE TOT/51, respectively.
706. International Legislation, a Collection ef the Texts of Multi-partite Instruments
of General International Law. Edited by Manley O Hudson, Vol.1919-21,
Washington Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1931 (Introduction).
707. UNCTAD VIII, Analytical Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat to the Conference
TD/358, 1992; also see Chapter 5 of this current work for a discussion of the impact
of international Decisions, Resolutions, Declarations and Agreements relating to
international technology transfer on regulation of international technology flows, and
Chapter 1 for a discussion of the so called hard and soft law issues.
708. UNCTAD VIII, Analytical Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat to the Conference,
opcit, at. ss. 610 - 624.
709. UNCTAD VIII, Analytical Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat to the Conference,
opcit, at s. 614.
710. See - Chapter 5 of this current work.
711. For socio - economic arguments supporting technology recipients - See, inter alia,
Farouk. J. Contractor; International Technology Lice; sing Compensation Costs and
Negotiation. Lexington Books C - 1981 - at p.106; Towards a theory of Technology
Licensing, Stanford Law review,Volume. 1989; The Multinational corporation and
Monopoly Patents in Nigeria, World Development Journal, Vol.16, No.4, (Pergamon
Press); United Nations centre on Transnational Corporations,Transnational
Corporations in World Development 1988 at p. 183 - It is alleged, inter alia, that
Transnational Corporations in particular, transfer to LDC's technology which is too
sophisticated or inappropriate largely because they control the patent systems in
LDC's and possess the know-how which keeps the recipient dependent on the
supplier. For opposing views, e.g that LDC's lack the necessary infrastructure such
communications networks, local amenities and physical and government support
which would attract high-tech firms or ensure the necessary adaptation and diffusion
of such technology if supplied- see, Blakely E. J, Roberts B. H and Manidis; (1987 )
Principles of designing support systems for the formation and attraction of
advanced technology firms, International Journal of Technology and
Management, Vol.2, No. 3&4 pp. 337-356.
712. For a discussion of the material conditions which necessitate the need for a Cod'.',
see, inter alia, - legal aspects of the New International Economic Order: Hossain
(1980) at p. 156-158.
713. See the UNCTAD Medium Term Plan 1984 - 1989, Chapter 20, Major Programme:
Science and Technology, Programme 2, Transfer of Technology - UNCTAD Doc..
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A/3716; UNCTAD's approach to the legal issues raised by technology transfer and
development issues however continues to be un-focussed or un-clear. UNCTAD
divides the legal issues into
(i) International Legal Issues - the Code;
(ii) National laws, regulations and policies on transfer and development of
technology;
(iii) The economic, commercial and developmental aspects of the industrial
property system;
(iv) Policies and instruments on the promotion and encouragement of technological
innovation;
Though this division is convenient the links that is by way of minimum
international standards and norms, international general principles etc. which as we
have shown in this work are now apparent, are often discussed in a dichotomised or
truncated way, thus retarding faster development and identification of new norms,
standards and principles while unduly enhancing traditional legal opinion divisions
between technologically developed (exporting) states and developing countries
(largely consuming) countries.
714. Key Concepts in International Investment Arrangements and their Relevancy to
Negotiations on International transactions in Services, UNCTC, Current Studies,
Series A, Number 13, ST/CTC/Ser./A/13, United Nations Centre for transnational
Corporations, New York, 1990 at 24.
715. For detailed discussion of codes of conduct in relation to multinational business, see;
International Codes and Multinational Business - Setting guide-lines for
international Business Operations by John M Kline - Quorom Books,Green Wood
Press,1985.
716. See - Rubin, Developments in the Law of International Economic relations:
Reflections Concerning the United Nations Commission on Transnational
Corporations 70 AM.J.INT.L (1976).
717. See for instance - Dennis Thompson; The UNCTAD Code on the Transfer of
Technology. Journal of World Trade Law, Vol.16, No.4, 1982 at p.31.
718. E.g traditional institutions such as the Bretton Woods institutions, until recently, did
not specifically mention or deal with "developing countries". The inclusion of
development objectives in the World Bank Charter was aimed at correction of
temporary dislocations caused by war in Europe; See for instance History of
UNCTAD infra, note 724, at p.9; Early efforts of the United Nations to reform the
international legal system governing the transfer of technology and skills to LDC's
include - UNGAR. 1713(xiv.) December 1961 which called for a study of die effects
of patents on the economies of LDC's. The resolution largely centred on the need to
study patent legislation in LDC's and problems of granting, protecting and use of
patents in LDC's. This was followed by other resolutions, increasingly in UNCTAD,
which gradually specified technology transfer as an issue E.g GAR.. 1713(xvi.)1964,
in UNCI AD 1 Final Act, UNGAR. 2091(xx.) of December 1965 which
recommended the full study of existing national and international practices for the
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transfer of patented and un-patented technology to developing countries. Se also
Resolution 150 (xvi) at the 456th. meeting, 1976, on the transfer of real resources to
developing countries.
719. See - The transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, with special reference to
licensing and know - how agreements TD/28/Supp.l and Corr.l in proceedings in
UNCTAD, 2nd. Session Vol. 1, Report and Annexes.
720. The law of "interdependence" has certain characteristics of which the essential ones
are;
(i) it is concerned not only with delimitation of the rights of states, but also
with harmonising them;
(ii) In every question it takes into account all various aspects;
(iii) It takes general interest fully into account;
(iv) It emphasizes the notion of the duties of states not only towards each
other but also towards international society.
(v) It condemns abuse of right;
(vi) It adjusts itself to the necessities of the international life and evolves
together with it, accordingly, it is in harmony with policy; General Assembly on The
Issue of The Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations Advisory
Opinion of the ICJ Reports, 1948 at p. 57; also See - New Trends in Contemporary
International Law , by Judge T.O Elias, Foreword by L. Wilberforce, The Josephine
Onoh Memorial Lecture, 1985.
721. The view that the Code is a unilateral LDC effort either in its inception or negotiation
is erroneous, though even some LDC jurists seem to affirm its correctness - See Draft
International Code of Conduct on The Transfer of Technology. TD/Code/TOT/52,
1988. View by UNCTAD expert Luiz O Baptista at p. 15; The Draft International
Code of Conduct on The Transfer of Technology, by Fikentscher Wolfgang, II C,
1980, at p.5.
722. See Fikentscher Wolfgang, opcit. note 721, especially footnotes at pp. 5-6. The
Pugwash Conference marked the threshold or change from speculation about
international regulation to actual proposals for negotiation. A draft Code appeared
after the 1973 Pugwash Conference (See World Development Journal Vol.2, Nos. 4
and 5, 1974, pp. 7 - 82). The Secretary General of the conference had remarked in his
opening speech that in light of the existing international situation, which is
disadvantageous to technology buyers in the LDC's be they Governments or private
firms, there is urgent need for a code of conduct to govern international transactions -
See also UNGAR 3201 (S-VI) of 1974; Lima Declaration , opcit , note 323.
723. The influx of newly independent states (or formerly non self governing territories),
into the international arena during the early 1960's was a primary cause of the change
of United Nations emphasis from political to social economic issues; See also Article
55 and 60 of United Nations Charter.
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724. Established under GAR.. 1995 (xix.) Dec. 1964, UNCTAD was meant not merely to
be a forum for the discussion or formulation of new approaches to international trade
but also to act an instrument for the realisation of specific policies and agreements
passed under principles and guide-lines of the United Nations - See UNCTAD for a
New International Economic Order by Zalmai Haquani, UN New York 1978 at pp.
3-10; The History of UNCTAD 1964 - 1984, UNCTAD/OSG/286. UN, New York,
1985.
725. UNGAR 3202(s-vi)1974, called for the formulation ol a Code of Conduct for the
transfer of technology. Under the resolution technology transfer was to be based on
three limbs that is:
(i) Improving access to technology;
(ii) Promoting effective transfer;
(iii) Encouraging indigenous Technology Transfer in LDC's.
Resolution 3362(s-vii), s. iii, para. 3 passed at the seventh session called for
international co-operation to evolve a transfer of technology Code, UNCTAD Reso.
89 (iv) Nairobi, 1976 called for an intergovernmental group of experts to elaborate a
Code of conduct etc. all the calls while emphasising the need for special assistance to
LDC's, contain no effective mechanisms for the accomplishment of this goal,
especially in relation to LLDC's. The developed countries effective will to assist may
be reflected in the stand of organisations in these countries, for instance the
international chamber of commerce has always stood for protection of private
technological property and appropriate remuneration for suppliers of technology-
irrespective of the relationship between supplier and recipient. According to the
Chamber, parties to transfer of technology transactions should be given full
autonomy to choose the law applicable to their transaction and the forum for the
settlement of disputes; see ICC TD/Code NGO's/6; TD/Code/TOT/49, 6th. session of
the UN conference p. 281.
726. For a discussion of the concept of common heritage of Mankind, See Christopher C.
Joyner - Legal Implications of lhe concept of ihe common Leriiage of manki? L
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 35, 1986 at pp. 190 - 199;
North-South, The adjustments Ahead OECD 1981.
727. See UNCTAD TD/CodcvTOT/21(part two) and TD/Code/TOT/47 Appendix E.
728. As Wallace notes in relation to the European Community experience, a certain loss
of sovereignty is a practical necessity in the application of a binding instrument by an
international or regional body, See International Codes and guide-lines for
Multinational Enterprises: update and selected Issues, International Lawyer 1985;
also Chapter V of this current work in relation to the Andean Pact experience.
729. The issue of the inappropriateness of traditional international law principles in
regulation of international resource transfers continues to be rigorously discussed.
For a discussion of the issue in the context of foreign investment - See* Inter alia, U.
S Banco National De Cuba V Chase Manhattan Bank 658F.2nd. 875(1981)
pp.887-894; Topco Case- International Law Reports, Vol. 53 (1979); Amln 1 Case
- International Legal Materials (vol. 17) 1978 .etc. Some of the traditional
principles established in such cases E.g in relation to standards of compensation,
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have never been accepted by more than half of the world's legal systems.
Consequently, it would be unjust to impose, through a multilateral instrument,
principles which have been bilaterally rejected or objected to.
730. For a discussion of some of the legal measures OECD countries have taken to
control the effects of monopoly power abuse within their territory, see chapter V of
current work. Also -for a discussion of issues of harmonisation of private industrial
property rights and the public interest, see United States V Studiengesellschaft
Kohle M.B.H. 670 F. 2nd, 1122 at 1127, US Court of Appeal for the District of
Columbia - The Court noted, inter alia, that:
"The Patent laws, authorised by the constitution, were
enacted by congress to stimulate invention and reward
innovation by granting a patentee a 12 year
monopoly....(US Constitution Article 1, s.8,35 U.S.A
s.154). Such a grant is in inevitable tension with the
general hostility against the monopoly expressed in anti¬
trust laws...";
See also - Intellectual Property Review, Recent Developments in Patent-Anti trust
interface, response to a new reality at pp.162. There is a growing trend towards
liberalisation of anti-trust regulation; International Business and National
Jurisdiction by A.D Neale, (1988); International Technology Transfer; Concepts.
Measures and Comparisons by Rosenberg. N and Frischtak C, New York 1985;
Competition law in the European Communities, Praeger Special Studies, Jan 1989,
vol.12. No.l atp.2;
731. The issue of Restrictive Business Practices, as discussed below, seems to be an over
lap in the Code with other multilateral instruments such as the Code on restrictive
business practices. The Code on restrictive business practices is however general and
does not deal comprehensively with technology transfer restrictive practices - See,
UNCTAD Report -Report of lh£ second Adhoc Group of Experts qd Restrictive
Business Practices. UNCTAD /TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6 march 1976 at pp.7-8; The New
Code Environment, UNCTC, Series A, No.16, 1991; UNCTAD - TD/B/1261, May
1990, Trade and Development Board, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of
Experts on restrictive Business Practices on its 9th.. Session.
732. See Chapters II & VI of this Current work.
733. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art. 31; Waldock, YBELC (1966 I)
esp. at p. 184 and for a through discussion of treaty interpretation, see Yambrusic,
opposite at. p.169-218; The Law of Treaties bv Lord McNair. 1961: The major
International Treaties 1914 -1945, A History and Guide with Texts - J.A.S.
Grenville, Methuen, 1987.
734. Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, Parry and Grant, Oceana Pub.
1986.
735. Lauterpacht: The Development of International Law by the permanent Court of
International Justice, especially at P.250.
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736. According to Hudson, certain circumstances require or necessitate lack of clarity in
the stated intention or the use of constructive ambiguity. Ambiguity becomes a
desideratum per se, to maintain uncertainty. This is often in cases where no
immediate solution exists or where only evolutionary processes may allow solutions
acceptable to all parties- See, Hudson, opcit note 409; Free-Zones Case Series A/B
NO. 46, pp. 182-3, at which it is said that account should be taken of human
psychology and more particularly of governmental psychology. According to many
authors the ICJ has failed to establish a consistent pattern of norms for treaty
interpretation. Art. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention is a UN legislative initiative
to establish such norms.
737. See The Challenge of developing in lh£ 1980's our response Edited by Anthony
Jennings & Thomas G. Weiss esp. at p.55, Fikentscher W, opcit, note 721, at p.9.
738. Appendix A to TD/Code/TOT/47.
739. See for instance the revised text of the draft outline of an international Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, TD/A.C 1/4, submitted by the experts from
the Group of 77; Doc.. TD/B/C.6/14 Annex II November - December 1975, revised
by the representative of Mexico on behalf of the Group of 77; World
Development(Joumal),Vol. 2, No. 4&5, April 1974 at p.79; Dennis Thompson, The
UNCTAD Code of Conduct on Hie transfer of technology J.W.T.L vol. 16 no.4 pp
311-337 at p.319; Canadian Year Book of International Law 1980 at p.234 - for
discussion of Group B's insistence on the right to freedom of contract and respect for
industrial property rights; also see- UN. Doc./TD/B/C.6/14 (1975) annex 1.
740. Preamble, TD/Code/TOT/47, Article 1.
741. Developed countries have resisted the incorporation of "ancillary" rights and duties
such as those found in United Nations General Assembly - E.g the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of states G.A Reso. 3281, 29 UNGAR Supp. 31, UN
Doc. A/9631(1974), See Rosenthal -The Charter c; Economic Righki and Dudes of
States and ihc New International Economic Order. 16 VA.J.1NT.L 310 (1976);
However, see Chapter one of this work on Methodology and Issues.
742. Paragraphs 5, 6 and & 7, TD/Code TOT 47.
743. TD/Code/TOT/47 para. 8, 9 & 10.
744. For suggested solutions to this controversy, see Chapter V of this Current Work.
745. For a discussion of maintenance of international (trade) competitive without negative
monopolistic practices - See, Ih£ Newly Industrialising Countries and Radical
Theories of Development: World Development Journal Vol. 13, NO.7, 1985, at
p.789.
746. Appendix A TD/Code/TOT 47 and proposals - Appendix B TD/Codc TOT/47,
Para. 13.
747. TD/Code TOT/47, Chapter 1.1(a).
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748. The complexity of international technology transfer transactions may be illustrated
by a simple diagram:
1 Multilateral Technological Co-operation & Assistance Multi- Bilateral
arrangements
2 Bilateral agreements (including state contracts)
.[International joint ventures etc.]
[State - A] [State B]
&
3 [Non Governmental Organisation parties]
4 [Supplying - Party] 5.[Recipient]
Local or foreign subsidiary.
6 Third Party ( E.g sub-licensee)
7 Regional organisations, state or private party.
Transactions can occur between and among any of the parties 1-7.
749. See Chapter VI of Current Work on developed country position during on-going
Uruguay Round on issues of private party intellectual property rights protection in
host states
750. TD/Code/TOT/47 para 1.4 .
751. See North- South Technology Transfer, the adjustments ahead QECD.1981 esp.
pp.27-28; Kwamena Acquaah- International Regulation of Transnational
Corporations, the New Reality, 1986, Praeger, and Fautorous's comment that:
"the ability ..to utilise resources located in several
territories, to transfer or withhold resources from
country to country, and to choose appropriate mode and
degrees of operation in accordance with the
management's perception of the company's interest
(allows transnational enterprises) to take advantage of
the conditions- natural, financial, political and legal,
prevailing in any particular country, and to evade, when
necessary, some of the effects of such conditions"
A.A.Fautorous, Columbia Journal of Transnational law vol. 10 at pp.330 [1971];
Para. 53 of the UN Code of conduct on Transnational Corporations, UNCTC
Current Studies, Series A No.4 UN 1986 ST/CTC/Ser.A/4 calls upon Transnational
Corporations to cooperage and participate in the promotion of economic and social
development in hosts states.
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752. According to the WIPO Licensing Guide : Technology means systematic
knowledge of the manufacture of a product, or the rendering of a service in industry,
agriculture or commerce, whether that knowledge be reflected in an invention, a
utility model, an industrial design, a plant variety, or technical information in the
form of documentation, or in skills or experience of experts, for the design,
installation, operation or maintenance of an industrial plant or its equipment or for
the management of an industrial or commercial enterprise or its activities; See also,
Workshop on Industrial Property Rights in Joint Venture Arrangements, held in
China, Lecture No. 2 - Methods for the Commercial Transfer and Acquisition of
Technology and their Relationship to Joint Venture Arrangements, Lecture prepared
by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO
Doc. WO/BW/2, Geneva, October 1982.
753. Para. 1.2, TD/Code TOT/47, Chapter 1.
754. See Chapter V of this current work.
755. Para. 1.3, TD - Code TOT /47 , Chapter 1
756. Para. 1.3(a), TD - Code TOT /47 , Chapter 1
757. Para 1.3 (c) &(d).
758. Appendix C, TD/ Code TOT/47, recommendation by the Secretary General and
President of the conference for para. 1.4.
759. For a discussion of mandatory direct regulation statutes and the opposing facilitating
law or non regulatory approach - See Chapters I and V of Current work.
760. For modifications of this approach, see Chapters I and V of Current work. However,
under framework treaty law and institutions, a flexible and evolutionary process
resolves such issues.
761. Para.2.1 (i),TD/Code TOT 47, See also the Centre for Transnational Corporations
Reporter CTC Reporter, UN, No.l 1, 1982 at p.33.
762. Draft international Code of conduct on the Transfer of technology, TD/Code
TOT/52, 1988 atpp.3-4 and para 2.1(vii) and (x) TD /Code TOT/47.
763. Para.2.1(iii) TD/Code TOT/47.
764. The Principle of good faith has long been accepted in international law as no less
obligatory upon states than upon individuals in carrying out agreements - Bin Cheng,
quoted as citing sole arbitrator in the Metzger & CO. Case- in Public International
Law, Text Book, Holbom Law Tutors, 13th Edition, Edited by R. MacLean at p. 180
(herein after MacLean); According to Lauterpacht, the essence of the doctrine of
abuse of rights is the sacrifice of an important social or individual interest to a less
important though hitherto legally recognised individual right, cited in MacLean,
opcit at pi82; Dr. Kiss suggests three elements which are central to the doctrine - (i)
the use of a state power which interferes with another state use of a power, (ii) the
use of a power for a reason which was not one for which the power was conferred,
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(iii) the use of power in an unjustifiable or arbitrary manner, quoted in MacLean,
opcit at p. 182, also see. Baranson and Roark; Trends in North - South transfer of
hi eh technology, in International Technology Transfer. Concepts . Measures and
Comparisons at pp.33-34.
765. Para 2.1 (v) and (vi).
766. See Chapter VI of current work (Trade and Technology).
767. For a discussion of the concepts of international obligations vis-a-vis international
law, see -; also see Chapter V of this current work.
768. Para 2.2 (iii) TD/Code TOT 47.
769. Para. 2.2(iv) TD/Code TOT 47.
770. UNGAR 3201 (s-vi)[1974J; para.2.2(v),(vi),(vii).
771. See Chapter V of this current work.
772. It has been consistently stressed that nothing in the Code should be construed to
supersede applicable national law e.g. see UNCTAD/TT MISC.71. Generally, Codes
of conduct, by their very nature that is incorporation of general international legal
norms and standards, should not be mandatory or confer powers of implementation
on an international institution, but rather encourage the raising of the threshold of
the international legal content in national laws that is enhance harmonisation - See
Hans Baade, The Legal effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations,
In Legal Problems q[ Codes q[ Conduct for Multinational Enterprises. Edited. N.
Horn 1980, at p.5 - 7.
773. See Chapter V of this Current work.
774. Report of the Committee on the Transfer of Technology on its third session,
November. 1980, Supp. No.5, UNTD/B.O.R 22nd.. session paragraphs 50-52.
775. An UNCTAD expert (Carlos Correa) suggested that a nation which accepted the
Code would be bound, implicitly, to conform to the principles of the Code, at least
where the Code rule was express, rather than implied or unstated. However, it is
apparent that the Code, in its present form is largely ambiguous and the states party
to the negotiations would like to retain the ambiguity; See Draft International Code
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology TD/Code TOT/52, 1988 esp.at p 15.
776. Consultations on the Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology, UNCTAD TD/Code TOT/50,10 OCT. 1986 esp. Para 19 and
UNCTAD, TD/B/1030.
777. UNCTAD, Report of the intergovernmental group of experts on the RBP'S on its
third session TD/B/1030, especially 22&23. Group B suggested that the Group of
77 should supply the necessary information since most of the contracts were
performed on their territory and restrictive practices could be curtailed through
effective application of national restrictive practices legislation. The Group 77 called
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for the effective implementation of the set of multilaterally agreed principles on
restrictive practices since Group B did not show a will to implement the set.
778. See TD/Code TOT/47 and Appendix A.l and D for proposed additions.
779. See Major Issues arising from the transfer of technology to developing countries,
pp.10-12.
780. TD/Code TOT/47, Chapter 4 and Appendix A, 4.5 (4), (5), (7) and UNCTAD,
Major issues arising from the transfer of technology to developing countries
TD/B.A.C.I 1/10/REV. 1(1974).
781. Originally, the group of 77 submitted a draft which listed over 40 practices which
were regarded as restrictive, a list which has been subsequently "re-framed" to fit
into general categories -See for instance ,UNCTAD, TD/AC.1/4 annex 1 1975.
782. For instance, courts in the U.S.A have upheld the right of enterprises to take
measures otherwise regarded as restrictive, so long as they do not discourage active
competition or protect weak competitors, E.g in Berkev Photo V Eastman Kodak £q.
3 F. 2nd. 263 (2 Cir. 1979). Telecorp V International Business Machines Cog . 510
2nd 894 (10 Cir 1975).
783. E.g see - Fikentscher W, opcit. note 721, at p.65; G. E Weston, New Trends in the
US Anti trust law: The Patent- Anti Trust Interface as an Example, 15 II C 269
(see note 108), & TD/Code TOT/52,1988 at p.5.
784. Current Issues In International Business Law, edited by David. L. Perrot, Avebury,
1988.
785. Draft International Code TOT 52,1988 at p.4 also Zuizdwijk, JM UNCTAD Code
on the transfer of technology 24 Mcgill L. J 562 (1978). According to Fraser, RBPs
though condemned as potentially harmful, could be justified if:
(i) If they caused avoidance of risks to consumers;
(ii) To protect strategic industries or those threatened by foreign dumping;
(iii) Were necessarily incidental to a common price agreement operating in the
public interest;
(iv) They enabled a smaller concern to compete effectively against a larger concern
which is using RP's - See Monopoly, Competition and the Law by Tim Fraser at
p.121.
786. TD/Code TOT/47, Chap 4, Appendix A 4.5 (ii), Chap 3 para. 3.2. The recipient
may inter alia, be required to purchase capital goods and technical services along
with the desired technology; Transnational Corporations in World Development.
UNCTC esp.at pp.176-182.
787. See Law and Ih£ Multinational Enterprise by Detlev F. Vagts in The Political
Economy of Law, opcit, note 32, at pp.374 - 375.
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788. TD/Codc TOT/47, Paragraph, 3.2 & 3.6; 1.4 and Chap 4.
789. Sec - Transferring Hazardous 7'echnologies and Substances - The International lerU
Challenge, by Gunther Hand! and Robert E. Lutz, Graham and Trotham, Martinus
Nijhoff 1989; The Bhopal Disaster Case. Pashukanis explains this apparent
dilemma in legal-economics terms by stating that in a market place, only the
continual reshuffling of values creates the idea of a fixed bearer of such rights. In the
market place, the person imposing liabilities simultaneously becomes himself liable.
He changes roles instantaneously, from claimant to debtor (because of the continual
"reshuffling of values in the market) - See Tbe Pol fical Economy of Law - A Third
World Reader, opcit, note 32, at p.45.
790. Report of the second Adhoc Group of experts on the Restrictive Business Practice
UNCTAD/TD/B/C.2/AC/5/6 (1976) at Pp.18-19, suggested by experts from Group
B; Art. 46 of the Havana Charter, The Act was not ratified and did not come into
force.
791. Article 46, Havana Charter.
792. Article 46, (2) (c) of the Havana Charter.
793. The Havana charter Article 46 used the mandatory word shall in providing for a
duty to avoid RBFs. The same was used in Group 77 first proposal E.g see
UNCTAD TD/AC.1/4 (1975). The current proposals use the word "should"
TD/Code TOT /47, Appendix A.2.
794. An UNCTAD expert suggested the criteria for the outlawing of restrictive practices
as:
(i) Those practices which are unduly restrictive of competition;
(ii) Adversely affect international trade or the economic or technological
development of the countries affected by the restrictions;
Such criteria, while useful, create problems of interpretation for instance what is
meant by competition, reasonableness, adverse etc.
795. See Chapter V of this current work.
796. E.g Farouk Contractor - opcit. note 711, at pp.3-5 - states that Mexico saved up to
$250 Million by introducing strict control over royalty payments and preventing
undue restriction of exports. The sum was roughly equal to the cost of one years
imports; See Towards a theory cf Technology Licensing. Stanford Journal of
International Law vol. 25, No.l Fall 1988 at pp 195-229; However see Chapter V of
this work on the implications and effects of direct regulation statutes.
797. For a general review, see A. A. Faotouros Qn Jii£ Implementation q[ International
Codes of Conduct: An analysis of Future Experience, the American University Law
Review, Vol. 30, pp.950.
798. From the beginning of negotiations, Group D did not favour a binding Code, See
UNCTAD /TD /Code TOT/21 (part two).
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799. See Chapter V of this current work for discussion of the concept of Mixed
Jurisdiction.
800. Mr. Dc - Souza, participant representing France at the sixth session of the United
Nations conference on International Code of Conduct for the Transfer of
Technology; See also Kline , opcit. note 715, at pp.46.
801. The US representative at the Code discussions was of the opinion that:
"nothing contained in a voluntary Code was going to
become law anywhere any time soon in any place
meaningful. But the Code will be read, studied and
quoted in Arbitration. It could create an appropriate
climate"
- See US Department of Advisory Committee on International Investment,
Technology and Development, November 1980 at p.23; For a contrary view which is
in accordance with the dynamic and complex nature of legal evolution in this area,
see A. A Fatourous, who cites, among others, the example of producers associations
which were legalised by a UN GA Resolution that is under Article 5 of the Charter of
the Economic Rights and Duties of States, GAR.. 3281 UNGAOR, supp.. (no.3I) 52,
UN Doc.. A/9631 (1974); Solysinki Choice of Law and Choice of Forern in
Transnational Technology Transfer Transactions, Recueil Des Cours vol.196
(1986).
802. The rules or obligations in the Code would, like all general norms point to the
existence of duties and obligations not create them. Implementation under
framework treaty institutions avoids a static determination of obligations.
803- Key Concepts in International Investment Arrangements and their Relevancy to
Negotiations on International Transactions in Services, UNCTC Current Studies,
Series A, Number 13, United Nations, New York, 1990 at pp 55 - 56.
804. See Chapter 1 of this current work for a discussion of the soft and hard law debate.
805. Chapter 5, TD/Code TOT/47. Para 5.1; See also Article 53 of the Draft Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations - The New Code Environment, UNCTC
publication Series A, Number 16.
806. TD/Code TOT/47 Para 5.2(c).
807. Chapter 5, TD/Code TOT/47, Para 5.4(v).
808. TD/ Code TOT/47 Para. 5.3(iii) & 5.4(ii).
809. TD/ Code TOT/47 Para. 5.4(vii) & 5.3(c) (ii).
810. See chapter V of this current work; Consultations on an International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology UNCTAD TI /MISC.70 1987.
811. TD/ Code TOT/47 Para 5.3(a) (i) (ii).
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812. TD/ Code TOT/47, Para. 5.2(b) and 5.4(x).
813. Charier on Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) , Chap 1(b) art 18 and
19. Such preferential treatment is now part of many international arrangements for
instance the General System of Preferences GSP under part 4 of GATT, Multilateral
Technical Co-operation (See Chapters III and IV of current work), Generalised
System of Trade Preferences GSTP etc. Preferential Treatment has been referred to
as infant nations protection, a legal parallel to the economic infant industries
protection. See, H. Kramer, Changing Principles Governing International Trade 8
J.W.T.L 227 (1974).
814. See Chapter V of current work.
815. UN Doc. TD /B/C.6/AC.1/2/SUPP 1/ REV 1(1975) at p.41.
816. Patent World , Issue Ten , July 1988, Surveying the World Scene- an exercise it;
Harmony of the Patent laws: John P Sinnott; See Chapters II, V and VI of Current
work.
817. TD/Code TOT/47, Para.6.1 & 6.2 & especially Para. 6.1(i).
818. See Chapter 3 of current work.
819. TD/Code TOT/47, paragraphs 6.2 (i) - (vi) and para. 6.3 & 6.4.
820. TD/Code TOT/47, Appendix A Para 8.1 (a). For a definition of framework treaties
see, opcit, note 17, and accompanying text.
821. Established under GA,- Resolution 1995 (xix.) as amended by Annex A.iv.26 of the
final Act of the first session of UNCTAD, September 1973; The committee has
functions established under the rules of procedure, Board Rule 79.
822. TD/Code TOT/47, Para. 8.1 (c).
823. TD/Code TOT/47, Para.8.2 (1) (b).
824. TD/Code TOT/47, Para. 8.2 .1 (a).
825. Eg see Blainplain, The BADGER CASE and the OECI) Guide-lines for
multinational Enterprises at p. 126,
826. For support of the ordre public and ius cogens argument see for instance Bier,
Conflict of Laws Problems of Trade Mark Licensing Agreements 13 II C 162 (1982)
(see note 108), CQfiea. Transfer of Technology in Latin America: A Decade of
Control 15 J.W.T.L 388 (1981), and TD/Code TOT/47, Appendix A , Chapter 9 (1).
The UNCTAD Secretariat suggested that the Code provisions be generally
applicable in conformity with national legislation governing validity , performance
or interpretation of any transaction - an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of
Technology Report of the UNCTAD secretariat; UN Doc.
TD/B/C.6/A.C.l/2/Supp/REV.l (1975) PP.3; See Chapter V of this current work.
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827. Group B feared "supremacy of national laws" as tending to give free reign or
having a legitimating effect on even the most radical transfer of technology laws,
even if such laws eliminated freedom of contract, See for instance
UNCTAD/TT/MISC.70, 1987atp.8.
828. This has been said to be the legal system to which "reasonable" parties considering
the relevant factors, would have resorted- Cheshire and North - Private International
Law at p.207. However, in practice, factors such bargaining power, access to
information do affect "reasonableness" and actual determination of entitlements.
829. Appendix F, Chap 9, text prepared by the interim committee Section 9(1).
830. See Chapter 5 of this current work.
831. See early suggestions by the G77, Appendix D, Section I B, Paragraph 4, UN Doc.
TD/ Code TOTADD.1(1978); ART.(V) UN Convention on the Recognition and
reciprocal enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
FOOT NOTES FOR CONCLUSION
832. These include political or economic commitments to safeguard employment or
income levels even in internationally non competitive industries or sectors - See inter
alia, Human Development Report 1992, Published for the UNDP (UN Plaza, New
York) by Oxford University Press.
833. See Chapter I of this work for discussion of the hard - soft law dichotomy and
rhetoric.
834. Title Xv ; Research and Technological Development, Articles 130f - 130p, EEC
Treaty (Maastricht Version), [1992], 1 C.M.L.R 573.
835. The term 'normalcy' is applied by Tarullo to describe the situation of 'sameness'
towards which all countries develop, with underdevelopment being regarded as an
aberration from the 'norm' of an industrialised free market economy. While
disagreeing with his definition of the ideal norm, the principle we refer to the
principle to illustrate that the condition of underdevelopment is a permanent
condition encompassing different States at different times, See The Organising
Principle of Normalcy, in Law and Development. International Library of Legal
Essays, pp. 477 - 483.
836. For discussion of North - South Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, see
Chapter 4 of present work.
837. See US Military and Para Military Act vities Case. ICJ Reports 1986, 97,
paragraphs 183 - 215; also General Assembly on the Issue of the Admission of a
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State to Membership in The United Nations Advisory Opinion of The ICJ Reports
1948.
838. See Annex XXXIX of Lome IV Convention, which allows the EEC to apply a third -
country preferential treatment to ACP products which, if offered MFN treatment
would cause imbalance or discriminatory effects on the Community market.
839. See Article 356 of Lome IV Convention.
840. The Calvo Doctrine has two main elements that is a sovereign state is entitled to non
intervention by other states in the exercise of its sovereign rights and that aliens are
entitled to the same treatment as nationals - See Carlos, Le Droit Internationale et
Pratique (1986) and Chapter V of this current work.
841. Hull's letter, reprinted in Hackworth 3 Digest of International Law (1942); Anglo -
Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom V Iran) ICJ Pleadings (1951; Chorzow
Factory Case [1927] P.C.I.J Series A, No.13.
842. Generally, See - The Law Making Functions of The Specialised Agencies if The
United Nations, opcit.
843. For discussion of the position of the least developed countries and special multilateral
measures that are a pre -condition for the successful absorption of imported
technology by these countries, See Chapter 3 and 4 of this Work.
844. Throughout this Work, we have illustrated the systematic character in which
organised international society operates in communicating and disseminating
information on legal developments and practice. Consequently, it is now possible for
all States to follow the logical development of norms and participate dynamically in
their concretisation, if necessary, into the form a treaty or convention, without great
lapses in time.
845. Balance of Commitments is also increasingly, especially in the GATT framework, also
referred to, rather ambiguously, as overall reciprocity However, due to the lack of any
precise definition of the term reciprocity and its historical associations, we avoid use
of the term. The obscure meaning of the term reciprocity, see Chapter II above and
E. Dell , Of Free Trade and Reciprocity, The World Economy (1986), p. 125; and for
a discussion of "overall reciprocity" in the GATT, See D. Dicke, Non - Reciprocal
Treatment, in Foreign Trade in The Present and New International Economic Order
- Fribourg University Press, 1988, pp.110.
87
Table A - Years 1987 and 1981 - 1987
Nigeria
Nature end frequency of unacceptable term* in agreement* submitted for registration
Contractual term* Number ofAgreements
Containing Contractual term*
Percentage
Mo Provision for Training
256 40
Excessively Long Duration 320 50
Transferee oblidged to pay
transferor's tax 128 20
Mo provisions for guarantees 268 42
Missing provision* 64 10
Nature and Frequency of Restrictive Clauses in the Agreement*
Submitted for Registration since Inception





Tie - in Clauses 32 5
Lade of Research and Development 64 10
F oreign Juris diction 256 40
PriceRestriction 6 1
ExcessiveControl ofTransferee's
Operations - 12 2
Restriction on Production Volume 25 4
Non - Reciprocal Transmission
of Improvements, Patents - 25 4
Obligation to use Designated
Personnel 12 2
Administrative Interference 12 2
The *ame agreement may contain mere than one restrictive clause.
TABLE C
Conflict of Interest in Internationa! Technology Transfer Transactioas.
Interest of Technology Owner or Supplier (Autonomy)
Access to Sales in Local Market
Transfer of Profits
Control Over Technology
Supply of (sourcing) spares, parts
Greater Use of Intangible Assets
Control Over Research and Development
Protection for Industrial or Intellectual Property
Control Over Performance
Increase in Turn over
Saving in Labour Costs
Saving In Research and Development Costs Abroad
Extended Duration of Contractual Obligations
Limitation of Competition
Limitation of Exports
Limitation of Third Sources Technology
Limitation of Guarantees ofWarranties
Retention of Rights to Improvements
Interest of Host Country or Recipient (Balanced
Commitments or Overall Reciprocity
Retention of Profits
Equal Rights of Control Over Joint Venture
Free to 'Source' Technology from third parties
Greater Equity, Especially Acces to Industrial Proper
Research and Development in Host State
Protection Against Abuse of Dominant Position
Technological Capacity (Aquisition of)
Start of New Production
Payment according to National LeveLs
Increased Use of Local Raw MateriaLs
Shortest Possible Duration of Contractual Obligations
Non Abuse of Dominant Position by Supplier
No General Restrictions
Access to Improvements
Receipt of Payments for Improvements
SOURCE:
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Joint Ventures as a Channel for the Transfer of
Technology, Moscow 1988, UNCTAD/TTIV1 EC/9, United Nations, New York, 1990.
Teble 1

























Pro duct Technolo gy
1. Product specification
2. Product design




































* end pro ducts
>logy Definition:
cck of knowledge which permits the introduction of new or improved machinery and equipment, pro i
■ses and services. In a wider sense, it includes additional elements, such as management and marl
■e: Transnational Corporations in World Development, UNCTC, Trends and Prospects, United Nati
New York, ST/CTC/89, 1988, p. 178)
IA6Lt b
Petent Applications end Grants During 1 979:
ntry Patent Granted Residents Patent Applications Residents Inhabitants pi
Total Total Applications
tine 3,375 1244 4,462 1,314 20,786
IBS 37 1 37 1 n.a
edesh 103 20 131 31 2,282,000
■6 127 20 134 15 361,866
1,583 175 8,602 1,958 59,51 9
tie 844 36 420 45 580,488
■$ice 20 6 107 30 72,066
■3 52 2 52 2 n.e
r 1 10 7 170 23 348,739
376 6 784 61 637,160
'ador 67 6 143 16 275,625
ong 893 26 648 17 292,056
2,182 594 2,910 1,053 626,391
■si 8 477 12 1 1,905,833
slemic Republic) 1,061 1 1 820 83 445,433
82 9 220 37 341,378
:e 63 2 73 6 359,833
■(Republic of) 1,419 258 4,722 1,034 36,570
i 37 37 2 2,908,500
12 2 19 2 n.a
2,026 236 4,485 692 94,666
:o 372 31 391 29 763,724
571 26 284 6 n.a
in 446 8 404 30 2,656,833
nes 857 82 1,471 144 324,636
ke 227 53 274,377
nd 22 7 6,496,428
4 242 3 261 26 238,230
1 458 34 558 73 605,986
y 108 15 213 43 67,534
■el a 660 39 2115 192 75,276
96 1 1 98 1 1 2,500,818
53 95 1 5,580,000
ive 183 12 256 55 129,927
24,616 6,846 32,174 1 1,303 4,722
sy (Federal
Republic) 22,534 10,895 55,184 30,879 1,980
44,104 34,863 174,569 150,623 768
lend 6,614 1,638 1 1,540 4,441 1,454
■Kingdom 20,800 4,182 44,666 19,468 2,873
■States 48,853 30,605 100,494 60,535 3,694
Sources - Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) ; World Intellectual Property Organisation (
Column (5) Population figure: in World Bank Ateles vere divided by fi
in (4)
OAPI * 1 2 Member States of the African ! ntellectual Property Organisation i .e Beni
United Republic of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
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